secrets-mcp
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Alternatives to secrets-mcp
No user-submitted related servers found.
Related Servers
- AlicenseBqualityBmaintenanceEnables AI agents to use vault-stored credentials without ever exposing plaintext secrets to model context, transcripts, or telemetry. It decrypts AES-256-GCM envelopes locally via WebCrypto, resolves opaque secret handles into subprocess environments and outbound HTTP requests, issues auto-zeroizing time-bounded leases, and scrubs echoed credentials from output.19MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEnables AI agents to securely use API keys by storing them in an encrypted vault and injecting them on demand with user approval, without exposing the key values to the model.1MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEnables AI coding agents to securely inject API keys and secrets into environment files, configs, or commands without the agent ever seeing the secret values.1 npmMIT
- AlicenseAqualityBmaintenanceEnables AI agents to make authenticated API calls and run commands with secrets injected, while keeping credentials completely hidden from the model, with policy enforcement, grants, and audit logging.6MIT

agentkeys-mcpofficial
AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceEnables AI agents to securely manage API credentials and make proxied API calls through AgentKeys, keeping secrets hidden from the agent.6 npmMIT- AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceAgent Vault is a local credential vault for AI agents. It enables agents to use secrets by name without ever seeing their values, with host allowlists, output scrubbing, and audit logging.4MIT
TDQS
Scored across 5 tools
Each tool has a clearly distinct purpose: store, list, use, delete, or inspect metadata. There is no overlap between staging, listing, requesting, revoking, and vault info.
Most tools follow a verb_noun pattern (stage_secret, list_secrets, revoke_secret), but request_with_secret includes an extra preposition and vault_info is noun-only. The deviations are minor and readability remains high.
Five tools is well-scoped for a secrets vault: create, list, use, delete, and inspect. Each tool earns its place without redundancy.
The surface covers the core lifecycle: stage, list, use in requests, revoke, and vault info. A minor gap is the lack of an explicit update or rotate operation, though stage_secret may overwrite handles implicitly.