1Password MCP Server
Manage 1Password vaults and credentials from any MCP client — discovering, creating, editing, rotating, and using secrets without dumping plaintext into the model transcript.
Discover vaults and items via
vault_list,item_lookup, anditem_list(metadata only, never secrets).Read safely with
item_getandpassword_read— concealed values, SSH keys, OTP seeds, and card numbers stay hidden unless you opt in withreveal: true.Validate references with
op_check_ref, returning only non-secret vault/item/field metadata.Create credentials — logins/passwords (
password_create) and Secure Notes with custom fields (note_create).Edit and rotate — update titles, notes, tags, URLs, and fields (
item_edit); rotate concealed fields (password_update); generate random or memorable passwords.Use secrets without revealing them —
op_runinjectsop://references into a local command's environment and redacts resolved values from returned output.Archive or permanently delete items with
item_archiveanditem_delete.Follow guided workflows — four prompts: password generation, credential rotation, vault audit, and secret-reference building.
Browse resources over
onepassword://URIs: server config, vault catalog, and per-vault item metadata.Restrict scope server-wide to an allow-list of vaults via
OP_MCP_ALLOWED_VAULTS, alongside tightly scoped service-account access.
Connects AI clients to 1Password vaults for secure credential management, enabling tools to list vaults, search, create, read, update, delete items, and generate passwords, with prompts for password generation, credential rotation, and vault auditing.
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@1Password MCP Serverlist my vaults"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
1Password MCP Server
Give your AI assistant a locked door to 1Password — not a pile of passwords in the chat.
@takescake/1password-mcp is a community Model Context Protocol (MCP) server. It lets Claude, Cursor, VS Code Copilot, OpenAI Codex, Gemini, and other MCP clients manage vaults and credentials through a 1Password Service Account.
Built on the MCP TypeScript SDK v2 with protocol negotiation for 2026-07-28 (and legacy clients). Secrets stay in 1Password; agents prefer op:// references and op_run so plaintext never has to land in the model transcript.
Not an official 1Password product. Community-built, Apache 2.0 licensed.
Who this is for
You are… | You get… |
Not deeply technical | A one-time setup: create a service account, paste the token into your AI app’s MCP settings, then ask in plain English (“list my automation vault”, “rotate the staging DB password”). |
An agent / LLM | Fifteen typed tools, four workflow prompts, three browsable resources, and clear rules: prefer |
A developer / SRE | Full item CRUD, secure notes, password generation, vault allow-lists, Keychain token loading on macOS, and CI-friendly env config. |
Related MCP server: mcp-1password
Why teams pick this server
Security-first defaults —
password_readreturns metadata, anditem_gethides secret-bearing fields (passwords, SSH keys, OTP seeds, card numbers), unless you opt in withreveal: true.op_run(the MCP equivalent ofop run) — injectop://vault/item/fieldinto a local command’s environment; resolved secrets are redacted from the returned stdout/stderr on a best-effort basis (including common encodings).Full vault toolkit — list, search, get, edit, create logins & notes, rotate passwords, archive, or delete.
Guided prompts — password generation, credential rotation, vault audit, and secret-reference helpers.
Browsable resources — vault and item catalogs over
onepassword://…URIs (no secrets in resource payloads).Modern MCP — stdio transport, Zod 4 schemas, MCP 2026-07-28 negotiation with legacy client compatibility.
What you get
Tools (15)
Grouped the way agents and humans actually use them.
Discover
Tool | What it does |
| List vaults the service account can access (id, name, description, type), limited to the allow-list if one is set. |
| Search a vault by title substring; optional |
| List every item in a vault (id, title, category, tags, |
Read (safe by default)
Tool | What it does |
| Full item: title, category, tags, notes, fields. Secret-bearing values (passwords and other concealed fields, SSH private keys, OTP seeds, card numbers) stay hidden unless |
| Read one field (default |
| Validate |
Create & update
Tool | What it does |
| Create a Login or Password item (username, URL, tags, notes). |
| Create a Secure Note with optional tags and custom fields. |
| Rotate a password / concealed field (creates the field if missing). |
| Update title, notes (empty string clears), tags, URL; upsert or remove fields. Unreferenced fields stay untouched. |
| Cryptographically secure random password (length 8–128; symbols/numbers/uppercase toggles). |
| Memorable passphrase from a ~500-word list (word count, separator, number/symbol suffixes). |
Use secrets without revealing them
Tool | What it does |
| Run a local command ( |
Soft-delete & destroy
Tool | What it does |
| Move an item to the archive (hidden from normal views). |
| Permanently delete an item — cannot be undone. |
Prompts (4)
Prompt | When to use it |
| Generate (random or memorable) and optionally store — without dumping the password into chat. |
| Find → verify access → generate → update → confirm |
| Inventory a vault by category; flag duplicates / oddities — never reveal secrets. |
| Build a paste-ready |
Resources (3)
URI | Contents |
| Non-secret server config (name, version, log level, token source, Node version). |
| JSON list of accessible vaults (limited to the allow-list if one is set). |
| URI template (listed by |
Upgrading from 4.x: resource URIs used to start with
1password://, which MCP clients could never read (a URI scheme can't start with a digit). Replace any hard-coded1password://URIs withonepassword://.
Before you start
You need two things:
Node.js 20 or newer
A 1Password Service Account with access to the vault(s) you want the AI to use
Create a service account (plain English)
Sign in to your 1Password account on the web.
Open Developer → Service Accounts (or follow 1Password’s guide).
Create a service account and grant it only the vaults you want automation to touch (for example an
AutomationorCIvault — not your personal banking vault).Copy the token once. Treat it like a master key.
Quick start
Claude Desktop / Cursor / VS Code / most IDEs
Add this to your MCP config (exact file depends on the app):
{
"mcpServers": {
"1password": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@takescake/1password-mcp"],
"env": {
"OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN": "YOUR_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN"
}
}
}
}Restart the app, then try: “List my 1Password vaults.”
macOS Keychain (no token in the config file)
Store the token in Keychain, then point the server at it:
{
"mcpServers": {
"1password": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@takescake/1password-mcp"],
"env": {
"OP_KEYCHAIN_SERVICE": "op-service-account-claude-automation",
"OP_KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT": "your-macos-username"
}
}
}
}Token resolution order: CLI (--service-account-token / --token) → OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN → macOS Keychain. OP_KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT is optional when the service name alone is unique. Avoid the CLI flags: command-line arguments are visible to other local processes, and the server logs a warning at startup if you use them.
OpenAI Codex (TOML)
Option A — token in config:
[mcp_servers."1password"]
command = "npx"
args = ["-y", "@takescake/1password-mcp"]
[mcp_servers."1password".env]
OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN = "YOUR_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN"Option B (recommended) — config only names the env var:
[mcp_servers."1password"]
command = "npx"
args = ["-y", "@takescake/1password-mcp"]
env_vars = ["OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN"]Set OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN in your shell or CI. Note: codex mcp add ... --env OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN=... writes the secret into Codex config; prefer env_vars when you can.
On macOS you can omit the token env and use OP_KEYCHAIN_SERVICE (+ optional OP_KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT) instead.
Optional: restrict the server to certain vaults
By default the server can use any vault the service account can see. To allow-list vaults:
{
"env": {
"OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN": "YOUR_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN",
"OP_MCP_ALLOWED_VAULTS": "Automation, CI"
}
}Names or IDs work (case-insensitive). Same setting via --allowed-vaults. The allow-list applies server-wide, to every tool and resource that touches a vault, not only op_run / op_check_ref:
vault_listandonepassword://vaultsshow only allowed vaults.Tools that take a
vaultId, and theonepassword://vaults/{vaultId}/itemsresource, must be given the vault’s ID (not its name); vaults outside the list are rejected.op://references are checked both as written and by the vault they actually resolve to.When an allow-list is set, each guarded call makes one extra
vaults.listread (mind service-account rate limits), and the server fails closed if vaults can’t be listed.
Upgrading from 4.0.3 or earlier? If you set this expecting it to affect only
op_run/op_check_ref, it now restricts everything.
This is defense in depth: scope the service account’s own vault access in 1Password first.
For agents: how to handle secrets
Follow this order every time:
Discover with
vault_list→item_lookup/item_list(metadata only).Confirm a reference with
op_check_ref— neverrevealjust to see if a path exists.Use a secret in a command or API call with
op_runandop://vault/item/fieldinenv.Reveal with
password_read/item_get+reveal: trueonly when the human explicitly needs the value in chat.Rotate with
password_generate→password_update(keepreturnSecret: falseunless asked).Prefer
item_archiveoveritem_deleteunless permanent removal is required.
op_run sketch
{
"argv": ["curl", "-sS", "https://api.example.com/health"],
"env": {
"API_TOKEN": "op://Automation/Example API/credential"
},
"timeout_ms": 60000
}Prefer argv over a shell command string when you can — fewer quoting surprises.
Configuration reference
Environment variables
Variable | Required | Description |
| Usually yes | Service account token. Not required on macOS if Keychain vars are set. |
| No | macOS: Keychain service name for the token. |
| No | macOS: optional account to narrow the Keychain lookup. |
| No | Comma-separated vault names/IDs (case-insensitive) the server may use, enforced server-wide. Empty = unrestricted. |
| No | Name reported to the 1Password SDK (default: |
| No | Version reported to the SDK (default: package version). |
| No |
|
| No | If set, forces debug logging. |
CLI flags
--service-account-token <token> 1Password service account token (avoid: visible to other local processes)
--token <token> Alias for --service-account-token
--log-level <level> error | warn | info | debug (default: info)
--integration-name <name> Custom integration name for the 1Password SDK
--integration-version <version> Custom integration version
--allowed-vaults <list> Comma-separated vault allow-list (names or IDs), applied server-wideSecurity & privacy
Read this before pointing the server at a vault you care about.
LLM privacy — Anything revealed to the model may be sent to your AI provider and retained under their policies.
MCP is not end-to-end encrypted for secrets in flight — Values are plaintext inside the MCP workflow and toward the model. They are encrypted at rest in 1Password once stored.
Best fit — Automation credentials: CI tokens, bot accounts, disposable env secrets.
Avoid — Banking, primary personal logins, recovery codes, or anything you cannot afford to expose to a model provider.
Token = master key — Scope the service account tightly; rotate immediately if leaked; never commit tokens or MCP configs with secrets.
Prefer the env var or Keychain for the token —
--token/--service-account-tokenputs it in the process arguments, which other local processes can read (the server warns at startup). A same-user process can generally read the server’s environment too (for example/proc/<pid>/environon Linux), so on macOS Keychain is the strongest option: it keeps the token out of config files and the process environment.Prefer references —
op://…+op_runbeat pasting passwords into prompts or files.op_runruns arbitrary commands as your user — Keep your MCP client’s approval prompts on for it; don’t auto-approve it.Redaction is best effort —
op_runmasks resolved secrets in returned output, including common encodings (base64, JSON- and URL-encoded forms, multi-line values). That protects against accidental disclosure. It is not a sandbox: a command can deliberately transform or transmit a secret it was given.Notes are not concealed —
item_getreturns notes as-is (likeop item get). Don’t keep secrets in the notes of vaults an agent can read.Least privilege — Dedicated automation vaults beat sharing your whole account.
OP_MCP_ALLOWED_VAULTSis a second fence, not a substitute.Reporting vulnerabilities — Open a public issue; see SECURITY.md.
Protocol & compatibility
Piece | Detail |
Package |
|
Runtime | Node.js ≥ 20 |
Transport | stdio |
MCP SDK |
|
Protocol | Negotiates 2026-07-28; keeps legacy client compatibility |
Registry name |
|
Development
git clone https://github.com/CakeRepository/1Password-MCP.git
cd 1Password-MCP
npm ci
npm run build
npm test
npm run lintWatch mode: npm run dev.
Project layout
src/
index.ts # Entrypoint — MCP stdio + protocol negotiation
server.ts # buildServer() — registers tools, prompts, resources
config.ts # CLI / env / Keychain / allow-list
client.ts # 1Password SDK client
logger.ts # Structured logs on stderr (stdout is protocol)
secret-ref.ts # op:// parsing & reference checks
vault-access.ts # Server-wide vault allow-list enforcement
redaction.ts # op_run output redaction
utils.ts # Result helpers, password generation
tools/ # All 15 MCP tools
prompts/ # Interactive workflow prompts
resources/ # onepassword:// resources
tests/See CONTRIBUTING.md. Maintainers / agents: agents.md.
Changelog
See CHANGELOG.md for version history, including the 5.0.0 release (resource URIs moved from 1password:// to onepassword://, plus security hardening; read its Changed notes before upgrading), the 4.0.0 MCP v2 / 2026-07-28 migration, and the 3.0.0 op_run / reveal-opt-in security changes.
License
Available Tools
15 toolsitem_archiveA
Archive an item in a 1Password vault. The item is moved to the archive and hidden from regular views, rather than being permanently deleted.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| itemId | Yes | Item ID to archive. | |
| vaultId | Yes | Vault ID containing the item. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It discloses that the item is 'moved to the archive and hidden from regular views,' and clarifies the non-destructive nature by contrasting with permanent deletion. This is meaningful behavioral context beyond a simple verb, though it could mention reversibility or permissions.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, front-loaded with the primary action, and every word earns its place. The distinction from deletion is packed efficiently into the second sentence without redundancy.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool is simple with two well-documented required parameters and no output schema. The description covers the core behavior and its non-destructive nature, making it contextually complete for typical use. A minor gap is lack of mention of how archived items are accessed or restored, but that is not essential.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, with both 'vaultId' and 'itemId' already documented. The description adds no additional parameter context, so it does not exceed the baseline of 3.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the action ('Archive') and the resource ('an item in a 1Password vault'), and distinguishes the tool from sibling item_delete by explicitly noting it is 'rather than being permanently deleted.' This is a specific, differentiating purpose statement.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies usage context by contrasting archiving with permanent deletion, helping the agent choose between item_archive and item_delete. It does not explicitly name sibling tools or provide when-not-to-use guidance, but the 'rather than being permanently deleted' phrase gives clear contextual direction.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
item_deleteA
Permanently delete an item from a 1Password vault. This action cannot be undone.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| itemId | Yes | Item ID to delete. | |
| vaultId | Yes | Vault ID containing the item. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It explicitly warns that deletion is permanent and irreversible, which is the most critical behavior for a delete tool. It does not cover permissions or return values, but the core risk is clearly communicated.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two concise sentences with no filler. 'Permanently delete an item from a 1Password vault' is front-loaded and immediately actionable, followed by the critical warning. Every word earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool is simple (two required string parameters) and the description fully conveys the action and its permanence. It does not mention return values, but for a delete operation this is less critical. Given no output schema and no annotations, the description sufficiently covers the context, though it could add 'on success' or error behavior.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema already provides full descriptions for both parameters (itemId and vaultId), and schema coverage is 100%. The tool description adds no parameter-specific meaning beyond what the schema provides, so the baseline of 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb and resource: 'permanently delete an item from a 1Password vault'. It clearly distinguishes from siblings like item_archive by emphasizing permanence, and from item_edit by focusing on deletion.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description makes it clear that this tool is for irreversible removal ('This action cannot be undone'), which implies when to use it. However, it does not explicitly mention alternatives (e.g., item_archive for reversible deletion) or when not to use it. The context is clear but lacks explicit exclusions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
item_editA
Edit an existing 1Password item. Update the title, notes (pass an empty string to clear notes), tags, website URL, upsert fields, or remove fields. Only referenced fields are changed; all others are preserved.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | No | Replacement primary website URL for the item. | |
| tags | No | Replacement set of tags (replaces all existing tags). | |
| notes | No | Full replacement of the item's notes. Pass an empty string to clear notes. | |
| title | No | New item title. | |
| fields | No | Fields to upsert (create or update) by id or title. | |
| itemId | Yes | Item ID to edit. | |
| vaultId | Yes | Vault ID containing the item. | |
| removeFields | No | Field ids or titles to remove from the item. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden. It discloses the critical partial-update behavior ('Only referenced fields are changed; all others are preserved') and the destructive edge case for clearing notes. This goes well beyond a simple 'update' statement, though it omits potential error conditions.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, essentially zero waste. The main action is front-loaded, followed by specific details (empty string clears notes, only referenced fields change). Highly efficient and scannable.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a moderate-complexity edit tool, the description covers all update operations and key behavior. With complete parameter schemas, it need not repeat return details. Minor omissions like item-not-found error handling are not significant enough to lower further.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds important cross-cutting semantics beyond individual parameter docs: the overall partial-update contract and the upsert/remove behavior for fields. This enriches understanding of how parameters interact.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb+resource ('Edit an existing 1Password item') and lists all supported update operations (title, notes, tags, URL, fields, remove fields). This clearly distinguishes it from sibling tools like item_delete or item_archive by focusing on modification.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies usage for editing existing items but does not explicitly state when to prefer this over alternatives. It gives no direct comparison to password_update or item_delete, though the edit-focused verbs make context clear. This is acceptable but not explicit.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
item_getA
Retrieve a full 1Password item — title, category, tags, notes, and all fields (id, title, type, section). Secret-bearing field values (passwords and other concealed fields, SSH private keys, one-time-password seeds, card numbers) are hidden unless reveal is true; only known non-secret types (text, URL, email, phone, date, menu, card type, address, reference) are shown by default. Accepts a secret reference (op://vault/item/field) or vault ID + item ID. Revealing a secret puts it in the model context/transcript — to USE a secret in a command or API call, prefer op_run with op:// references instead.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| itemId | No | Item ID to retrieve (required if secretReference is not provided). | |
| reveal | No | If true, include secret-bearing field values (passwords, SSH private keys, one-time-password seeds, card numbers) in plaintext — this puts the secret in the model context/transcript. Defaults to false; prefer op_run to use a secret without revealing it. | |
| vaultId | No | Vault ID containing the item (required if secretReference is not provided). | |
| secretReference | No | Secret reference in op://vault/item/field format. If provided, vaultId and itemId are ignored. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations present, the description carries the full burden and does so well: it discloses that secret-bearing values (passwords, SSH keys, OTP seeds, card numbers) are hidden by default, lists the non-secret types that are shown, and warns that revealing places the secret in the model context/transcript. It omits auth/permission requirements and any rate-limit behavior, which keeps it short of a 5.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Content is front-loaded — what is retrieved first, then the reveal semantics, then the op_run alternative. It is dense but every sentence earns its place; the only mild cost is that the second sentence packs several lists into one long clause.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a read tool with no output schema and no annotations, the description covers the key things an agent needs: what is returned, what is redacted by default, how to select the item, and the safer alternative for using secrets. Remaining gaps (auth prerequisites, error modes) are minor given there is no output schema to lean on.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Although schema description coverage is 100% (baseline 3), the description adds real meaning beyond the schema: the op://vault/item/field reference format, the precedence rule that secretReference causes vaultId/itemId to be ignored, and the hidden-vs-visible type taxonomy tied to reveal. That extra semantic layer justifies a bump above baseline.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb ('Retrieve') and resource ('a full 1Password item') and enumerates the returned surface (title, category, tags, notes, all fields), which implicitly separates it from lighter siblings like item_lookup or item_list. An agent can tell what shape of result it gets without opening the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives clear routing guidance for the secret-handling case: 'to USE a secret in a command or API call, prefer op_run with op:// references instead,' which is an explicit alternative and a when-not for reveal=true. It does not, however, clarify when to choose item_get over item_lookup or item_list, so the coverage is strong but not exhaustive.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
item_listA
List all items in a 1Password vault, returning id, title, category, tags, and updatedAt for each. Never returns secret values.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| vaultId | Yes | Vault ID to list items from. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the burden. It adds a meaningful behavioral guarantee with 'Never returns secret values' and specifies the return fields, providing useful transparency for a read-only operation. It does not mention permissions or pagination, but these are less critical for a simple listing tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two concise sentences with no filler. Each sentence earns its place: the first covers scope and return fields, the second adds a critical safety guarantee.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple listing tool, the description adequately covers purpose, return shape, and a safety constraint. It lacks explicit usage alternatives and a clear read-only label, but the core information needed for correct invocation is present.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100% for vaultId, so the baseline of 3 applies. The description does not add any parameter-specific meaning beyond the schema; it only repeats the concept of a vault without clarifying ID format or source.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool lists all items in a 1Password vault and enumerates the returned fields (id, title, category, tags, updatedAt). This distinguishes it from sibling tools like item_lookup or item_get, which focus on individual items.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The phrase 'List all items' implies a bulk retrieval use case, but there is no explicit guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives such as item_lookup or item_get. No exclusions or alternative references are provided.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
item_lookupA
Search for items within a 1Password vault by title substring. Returns item IDs, titles, categories, and vault IDs.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | Maximum number of items to return (default: all). | |
| query | No | Optional substring to filter item titles (case-insensitive). | |
| vaultId | Yes | Vault ID to search within. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Without annotations, the description carries the full burden. It discloses the return fields (IDs, titles, categories, vault IDs) and the substring matching behavior, which is useful. However, it does not explicitly state that it is a read-only operation, nor does it mention any pagination or default behavior when query is omitted—though the schema covers limit.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two concise sentences, front-loaded with the primary action and resource. There is no redundant or filler content; every word contributes to understanding the tool's purpose and output.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple search tool with fully documented parameters and no schema, the description provides key information: purpose, matching method, and returned fields. However, it does not explain behavior when query is omitted (which the schema implies returns all items) or any result ordering, leaving a small gap in completeness.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds minimal semantic value beyond the schema: it reinforces that the query is a title substring filter and that the search is vault-scoped, but these are already in the schema descriptions.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific action ('Search for items') with a precise resource ('1Password vault') and method ('by title substring'). It clearly distinguishes from siblings like item_list (which likely lists all items) and item_get (single item retrieval) by specifying substring search.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies usage for finding items by title substring but does not explicitly state when to prefer this over item_list or other alternatives, nor does it give exclusions. It gives minimal context but lacks explicit 'use when' or 'instead of' guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
note_createA
Create a Secure Note item in a 1Password vault, with optional tags and custom fields.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| tags | No | Optional tags for organization. | |
| notes | Yes | Note body text. Pass an empty string for an empty note. | |
| title | Yes | Note title. | |
| fields | No | Optional custom fields to attach to the note. | |
| vaultId | Yes | Vault ID to create the note in. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description must carry the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It identifies the action as 'create' but does not mention authentication requirements, whether existing items are affected, or what happens on success or failure.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is one short sentence that immediately states the primary action and includes relevant optional features. It avoids unnecessary words and is well structured.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool is a create operation with no output schema and no annotations, yet the description does not explain return values or error scenarios. However, the schema thoroughly covers parameters, so the description is moderately complete but not fully self-sufficient.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema provides full descriptions for all 5 parameters, including notes, tags, fields, title, and vaultId. The description adds only a brief mention of optional tags and custom fields, which adds no new semantics beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool creates a Secure Note item in a 1Password vault, using a specific verb and resource, and mentions optional tags and custom fields. It distinguishes itself from sibling password_create by focusing on notes.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description does not explicitly state when to prefer this tool over alternatives like password_create, nor does it mention exclusions. The tool name and note-specific context imply its intended use, but no explicit guidance is provided.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
op_check_refA
Validate an op://vault/item/field secret reference and return only non-secret metadata (vault name, item title, field label, field type) confirming it resolves — the field VALUE is never returned. Use this to check a reference is correct before using it with op_run; do not use password_read/item_get with reveal just to check a reference exists.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| secretReference | Yes | Secret reference to validate, in op://vault/item/field format. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description fully carries the safety disclosure. It explicitly states that the field VALUE is never returned and lists the non-secret metadata returned (vault name, item title, field label, field type), which is essential for trust and safe use.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences, front-loaded with the action and safety guarantee, and contains no fluff. Every phrase adds value, making it both concise and effective.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a single-parameter validation tool with no output schema, the description covers all necessary context: the input format, the validation purpose, the non-sensitive return data, and the usage scenario. It is fully self-sufficient even without annotations.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema description already fully documents the parameter ('Secret reference to validate, in op://vault/item/field format.'), covering 100% of the parameter's meaning. The description adds no extra parameter semantics, so the baseline score of 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's purpose with the verb 'validate' and the resource 'op://vault/item/field secret reference'. It also distinguishes itself from sibling tools like password_read and item_get by explicitly saying not to use those for the same purpose.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It explicitly directs when to use the tool ('Use this to check a reference is correct before using it with op_run') and when not to ('do not use password_read/item_get with reveal just to check a reference exists'). This is excellent, unambiguous guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
op_runA
Run a local shell command with 1Password secrets injected as environment variables. Resolved values go only into the child process environment, are never logged by the server, and are redacted from stdout/stderr on a best-effort basis (including common encodings such as JSON, URL and base64) — a command that deliberately transforms or transmits a secret can still expose it. This is the preferred way to USE a secret in a command, API call, or script: prefer op_run with op://vault/item/field references in env over reading a secret with password_read/item_get and pasting it into a command yourself, which would put the plaintext in the model context and transcript.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| cwd | No | Working directory to run the command in, e.g. a repo checkout path. | |
| env | No | Map of ENV_VAR_NAME -> value. A value matching op://vault/item/field is resolved via 1Password and injected as plaintext into the child process env only; any other value is passed through unchanged as a literal. | |
| argv | No | Argument vector [executable, ...args] to execute directly without a shell (safer against quoting/injection issues). Provide either `command` or `argv`, not both. | |
| shell | No | Optional shell executable to use with `command` (e.g. 'powershell.exe', 'C:/Program Files/Git/bin/bash.exe', '/bin/bash'). Defaults to the platform shell (cmd.exe on Windows, /bin/sh elsewhere). Ignored when `argv` is used. | |
| stdin | No | Optional text to write to the process's stdin. | |
| command | No | Shell command line to execute (run via the platform shell). Provide either `command` or `argv`, not both. | |
| timeout_ms | No | Kill the process and everything it started if it runs longer than this many milliseconds. Default 120000 (2 minutes). |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so well: it specifies that resolved values live only in the child process environment, are never logged by the server, and are redacted from stdout/stderr on a best-effort basis across JSON/URL/base64 encodings — and candidly admits the limit that a command which transforms or transmits a secret can still leak it. It stops short of characterizing the side-effect/risk profile of executing arbitrary shell commands (filesystem, network, privilege), which matters for a tool with no annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the action and its differentiator, then the security caveat, then the routing preference — no sentence is filler. The encoding list and the long final clause are dense but each carries actionable information, so the length is justified for a security-sensitive tool.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Covers purpose, secret-handling behavior and sibling routing for a 7-parameter tool with nested objects. The gap is the return contract: there is no output schema, and the description never states what the caller gets back (stdout/stderr/exit code shape), which an agent needs to interpret results.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents cwd, env, argv, shell, stdin, command and timeout_ms, including the command-vs-argv exclusivity. The description's discussion of `env` and op:// resolution restates what the schema says rather than adding format or edge-case detail. Baseline 3 is appropriate when the schema does the heavy lifting.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Combines a specific verb and resource ('Run a local shell command') with the distinguishing capability ('1Password secrets injected as environment variables'), which no sibling tool offers. It also explicitly names the sibling behaviors it supersedes (password_read/item_get), so an agent can route without opening any schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
States the preferred path and the exact alternative it replaces: use op_run with op://vault/item/field references in `env` rather than reading a secret and pasting plaintext into a command. The condition for choosing it is explicit, not inferred.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
password_createB
Create a new password/login item in a 1Password vault with optional username, URL, tags, and notes.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | No | Optional website URL to associate. | |
| tags | No | Optional tags for organization. | |
| notes | No | Optional notes. | |
| title | Yes | Item title. | |
| vaultId | Yes | Vault ID to create the item in. | |
| category | No | Item category. Defaults to Login. | |
| password | Yes | Password to store in the item. | |
| username | No | Username to store in the item. | |
| returnSecret | No | If true, include the created password in the response. Defaults to false for security. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description must disclose behavioral traits. It mentions it's a create operation but does not address permissions, reversibility, response format, or security implications such as the returnSecret behavior.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, front-loaded sentence that efficiently conveys the core purpose without extra words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With 9 parameters, no annotations, and 13 sibling tools, the description is somewhat sparse. It names the resource and optional fields but lacks usage differentiation and return value expectations; however, the schema covers parameter details, making it minimally viable.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the schema fully documents all 9 parameters. The description adds only a summary of optional fields (username, URL, tags, notes), which adds marginal value beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool creates a new password/login item in a 1Password vault, with a specific verb and resource. It distinguishes from siblings like password_update (update) and password_generate (generate a password).
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides no guidance on when to use this tool versus password_update, password_generate, or note_create. It simply states the action without exclusions or alternatives.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
password_generateB
Generate a cryptographically secure random password with configurable length and character types. Uses rejection sampling for unbiased randomness.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| length | No | Length of the password. Defaults to 20. | |
| includeNumbers | No | Include digits (0-9). Defaults to true. | |
| includeSymbols | No | Include symbols (!@#$%^&*…). Defaults to true. | |
| includeUppercase | No | Include uppercase letters. Defaults to true. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden. It adds valuable behavioral details: 'cryptographically secure' and 'unbiased randomness' via rejection sampling. However, it does not disclose potential return format, non-storage guarantees, or any error conditions. It provides some behavioral context but not a rich profile.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, both purposeful: the first states the core function, the second provides a meaningful algorithmic detail. No wasted wording, and key information is front-loaded. This is an excellent example of concise, well-structured description.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple tool with all parameters documented and defaults in the schema, the description covers security and randomness quality. It lacks any comparison to sibling tools or guidance on when to use it, but the core functionality is fully explained. The output (a password) is implied, and there is no output schema to elaborate. Slightly incomplete due to missing alternative guidance.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the schema already fully documents all parameters with descriptions and defaults. The description only summarizes 'configurable length and character types', adding no additional meaning beyond the schema. Baseline 3 is appropriate because the schema does the heavy lifting.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states it generates a password with configurable length and character types, specifying it is cryptographically secure. It does not explicitly differentiate from the sibling tool password_generate_memorable, but the 'cryptographically secure' phrasing implies the intended use case. This is clear but lacks explicit sibling comparison.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives such as password_generate_memorable, nor any mention of prerequisites or typical use cases. The description does not state exclusions or recommend this tool for specific scenarios, leaving the agent without direction for tool selection.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
password_generate_memorableA
Generate a memorable passphrase from random dictionary words with optional number and symbol suffixes. Uses a ~500-word curated list for good entropy.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| separator | No | Separator between words. Defaults to '-'. | |
| wordCount | No | Number of words to include. Defaults to 3. | |
| capitalize | No | Capitalize each word. Defaults to true. | |
| includeNumber | No | Append a random number (0-99) at the end. Defaults to true. | |
| includeSymbol | No | Append a random symbol at the end. Defaults to true. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the transparency burden. It discloses the word list size (~500 words), the use of optional number/symbol suffixes, and the random dictionary word approach, which provides useful behavioral context beyond the bare function.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences, front-loaded with the core function, and every sentence adds value. No filler or redundant repetition of schema details.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a tool with no annotations or output schema, the description covers the core generation behavior and entropy context. However, it lacks usage differentiation from sibling password_generate, which is a notable gap for a tool in a list with overlapping functionality.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so parameters are already well-documented. The description adds minimal extra parameter semantics; it only mentions 'optional number and symbol suffixes' which aligns with the schema. Baseline 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's function: generating a memorable passphrase from random dictionary words. It also distinguishes it from likely siblings like password_generate by emphasizing 'memorable' and the use of a curated word list.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies the use case (memorable passphrases) but does not explicitly contrast it with alternatives like password_generate. No when-to-use or when-not-to-use guidance is provided.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
password_readA
Retrieve a secret from 1Password using either a secret reference (op://vault/item/field) or vault ID + item ID. Supports field selection and optional value reveal (defaults to metadata-only). Revealing a secret puts it in the model context/transcript — to USE a secret in a command or API call, prefer op_run with op:// references instead.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| field | No | Field id or title to read. Defaults to 'password'. | |
| itemId | No | Item ID for item lookup (required if secretReference is not provided). | |
| reveal | No | If true, include the secret value in plaintext in the response — this puts the secret in the model context/transcript. Defaults to false; prefer op_run to use a secret without revealing it. | |
| vaultId | No | Vault ID for item lookup (required if secretReference is not provided). | |
| secretReference | No | Secret reference in op://vault/item/field format. If provided, vaultId and itemId are ignored. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden. It discloses that reveal puts the secret in the transcript, defaults to metadata-only, and clearly states the read-only nature of retrieval. The transcript warning is critical and well-addressed, though other behavioral details like permissions are absent.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three focused sentences with the main purpose first, followed by critical usage caveats. No redundant words, perfectly front-loaded, and each sentence earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's moderate complexity, no annotations, and no output schema, the description covers the key aspects: input modes, field selection, reveal behavior, and an alternative tool. It could mention return format in more detail, but the metadata-only vs revealed distinction suffices for an agent to understand what to expect.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, but the description adds value by explaining the two lookup modes (secretReference vs vaultId+itemId) and the default metadata-only behavior, which clarifies parameter relationships beyond individual schema descriptions.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool retrieves a secret from 1Password, specifying two input modes (secret reference or vault ID + item ID). It distinguishes from siblings by explicitly directing users to op_run for using secrets in commands/API calls.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Provides explicit guidance to prefer op_run with op:// references when the secret is to be used in a command or API call, and warns against unnecessary reveal. It doesn't mention item_get as an alternative for non-secret retrieval, but the main ambiguity with op_run is resolved.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
password_updateA
Update (rotate) a password or concealed field on an existing 1Password item. If the target field does not exist, it will be created.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| field | No | Field id or title to update. Defaults to 'password'. | |
| itemId | Yes | Item ID to update. | |
| vaultId | Yes | Vault ID containing the item. | |
| newPassword | Yes | New password value. | |
| returnSecret | No | If true, include the updated password in the response. Defaults to false for security. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Without annotations, the description carries the full burden. It discloses one behavioral trait: if the target field does not exist, it will be created. However, it does not mention permissions, reversibility, side effects, or what happens to the item's metadata, which are important for a mutation tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences, with the main action stated first and the key side-effect in the second sentence. Every word contributes value; there is no fluff or repetition.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
This is a mutation tool with no output schema and no annotations. The description covers the core action and creation behavior, but it does not explain return values or clarify when to choose this over sibling item_edit, which could also modify fields. Given the low complexity, a 3 is appropriate.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds no extra parameter semantics beyond what the schema already provides, but since the schema is thorough, the description does not need to compensate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb 'Update (rotate)' and clearly identifies the resource: a password or concealed field on an existing 1Password item. This distinguishes it from sibling tools like password_create (which creates new items) and password_read (which reads values).
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides clear context by stating it applies to 'an existing 1Password item,' implying it is not for creation. However, it does not explicitly mention alternatives or when-not-to-use scenarios, so it falls slightly short of a 5.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
vault_listA
List the 1Password vaults accessible to the service account (limited to the allow-listed vaults when OP_MCP_ALLOWED_VAULTS / --allowed-vaults is configured). Returns vault IDs, names, descriptions, and types.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does disclose a real behavioral constraint: results shrink to the allow-listed vaults when OP_MCP_ALLOWED_VAULTS / --allowed-vaults is configured. It also specifies returned fields. It stops short of stating read-only nature, auth requirements, or pagination/rate limits.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two compact sentences, front-loaded with the core action and followed by the scoping caveat and return fields. No filler or repetition.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a parameterless read tool this is nearly complete: scope, filtering behavior, and return shape are all covered, which compensates for the absent output schema. Only auth/permission expectations and result-size behavior are unstated.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool takes zero parameters, so there is nothing for the description to disambiguate; baseline 4 applies. The mention of returned fields is return-value information rather than parameter semantics.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ("List the 1Password vaults") and scopes it precisely to those accessible to the service account. An agent can immediately distinguish this vault-enumeration tool from the many item_* siblings that operate on items within vaults.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The allow-list caveat implies the tool is the discovery entry point, but there is no explicit when-to-use guidance, no mention of prerequisites (e.g., required credentials), and no routing to alternatives such as item_list for enumerating contents. Usage must be inferred.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
2 tool updates
v5.0.0- Changed
item_get1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / reveal / descriptionPrevious value: -"If true, include concealed field values in plaintext — this puts the secret in the model context/transcript. Defaults to false; prefer op_run to use a secret without revealing it."New value: +"If true, include secret-bearing field values (passwords, SSH private keys, one-time-password seeds, card numbers) in plaintext — this puts the secret in the model context/transcript. Defaults to false; prefer op_run to use a secret without revealing it."
- Changed
op_run1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / timeout_ms / descriptionPrevious value: -"Kill the process if it runs longer than this many milliseconds. Default 120000 (2 minutes)."New value: +"Kill the process and everything it started if it runs longer than this many milliseconds. Default 120000 (2 minutes)."
15 tool updates
v4.0.1- Changed
item_archive2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / $schemaPrevious value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema" - removed
Input schema / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -false
- Changed
item_delete2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / $schemaPrevious value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema" - removed
Input schema / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -false
- Changed
item_edit3 fields changed- changed
Input schema / $schemaPrevious value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema" - removed
Input schema / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -false - removed
Input schema / properties / fields / items / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -false
- Changed
item_get3 fields changed- changed
Input schema / $schemaPrevious value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema" - removed
Input schema / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -false - changed
Input schema / properties / reveal / descriptionPrevious value: -"If true, include concealed field values in plaintext. Defaults to false for security."New value: +"If true, include concealed field values in plaintext — this puts the secret in the model context/transcript. Defaults to false; prefer op_run to use a secret without revealing it."
- Changed
item_list2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / $schemaPrevious value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema" - removed
Input schema / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -false
- Changed
item_lookup2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / $schemaPrevious value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema" - removed
Input schema / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -false
- Changed
note_create3 fields changed- changed
Input schema / $schemaPrevious value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema" - removed
Input schema / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -false - removed
Input schema / properties / fields / items / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -false
- Added
op_check_ref - Added
op_run - Changed
password_create2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / $schemaPrevious value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema" - removed
Input schema / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -false
- Changed
password_generate2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / $schemaPrevious value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema" - removed
Input schema / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -false
- Changed
password_generate_memorable2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / $schemaPrevious value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema" - removed
Input schema / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -false
- Changed
password_read3 fields changed- changed
Input schema / $schemaPrevious value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema" - removed
Input schema / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -false - changed
Input schema / properties / reveal / descriptionPrevious value: -"If false, return metadata only without the secret value. Defaults to true."New value: +"If true, include the secret value in plaintext in the response — this puts the secret in the model context/transcript. Defaults to false; prefer op_run to use a secret without revealing it."
- Changed
password_update2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / $schemaPrevious value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema" - removed
Input schema / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -false
- Changed
vault_list1 field changed- changed
Input schema / $schemaPrevious value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
5 tool updates
v2.5.0- Added
item_archive - Added
item_edit - Added
item_get - Added
item_list - Added
note_create
8 tool updates
v2.4.2- First observed
item_delete - First observed
item_lookup - First observed
password_create - First observed
password_generate - First observed
password_generate_memorable - First observed
password_read - First observed
password_update - First observed
vault_list
TDQS
Scored across 15 tools
Overlap among item_get, password_read, and op_check_ref: all accept secret references or vault+item inputs and return metadata or secret data, with only subtle distinctions (full item vs single secret vs validation). item_edit and password_update both modify fields, and the retrieval tools can be confused despite descriptions that attempt to steer usage.
Most tools follow a resource_action snake_case pattern (item_get, password_read, vault_list, note_create), which is readable and predictable. Minor deviations exist with op_run and op_check_ref using an op_ namespace and non-noun-verb phrasing, and password_generate_memorable extends the pattern.
15 tools is within the typical 3-15 range for a password manager integration, covering listing, reading, creating, editing, deleting, generating, and injecting secrets. It is slightly heavy due to overlapping retrieval tools, but each tool has a plausible role.
Core item lifecycle is well covered: list/search/get, create login and secure note, edit, update password, archive/delete, plus secret generation and op_run injection. Gaps remain in generic item creation for arbitrary 1Password categories and vault-level CRUD, but agents can work around most workflows.
Maintenance
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