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Universal Web Retrieval MCP

Universal Web Retrieval MCP

Universal Web Retrieval MCP

A universal MCP server providing resilient web search and content retrieval through a configurable provider chain — AnySearch, Tavily, DDGS, Tencent Yuanbao Search, Bocha, DeepSeek, Kimi, Zhipu BigModel, Brave Search and Jina Reader — with automatic failover.

Quick Start

No API key is required. With no keys configured the server uses the keyless mode of AnySearch/Tavily and falls back to keyless DDGS.

uvx (zero config, recommended):

{"mcpServers": {"universal-web-retrieval": {"command": "uvx", "args": ["uwr"]}}}

npx (same server, no Python toolchain needed — the launcher fetches a runner):

{"mcpServers": {"universal-web-retrieval": {"command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@withgardener/uwr"]}}}

pip:

pip install uwr
uwr        # stdio MCP server

API keys are optional: add TAVILY_API_KEY, ANYSEARCH_API_KEY (or any of the others) to the env block when you have them. See Configuration.

Related MCP server: DeepSeek Search MCP

Overview

Give any MCP-capable agent reliable web access through a single server. Universal Web Retrieval routes each request through an ordered provider chain, picks keyed or keyless authentication automatically based on which API keys are present, and moves to the next provider on rate limits, outages, or upstream errors.

The active chains are selected in this order:

  1. providers argument passed for the call.

  2. Environment configured chain (UWR_SEARCH_CHAIN or UWR_FETCH_CHAIN).

  3. Built-in default (anysearch,tavily,ddgs).

providers=None selects the configured chain. An explicitly empty list, providers=[], is invalid input; it never means "use defaults". Jina Reader works keyless and is deliberately absent from both defaults. New providers are opt-in, preserving the default behavior from 0.1.x.

Agent (any MCP client)
│
├── web_search ──▶ chain from UWR_SEARCH_CHAIN   (default: AnySearch → Tavily → DDGS)
└── web_fetch  ──▶ chain from UWR_FETCH_CHAIN    (default: AnySearch → Tavily → DDGS.extract)

Features

  • Three standard tools — web_search, web_fetch, and list_providers, clean JSON in/out.

  • Configurable chains — UWR_SEARCH_CHAIN / UWR_FETCH_CHAIN set the order; UWR_DISABLED_PROVIDERS switches providers off without editing the chains.

  • Per-call override — web_search(..., providers=["bocha"]) or ["yuanbao","tavily"] runs just that order for one call.

  • Automatic provider failover — one provider failing never fails the tool.

  • Opt-in fan-out — mode="fanout" queries up to N providers concurrently and rank-fuses the answers (RRF) instead of taking the first one. See Search modes.

  • Auto keyed/keyless — key configured → official keyed API; key absent → official keyless access (where the provider offers one). Keyed-only providers (Yuanbao, Bocha, DeepSeek, Kimi, Zhipu, Brave) without a key are skipped, never attempted, so a missing key cannot 401 the chain.

  • Strict official APIs — every provider is called through its official documented endpoint and auth mechanism. No scraping hacks, no undocumented endpoints.

  • Error classification — rate limits / outages fall over; invalid credentials fail loudly (ERROR log) and move to the next provider; malformed input never triggers fallback.

  • Bounded latency — per-provider timeouts are capped to the remaining chain budget; the router does not start a provider call once less than 100 ms remain.

  • Observable — every response carries provider, mode, latency_ms and an attempts trail.

  • Zero agent coupling — standard MCP stdio; works with Hermes, Claude Code, OpenCode, or any MCP client.

Architecture

src/universal_web_retrieval/
├── server.py            # MCP tool surface (web_search / web_fetch / list_providers)
├── config.py            # env-driven settings, call-time key + chain reads
├── errors.py            # ProviderError classification, result models, Provider ABC
├── fanout.py            # URL dedupe + Reciprocal Rank Fusion merge (fan-out mode)
└── providers/
    ├── registry.py      # name -> provider instance; capability lookup
    ├── router.py        # chain resolution (env / override / default) + failover + fan-out
    ├── anysearch.py     # AnySearch (keyed Bearer / keyless no-auth-header)
    ├── tavily.py        # Tavily (keyed Bearer / keyless X-Tavily-Access-Mode)
    ├── ddgs.py          # DDGS (official package; text + extract)
    ├── yuanbao.py       # Tencent Yuanbao Search (MCP over Streamable HTTP, Bearer)
    ├── bocha.py         # Bocha Web Search API (REST, Bearer)
    ├── deepseek.py      # DeepSeek Search + Fetch API (REST, Bearer)
    ├── kimi.py          # Kimi/Moonshot search + search_pro + fetch (REST, Bearer)
    ├── zhipu.py         # Zhipu BigModel web_search (REST, Bearer)
    ├── brave.py         # Brave Search API (REST, X-Subscription-Token)
    └── jina.py          # Jina Reader r.jina.ai (keyless or Bearer, fetch only)

Installation

pip install uwr                    # from PyPI
uvx uwr                            # or run without installing
npx -y @withgardener/uwr           # or through the npm launcher

uwr --version                      # uwr 0.3.1
uwr                                # run the stdio MCP server

ddgs is a runtime dependency (the fixed final fallback of the default chains), not an optional extra. Dependencies are pinned to compatible ranges (mcp>=2,<3, httpx>=0.27,<1, ddgs>=9.16,<10) so a major-version breaking change never ships to a running server via a routine pip update.

From source (development)

git clone https://github.com/withgardener/universal-web-retrieval-mcp.git
cd universal-web-retrieval-mcp
pip install -e .

uwr                                # or: PYTHONPATH=src python -m universal_web_retrieval

Configuration

Chains

Env var

Default

Effect

UWR_SEARCH_CHAIN

anysearch,tavily,ddgs

Ordered search chain, e.g. anysearch,tavily,yuanbao,bocha,ddgs

UWR_FETCH_CHAIN

anysearch,tavily,ddgs

Ordered fetch chain (search-only providers are dropped)

UWR_DISABLED_PROVIDERS

(empty)

Names switched off everywhere, e.g. bocha,deepseek

UWR_SEARCH_MODE

failover

failover (first success wins) or fanout (query N providers, merge). Unknown values warn once and use failover

UWR_SEARCH_FANOUT

3

Max providers queried concurrently in fan-out mode (≥ 1, clamped to the chain length)

UWR_FANOUT_GRACE

5

Seconds to wait for stragglers after the first fan-out answer; 0 waits for all (still deadline-bounded)

Resolution rules:

  1. A per-call providers argument wins (it only affects that call).

  2. Otherwise UWR_SEARCH_CHAIN / UWR_FETCH_CHAIN.

  3. Otherwise the built-in defaults above — 0.2.0 is behaviour-compatible with 0.1.x out of the box.

Unknown names, providers lacking the capability, and disabled providers are dropped with one warning per distinct chain (not once per request). A chain that resolves to nothing falls back to the defaults. An explicitly empty/invalid per-call override is an input error instead — providers=["bocha"] never silently becomes the whole default chain.

Keys and tuning

Env var

Required

Effect

ANYSEARCH_API_KEY

no

AnySearch keyed mode; absent → official keyless

TAVILY_API_KEY

no

Tavily keyed mode; absent → official keyless (X-Tavily-Access-Mode: keyless)

YUANBAO_API_KEY (alias WSA_API_KEY)

for yuanbao

Tencent Yuanbao Search service key

BOCHA_API_KEY

for bocha

Bocha Web Search API key

DEEPSEEK_API_KEY

for deepseek

DeepSeek API key (Search + Fetch API)

MOONSHOT_API_KEY (alias KIMI_API_KEY)

for kimi

Kimi / Moonshot platform key

ZHIPU_API_KEY (alias BIGMODEL_API_KEY)

for zhipu

Zhipu BigModel (智谱) key

BRAVE_API_KEY

for brave

Brave Search API subscription token

JINA_API_KEY

no

Jina Reader key — optional (keyless 20 RPM, with free key 500 RPM)

UWR_KIMI_SEARCH_TIER

no

basic (default) → /v1/tools/search $0.002/call; pro → /v1/tools/search_pro $0.003/call

UWR_ZHIPU_ENGINE

no

search_std (default) / search_pro / search_pro_sogou / search_pro_quark

WEB_RETRIEVAL_TIMEOUT

no

Overall chain deadline in seconds (default 45)

WEB_RETRIEVAL_LOG_LEVEL

no

WARNING default; logs go to stderr (stdout is MCP JSON-RPC)

WEB_RETRIEVAL_MAX_RESULTS

no

Cap for web_search.limit (default 20)

WEB_RETRIEVAL_EXTRACT_CHAR_LIMIT

no

Max fetched-content chars (default 15000). Results report truncated/original_length

WEB_RETRIEVAL_BLOCK_PRIVATE

no

1 makes web_fetch refuse private/loopback/link-local hosts (default: off — they are fetched). A pre-flight heuristic, not SSRF protection

WEB_RETRIEVAL_NETGUARD_DNS_TIMEOUT

no

Seconds the opt-in pre-flight DNS lookup may take before the target is refused (default 2). Only used with WEB_RETRIEVAL_BLOCK_PRIVATE=1

UWR_BLOCK_DETECTION

no

off disables CDN/CAPTCHA interstitial detection in web_fetch (default: on)

UWR_BLOCK_DETECTION_MAX_CHARS

no

Bodies at/above this many chars are never judged "blocked" (default 4000)

WEB_RETRIEVAL_ANYSEARCH_CONNECT_TIMEOUT / _TIMEOUT

no

AnySearch connect/read timeouts (5s / 20s)

WEB_RETRIEVAL_TAVILY_CONNECT_TIMEOUT / _TIMEOUT

no

Tavily connect/read timeouts (5s / 20s)

WEB_RETRIEVAL_DDGS_TIMEOUT

no

DDGS overall timeout (15s)

UWR_YUANBAO_CONNECT_TIMEOUT / UWR_YUANBAO_TIMEOUT

no

Yuanbao timeouts (5s / 20s)

UWR_BOCHA_CONNECT_TIMEOUT / UWR_BOCHA_TIMEOUT

no

Bocha timeouts (5s / 20s)

UWR_DEEPSEEK_CONNECT_TIMEOUT / UWR_DEEPSEEK_TIMEOUT

no

DeepSeek timeouts (5s / 20s)

UWR_KIMI_CONNECT_TIMEOUT / UWR_KIMI_TIMEOUT

no

Kimi timeouts (5s / 20s)

UWR_ZHIPU_CONNECT_TIMEOUT / UWR_ZHIPU_TIMEOUT

no

Zhipu timeouts (5s / 20s)

UWR_BRAVE_CONNECT_TIMEOUT / UWR_BRAVE_TIMEOUT

no

Brave timeouts (5s / 20s)

UWR_JINA_CONNECT_TIMEOUT / UWR_JINA_TIMEOUT

no

Jina timeouts (5s / 30s — Reader drives a browser)

UWR_YUANBAO_MCP_URL

no

Override the Yuanbao MCP endpoint

UWR_BOCHA_BASE_URL

no

https://api.bochaai.com (or https://api.bocha.cn)

UWR_DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL

no

Default https://api.deepseek.com

UWR_KIMI_BASE_URL

no

https://api.moonshot.cn (default) or https://api.moonshot.ai (international)

UWR_ZHIPU_BASE_URL

no

Default https://open.bigmodel.cn

UWR_BRAVE_BASE_URL

no

Default https://api.search.brave.com

UWR_JINA_BASE_URL

no

Default https://r.jina.ai

Every key is read at call time, so a restart of the MCP server process is enough for new values to take effect (for Hermes: the mcp_servers env is frozen at gateway start — restart the gateway or kill the child process).

Tools

web_search(query, limit=5, providers=None, mode=None)

{
  "success": true,
  "provider": "anysearch",
  "mode": "keyless",
  "latency_ms": 1555,
  "attempts": [{"provider": "anysearch", "outcome": "ok"}],
  "results": [{"title": "...", "url": "...", "snippet": "..."}]
}

When a provider exposes publication date / site (Yuanbao, Bocha, DeepSeek, Kimi, Zhipu, Brave), the result rows also carry published, site and (where scored) score. provider / mode / latency_ms / attempts are diagnostic metadata — consumers only need results.

mode selects the search mode for this call ("failover" or "fanout", see Search modes); omit it to use UWR_SEARCH_MODE. In fan-out mode provider is "fanout", mode is the shared auth mode of the answering providers (or "mixed"), attempts entries for successful providers also carry results and latency_ms, and every result row carries sources (provider names in chain order):

{
  "success": true, "provider": "fanout", "mode": "keyed", "latency_ms": 812,
  "attempts": [
    {"provider": "bocha", "outcome": "ok", "results": 5, "latency_ms": 640, "mode": "keyed"},
    {"provider": "tavily", "outcome": "ok", "results": 5, "latency_ms": 790, "mode": "keyed"},
    {"provider": "ddgs", "outcome": "skipped:grace"}
  ],
  "results": [{"title": "...", "url": "...", "snippet": "...", "sources": ["bocha", "tavily"]}]
}

attempts is the per-provider outcome trail in chain order:

Outcome

Meaning

ok

This provider produced the answer (fan-out entries also carry results, latency_ms, mode)

empty

(failover) This provider answered OK with zero hits — an answer, not a failure; the walk continued

error:<msg>

Attempted and failed; the chain moved on

skipped:not_configured

Keyed-only provider without a key — never called

skipped:deadline

The chain deadline passed before this provider could start (failover) or answer (fan-out)

skipped:grace

(fan-out only) Still running when the grace window after the first answer closed; its result is discarded

skipped:fanout

(fan-out only) Eligible chain member beyond the configured N-provider fanout cutoff

An empty answer is not an error (0.3.1). A provider that replies OK with zero hits is recorded as empty (failover keeps walking, because a later link may have hits) and, if no provider produces hits, the call succeeds with results: []. "Nothing matched" is no longer reported as all providers failed.

A null container is malformed, not empty. {"results": null} — the shape a gateway error page, a truncated body or a schema change serialises to — is reported as malformed response (results is null, not a list) and falls over to the next provider, rather than being turned into a successful empty result. Only a present, genuinely empty list is an empty answer.

Success schema (search): {"success": true, "provider": ..., "mode": ..., "latency_ms": ..., "attempts": [...], "results": [...]}. Provider error schema: {"success": false, "error": "...", "attempts": [...]}. Invalid-input schema: {"success": false, "error": "invalid input: ..."} (no attempts). Fetch returns one object per URL with url, content, content_type, title, truncated, original_length, provider, mode, latency_ms, and attempts; failed URLs carry error and attempts instead of success metadata.

Sample failure of a mixed chain (UWR_SEARCH_CHAIN=yuanbao,bocha,ddgs with no Yuanbao/Bocha keys):

{
  "success": false,
  "error": "all providers failed: yuanbao: skipped (not_configured) | bocha: skipped (not_configured) | ddgs(keyless): HTTP 429 rate limited: ...",
  "attempts": [
    {"provider": "yuanbao", "outcome": "skipped:not_configured"},
    {"provider": "bocha", "outcome": "skipped:not_configured"},
    {"provider": "ddgs", "outcome": "error:HTTP 429 rate limited: ..."}
  ]
}

Per-call override:

{"query": "腾讯 财报", "providers": ["bocha"]}          // Bocha only
{"query": "腾讯 财报", "providers": ["yuanbao", "tavily"]}  // try Yuanbao first

An override that contains no usable provider (including providers=[]) is an input error. providers=None means use the configured chain; an empty explicit list never falls back to the defaults.

web_fetch(url | urls, providers=None)

Accepts a single url string or a urls array (max 5) and an optional providers override. Returns a JSON array:

[{
  "url": "https://example.com",
  "content": "# Example Domain\n\n...",
  "content_type": "text_markdown",
  "title": "Example Domain",
  "truncated": false,
  "original_length": 1256,
  "provider": "anysearch",
  "mode": "keyless",
  "latency_ms": 191,
  "attempts": [{"provider": "anysearch", "outcome": "ok"}]
}]

Failed URLs carry an error field instead of content. Content is Markdown/clean text — never raw HTML. JS-rendered, login-walled, or CAPTCHA-protected pages are not guaranteed (plain HTTP retrieval only; no browser automation).

Truncation is explicit (0.3.1). content is cut at WEB_RETRIEVAL_EXTRACT_CHAR_LIMIT characters; truncated: true says it happened and original_length is the pre-cut character count (characters, not bytes). No marker text is appended — the fields are the marker, so content stays a clean prefix.

Blocked pages are errors, not content (0.3.1). A CDN/CAPTCHA interstitial (Cloudflare "Just a moment…", "Checking your browser", Akamai "Access Denied" with a Reference #) raises a fallback-eligible error so the chain tries the next provider. Detection needs evidence, never a single word: inside a body shorter than UWR_BLOCK_DETECTION_MAX_CHARS it blocks on two distinct technical fingerprints (cf_chl_opt, "checking your browser", "enable javascript and cookies to continue", _incapsula_resource, …) or on a challenge title ("Just a moment…", "Access Denied", "Attention Required! | Cloudflare") plus one marker; the title only counts as the whole title or the challenge phrase plus the site's own short label ("Access Denied - example.com"). A short help page titled "CAPTCHA help", a glossary listing reCAPTCHA/hCaptcha/Turnstile, an FAQ quoting "Just a moment…", a doc showing one cf_chl_opt sample or a help page titled "Access Denied: a practical guide to 403 responses" all pass through — they were false positives of the earlier title-word rule. Length alone is never a signal either. UWR_BLOCK_DETECTION=off disables it.

list_providers()

Returns every provider this build knows, with capability, configuration status, enabled flag and its 1-based position in each active chain, plus the active search_mode, the fan-out settings (fanout.n, fanout.grace_s) and the fetch policy (fetch_policy.block_private_network, .block_detection, .extract_char_limit). Key values are never returned.

{
  "chains": {"search": ["anysearch", "tavily", "ddgs"], "fetch": ["anysearch", "tavily", "ddgs"]},
  "defaults": {"search": ["anysearch", "tavily", "ddgs"], "fetch": ["anysearch", "tavily", "ddgs"]},
  "search_mode": "failover",
  "fanout": {"n": 3, "grace_s": 5.0},
  "disabled": [],
  "providers": [
    {"name": "bocha", "kind": "search", "capabilities": ["search"], "keyed_only": true,
     "configured": false, "auth_mode": null, "enabled": true, "position": {"search": null}},
    {"name": "anysearch", "kind": "search", "capabilities": ["fetch", "search"], "keyed_only": false,
     "configured": true, "auth_mode": "keyed", "enabled": true,
     "position": {"search": 1, "fetch": 1}}
  ]
}

Network scope & private targets

Private-network fetches are allowed, as in 0.3.0. The block is opt-in. web_fetch retrieves any URL the host can reach, including intranet pages, localhost dev servers and cloud metadata endpoints — a deliberate capability for a local agent tool. Set WEB_RETRIEVAL_BLOCK_PRIVATE=1 (the name reserved here since 0.1.0) to refuse private, loopback, link-local, CGNAT and otherwise non-public targets before any provider is called; the refusal is per URL (error: invalid input: refusing to fetch …), so a batch keeps working. Off by default — the check is off unless that variable is set, so upgrading changes nothing.

How far the check reaches when it is on, and where it stops:

  • IP literals are decided exactly, with no DNS: bracketed IPv6, IPv4-mapped IPv6, an IPv6 zone id ([fe80::1%25eth0]), and every legacy numeric IPv4 spelling the C library also accepts — 127.1, 0177.0.0.1, 0x7f.0.0.1, 0x7f000001 and the integer 2130706433. Those forms are decoded here rather than handed to the resolver, because ipaddress.ip_address rejects them and anything that reaches the resolver can dodge the check. A numeric-only host that cannot be decoded (1.2.3.4.5, 09.1.1.1) is refused: it cannot be a domain name, and guessing is the wrong direction for a deny check.

  • Loopback names are refused without DNS: localhost, localhost. and any *.localhost are reserved for loopback (RFC 6761), so a resolver that fails to answer for one cannot turn it into an allow.

  • Hostnames are resolved with socket.getaddrinfo — the platform resolver — so /etc/hosts, systemd-resolved and host-level controls still apply. No private DNS client is added: bypassing the dependent host's resolution policy would defeat its existing security constraints. Every returned address must be globally routable, so a public+private answer (what a rebinding attempt looks like from here) is rejected.

  • The lookup is bounded (WEB_RETRIEVAL_NETGUARD_DNS_TIMEOUT, default 2 s) and a lookup that does not answer in time is refused rather than treated as allowed — a stalled resolver would otherwise be a way to skip the check. That is a conservative choice: a genuinely slow resolver will now refuse targets until you raise the timeout.

  • Redirects are followed by the provider's own network, not by this process. A final URL a provider reports is re-checked and fails the call closed when it is non-public, but the hop has already happened — there is no connection binding to inspect, so this cannot prevent that hop. Preventing it outright needs a local fetching proxy, which this server does not have.

  • DNS rebinding between our check and the provider's connect cannot be excluded for the same reason. Only a design that resolves, connects and then verifies the peer address can claim that; a third-party extraction API does not expose it.

  • A hostname that does not resolve here is still allowed (logged at DEBUG). The provider resolves it on its own network, so a definitive NXDOMAIN proves nothing about the provider's view — residual gap: an internal-only name that only resolves inside your network is not detectable from this host. A timeout is treated differently, as above.

  • The answer is only as good as this host's resolver. A host with a poisoned, split-horizon or overridden resolver gets the answer that resolver gives.

This is not SSRF protection, and it is not a guarantee. It is a cheap pre-flight deny of obvious targets that only runs when you ask for it; it cannot stop DNS rebinding or a provider-side redirect hop, and it does not sandbox the extraction service. For untrusted agent input in a hardened deployment, keep network isolation (container or netns without a route to the intranet, egress firewall rules, and a deny-list at the provider) as the outer boundary. Treat the check as extra friction on top of that, never as a replacement for it.

Batch behavior: urls is capped at 5 per call (larger batches are rejected with an explicit error, not silently truncated), duplicates are de-duplicated preserving first-seen order, and the whole batch shares one deadline — URLs whose turn arrives after the deadline return a timeout error without any network attempt.

The URL you pass in is echoed back verbatim, credentials included (0.3.1). Every entry in the result carries the caller's URL in its top-level url field — on success and on failure alike — so the returned link is the exact link that was asked for. That is deliberate: rewriting it would produce a link that no longer works. It also means a credential embedded in the URL (?token=…, ?sig=…, ?api_key=…, ?X-Amz-Signature=…) comes back in cleartext instead of being scrubbed; the only rewrite such a URL can get is an exact match for a provider credential configured in this process, which the safety net still strips (and that stripping breaks the link — the right trade when the alternative is echoing your own key). Scrubbing otherwise covers diagnostic fields (error, attempts, the AUTH FAILURE log line), never the url field, and page content is returned as fetched. The payload then flows into the calling agent's context, and from there into whatever that client records — session transcripts, chat logs, or the model service that serves the conversation — plus any host that stores them. Treat a URL with an embedded credential as disclosed to those destinations: prefer short-lived signed URLs, revoke or let them expire after the fetch, and do not send a long-lived secret as a query parameter. The diagnostic redaction described below is not a confidentiality guarantee for a URL you supply, and it cannot un-disclose one that already went through.

Credential handling (0.3.1, changed). Diagnostic text — error strings, attempts outcomes, the AUTH FAILURE log lines — is scrubbed of configured key values, NAME=value key assignments, bearer tokens and credential-bearing query parameters (?token=, ?sig=, ?api_key=, …). A structured diagnostic field is scrubbed recursively: an error or errors value that is a mapping or a list has every string inside it treated the same way, at any depth, while codes and counts keep their types. Successful payloads are no longer pattern-rewritten: a fetched page may legitimately contain signed URLs (?sig=…) and rewriting them produced links that no longer work. The only pass over a success payload removes the exact values of credentials configured in this process (a page echoing your key is a leak by definition), and that pass also covers anything nested. Trust boundary: this server hands the payload to the calling agent and does not write it to its own log — what the client then does with it (transcript, chat log, model provider) is outside this server's control, see the echo note above; third-party signed URLs inside page content belong to that page's publisher and are returned as-is.

Routing & fallback

Capability

Default chain

Optional members, on request only

web_search

AnySearch → Tavily → DDGS

Yuanbao, Bocha, DeepSeek, Kimi, Zhipu, Brave

web_fetch

AnySearch → Tavily → DDGS.extract

DeepSeek, Kimi, Jina (search-only providers are dropped from fetch chains)

A link is skipped when: rate-limited (429), timed out, upstream 5xx, or any provider error. Invalid credentials fail loudly (ERROR log AUTH FAILURE on <provider>) and the chain moves to the next provider — a wrong key is never silently retried as keyless on the same provider. Malformed input (empty query, bad URL scheme) returns an immediate input error with no fallback.

Example chains (not defaults). Defaults stay minimal so existing deployments are unchanged. If you hold the keys, this is a sensible China-friendly ordering — deepseek/kimi give independent indexes and correct published dates, and ddgs stays last as the keyless floor:

UWR_SEARCH_CHAIN: anysearch,tavily,deepseek,kimi,yuanbao,ddgs
UWR_FETCH_CHAIN: anysearch,tavily,deepseek,kimi,ddgs

Every one of those links is either free or priced per call (see the table below), and each one falls through on error, so a longer chain costs nothing when earlier links succeed. Two rules worth keeping:

  • Keep ddgs last — keyless, no quota, the floor of the chain.

  • Never put jina in a default chain — it works without a key, so a stale/keyless deployment would start sending every fetch through it. Add it explicitly when you want its Markdown quality, e.g. UWR_FETCH_CHAIN: anysearch,tavily,jina,ddgs.

Search modes

web_search has two modes. The default is unchanged from every earlier release.

Mode

Behaviour

Cost per search

failover (default)

Walks the chain in order; the first provider that returns OK wins, even with no hits

one provider call

fanout

Queries the first N eligible providers concurrently, waits UWR_FANOUT_GRACE seconds for stragglers once the first answer (hit or empty) arrives, then merges and rank-fuses everything that arrived

N provider calls

The trade-off: fan-out spends N× provider quota per search, and its latency is bounded by the grace window (at most UWR_FANOUT_GRACE seconds more than the fastest provider) and by the shared chain deadline (WEB_RETRIEVAL_TIMEOUT) — never by the slowest provider. In exchange it buys agreement: a page several providers return outranks a page only one of them found, which is what you want when a wrong first hit is expensive.

Latency and quota

Measured on the default chain (anysearch,tavily,ddgs) with N=3 and the default 5 s grace:

Scenario

Wall time

failover, first provider healthy

~2 s

fanout, third provider slow

~7 s

fanout, all three providers fast

~2.5 s

In the slow case the first two providers answered at about 2.1 s and ddgs was still running when the grace window closed: the response came back at about 7 s with ddgs recorded as skipped:grace. All three calls were made either way, so every fan-out spends N× provider quota — including the ones whose answers are thrown away. An abandoned provider keeps running in its daemon thread and may still complete (and be billed) in the background; the grace window decides what you wait for, not what you pay for.

Selecting a mode:

  • UWR_SEARCH_MODE=fanout (or failover) sets the default for every call. An unknown value logs one warning and falls back to failover.

  • web_search(..., mode="fanout") overrides the default for one call. An unknown per-call value is an input error — it never silently switches modes.

  • In fan-out mode providers still defines the candidate order; its first N eligible entries are queried. Keyed-only providers without a key are recorded as skipped:not_configured and do not consume a slot.

  • UWR_SEARCH_FANOUT (default 3, minimum 1, clamped to the chain length) sets N.

Merging (fanout.py):

  1. URLs are normalised for dedupe into a scheme-less key, //host[:port]/path?query, so http:// and https:// for one page collapse — as does a default port (:80 for http, :443 for https). The host is IDNA-normalised with any leading www. stripped (non-default ports and IPv6 literals preserved), the fragment and tracking parameters (utm_*, gclid, fbclid, mc_cid, mc_eid, ref, ref_src, spm) dropped, remaining parameters sorted, and a trailing / removed (except for the root path). The output keeps the best-ranked occurrence's original URL, not the key.

  2. Reciprocal Rank Fusion: score = Σ 1/(60 + rank) over every provider that returned the URL, with a 1-based rank inside that provider's list. Ties break on number of sources, then best single rank, then chain order.

  3. Per row: title and URL from the best-ranked occurrence, the longest non-empty snippet, and published / site from the first non-empty value in chain order. Every row gains sources — the provider names, in chain order.

Fan-out responses set provider: "fanout" and mode to the shared auth mode of the answering providers, or "mixed" when they differ. attempts carries one entry per queried provider: ok (plus results, latency_ms and the mode that answered), error:<msg>, skipped:not_configured, skipped:fanout (beyond the N-provider cutoff), skipped:grace (a late successful answer is discarded; a late error stays visible) or skipped:deadline. Success requires at least one provider to answer OK, not at least one hit: if every answering provider returns an empty list, the response is a success with results: [] and ok / results: 0 entries in attempts — the same thing failover returns for that query. Only when no provider answers OK at all is it the same all providers failed: ... error with the trail attached, and one provider's fallback_eligible=False error does not abort the others.

{"query": "rust async runtime", "mode": "fanout",
 "providers": ["bocha", "tavily", "ddgs"]}

web_fetch is always failover: there is nothing to merge for a single URL.

Concurrency: providers are synchronous HTTP clients, so fan-out starts one daemon thread per selected provider — plain threading.Thread plus a queue.Queue of (provider, outcome) records, no new dependency and no private interpreter internals. Each worker gets its own timeout budget and shares no mutable per-call state. Yuanbao is the only provider holding per-instance state (MCP session id and JSON-RPC counter); both are guarded by an RLock, and a concurrent handshake race costs one extra session, not correctness. A straggler that outlives the grace window keeps running in its daemon thread; the collector never joins it, it cannot delay interpreter exit, and the result it eventually posts is dropped.

Provider behavior

The built-in chain remains anysearch,tavily,ddgs for search and fetch; all newly added providers are opt-in unless explicitly listed in UWR_SEARCH_CHAIN, UWR_FETCH_CHAIN, or a per-call providers override. Jina is keyless but deliberately absent from defaults.

See docs/providers.md for each provider's official endpoint, auth mechanism, keyless behavior, pricing notes and last-verified date.

Provider

Capabilities

Auth

Key env

Price / free tier

Notes

AnySearch

search + fetch

keyed Bearer / keyless (no auth header)

ANYSEARCH_API_KEY

plan-based

default first link

Tavily

search + fetch

keyed Bearer / keyless header

TAVILY_API_KEY

1,000 free credits/month

default second link

DDGS

search + fetch

none

—

free, no quota

default last link; JS/login pages not guaranteed

Yuanbao (元宝搜索)

search

keyed only

YUANBAO_API_KEY / WSA_API_KEY

14–26 CNY / 1k calls by tier

Tencent MCP endpoint, SearchPro, Cnt 10–50

Bocha (博查)

search

keyed only

BOCHA_API_KEY

0.036 CNY/call; 1,000 free trial calls (3 months)

POST /v1/web-search, count 1–50, summary: true

DeepSeek

search + fetch

keyed only

DEEPSEEK_API_KEY

$0.75 / 1k successful calls (same for search and fetch)

POST /v1/tools/search, /v1/tools/fetch; 100 QPS search, 25 QPS fetch

Kimi (Moonshot)

search + fetch

keyed only

MOONSHOT_API_KEY / KIMI_API_KEY

$0.002 basic search, $0.003 pro search, $0.002 fetch; billed only on HTTP 200 with results

text_query + search_results; CN api.moonshot.cn, intl api.moonshot.ai

Zhipu BigModel (智谱)

search

keyed only

ZHIPU_API_KEY / BIGMODEL_API_KEY

search_std 0.01, search_pro 0.03, search_pro_sogou 0.05, search_pro_quark 0.05 CNY/call

POST /api/paas/v4/web_search; engine via UWR_ZHIPU_ENGINE

Brave Search

search

keyed only

BRAVE_API_KEY

$5.00 / 1k requests, $5 free credits every month (≈1k requests)

X-Subscription-Token header, count 1–20, 50 req/s

Jina Reader

fetch

keyless (20 RPM) or keyed Bearer (500 RPM free key)

JINA_API_KEY (optional)

free tier: 20 RPM keyless, 500 RPM with a free key

GET https://r.jina.ai/?url=… + Accept: application/json; never in a default chain

Official sources for every row are listed in docs/providers.md. Prices are catalogue list prices as published on 2026-10-20 and may change; the provider's own pricing page is authoritative.

Examples

All provider keys below are placeholders or environment-variable references; never put live credentials in client configuration files.

Generic MCP client (stdio)

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "universal-web-retrieval": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": ["uwr"],
      "env": {
        "ANYSEARCH_API_KEY": "${ANYSEARCH_API_KEY}",
        "TAVILY_API_KEY": "${TAVILY_API_KEY}",
        "UWR_SEARCH_CHAIN": "anysearch,tavily,bocha,ddgs"
      }
    }
  }
}

Swap "command": "uvx", "args": ["uwr"] for "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@withgardener/uwr"] where npm is the only package manager available, or for "command": "python", "args": ["-m", "universal_web_retrieval"] when running the from-source checkout with PYTHONPATH set.

Hermes Agent

In ~/.hermes/config.yaml:

mcp_servers:
  universal-web-retrieval:
    command: /home/hermes/.local/bin/uvx
    args: ["uwr"]
    transport: stdio
    enabled: true
    env:
      ANYSEARCH_API_KEY: ${ANYSEARCH_API_KEY}
      TAVILY_API_KEY: ${TAVILY_API_KEY}
      # optional, only if the corresponding key is provided:
      # YUANBAO_API_KEY: ${YUANBAO_API_KEY}
      # BOCHA_API_KEY: ${BOCHA_API_KEY}
      # DEEPSEEK_API_KEY: ${DEEPSEEK_API_KEY}
      # MOONSHOT_API_KEY: ${MOONSHOT_API_KEY}
      # ZHIPU_API_KEY: ${ZHIPU_API_KEY}
      # BRAVE_API_KEY: ${BRAVE_API_KEY}
      # JINA_API_KEY: ${JINA_API_KEY}
      # UWR_SEARCH_CHAIN: anysearch,tavily,deepseek,kimi,yuanbao,ddgs
      # UWR_FETCH_CHAIN: anysearch,tavily,deepseek,kimi,ddgs

Claude Code

claude mcp add universal-web-retrieval \
  --env TAVILY_API_KEY="${TAVILY_API_KEY}" \
  -- uvx uwr

Cursor

Add a project .cursor/mcp.json or user MCP configuration with environment variables supplied by the launching process:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "universal-web-retrieval": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": ["uwr"],
      "env": {
        "ANYSEARCH_API_KEY": "${ANYSEARCH_API_KEY}",
        "TAVILY_API_KEY": "${TAVILY_API_KEY}"
      }
    }
  }
}

For Cursor releases using its ${env:NAME} interpolation syntax, use "${env:ANYSEARCH_API_KEY}" and "${env:TAVILY_API_KEY}". Verify environment substitution on your Cursor version; do not replace these references with literal credentials.

Development

pip install pytest
pytest tests/unit -v            # chain/override/attempts/provider unit tests (no network)

# Live provider smoke tests (hit real APIs; opt-in):
RUN_LIVE_TESTS=1 pytest tests/integration -v

Unit tests clear provider keys and UWR_* variables per test, so the suite is hermetic — it passes with or without keys exported in your shell. New providers are covered with mocked HTTP only (no keys needed, no live calls).

License

MIT

Available Tools

3 tools
list_providersA

List every provider this server knows: capabilities (search/fetch), whether it is usable right now (configured / key present), whether it is enabled, and its 1-based position in each active chain. Also reports the active search mode (failover/fanout), the fan-out fan width/grace, and the fetch policy (private-network access, block-page detection, extract limit). Never returns key values. Use it to decide what to pass in web_search/web_fetch providers.

Inputs: no named parameters. Returns: result

web_fetchA

Fetch one URL's page content as Markdown with automatic provider failover (default: AnySearch -> Tavily -> DDGS.extract; operators can reorder the chain with UWR_FETCH_CHAIN). Auth is automatic (keyed when a key is configured, else official keyless). Accepts a single url string, or urls array (max 5) for batch. providers overrides the chain order for this call. Returns JSON array of {url, content, title, content_type, truncated, original_length, provider, mode, latency_ms, attempts} — truncated: true means content was cut at WEB_RETRIEVAL_EXTRACT_CHAR_LIMIT and original_length is the pre-cut character count; failed URLs carry an error field instead. A CDN/CAPTCHA interstitial (Cloudflare "Just a moment…", Akamai "Access Denied") is not returned as content: it is a fallback-eligible error, so the chain tries the next provider. Private, loopback and link-local targets are fetched like any other URL by default; with WEB_RETRIEVAL_BLOCK_PRIVATE=1 they are refused instead. That opt-in check is a target heuristic, not SSRF protection (no protection against DNS rebinding or a redirect hop at the provider). Note: JS-rendered, login-walled or CAPTCHA-protected pages are not guaranteed. PRIVACY: each entry echoes the caller's URL verbatim in url, on success and on failure, so the link stays usable — a credential inside that URL (?token=, ?sig=, ?api_key=) is therefore returned in cleartext, not scrubbed (only an exact value of a provider key configured here is still stripped). error and attempts are scrubbed; url and content are not. The payload enters this conversation and may be recorded in session transcripts or chat logs and sent to the model provider serving it. Prefer short-lived signed URLs and revoke them after the fetch; redaction is not a confidentiality guarantee.

Inputs: url, urls, providers. Returns: result

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Loading tool schema changelog…

    TDQS

    A4.4/5.0

    Scored across 3 tools

    Disambiguation5/5

    Each tool targets a distinct action on a distinct resource: search the web, fetch a URL, and introspect the provider configuration. The `providers` parameter explicitly cross-references web_search/web_fetch with list_providers, so the boundary between 'use a provider' and 'inspect providers' is unambiguous.

    Naming Consistency5/5

    All three names follow a consistent snake_case verb_noun pattern (web_search, web_fetch, list_providers). The prefix/verb split is predictable and unambiguous across the set.

    Tool Count5/5

    Three tools is a tight, well-scoped surface for a retrieval server: search, fetch, and configuration introspection. There is no filler or redundant tool, and the provider-chain complexity is absorbed into parameters rather than fragmented into extra tools.

    Completeness4/5

    The core retrieval lifecycle (discover via search, retrieve content via fetch, inspect/adjust providers) is fully covered. Minor gaps remain, such as no caching/session state or structured extraction beyond raw Markdown, but agents can work around these.

    Maintenance

    ActivityNo data
    ResponsivenessOutdated data

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    • A
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