cve_lookup

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint and openWorldHint, covering safety and openness. The description adds substantial behavioral context by listing the specific fields returned (CVSS v2/v3, EPSS, KEV status, mitigations, ransomware associations, CPEs), which goes beyond the annotations and helps the agent set expectations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is two sentences with zero fluff. The first sentence front-loads the core purpose, and the second enumerates the key return fields. Every clause earns its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter lookup tool with no output schema, the description adequately covers the return content by listing the major fields. It does not mention error handling or pagination, but given the simplicity and the openWorldHint annotation, the essential information is present. Minor gaps prevent a 5.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema fully describes the parameter (pattern and description), so schema coverage is 100%. The description does not add new parameter semantics beyond what the schema already provides; it merely reinforces that a CVE ID is needed. With full schema coverage, baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb ('Query') and resource ('detailed vulnerability information from Shodan's CVEDB'), and enumerates the concrete data returned (CVSS, EPSS, KEV, mitigations, ransomware, CPEs). This clearly distinguishes it from siblings like cves_by_product, which likely searches by product.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description implies usage when you have a CVE identifier (the required parameter), but it does not explicitly mention when not to use it or recommend alternatives like cves_by_product for product-based queries. Guidance is implicit rather than explicit.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.