io.github.zw008/vmware-debug
A local-only incident-correlation and investigation-ledger server for VMware troubleshooting — it correlates already-fetched events, tracks evidence/hypotheses across a case, and grades conclusions, without ever touching a VMware system.
Correlate events (stateless):
build_incident_timelinetakes pre-fetched event envelopes ({ts, source, severity, entity, text, fields}) and returns a timeline, anomalous spikes, ranked root-cause hypotheses with suggested checks, and next tools to run.Discover symptoms:
list_symptom_categoriesreturns the recognised symptom categories with keywords and suggested next checks;get_case_readinesstells you the best grade your environment can reach per category before you start.Plan an investigation:
plan_caserecomputes what to fetch next (skill, tool, purpose) from the case's current state, including what is unreachable and how to supply it.Run a case ledger:
open_case,list_cases,get_casecreate and inspect cases (scope, ledger sizes, grade history).Record findings (append-only, under
$OPS_HOME):submit_case_evidence(raw tool results with source/query/time basis),record_case_gap(what couldn't be retrieved and how to close it),record_case_hypothesis(register/read candidate explanations H1, H2, …),record_case_timeline(re-correlate everything the case collected intotimeline.md).Grade and close:
grade_caserecomputes the conclusion level from the ledger (Candidate → Probable → Confirmed, plus Excluded) with no caller-supplied grade;close_caserecords the final grade, archives, and lists still-open gaps.Knowledge layer:
get_case_knowledgeshows accepted formats, what's mounted, and which version-checked entries apply to a given case.Operational traits: no VMware credentials or API calls, every tool writes an audit row to
~/.vmware/audit.db, default stdio with optional token-authenticated HTTPS, and tool exposure can be limited to read-only (plus chosen writes).
Provides diagnostic tools for VMware environments, correlating events and ranking hypotheses from logs and symptoms.
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@io.github.zw008/vmware-debug Show timeline for recent ESXi host failures"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
VMware Debug
English | 中文
Maintainer: Wei Zhou · zhouwei008@gmail.com
Community-maintained open-source project; not an official VMware or Broadcom product.
Overview · Quick Start · MCP Configuration · Capabilities and Workflows · Safety and Audit · Troubleshooting · Companion Skills · Reference · License
Overview
Runs locally over stdio by default; see below for data sources and execution boundaries.
Disclaimer: Community-maintained open-source project, not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by VMware, Inc. or Broadcom Inc. "VMware" and "vSphere" are trademarks of Broadcom. Source is publicly auditable under the MIT license.
The diagnostic brain of the VMware skill family. You bring the symptom (an error,
a log dump, a slow VM); this skill runs a systematic investigation, correlates
events from the other skills into one timeline, ranks root-cause hypotheses, and
tells you what to check next. It makes no VMware API calls and never executes
fixes; case operations write a local ledger under $OPS_HOME, and every tool also
writes a separate audit trail. Default stdio has no listener; optional authenticated
HTTPS uses caller tokens and TLS certificate/key files. Remediation is routed to vmware-aiops (single op) or
vmware-pilot (multi-step, gated), mirroring the vmware-harden → vmware-pilot
advisor/executor split.
See skills/vmware-debug/SKILL.md for the full
methodology, the event-envelope contract, and symptom routing.
Related MCP server: vmware-knight
Quick Start
Requires Python >=3.10 and uv.
uv tool install vmware-debug==2.3.3
vmware-debug --helpTarget, credential and local data setup: setup guide.
Install
uv tool install vmware-debug==2.3.3
vmware-debug categories # see which symptom categories it can diagnoseOffline / Air-Gapped Install (from source)
This project uses the modern PEP 517 build system (hatchling), so there is no
setup.py by design — that is expected, not a missing file. If you cloned the
source and hit ERROR: File "setup.py" or "setup.cfg" not found ... editable mode currently requires a setuptools-based build, your pip is older than 21.3 and
cannot do an editable (-e) install with a non-setuptools backend. Editable
mode is a developer convenience, not needed to run the tool — do one of:
# From the source tree — a normal (non-editable) install builds a wheel:
pip install . # NOT pip install -e .
# ...or upgrade pip first, and editable works too:
pip install --upgrade pip && pip install -e .For a truly air-gapped host, build the wheels on a connected machine and copy them over — the target then needs no network:
# On a connected machine, collect this package + its dependencies as wheels:
pip wheel . -w dist # → dist/*.whl (or: uv build, for just this package)
# Copy dist/ to the air-gapped host, then install offline:
pip install --no-index --find-links dist vmware-debugMCP Configuration
Copy this configuration into your MCP client's local stdio settings. The client must be able to find uvx; the initial package installation requires access to a package index.
{
"mcpServers": {
"vmware-debug": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": ["--from", "vmware-debug==2.3.3", "vmware-debug-mcp"]
}
}
}Debug needs no vCenter target configuration or VMware account credentials; case operations write a local ledger and tool calls have a separate audit trail.
Capabilities and Workflows
MCP tools (14 — 7 read, 7 write)
The seven writes go to the local case ledger only; none reaches a VMware system.
Correlation — stateless, for a single look:
Tool | What |
| [READ] Correlate pre-fetched events → timeline + spikes + ranked hypotheses + next-check ideas |
| [READ] List recognised symptom categories + what to check for each |
Investigation ledger — for an incident you will reason about over time:
Tool | What |
| [WRITE] Define the event; returns a case id and the grade this environment can reach |
| [READ] What grade this environment can reach, per symptom category, before you start |
| [READ] Which knowledge formats are accepted, what is mounted, and which entries apply to a case |
| [READ] What to fetch next — skill, tool and purpose per step; recomputed from the case's current state |
| [READ] Cases, newest first |
| [READ] One case: scope, ledger sizes, grade history |
| [WRITE] Register a candidate explanation, or read the ledger of what supports and refutes each |
| [WRITE] Record one retrieved fact, with its source, query and time basis |
| [WRITE] Record what could not be retrieved, and how to close it |
| [WRITE] Correlate everything the case has collected into one timeline |
| [WRITE] Recompute the conclusion grade from the ledger and record it |
| [WRITE] Record the final grade, archive, and name what was left open |
Event envelope: {ts, source, severity, entity, text, fields}. The agent normalizes events from each source
into this shape before handing them to debug, so debug has zero runtime dependency on the other packages.
Keep each event's event_type in fields — the classifier matches it as well as the text, and most modern
vSphere events are EventEx: the text is a generic boilerplate sentence, and only eventTypeId says what the
event actually is.
Common Workflows
Use
vmware-debug categoriesto select a symptom category.Collect relevant evidence with Monitor, Aria or Log Insight and normalize it into
events.jsonusing the event envelope; Debug itself does not connect to those systems.Run
vmware-debug triage --events events.jsonand inspect the timeline, hypotheses and next checks.If there are no events or a source is unreachable, check the source tool's configuration and connectivity and retain the evidence gap; missing data is not a healthy result.
Hand an evidence-backed fix to AIops or Pilot under that tool's execution gates.
Safety and Audit
Security
CLI policy refusals print the reason and rule, exit with code 1, and retain one denied audit row.
The diagnostic engine connects to no vCenter/NSX/Aria and needs no VMware account credentials.
Default stdio has no listener; optional HTTPS requires caller tokens and TLS files. Every tool writes
a separate audit row in ~/.vmware/audit.db. Case tools also write the local ledger: evidence, gaps, hypotheses and
grade history are append-only; timeline.md is regenerated from the evidence, and case.json holds the current
grade and status. The same holds with several writers: every write to a case first takes that case's lock file
(.ledger.lock, exclusive create), so two processes writing the same case in a shared $OPS_HOME are serialized
instead of dropping each other's entries; every file is written under a temporary name and then moved into place,
so a reader never sees a half-written file (on a file system without hard links, a new evidence file is instead
created in place: still never overwritten, but it can be read half-written). A lock left behind by a crashed
process is reported together with its holder and never deleted automatically; delete it by hand once you have
confirmed no process is writing that case. Released versions 1.11.3 and earlier do not take this lock, so every
machine sharing a case directory must upgrade. See SECURITY.md.
Remote access (HTTPS) and limiting tools
By default vmware-debug mcp speaks stdio to one local client and offers every tool. Two options change that
(vmware-policy ≥ 1.21.0).
Serve over HTTPS so clients on other machines can connect. Every caller needs a bearer token:
vmware-audit token create alice # prints the token once; give it to alice
vmware-audit token list # names only
vmware-audit token revoke alice # refused from its next request, no restart
vmware-debug mcp --transport https --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8443 \
--cert /etc/vmware-mcp/server.pem --key /etc/vmware-mcp/server-key.pem \
--public-name mcp.example.comConnect a client (Claude Code shown; any MCP client that supports streamable HTTP and custom headers works):
claude mcp add --transport http vmware-debug https://mcp.example.com:8443/mcp \
--header "Authorization: Bearer $VMWARE_MCP_TOKEN"{
"mcpServers": {
"vmware-debug": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://mcp.example.com:8443/mcp",
"headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer ${VMWARE_MCP_TOKEN}" }
}
}
}The server will not start without a token, refuses Host/Origin values outside
--public-name, and checks before it binds that unauthenticated requests get 401. Use a certificate your clients trust for those names.Behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy on the same machine use
--transport http --host 127.0.0.1 --public-name mcp.example.comand pass theAuthorizationheader through.Behind a load balancer or gateway on another machine, keep
--transport https(a self-signed certificate is fine), list in--public-namethe host name the balancer sends asHost, and have it forwardAuthorization. Its health probe can useGET /healthz, which needs no token and returns only{"status": "ok"}(vmware-policy ≥ 1.23.0).Send
traceparentorX-Request-IDwith each request to have it stored on the audit row;vmware-audit log --correlation-id IDthen finds the calls behind one platform request.The audit log records each caller as
token:<name>. Calls naming different targets run in parallel; calls that name no target run one at a time, so name the target when several people share a server.Everyone who can reach the endpoint acts with this server's account. Tokens identify callers; they grant nothing on the platform. Run one endpoint per privilege level.
Several people or roles on one endpoint: run
vmware-audit roles enableonce, then give each token a role (vmware-audit token create NAME --role reader, or a role inroles.yamlnaming tools and targets; vmware-policy ≥ 1.24.0). A role limits what the token may call on this endpoint; it cannot grant more than the account has. See vmware-policy's README, "Roles for network callers".
Offer only read tools, plus the writes you choose:
vmware-debug mcp --expose read --allow-write close_case
# or: VMWARE_DEBUG_MCP_EXPOSE=read VMWARE_DEBUG_MCP_ALLOW_WRITE=close_case vmware-debug mcpTools not offered do not appear in the client's tool list. A bad value or an unknown write tool stops the server (exit 2). This limits what clients are offered; it is not authorization, so the account itself should be least-privilege.
Details: skills/vmware-debug/references/setup-guide.md ("Serving MCP over HTTPS", "Limiting which tools are offered").
Troubleshooting
For installation issues, see the installation instructions on this page. Check CLI arguments with --help before operating. Include only a minimal, redacted example when reporting a problem.
Companion Skills
The VMware Skills family contains 14 MCP servers and the shared Policy library. Choose tools by responsibility: vmware-skills.
Companion Skills
Need | Skill |
Incident correlation / root cause | vmware-debug (this project) |
Centralized log search | vmware-log-insight (feed its |
vCenter events and alarms | vmware-monitor |
Metrics / anomalies | vmware-aria |
Executing a fix | vmware-aiops (single op) / vmware-pilot (multi-step, gated) |
Reference
Release history: RELEASE_NOTES.md.
Read-only self-test with your own model and agent host: model-fit self-test.
Upgrading to 2.0
2.0 renames 13 of its 14 MCP tools so every name starts with a verb (e.g. case_close → close_case, case_get → get_case, case_grade → grade_case). The full old → new table is in
RELEASE_NOTES.md. Nothing else changes: same tools, parameters,
safety gates and CLI commands. If an agent prompt, script or ~/.vmware/rules.yaml names a tool, update it — though deny
rules written with the old names keep working with vmware-policy ≥ 1.18.1 (vmware-audit policy lists any rule the
renames widened), and vmware-pilot ≥ 1.13 translates old names in saved workflows.
If an install older than 2.0 shares that rules.yaml, give it vmware-policy ≥ 1.18.2 too: it matches each rule
against both the old and the new name, so one file serves both.
License
MIT.
Available Tools
14 toolsbuild_incident_timelineARead-onlyIdempotent
[READ] Correlate already-fetched VMware events into one incident view.
WHEN: use this after you've pulled events for an incident from the data-source skills (vmware-monitor get_events/get_alarms, vmware-aria list_alerts/list_anomalies, vmware-log-insight search_logs/aggregate_logs, vmware-nsx) — feed them here to find what correlates and where to look next. Not sure which events to pull? Run list_symptom_categories first. This tool does NOT fetch anything itself.
RETURNS: {event_count, window, binning, classification, spikes
(strongest anomalous bins), spikes_total, hypotheses (ranked
root-cause candidates, each with a suggested_check), next_checks (which
skill/tool to run next)}. Read binning for the resolution you were
given, and classification for how much of the stream matched nothing —
the ranking describes only the part that did.
GOTCHAS: read-only, stateless, no network — nothing is executed. Remediation routes to vmware-aiops (single fix) or vmware-pilot (multi-step). A malformed event returns {error, hint} naming the offending index.
Inputs: events (required), top_n, bin_seconds, z_threshold.
close_caseA
[WRITE] Record the final grade and archive the case — step 08.
WHEN: when the investigation is finished, or is being handed over. Closing turns a working folder into a record other people rely on, so it computes and records the grade rather than accepting one.
RETURNS: {case_id, state, grade, open_gaps, path, note}. open_gaps
names anything still blocking a hypothesis at the moment of closing —
stated here rather than left in the file for someone to find.
GOTCHAS: a closed case is not closed again and its record is never rewritten. To reopen the question, open a new case that cites this one, so the original conclusion and whatever changed it both stay readable.
Inputs: case_id (required).
get_caseARead-onlyIdempotent
[READ] One case: its scope, its ledger sizes, and its grade history.
WHEN: to pick up an investigation, or to see why a case sits at the
grade it does. Returns counts and identifiers rather than the whole
ledger — read the case folder itself (the path from open_case) for
full evidence bodies.
RETURNS: {case_id, path, state, grade, opened_at, scope, evidence_count,
sources, gap_count, blocking_gaps, grade_history}. sources is the
distinct skills evidence came from, which is what corroboration is
counted in.
Inputs: case_id (required).
get_case_knowledgeARead-onlyIdempotent
[READ] What the knowledge layer accepts, and what is mounted.
WHEN: when someone asks what can be added to make conclusions stronger, or when a case will not reach Confirmed and you need to say why in terms they can act on. This is the answer to "which knowledge formats do you take" — the first question anyone mounting a library asks.
RETURNS: {root, sections, entries, with_applies_to, by_source, unreadable, unsupported, formats, needs_conversion, note} — plus {applicable, decisive_here} when a case_id is given.
formats lists every extension read and how each carries its metadata:
Markdown front-matter, YAML/JSON whole-file, JSONL per line, CSV/TSV per
row, and plain text with a sibling .yaml. needs_conversion names the
ones that must become Markdown first (PDF, DOCX, PPTX, HTML).
GOTCHAS: an entry is decisive ONLY if its applies_to block was checked
against the case scope and passed — matching is by version
applicability, never by similarity, because an entry written for the
wrong build reads exactly like the right one. An entry with no
applies_to can support a hypothesis but can never make a case
Confirmed. A constraint the case scope cannot answer is not a match
either: silence is not a pass.
Inputs: case_id.
get_case_readinessARead-onlyIdempotent
[READ] What strength of conclusion can this environment reach?
WHEN: before starting an investigation, or when a case will not go higher and you want to know whether that is fixable. Answering this first is worth far more than discovering it halfway through.
RETURNS: {classes, categories, unrecognised_skills, note}. A name that
matched no skill in the catalogue comes back in unrecognised_skills
rather than being absorbed into "not installed" — otherwise a typo reads
as advice to install something you already have. Per evidence class:
whether it is
available, through which tools, and if not, how_to_supply. Per
symptom category (storage, network, compute, ha_drs, configuration,
accelerator, kubernetes, hardware, host_lifecycle, power_lifecycle,
auth, platform, licensing, data_collection): a ceiling and the
independent_sources behind it. There is deliberately no single score —
"readiness 78%" cannot be acted on, "storage reaches Probable, hardware
reaches Candidate" can.
GOTCHAS: two classes served by the SAME skill count as one source, so two available classes do not always mean Probable. The hardware class is unavailable no matter what is installed — nothing in this family reaches below ESXi — and the knowledge class becomes available only when entries are mounted under $OPS_HOME/knowledge/.
Inputs: available_skills.
grade_caseA
[WRITE] Compute and record the conclusion grade — steps 07/08.
WHEN: when you think the investigation has reached a conclusion, or to record where it stands before handing it over.
There is deliberately NO parameter for the grade. You cannot state a conclusion level; it is recomputed from the ledger on every call. If you disagree with the result, change the ledger — submit the evidence that is missing, or record the gap that is blocking it.
The levels: Candidate (a hypothesis exists); Probable (at least two INDEPENDENT sources agree — two calls to the same skill are one source — and nothing outstanding could overturn it); Confirmed (that, plus a decisive item: a direct hardware diagnostic, a version-checked knowledge-base entry, or a vendor SR, and no gap left open); Excluded (an observation that actually rules the hypothesis out — "we looked and found nothing" is a gap, not an exclusion). Exclusion is per hypothesis, counting only sources that falsify THAT hypothesis; the case is Excluded only when every registered one is. A hypothesis contradicted but not yet ruled out holds the case at Candidate. Otherwise the grade counts only evidence that falsifies nothing.
RETURNS: {grade, previous, direction, reasons, ceiling, ceiling_reasons,
rules_source, rules_origin, hypotheses}. hypotheses lists every
registered hypothesis as {id, status: open|excluded}. direction is
initial/up/down/unchanged — grades may go DOWN, and the history records
it when they do.
GOTCHAS: on a stock install ceiling is "probable", because Confirmed
needs a decisive source and there is neither a hardware-diagnostic
channel nor a knowledge library mounted yet. That is a real limit, not
a caution. Every grading is appended to conclusion.md and none is ever
rewritten.
Inputs: case_id (required).
list_casesARead-onlyIdempotent
[READ] List investigation cases, newest first.
WHEN: to find the id of a case you or someone else opened earlier. Returns the family list envelope {items, returned, limit, total, truncated, hint}; each item is {case_id, summary, state, grade, opened_at}. A case whose folder is damaged appears with state="unreadable" rather than vanishing from the list.
Inputs: limit.
list_symptom_categoriesARead-onlyIdempotent
[READ] List the symptom categories vmware-debug recognises, each with example keywords and a suggested next check (which skill/tool to run). Takes no parameters. Use this when you don't yet know what to look at — it turns "something's wrong" into concrete investigation steps. Then gather the events those checks name and pass them to build_incident_timeline. Returns the family list envelope {items, returned, limit, total, truncated, hint}; each item is {category, example_keywords, suggested_check}. The routing table is a fixed constant, so truncated is always false and total exact — this is every category, not a page. Read-only; no network access.
Inputs: no named parameters.
open_caseA
[WRITE] Open an investigation case — step 01, define the event.
WHEN: at the start of an incident you expect to reason about rather than glance at. For a one-off lookup use build_incident_timeline alone.
RETURNS: {case_id, path, state, grade, ceiling, ceiling_reasons, next}.
Read ceiling now — it is the best grade this install can reach at all.
GOTCHAS: writes only under $OPS_HOME, never to a VMware system, and never over an existing case.
Inputs: summary (required), determined_by (required), objects, window_end, +2 more.
plan_caseARead-onlyIdempotent
[READ] What to fetch next for this case — step 02, recomputed each call.
WHEN: right after open_case, and again after each round of evidence. It is not a checklist: submit something and the next plan is shorter, lose a source and it routes around it.
RETURNS: {category, category_signals, steps, already_covered, held_back, unavailable, ceiling, note}. Steps are interleaved across evidence classes, so you get breadth before depth — corroboration is counted in distinct sources, which is what actually moves the grade. Each step is {evidence_class, skill, tool, purpose, objects, window, degraded} — call that skill's tool, then submit the result with submit_case_evidence.
GOTCHAS: unavailable is the important half. A source this install
cannot reach is listed there with how_to_supply rather than left out, so
the gap is visible now instead of when the conclusion refuses to firm
up. An empty steps is never silent — note says whether everything
reachable is already in, or whether nothing here can be reached.
category_signals names the words that chose the category, and any
category that also matched — check it first, since the rest runs off
that one word.
Inputs: case_id (required), category, max_steps, available_skills.
record_case_gapA
[WRITE] Record something the investigation could NOT obtain.
WHEN: any time a fetch failed, was refused, returned nothing, or the data simply does not exist in this environment. This is the tool that keeps a case honest: an unrecorded gap makes it look better supported than it is.
RETURNS: {case_id, gap_id, grade, reasons}.
GOTCHAS: recording a gap does not punish the case for the evidence it does have — a missing confirmation caps the grade, it does not demote it. Writing gaps down is meant to be free.
Inputs: why (required), what (required), case_id (required), how_to_close (required), +2 more.
record_case_hypothesisA
[WRITE] Register a candidate explanation — step 06. Called without
statement it writes nothing and only reads the hypothesis ledger.
WHEN: as soon as you have a theory worth testing, and again to see where
each one stands. Pass statement to add one; omit it to just read.
Every hypothesis gets an id (H1, H2, …). Those ids are what record_case_gap(blocks=[...]) and submit_case_evidence(falsifies=[...]) refer to, and an id that was never registered is REFUSED rather than ignored — a dangling reference blocks nothing and falsifies nothing, which quietly reports a stronger case than you have.
RETURNS: {case_id, added, hypotheses, note}. Each entry carries its
status: refuted (ruled out by grade_case's rule), blocked (a gap is
in the way, with the gap id and how to close it), or open.
refuted_by lists every falsifying item; the first next step says when
more sources are needed. Status is computed from what points at the
hypothesis, never asserted.
GOTCHAS: refuted outranks blocked. Once an observation settles the question, a missing measurement no longer matters.
Inputs: case_id (required), statement.
record_case_timelineA
[WRITE] Correlate everything this case has collected — steps 04/05.
WHEN: once evidence is in. Unlike build_incident_timeline, this takes no events: it reads the payloads already submitted, so the result is reproducible from the case folder alone months later, on a machine with access to nothing.
RETURNS: {event_count, window, binning, classification, spikes, spikes_total, hypotheses, evidence_without_events, evidence_without_events_detail, rejected, note} and writes timeline.md.
GOTCHAS: note distinguishes three states that all show zero events —
no evidence submitted at all, evidence that carried none, and a genuinely
quiet window — and names which items carried none, with what they held
instead. rejected names any row that could not be read, with the
evidence item it came from; dropping those silently would shrink the
picture the conclusion rests on. Submit a read tool's raw result as
payload for its events to reach here — a summary of the result carries
no rows, and submit_case_evidence says so at the time.
Inputs: case_id (required), top_n, bin_seconds, z_threshold.
submit_case_evidenceA
[WRITE] Record one retrieved fact — steps 02/03 of the evidence loop.
WHEN: after every read-tool call you intend to reason from.
RETURNS: {case_id, evidence_id, payload_events, payload_note, grade, reasons} — the resulting grade, so you need no second call to see whether this changed anything, and what the payload was read as, so a summary submitted in place of a result is visible here rather than as a zero from record_case_timeline later.
GOTCHAS: a fetch that failed or came back empty goes to record_case_gap, not here.
Inputs: case_id (required), summary (required), source_tool (required), source_skill (required), +9 more.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
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TDQS
Scored across 14 tools
Most tools are clearly separated by lifecycle stage and action, but build_incident_timeline and record_case_timeline both perform event correlation, and plan_case, get_case_readiness, and get_case_knowledge all provide advisory information. The detailed descriptions do a good job of distinguishing them, but they require careful reading.
All 14 tool names use snake_case and begin with a clear verb (build_, list_, open_, get_, submit_, record_, grade_, plan_, close_). The pattern is highly predictable and consistent across reads and writes.
14 tools is well-scoped for a case-based investigation workflow that includes setup, evidence handling, grading, readiness, planning, knowledge, and closure. Each tool appears to earn its place rather than padding the surface.
The server covers the full investigation lifecycle from open_case through close_case, including evidence, gaps, hypotheses, timelines, grading, and readiness. Minor gaps exist around directly reading case evidence bodies or fetching events, but those are intentionally delegated to external data-source skills and the case folder.
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