Verax
OfficialClick on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@VeraxApprove the tool call get_user and record the signed decision and effect row."
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
Verax
The body an agent asks before it acts.
Verax is an MCP server that sits between an agent and its tools. Every tool call passes a policy gate and leaves a signed decision record before anything runs; every call that ran leaves an effect row that is reconciled against its record afterwards. A refusal is recorded the same way as an approval. A call the policy will not decide alone is held until an operator on this machine approves it. The ledger stays on the machine the body runs on, and the body opens only when its authorization is configured: there is no default token.
By VERAX Teknoloji. Sister projects: Conarium · Tugra · Cedulon. Decision records use the Cedulon record format.
What ships
Package | What it is |
The MCP server and the | |
The decision proxy the body is built on: policy, signed records, ledger, | |
The roster document a body serves and the panel lists, with its strict parser. |
The body is also listed in the MCP registry as io.github.verax-ai/verax.
Related MCP server: Conarium
Install
npm install -g @verax-ai/body
verax --help
verax doctorNode 22.6 or newer. The body speaks MCP over Streamable HTTP at /mcp on
VERAX_BIND (default 127.0.0.1:8787) and needs an issuer, a JWKS URL, an
audience, a state directory and a policy file before it listens; verax doctor names what is missing. The variables and the run steps are in
packages/body/README.md.
Tools
The policy decides which of these a token's scopes may call;
packages/proxy/policy/default.json denies what it does not name.
Tool | Description |
| Reads one memory item behind the gate, stored per tenant. |
| Writes one memory item behind the gate, stored per tenant. |
| Reads a decision back from the signed ledger, with its chain, its signatures and its findings. |
| Reads the inbox. |
| Writes to the outbox; reaches only hosts the policy allow-lists. |
| Authorizes a payment and records it, under a cap, a payee list and a daily limit from the policy; held for an operator when the policy says so. The body does not move money. |
What the body does beyond the gate
Approval: a held call is approved with
verax approveon this machine, or from the panel after a passkey sign-in (verax operator); the approver's operator id is bound into the signed record by hash.Witness:
verax witnesssigns effect rows from a second process and writes durable checkpoints; without it the witness class staysself.Halt and revoke:
verax haltturns every further call into a signed deny; a revoked token id is refused before any record is written.Reconcile:
verax reconcilematches recorded spends against a card statement export and names the matched, ghost and authorized-but-unpaid rows.Tenant key: memory and inbox are stored under a key derived from the token's issuer and subject; another tenant's id is answered with a signed deny.
Bounds: rate and daily counters, a disk-low refusal (HTTP 507) when a deny could not be recorded, and an egress allow-list; counters that cannot be read fail closed.
Doctor and heartbeat:
verax doctornames what is missing or stale before the first call finds out.
Connect a client
The body listens on http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp by default. A client
configuration looks like this; the token comes from your issuer.
{
"mcpServers": {
"verax": {
"url": "http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp",
"headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer <token from your issuer>" }
}
}
}Status
What the tree carries and what stays unproven is stated, item by item, in
docs/STATUS.md. Nothing in this repository is a claim
beyond that file, and a paragraph there is not a release. The threat model is
in docs/THREAT_MODEL.md; how to report a
vulnerability is in SECURITY.md.
What else is in the tree
apps/panelis the account-for screen: the records list, the black box and the status view, read from the signed ledger. Private; it is not published. The panel session uses the code flow; the access token stays in memory and is dropped on refresh. Vite may still attachVERAX_DEV_TOKENfrom.env.localto/apiwhen the request has no Authorization header (desktop MCP brains and tests).scripts/dev-issuer.mjsis development only; not a production authorization server. It servesGET /authorize(PKCE S256) andPOST /token, writes a token to--out, and never prints one. It listens onVERAX_DEV_ISSUER_PORT(default 8790).NODE_ENV=productionexits.scripts/demo-box.mjsis development only: one process that starts the dev issuer and the body on loopback with a temporary ledger, mints itself a short-lived token through the issuer's code flow, and speaks MCP over stdio for a sandbox that cannot hold a token of its own, such as a directory's build check. The body is not changed by it: every call still passes the gate and is recorded,spendis always held, and no operator is there to approve it.NODE_ENV=productionexits. Not a deployment.
Developing
npm ci
npm test # guards, typecheck, build, unit and cost suites, panel
npm run pack:smoke # pack the three packages and install them elsewhereCI runs the suite as a non-root user on Linux and again on Windows, plus the
proxy performance check. Releases go out from the Actions tab:
release.yml publishes the three packages with npm trusted publishing and a
provenance attestation, then mcp-registry.yml updates the registry record
once npm answers for the new version. Neither runs on push.
License
Apache-2.0.
Available Tools
6 toolsaudit.explainA
Reads one decision back from the signed ledger by its ref and explains it. Use it to check what the body decided about an earlier call and whether the recorded effect matched, before repeating a call or reporting on it; read-only, and the lookup itself is recorded too. Returns JSON with record (the signed decision's claims: tool, verdict, policy hash, timestamps), effect (the reconciled effect row), finding (match, mismatch or missing), witnessClass, guarantee, warnings, trustRoot (which key verified the signatures), and for a held call pair with its defer and resolution records. A ref that does not exist, or belongs to another tenant, is answered with the same signed deny, so neither case reveals the other.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| ref | Yes | The decision reference: the ref returned by an earlier call, also the tail of a denied:… or deferred:… answer; 1 to 64 characters of letters, digits, '.', '_' or '-', starting with a letter or digit. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so thoroughly. It discloses the read-only nature, the side effect that the lookup is recorded, and the security behavior of returning a signed deny for both non-existent and other-tenant refs to avoid information leaks. This is exemplary behavioral disclosure.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is dense but well-organized, moving from purpose to usage, return fields, and edge-case behavior. It is longer than minimal, yet every sentence contributes essential information and nothing feels redundant or off-topic.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a single-parameter tool with no output schema, the description fully explains the return shape: record, effect, finding, witnessClass, guarantee, warnings, trustRoot, and the held-call pair case. Error semantics are also covered with the signed-deny behavior. An agent has everything needed to call and interpret the tool correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3, but the description adds practical semantics beyond the schema: the ref is the one returned by an earlier call, or the tail of a denied/deferred answer. This helps the agent locate the correct value to pass.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource: reads a signed ledger decision by ref and explains it. The tool's focus on auditing decisions is clearly distinct from sibling tools handling memory, messaging, and spending, so an agent can tell them apart immediately.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly says when to use it: to check what the body decided about an earlier call and whether the effect matched, before repeating or reporting on it. It also notes the lookup is recorded, which is a useful side-effect warning. No alternatives are named, but the siblings are unrelated so exclusions are not necessary.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
memory.getA
Reads one memory item this tenant stored earlier with memory.put, by its id. Use it to recall a fact, a setting or a note before acting on it; nothing is written. Like every call it passes the policy gate and leaves a signed decision record; an id that belongs to another tenant is answered with a signed deny. Returns the stored item as JSON: {id, body, source, validFromMs, validUntilMs, versionHash}. Outside the validity window the body is withheld: {stale: true, id, validUntilMs} after it, {notYetValid: true, id, validFromMs} before it. An unknown id answers {error: "not-found", id}.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | The id given to memory.put: 1 to 128 characters of letters, digits, '.', '_' or '-', starting with a letter or digit; case-sensitive. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden, and it delivers: it discloses policy-gate behavior, signed decision records, cross-tenant deny behavior, exact JSON return shapes, stale/notYetValid handling, and not-found errors. This is unusually thorough for a read tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is dense but every sentence earns its place: purpose first, then usage, then safety/behavior, then return formats and edge cases. There is no filler, and the structure front-loads the single most important fact: what the tool reads.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a one-parameter read tool with no output schema and no annotations, the description fully covers return values, success and error cases, cross-tenant behavior, and validity-window semantics. An agent has everything needed to call it correctly and interpret all possible responses.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema itself fully documents the one parameter, including the charset, length, starting character, and case-sensitivity, so schema coverage is 100%. The description adds only 'by its id' and 'given to memory.put,' which is helpful but does not materially go beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Reads one memory item this tenant stored earlier with memory.put, by its id.' This accurately distinguishes it from the write sibling memory.put and from other tools: it is a read operation for a single memory item.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives a clear use case: 'Use it to recall a fact, a setting or a note before acting on it; nothing is written.' It implies read vs. write by referencing memory.put, but it does not explicitly state 'use memory.put when storing' or list exclusions beyond that the call writes nothing.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
memory.putA
Writes one memory item for this tenant, or replaces the item with the same id, in the body's state directory on this machine. Use it to keep a fact for a later memory.get together with where it came from and how long it holds, so a stale fact is not served later. The call passes the policy gate and is recorded; the record carries the item's versionHash, a SHA-256 over id, body and validity window. Returns {ok: true, id, versionHash}. A missing source answers {error: "source-required"}, a missing validUntilMs {error: "validUntilMs-required"}, a malformed id {error: "id-invalid"}.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | Identifier to store under and read back with memory.get: 1 to 128 characters of letters, digits, '.', '_' or '-', starting with a letter or digit; case-sensitive. An existing item with this id is replaced. | |
| body | Yes | The value to keep, as any JSON: object, array, string, number or boolean. Stored as given and returned as given by memory.get. | |
| source | Yes | Where the value came from, as a JSON object of your choosing, for example {"kind": "document", "ref": "invoice-2026-09.pdf"}. Required; stored with the item so a later reader can weigh it. | |
| validFromMs | No | Optional. Unix time in milliseconds from which the item may be served; before it memory.get answers notYetValid. Omit to serve it at once. | |
| validUntilMs | Yes | Required. Unix time in milliseconds after which memory.get answers stale and withholds the body. Pick the moment the fact should no longer be trusted. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries full behavioral burden. It discloses that the call passes the policy gate, is recorded, returns a versionHash, and defines error responses for missing source, missing validUntilMs, and invalid id. It also implies mutation via 'writes' and 'replaces', though it doesn't explicitly state destructive effects beyond replacement.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a few sentences, but every sentence adds meaningful information: the core action, usage rationale, recording and hashing behavior, and error cases. It is front-loaded with the primary action and does not waste words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a tool with 5 params, nested objects, no output schema, and no annotations, the description covers the essential operational details: what it does, how to use it, what it returns (example), and common errors. It doesn't explain the exact return structure beyond the example, but that is acceptable given no output schema and the example provided.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3. The description adds value by explaining the purpose of source and validUntilMs in the usage section and enumerating error responses tied to specific parameters (e.g., source-required, validUntilMs-required, id-invalid). This goes beyond the schema's basic field descriptions.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (writes/replaces) and resource (one memory item), with explicit scope (tenant, body's state directory on this machine). It also distinguishes from the sibling memory.get by saying 'for a later memory.get', making the action unambiguous.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Provides clear context: use it to keep a fact for later retrieval, with provenance and validity window to avoid serving stale facts. It doesn't explicitly state when not to use it or name alternative tools, but the guidance is sufficient for an agent to decide when to write memory.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
message.readA
Reads this tenant's inbox, the messages placed for it in the body's state directory on this machine, and returns them as a JSON array in arrival order, oldest first. Use it to see what has arrived before deciding what to answer. Takes no arguments; read-only; the call is recorded like every other. An empty or absent inbox answers [].
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It discloses the read-only nature, that the call is recorded, and that an empty inbox returns [] – all beyond what the schema shows.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is succinct, front-loads the core action (reads inbox), and includes necessary behavioral notes without fluff.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given zero parameters, no output schema, and no annotations, the description fully covers what an agent needs to know: what it does, when to use it, and the return format.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
There are no parameters, so there is nothing to add. The schema coverage is 100%, and the description confirms no arguments are needed, which is sufficient.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool reads the tenant's inbox and returns messages as a JSON array. However, it does not explicitly differentiate from sibling tools like message.send or memory.get, though the read-only nature is implied.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description says to use it before deciding what to answer, which gives some context. But it does not mention when not to use it or compare with alternatives like memory.get.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
message.sendA
Queues one message in this tenant's outbox on this machine for the delivery step the operator runs; this call opens no network connection and nothing leaves the body from it. Use it to hand off a message, not to deliver one. Like every call it passes the policy gate and leaves a signed decision record. The gate reads the host after the last '@' in to and allows it only when it is on the policy's egress allow-list; otherwise the call is refused with denied:egress-blocked, or denied:egress-host-missing when no host can be read. A policy rule in approve mode holds the call for an operator instead and answers deferred:approval-required:. Returns {queued: true, ref}, where ref is the decision reference for audit.explain.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| to | Yes | Recipient address with a host after the last '@', for example ops@example.com. The host, lower-cased, is matched against the policy's egress list. | |
| _ref | No | Optional reference you choose for this call, 1 to 64 characters of letters, digits, '.', '_' or '-', starting with a letter or digit. Resend the same call with the same _ref after an operator approved it to receive allowed:<ref>; a _ref reused for a different call is refused with denied:ref-reuse. | |
| text | Yes | The message body as plain text. Stored as given in the outbox row. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full disclosure burden, and it does so thoroughly: no network connection is opened, nothing leaves the body, the policy gate is passed, a signed decision record is left, and refusal/deferral outcomes are specified. This gives a complete behavioral picture.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is dense but every sentence earns its place: core behavior, usage guidance, policy outcome, approval behavior, and return value. The most important disambiguation—queueing rather than delivering—is front-loaded.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Despite having no output schema and no annotations, the description fully specifies the return shape, error/refusal statuses, approval flow, and policy context. An agent has enough information to invoke this tool correctly and interpret its result.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds useful meaning: the host is lower-cased and checked against the egress allow-list, and the _ref interaction with operator approval and ref-reuse refusal is clarified. This goes beyond the schema without being redundant.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb and resource: it 'queues one message in this tenant's outbox on this machine' and explicitly says it is not delivering the message. This clearly distinguishes it from message.read and from any actual network-send behavior the name 'send' might imply.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It explicitly states when to use the tool ('Use it to hand off a message, not to deliver one') and points to the operator-run delivery step as the separate follow-up. It also explains policy approval/deferral behavior so the agent knows when the call will be queued versus held for an operator.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
spendA
Asks the body to authorize a payment and records the decision; the body never moves money, so authorized: true is a signed permission for a later payment step, not a transfer. Use it before any payment so that amount, currency, payee and reference are checked against the policy: the one currency the policy names, a cap per call, a payee list and a daily limit. A call outside those bounds is refused with a signed deny naming the bound: denied:spend-cap, denied:spend-payee, denied:spend-currency or denied:spend-daily. A call within them is held for an operator on this machine and answers deferred:approval-required:; once that ref is approved (verax approve, or the panel), resending the same call with the same _ref answers allowed:, and the authorization is recorded as {authorized: true, ref, amountMinor, currency, payee, reference}. Without a spend rule in the policy every call answers denied:spend-not-wired.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| _ref | No | Optional reference you choose for this call, 1 to 64 characters of letters, digits, '.', '_' or '-', starting with a letter or digit. Resend the same call with the same _ref after an operator approved it to receive allowed:<ref>; a _ref reused for a different call is refused with denied:ref-reuse. | |
| payee | Yes | Who is to be paid, spelled exactly as the policy's payee list spells it (a merchant or account name). A payee off the list is refused. | |
| currency | Yes | ISO 4217 code in upper case, for example USD, EUR or TRY. Must equal the currency the policy's spend rule names. | |
| reference | Yes | Your own reference for this payment, such as an invoice or order id. Recorded with the authorization and used by verax reconcile to match the card statement. | |
| amountMinor | Yes | Amount in the currency's minor unit as a positive integer: cents, kuruş or pence, so 1250 means 12.50. Compared against the policy's cap per call and daily limit. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations exist, so the description carries the full disclosure burden — and it excels: it reveals that 'authorized: true is a signed permission... not a transfer,' enumerates every refusal token (denied:spend-cap, denied:spend-payee, denied:spend-currency, denied:spend-daily, denied:spend-not-wired), explains the deferred:approval-required flow, and specifies the recorded result shape {authorized: true, ref, amountMinor, currency, payee, reference}. This far exceeds typical behavioral disclosure.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a dense single paragraph, but every sentence earns its place: purpose and non-transfer caveat, when-to-use and policy checks, refusal modes, approval flow, and the not-wired fallback. It is front-loaded with the core purpose, though breaking the wall of text into shorter sentences would improve scannability.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With no output schema and no annotations, the description must cover result states and does: every possible answer (denied tokens, deferred:approval-required:<ref>, allowed:<ref>) is specified, along with the recorded authorization object and the not-wired case. For a complex async approval tool, an agent has everything needed to invoke it correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100% — each parameter already has detailed descriptions including the policy constraints (amountMinor compared against cap and daily limit, currency must equal the policy currency, payee must be on the list, _ref reuse rules). The description reinforces how parameters map to refusal tokens but adds little beyond what the schema provides, so the high-coverage baseline of 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb+resource — 'asks the body to authorize a payment and records the decision' — and immediately disambiguates by clarifying 'the body never moves money... not a transfer.' None of the sibling tools (memory.get, message.send, audit.explain) overlap with payment authorization, so an agent can identify this tool's role unmistakably.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives explicit when-to-use guidance: 'Use it before any payment so that amount, currency, payee and reference are checked against the policy.' It also narrates the full acceptance/rejection flow and the approval path via 'verax approve, or the panel.' It stops short of explicitly naming alternatives or exclusions, though no sibling is a payment alternative, so 4 rather than 5.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
6 tool updates
v0.1.1- First observed
audit.explain - First observed
memory.get - First observed
memory.put - First observed
message.read - First observed
message.send - First observed
spend
TDQS
Scored across 6 tools
Each tool has a clear, distinct purpose: memory.get/put for storage, audit.explain for decision lookup, message.read/send for messaging, and spend for payment authorization. There is no overlap or ambiguity; an agent can confidently select the right tool for a task.
Most tools follow a consistent 'domain.verb' pattern (memory.get, memory.put, audit.explain, message.read, message.send), but 'spend' is a lone verb without a domain prefix, creating a minor deviation. The overall style is uniform and readable.
With 6 tools, the surface is well-scoped for the domains covered (memory, messaging, audit, spending). Each tool serves a distinct operational need, and the count is neither sparse nor bloated.
Core operations are covered: memory supports get and put (including replace), messaging supports read and send, audit supports explain (though no list), and spend supports authorization. Minor gaps exist, such as no explicit delete for memory or messages and no audit listing, but these are not critical for the intended workflows.
Maintenance
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