cedulon
Cedulon is a local MCP server for policy-gated, auditable agent-to-agent spend on a mock rail, with signed receipts and fail-closed enforcement.
cedulon_spend: Submit a spend request (amount, currency, payee, nonce, optional tool); if policy allows, get a signed COSE receipt JSON; if denied, get a fail-closed reason such as
limit-amount.cedulon_audit: Reconcile the in-process receipt chain and checkpoint against the rail extract; optionally inject extra settlements to test bypasses; returns balanced books or findings.
cedulon_verify_receipt: Verify a spend receipt COSE_Sign1, including an optional payee countersignature, using the receipt object or COSE hex plus public keys.
cedulon_export_ledger: Export receipts, checkpoint, and rail extract in the
demo:exportJSON shape for external auditing or verification.cedulon_status: View server version, policy summary, receipt count, and chain head hash.
Policy enforcement via environment: Configure limits like max amount, cumulative caps, payment counts, windows, allowed payees/currencies/tools, and payer identity; optional persistent state via
CEDULON_STATE_PATH.Works as a local stdio MCP server: no network requests, no credentials, no real money—settles on a mock rail and is usable from Claude Desktop/Code/Cursor or via
docker run -i --rm cedulon.
Cedulon
Audit layer for agent-to-agent spend: signed trade manifest, fail-closed policy, signed spend receipt (SCITT-anchorable).
Cedulon is not a payment rail. It sits above x402 and AP2.
The packages are on npm and the MCP server is in the MCP Registry, but nothing
here touches money: no real wallets and no network rails, only mock fixtures.
cedulon_spend settles on a mock rail and says so in its own description.
Core packages carry zero runtime dependencies; the MCP server package depends only on the official MCP SDK.
Requirements
Node.js 22 or newer (20+ for the libraries; scripts use Node type stripping)
npm 10 or newer
Related MCP server: dingdawg-agent-wallet
Install and run (clean clone)
npm install
npx tsc --noEmit
npm run test:all
npm run demonpm run tamper is expected to exit non-zero (tampered bytes fail verify).
npm run demo:unguarded shows the unprotected hole: 100/100 allows.
npm run audit must exit 0 (audit: balanced).
npm run demo:bypass must exit non-zero:
audit: 1 settlement without receipt → FAIL.
npm run demo:bypasses prints four FAIL lines (missing receipt, wrong
amount, null-ref, garbage chain head) and exits 0 only when every bypass
is caught; a missed bypass makes it exit non-zero.
npm run demo:live reconciles a real Base Sepolia USDC window instead of a
fixture. Read-only: it needs an RPC URL in CEDULON_RPC_URL and no wallet,
key, or transaction. Against an account whose receipts you do not hold, every
settlement the chain reports comes back as a gap.
A third party can reproduce this without trusting us:
docs/RUN_AS_VERIFIER.md.
Five-minute path, including the MCP host config: docs/QUICKSTART.md.
MCP server
Cedulon can run as a local stdio MCP server. The host talks JSON-RPC on stdin/stdout. The five tools are thin wrappers over the existing packages; they do not reimplement policy, receipts, or audit.
Tool | Arguments | Result |
|
| Allow → signed receipt JSON. Deny → |
| optional |
|
|
|
|
| none | Receipts + checkpoint + extract in the |
| none |
|
Claude Desktop / Claude Code / Cursor. Nothing to clone and nothing to build:
{
"mcpServers": {
"cedulon": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@cedulon/mcp-server"]
}
}
}In Claude Code that config is one command:
claude mcp add cedulon -- npx -y @cedulon/mcp-serverPolicy limits come from the environment: CEDULON_MAX_AMOUNT,
CEDULON_MAX_CUMULATIVE, CEDULON_MAX_PAYMENTS, CEDULON_WINDOW_MS,
CEDULON_ALLOWED_PAYEES, CEDULON_ALLOWED_CURRENCIES,
CEDULON_ALLOWED_TOOLS, CEDULON_PAYER. Set CEDULON_STATE_PATH to keep the
receipt chain across restarts; without it the ledger lives in memory.
Working inside this repository instead, against the sources:
npm run mcpThe server is listed in the MCP Registry as
io.github.dogrucanemek-alt/cedulon; server.json is the entry it is published
from.
npm run mcpb builds an .mcpb bundle — a zip holding the server and its
dependencies, which a desktop host installs in one click, with the policy caps
exposed as settings. It installs the released npm package rather than packing
the working tree, so the bundle holds what npm would have given you, and the
version must already be released. The result lands in build/ and is a release
artifact, not source. Released bundles are attached to the matching GitHub
release, with the bundle's SHA-256 in the release notes; v0.11.0 carries
cedulon-0.11.0.mcpb.
smithery.yaml is the older ecosystem format and is not submitted; Smithery's
current instructions take an HTTPS endpoint or an .mcpb bundle.
There is also a Dockerfile, for hosts and directories that build the
repository rather than install the package:
docker build -t cedulon .
docker run -i --rm cedulonThe protocol is the container's stdin/stdout, so it needs -i. It needs no
credentials: the server settles on a mock rail and holds no wallet.
Layout
packages/core policy engine + Decision Token (workspace dep on @cedulon/cose)
packages/cose deterministic CBOR + COSE_Sign1 (Ed25519)
packages/manifest signed trade manifest
packages/receipts spend receipt (COSE default, JSON legacy)
packages/checkpoint epoch checkpoints + in-process transparency log
packages/audit rail-extract completeness checker
packages/mcp-guard MCP tools/call wrapper (mock)
packages/mcp-server stdio MCP server (official SDK)
packages/x402-adapter HTTP 402 adapter + mock rail extract
packages/base-extract read-only Base Sepolia USDC → RailExtract
examples/demo runaway, dispute, bypass, audit CLI
spec/ draft-dogru-cedulon-08 (posted 2 September 2026),
-07, -06, -05, -04, -03, -02, -01, -00,
plus the reattestation and streaming drafts
THREAT_MODEL.md
docs/RUN_AS_VERIFIER.mdBrand names come from packages/core/src/brand.ts only.
How to cite
Citation metadata is in CITATION.cff. The archived -00 release is
published as https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22099792
Privacy Policy
https://cedulon.com/privacy.html
The MCP server runs on your machine and makes no network requests. It collects
nothing, because there is no endpoint of ours to collect it. packages/mcp-server/README.md
states what it holds while it runs and what it writes if you ask it to.
License
Apache-2.0
Available Tools
5 toolscedulon_auditARead-only
Reconcile the in-process receipt chain and checkpoint against the rail extract. Returns audit: balanced or findings.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| trust | No | Rail key you hold out of band: { publicKeyPem, accountId?, railId?, windowStartMs?, windowEndMs? } | |
| manifest | No | A Trade Manifest you were presented with. Omit for a no-manifest deployment. Present without manifestTrust is unauthenticated-manifest. | |
| payeeTrust | No | Payee keys you hold out of band, keyed by payee: { "payee-1": publicKeyPem } | |
| issuerTrust | No | Issuer key(s) you hold out of band: { publicKeyPem: string | string[] }. Without it the audit checks this server's records against this server's own key. | |
| witnessTrust | No | Transparency log key you hold out of band: { publicKeyPem: string | string[] } | |
| manifestTrust | No | Manifest publisher key(s) you hold out of band: { publicKeyPem: string | string[] } | |
| extraSettlements | No | Optional extra extract rows, used to inject a bypass settlement in tests |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With readOnlyHint=true and openWorldHint=false, the annotations already cover the safety profile and closed-world assumption. The description adds the outcome contract ('balanced or findings') and names the comparison sources, but it does not explain what findings contain, how failures are expressed, or any other behavioral caveats. No contradiction with annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences with no filler: the purpose is front-loaded ('Reconcile...') and the outcome is stated in the second sentence. Every phrase earns its place, and the description is appropriately sized for an audit tool whose parameters are documented in the schema.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 7-parameter nested-object tool with no output schema, the description is a bit thin: it gives the high-level result ('balanced or findings') but not the shape of findings or any guidance on how trust/manifest inputs affect the audit. The rich schema compensates for parameter coverage, but the return contract remains under-specified.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the description does not need to repeat parameter details. The description itself adds no parameter-level semantics, but the schema already explains trust, manifest, payee/issuer/witness/manifest trust, and extraSettlements in enough detail. Baseline 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb ('Reconcile') and identifies the exact resources involved: the in-process receipt chain and checkpoint are compared against the rail extract. It also says the result is either 'balanced or findings,' which distinguishes this audit/reconciliation tool from siblings like spend, verify_receipt, export_ledger, and status.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies the tool is for reconciliation and audit-style checks, so an agent can infer it is not for spending, single-receipt verification, exporting, or status. However, it never explicitly says when to use this tool instead of a sibling, nor does it mention any conditions or exclusions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
cedulon_export_ledgerARead-only
Export receipts, checkpoint, and rail extract in the same JSON shape as npm run demo:export.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true and openWorldHint=false, covering the safety and world-scope behavior. The description adds the useful detail that output matches npm run demo:export, but it does not disclose any other behavioral traits such as output size, asynchronous behavior, or prerequisites, so it only partially contributes beyond annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, front-loaded sentence with no redundant words. It clearly communicates the operation, the target data, and the output format without padding.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a zero-parameter tool, the description is mostly sufficient: it names the data kinds and the output shape. It relies on familiarity with 'npm run demo:export' and leaves terms like 'checkpoint' and 'rail extract' undefined, but in a project context this is likely enough for an agent to invoke the tool correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema has zero parameters and coverage is effectively 100%, so no parameter documentation is needed. The description's mention of the three export categories adds context about what the tool operates on, but since there are no configurable inputs, there is little parameter semantics to add.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description names a specific verb ('Export') and the exact resources ('receipts, checkpoint, and rail extract'), making the tool's function immediately clear. It also distinguishes itself from siblings by being the export operation, as opposed to spend, audit, verify, or status actions. The reference to the demo:export JSON shape further pins down intent.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies when to use this tool: any time an export of receipts, checkpoint, or rail extract data is needed in the demo:export shape. However, it does not explicitly mention alternatives or state when not to use it, leaving routing to siblings to be inferred rather than spelled out.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
cedulon_spendA
Policy-gated spend on the mock rail. Allow returns a signed COSE receipt JSON. Deny returns the fail-closed reason.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| tool | No | Calling tool name recorded on the request | |
| nonce | Yes | ||
| payee | Yes | ||
| amount | Yes | Integer amount as a decimal string | |
| currency | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description discloses both possible outcomes—an allow path returning a signed COSE receipt JSON and a deny path returning the fail-closed reason. This goes beyond the annotations, which only indicate hints like readOnly false and idempotent false. It doesn't explain the policy itself, but it clearly communicates the behavioral contract.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is extremely concise: two short sentences, front-loaded with the primary action, and each sentence adds distinct value. There is no filler, redundancy, or unnecessary background.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
While the description explains return variants, it does not cover policy prerequisites, parameter formats, or the meaning of nonce, payee, and currency. With no output scheme and only 40% schema description coverage, these omissions make it difficult for an agent to invoke the tool correctly the first time.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is only 40%, yet the description adds no parameter-level meaning for nonce, payee, or currency, and does not even mention 'amount' or 'tool'. With most parameters undocumented in both schema and description, the agent has little guidance on how to set valid inputs.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly identifies the action ('spend'), the resource ('mock rail'), and the policy-gating nature of the operation. It also distinguishes the tool from siblings like cedulon_verify_receipt and cedulon_audit by describing the spend-specific outcome.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies this tool is used when a policy-gated spend should be attempted, and sibling names suggest the other tools serve different purposes. However, it does not explicitly state when to use this tool over alternatives, nor does it provide exclusions or condition-based routing.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
cedulon_statusARead-only
Server version, policy summary, receipt count, and chain head hash.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true and openWorldHint=false, covering the safety profile. The description adds useful context about the specific data fields exposed, but does not disclose any further behavioral details such as response format, freshness, or failure modes. This is comparable to a straightforward status read where the annotations carry the main burden.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, compact sentence that front-loads the most important information: it enumerates exactly what the status tool exposes. Every word earns its place and there is no redundant or filler content.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a parameterless status endpoint with read-only annotations, the description is largely sufficient: it names the key result fields. There is no output schema to supplement the return values, but the listed fields are concrete enough for an agent to understand what this tool offers in the context of its siblings.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool takes zero parameters and the schema is empty, so there are no parameter semantics to document. With 0 params, the baseline of 4 applies, and the description does not need to compensate for any parameter coverage gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The title 'Server status' plus the description's list of returned data ('Server version, policy summary, receipt count, and chain head hash') clearly identifies this as a read-only status tool. It is distinct from the sibling tools (spend, audit, verify_receipt, export_ledger), though it lacks an explicit verb such as 'returns' or 'gets'.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides no explicit guidance on when to choose this tool versus its siblings such as cedulon_audit or cedulon_export_ledger. There is no stated condition, exclusion, or mention of alternatives; usage is only weakly implied by the word 'status' in the title.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
cedulon_verify_receiptARead-only
Verify a spend receipt COSE_Sign1 (and payee countersignature when present). Supply expectIssuerKeyPem to check it against a key you already hold; without one the receipt is only checked against the key it carries, which any key satisfies.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| coseHex | No | ||
| receipt | No | Full SignedReceipt object from cedulon_spend | |
| publicKeyPem | No | ||
| counterCoseHex | No | ||
| expectPayeeKeyPem | No | Payee key you hold out of band, for the countersignature. | |
| payeePublicKeyPem | No | ||
| expectIssuerKeyPem | No | Issuer key you hold out of band. Omit and the check is self-referential. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations only declare readOnlyHint, so the description carries the burden of behavioral caveats. It adds the important warning that omitting expectIssuerKeyPem makes verification self-referential and 'any key satisfies' it, which prevents an agent from over-trusting a nominally verified receipt.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two dense sentences with no filler. It front-loads the primary purpose and then delivers the single most important usage caveat, making every word earn its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With 7 optional parameters, no required fields, no output schema, and no guidance on which parameter combinations are valid, the description is not complete enough for reliable invocation. It explains the issuer-key pitfall but leaves the receipt/countersignature input representations and the verification result unspecified.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is only 43%, and the free-text description explains only expectIssuerKeyPem behaviorally. The relationship between coseHex, receipt, counterCoseHex, publicKeyPem, and payeePublicKeyPem is left unstated, so an agent cannot confidently choose among the seven optional input modes from the description alone.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with the verb 'Verify' and names the specific resource: a spend receipt COSE_Sign1 plus the optional payee countersignature. This clearly separates it from spend/audit/export/status siblings and makes the tool's operation unambiguous.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides concrete conditional guidance: supply expectIssuerKeyPem when you want to check against a key you already hold, and omit it when you accept the receipt's self-carried key. It does not name alternative tools, but the parameter-level when/how instructions are clear enough for correct invocation.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
TDQS
Each tool has a clearly distinct role: spend creates a receipt, audit reconciles, verify_receipt validates a receipt, export_ledger exports data, and status reports server state. There is no overlap or ambiguity between tool purposes.
All tools share the cedulon_ prefix and lowercase snake_case style, which is predictable. Minor inconsistency exists between single-word action names (spend, audit) and verb_noun names (verify_receipt, export_ledger), plus status is a noun rather than an action.
Five tools is well-scoped for a focused server handling spend, verification, audit, export, and status. Each tool contributes a distinct capability without redundancy or bloat.
The tool surface covers the core lifecycle of creating, verifying, auditing, exporting, and monitoring receipts. Minor gaps exist such as no explicit receipt lookup by ID or cancellation/refund flow, but for a mock rail server the set appears functionally complete.
Maintenance
Related MCP Connectors
Policy gate and signed trust receipts for autonomous agent actions.
Governed agent execution: x402 payments, budgets, receipts, verification, and audit.
Cryptographically anchored evidence for agents: verified run receipts, proof-gated settlement.
Advisory policy preflight for AI-agent spend requests; never executes payments or accesses wallets.
Related MCP Servers
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceDual-rail MCP server for initiating and verifying MPP and x402 payments, plus MPP-attested identity claims, enabling agent-native financial settlement.MIT
- FlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceProvides MCP tools to enforce spend policies (allow, deny, step-up, allowlist) on agent wallets with an immutable audit trail.
- AlicenseAqualityAmaintenancePost-quantum, tamper-evident receipts for consequential agent actions. Provides tools for auditing, gating decisions, and egress classification with quantum-hardened security.7Apache 2.0
- FlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceProvides policy-driven runtime authorization and security evaluation for MCP-based agents, including MCP streaming HTTP gateway, mock MCP servers, deterministic agent demos, and audited tool invocation with redacted PostgreSQL audit chains.
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