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dogrucanemek-alt

cedulon

by dogrucanemek-alt
OverviewSchemaSourceRelated ServersDiscussionsAdmin
TypeScript
Local

cedulon_audit

Read-only

Reconcile a receipt chain and checkpoints against this server's ledger or a presented signed rail extract, returning balanced/findings, scope, and counts to expose settlements without receipts.

Instructions

Reconcile the in-process receipt chain and checkpoint against the rail extract: this server's own ledger, or a signed extract you present. Returns audit: balanced or findings, names the account, rail and window it was computed over (scope) when an extract declared one, and counts the class every receipt and row landed in (counts).

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
trustNoRail key you hold out of band: { publicKeyPem: string | string[], accountId?, railId?, windowStartMs?, windowEndMs? }
extractNoA signed rail extract you were presented with: { body: { accountId, railId, windowStartMs, windowEndMs, settlements: [{ ref, amount, currency, timestampMs }], clockSkewMs? }, signature, publicKeyPem }. Present, it is the settlement side of the audit: this server's in-process settlement rows are not consulted, rows added through extraSettlements are refused beside it (an empty list adds nothing and is accepted), and the result carries scope. The receipt side is still this server's own receipt chain and checkpoints, so an extract for an account or rail this server did not settle on reports this server's receipts as unmatched; that is the correct reading of that pairing, not a defect. A body the library would refuse to sign (malformed window, amount outside the grammar, negative clock skew), an empty account, rail or signature, or a key that is not a PEM is refused as extract: ... before anything is reconciled. Absent, the audit runs over this server's own ledger and declares no scope.
manifestNoA Trade Manifest you were presented with. Omit for a no-manifest deployment. Present without manifestTrust is unauthenticated-manifest.
payeeTrustNoPayee keys you hold out of band, keyed by payee: { "payee-1": publicKeyPem }
issuerTrustNoIssuer key(s) you hold out of band: { publicKeyPem: string | string[] }. Without it the audit checks this server's records against this server's own key.
witnessTrustNoTransparency log key you hold out of band: { publicKeyPem: string | string[] }
manifestTrustNoManifest publisher key(s) you hold out of band: { publicKeyPem: string | string[] }
extraSettlementsNoOptional extra extract rows, used to inject a bypass settlement in tests

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changedv0.16.0
    • changedInput schema / properties / trust / description
      Previous value: -"Rail key you hold out of band: { publicKeyPem, accountId?, railId?, windowStartMs?, windowEndMs? }"New value: +"Rail key you hold out of band: { publicKeyPem: string | string[], accountId?, railId?, windowStartMs?, windowEndMs? }"
  2. Changed1 schema field changedv0.12.0
    • addedInput schema / properties / extract
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "A signed rail extract you were presented with: { body: { accountId, railId, windowStartMs, windowEndMs, settlements: [{ ref, amount, currency, timestampMs }], clockSkewMs? }, signature, publicKeyPem }. Present, it is the settlement side of the audit: this server's in-process settlement rows are not consulted, rows added through extraSettlements are refused beside it (an empty list adds nothing and is accepted), and the result carries scope. The receipt side is still this server's own receipt chain and checkpoints, so an extract for an account or rail this server did not settle on reports this server's receipts as unmatched; that is the correct reading of that pairing, not a defect. A body the library would refuse to sign (malformed window, amount outside the grammar, negative clock skew), an empty account, rail or signature, or a key that is not a PEM is refused as extract: ... before anything is reconciled. Absent, the audit runs over this server's own ledger and declares no scope.",
+  "type": "object"
+}
  3. Changed6 schema fields changedv0.5.1
    • addedInput schema / properties / issuerTrust
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "Issuer key(s) you hold out of band: { publicKeyPem: string | string[] }. Without it the audit checks this server's records against this server's own key.",
+  "type": "object"
+}
    • addedInput schema / properties / manifest
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "A Trade Manifest you were presented with. Omit for a no-manifest deployment. Present without manifestTrust is unauthenticated-manifest.",
+  "type": "object"
+}
    • addedInput schema / properties / manifestTrust
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "Manifest publisher key(s) you hold out of band: { publicKeyPem: string | string[] }",
+  "type": "object"
+}
    • addedInput schema / properties / payeeTrust
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "Payee keys you hold out of band, keyed by payee: { \"payee-1\": publicKeyPem }",
+  "type": "object"
+}
    • addedInput schema / properties / trust
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "Rail key you hold out of band: { publicKeyPem, accountId?, railId?, windowStartMs?, windowEndMs? }",
+  "type": "object"
+}
    • addedInput schema / properties / witnessTrust
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "Transparency log key you hold out of band: { publicKeyPem: string | string[] }",
+  "type": "object"
+}
  4. First observedv0.2.3

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only declare readOnlyHint and openWorldHint; the description adds substantial non-obvious behavior: extract presence suppresses in-process settlement rows and makes extraSettlements refused, scope is populated only when an extract declared one, an empty list is still accepted, and mismatched account/rail pairings are the correct reading rather than a defect. It also enumerates the validation failures that surface as 'extract: ...' before reconciliation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences, front-loaded with the action, then the return shape (audit/scope/counts). The extract clause runs long and nests several conditions, but each carries decision-relevant information rather than filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With 8 optional nested parameters and no output schema, the description carries the return contract itself (balanced vs findings, scope, counts) and the key cross-parameter interactions, which is most of what an agent needs. Minor gap: it does not characterize cost, determinism, or how findings are enumerated.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds real meaning the schema does not: extraSettlements is refused beside an extract (except an empty list), issuerTrust absence falls back to the server's own key, and manifest without manifestTrust yields unauthenticated-manifest. That is genuine semantic lift above the field descriptions.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: reconcile the in-process receipt chain and checkpoint against a rail extract or this server's own ledger. It is clearly distinguishable from cedulon_verify_receipt and cedulon_export_ledger by scope (whole-ledger reconciliation vs. single receipt / export), though it never names those siblings explicitly.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives conditional context for the two modes (extract present = settlement side taken from the extract; absent = this server's own ledger), plus the refusal conditions. But it never says when an agent should choose this tool over cedulon_verify_receipt or cedulon_status, so routing must be inferred from the verb.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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