TWZRD Agent Intel
OfficialProvides pre-spend trust and receipt layer for agents making x402 payments on Solana, including seller vetting, merchant cards, readiness checks, and optional settlement facilitation.
This server has a remotely hosted endpoint. Open its connector listing for connection details, authentication requirements, and setup instructions:
Overview
An agent paying an HTTP 402 Payment Required endpoint should not sign blind.
TWZRD sits on the buyer's pay path, before the wallet signs:
Check the seller first. The hosted checks score the seller from public settlement history and wash-fleet exposure, and return a readiness card (
allow,warnorblock) before any money moves. Preflight is free and advisory; a gate on the pay path turns it into a refusal.Refuse fail-closed. Where the seller check runs, the gate refuses a wash-flagged seller, a seller that was never evaluated or has no score, a
warnwith no cap, and a price over your cap. It also stops while a.killor.pausefile is in force. A refusal happens before your signer is called (signerInvocations: 0). See Refusal defaults and stop files.Keep records you can check offline. The gate can sign a
twzrd.payment_decision.v1record of its own decision with your signer, and bind-v1 ties a settled payment to the exact offer it paid for, verifiable from public chain data. A paid/trustcall returns a V7 receipt: TWZRD's score, its freshness fields and the settlement transaction in akeccak256leaf signed with Ed25519, whichtwzrd-receipt-verifierchecks without calling TWZRD.
Non-custodial. TWZRD never holds a key. Not a wallet. Not a payment network. A preflight finding is advice until a gate enforces it. A valid receipt shows what TWZRD observed and signed at settlement time, not that the service was delivered.
seller's 402 ──► TWZRD gate ──┬── allow ──────────────► your signer ──► settle
├── warn, within a cap ─► your signer ──► settle
└── block ──► abort: 0 signer calls, 0 USDC spent
Records: twzrd.payment_decision.v1 (the gate's decision, signed with your key)
bind-v1 (the settled payment bound to its offer)
V7 receipt (paid /trust; checked offline against TWZRD's published key)Terms used here (payTo, readiness card, AutoGate, Path A and Path B, V7 receipt, bind-v1, resource join) are defined in the glossary. The commerce walkthrough lives in docs/COMMERCE-KIT.md.
Related MCP server: x402 Discovery & Trust MCP
What ships
Hosted checks and the gate.
https://intel.twzrd.xyz/mcpand the REST routes below,twzrd-x402-gateon npm, the offlinetwzrd-receipt-verifier, and the receipt transparency log (one on-chain anchor per advanced tree head, hourly). A no-spend recorded run is at/v1/intel/demo-gate.Networks. Free checks score x402 sellers on Solana mainnet and Base mainnet (
eip155:8453), and the gate runs the scored preflight on both. The paid/quickand/trustendpoints accept the buyer's payment on either chain and score a Solana seller wallet, so signed V7 receipts cover Solana sellers. Other EVM chains are recognized and not scored. The examples below use the Solana seat. The gate's network table covers Base.Listing evidence (read-only). A separate endpoint serves TWZRD's signed product-listing evidence; see Listing evidence.
Out of scope. Identity of a person, company, or agent. Checkout, purchase completion, or delivery. Permission to spend. See What TWZRD does not claim.
Quickstart
Without code: one free preflight
Send the URL you are about to pay. No signup, no wallet, no key.
curl -sS -X POST https://intel.twzrd.xyz/v1/intel/preflight \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"resource_url":"https://api.oblique.markets/api/v1/paid/time","price_usdc":0.01}'
# Or by payTo, the accepts[].payTo in the seller's 402 (Solana base58 or Base 0x):
# -d '{"seller_wallet":"GYyTRmt317JafPHXPnM54Fsvsma5GnS9wm6qGMqaykdS","price_usdc":0.01}'Read readiness_card.decision (allow, warn or block), its
reason_codes and recommended_cap_usdc. A resource_url resolves only
when the URL is in the resource join (GET /v1/intel/resources).
readiness_card.seller_wallet: null with
null_reason: "unknown_subject" means it did not resolve: send the 402's
payTo as seller_wallet instead. An unknown subject is not a clean seller.
Preflight is advice for your own policy; it refuses nothing until a gate sits
on the pay path.
With code: createBuyerFetch
Guard an agent's paying fetch: a caller-supplied USDC cap, an explicit recipient allowlist, mandatory free preflight, and a local decision record before signing.
npm install twzrd-x402-gate@0.27.0 @x402/core @x402/fetchimport { createBuyerFetch } from "twzrd-x402-gate";
const guardedFetch = createBuyerFetch({
client, // your configured official x402Client
maxPricePerCall: "0.01", // USDC per call (required)
allowedRecipients: [sellerPayTo], // the 402's accepts[].payTo (required)
hourlyBudgetCap: "1.00",
});
const response = await guardedFetch(resourceUrl);A preflight block, a call over the cap, an unlisted recipient or a check outage
throws BuyerFetchBlockedError before your signer runs. The
quickstart runs a blocked payment with no
wallet first. The optional expectedAmount quote binding needs twzrd-x402-gate@0.12.4 or later.
PayAI x402-solana
npm install twzrd-x402-gate@0.27.0 x402-solana@3.0.1import { createX402Client } from "x402-solana/client";
import { createTwzrdBeforePaymentHook } from "twzrd-x402-gate";
const client = createX402Client({
wallet,
network: "solana",
beforePayment: createTwzrdBeforePaymentHook({ refuseWashFlagged: true }),
});The hook checks the seller on each 402 before x402-solana pays it.
installTwzrdAutoGate("x402-solana", opts) installs the same hook through AutoGate.
Already on an x402Client, PayKit, MPP or @x402/mcp?
Pick your seat from the gate's
entry-point table; each seat
keeps its own defaults (defaults by entry point).
twzrd.safeFetch(url, opts) is the spend-control wrapper: a cumulative
maxSpend, an allowNetworks list, the .kill and .pause files, and
optional bind-v1 (requireOfferBinding, which also needs a
composeBoundTransaction callback). It runs no seller check unless you pass a
preflight callback.
Verify a receipt offline
npx twzrd-receipt-verifier@^1.4.0 receipt.json \
--pubkey Ak5SQwHpuQAqU7ty7ZWX7qgF39A9yi72c22KNn8sHzvSOr with Python:
pip install 'twzrd-receipt-verifier>=1.4.0'
twzrd-verify-receipt receipt.json --pubkey Ak5SQwHpuQAqU7ty7ZWX7qgF39A9yi72c22KNn8sHzvSBoth exit 0 on a valid receipt and 1 on an invalid one. --pubkey pins
the receipt signing key (twzrd-receipt-ed25519-v2) out of band; the same key
is published at https://intel.twzrd.xyz/.well-known/twzrd-receipt-pubkey.
--max-age enforces your own staleness limit from the signed
timestamp_unix. Verifiers older than 1.4.0 reject V7.
Start here, by what you came to do
You want to | Do this |
See a refusal with nothing installed | Run the hosted no-spend check below: one |
Put the gate on a paying agent | With code above, then |
Check one seller before paying, without code | Without code above. |
Call the checks from an MCP client | Add |
Review the cryptography and the claims | REVIEW.md (bind-v1, with mainnet ground truth), docs/security-assurance.md, docs/receipt-v6-spec.md, docs/transparency-log.md, SECURITY.md. |
Know which document is current | docs/README.md: every document in this repository, labeled canonical, historical or internal, with the versions verified on the date shown. |
Build or publish from this checkout | AGENTS.md: what is source and what is a published-artifact mirror, the one supported install, and the fork relationship with the upstream monorepo. |
Versions
Registry latest as read on 2026-11-18; killswitch container pin last rechecked on 2026-11-17. The tree column is what this checkout mirrors; a difference is a pending resync, not a second product.
Package | Registry | This tree | Role |
| npm 0.27.0 | 0.27.0 | Buyer-side gate SDK and CLIs; the one package with source here |
| npm 3.0.1 | peer | Compatible Solana client seat |
| npm and PyPI 1.4.6 | floor | Offline V5/V6/V7 receipt verifier (separate repository) |
| npm 0.6.5 / PyPI 0.2.4 | 0.6.6 ( | Local spend-capped MCP client; prefer the hosted MCP |
| npm 0.10.3 | 0.10.3 ( | elizaOS actions |
| npm 0.3.12 | 0.3.12 ( | elizaOS and facilitator settle hook |
| npm 0.5.1 | separate repository | OpenClaw wrapped-fetch adapter |
| PyPI 0.5.14 | not in this repository | Server package behind the hosted checks |
| npm 0.5.4 | 0.5.4 | Offline transparency-log verifier: |
| npm 0.5.0; | 0.5.0 | Local OpenAI-compatible proxy with token and dollar ceilings, a file kill switch and a JSONL spend ledger |
Endpoints and prices
All routes are on https://intel.twzrd.xyz. Free routes need no key and no
wallet. Paid routes take USDC over x402 or MPP (WWW-Authenticate: Payment, a
Solana charge with a sponsored fee payer). x402 on /quick, /trust and
/verify-endpoint also accepts USDC on Base; /merchant takes Solana USDC
only.
Route | Method | Price | Returns |
| POST | free | Readiness card: |
| GET | free | Merchant risk card: a decision and |
| GET | free | A labeled sample V7 receipt, not an attestation for any wallet |
| POST | free | Hosted receipt check: V7, and V5 and V6 still verify |
| GET | $0.001 |
|
| GET | $0.05 | Counterparty trust; a signed V7 receipt when you pay on Solana |
| GET | $0.05 | A signed track record for a Solana |
| POST | $0.005 | A check of a seller's x402 endpoint, with a signed receipt |
Refusal defaults and stop files
Each entry point's defaults are in the gate's defaults by entry point table. Where the seller check runs, 0.24.0 refuses these by default (the last three since 0.13.0):
Seller evidence | Reason code | Option (environment variable) |
The merchant card says |
|
|
The card has not fully answered the wash question (no card, |
|
|
Intel has never evaluated the seller |
|
|
A |
|
|
Setting an option to false, or its variable to 0 or false, turns that
refusal off. createBuyerFetch pins all four on, fails closed, and ignores the
variables; with expectedAmount set it also refuses any other amount
(expected_amount_mismatch). twzrd.safeFetch runs none of these checks
unless you pass preflight.
Stop files (from 0.20.0). Every gate entry point that calls a signer or a
payer reads .kill and .pause from its state directory (stateDir or
TWZRD_STATE_DIR, default ./data), on entry and again at the go-ahead. While
.kill exists, or a .pause (twzrd.pause_sentinel.v1) is in force or
unreadable, it refuses (twzrd_kill_switch, twzrd_payment_paused,
twzrd_pause_corrupt). Turning seller evaluation off does not turn these off.
@twzrd1111/agent-killswitch reads both files and writes .pause when a
budget window is spent, so pointing both at one directory stops model spend
and payments together.
MCP and agent discovery
The hosted MCP server at https://intel.twzrd.xyz/mcp (streamable HTTP) is
free and needs no API key. tools/list is the live set (22 tools on
2026-11-14); the three watch tools need a signature from the payer's key.
{
"mcpServers": {
"twzrd-agent-intel": {
"url": "https://intel.twzrd.xyz/mcp"
}
}
}Skill: https://intel.twzrd.xyz/skill.md (skill
twzrd-trust; the live copy carries its version), ornpx clawhub install twzrd-trust.Agent contract: https://intel.twzrd.xyz/llms.txt, the full reference at https://intel.twzrd.xyz/llms-full.txt, and https://intel.twzrd.xyz/.well-known/agent.json.
Machine descriptors:
/.well-known/x402,/.well-known/mcp.jsonand/openapi.json(OpenAPI 3.1).Receipt signing key (
twzrd-receipt-ed25519-v2):Ak5SQwHpuQAqU7ty7ZWX7qgF39A9yi72c22KNn8sHzvS, published at/.well-known/twzrd-receipt-pubkey.Local MCP clients:
twzrd-mcp-server(npm) andtwzrd-mcp(PyPI) pay the $0.001 and $0.05 calls themselves. Paid tools stay off untilTWZRD_MCP_PAYMENTS_ENABLED=1and a wallet key are set;twzrd-mcp-servercaps spend at $0.05 per call and $1.00 in total by default (TWZRD_MAX_USDC_PER_CALL,TWZRD_MAX_USDC_TOTAL).
Run one blocked payment locally
npm ci
npm run build
npm run buyer-demo --workspace=twzrd-x402-gateThis uses the real x402 client against an offline 402 fixture. It prints
reason: price_cap_exceeded, signer_invocations: 0 and usdc_spent: 0, and
writes .twzrd/demo-decisions.jsonl locally. It makes no network request and
needs no wallet.
For an installed consumer, pack the gate and install the tarball with its
optional @x402/core and @x402/fetch peers; then run npx twzrd-buyer-demo.
See the package README for the install and live
client wiring. /quick and /trust stay optional seller-score products; the
wrapper buys neither and makes no fulfillment claim.
Hosted no-spend check
Run this one-line command with no wallet, no API key, and no configuration:
curl -fsS https://intel.twzrd.xyz/v1/intel/demo-gate | jq '{verdict: (.steps[] | select(.name == "block_path") | .verdict), approved: (.steps[] | select(.name == "block_path") | .approved), signerInvocations: (.steps[] | select(.name == "block_path") | .signer_invocations), mode, ok}'Without jq, run: curl -fsS https://intel.twzrd.xyz/v1/intel/demo-gate
Expected output:
{
"verdict": "block",
"approved": false,
"signerInvocations": 0,
"mode": "no_spend",
"ok": true
}Blocks happen before your signer is invoked (signerInvocations: 0) — zero USDC at risk.
How the pieces fit
Pre-spend trust for AI agents that pay x402 sellers: check the seller and resource before paying.
You are | Free | Paid |
an agent about to pay an x402 seller | Readiness card (allow, warn or block), wash flags, seller reputation, offline receipt check. | $0.001 |
Each piece below works alone. Plugged into the hosted checks, they form one pre-spend path.
Piece | On its own | Plugged in | Install |
Free checks with nothing to install: is this x402 seller safe to pay, by its payTo or by the resource URL. | The pieces below that screen a payment call it; it is where the decisions and the signed receipts come from. The receipt verifier needs no server. | Add | |
Wraps an x402 client's pay path: asks the hosted checks about the seller before your signer runs, refuses a block (the signer is never invoked), enforces a spend cap, and can issue a | Decisions come from the hosted checks; pairs with |
| |
OpenClaw plugin: assign its wrapped fetch to the client and every 402 that passes through it is checked before a signer can attach payment (enforce and fail-closed by default). | Matches the gate's wrapper and adds OpenClaw tool-call gating, against the hosted checks. Payments outside the wrapped fetch (a ClawRouter proxy, unparsed exec or curl) are not covered. |
| |
Verifies a TWZRD receipt offline against a published Ed25519 key: no wallet, no API key, no trust in TWZRD's server. | Checks the signed receipts that the hosted checks issue. |
| |
A local MCP client with 6 tools that pays the $0.001 and $0.05 calls itself under a spend cap (a wallet only if you enable paid calls). | Calls the hosted checks; use the hosted MCP directly for the free checks. |
| |
Framework seats: a settle hook for facilitators (see docs), a Faremeter payer chooser, and elizaOS actions. | Each seat calls the hosted checks from inside its framework. |
| |
The server package behind the hosted checks. Run it yourself behind a firewall; a local run serves a small static snapshot, not live data. | Point a self-hosted instance at live data with its environment variables. |
| |
Seller starters: | Cloudflare Worker templates for selling a paid API to agents over x402: | Both default to the TWZRD facilitator. | Deploy button in each repo |
Put them together
Refuse before signing: gate (or preflight) + hosted checks. A blocked seller never reaches your signer. Prove it with no wallet and no spend:
curl -fsS https://intel.twzrd.xyz/v1/intel/demo-gate.Keep proof of what you paid for: paid trust receipt + receipt verifier. A signed receipt you or anyone else can verify offline.
Screen every settlement you broker: plugin-trustgate settle hook + hosted checks. A facilitator aborts a settle to a blocked seller before the transfer.
What TWZRD does not claim
TWZRD scores observed wallet and payment behavior. It does not prove a person, company, or agent identity.
authorizes_spendis always false: a check is evidence for your own spend policy, never permission to spend.Not a wallet. Not a payment network.
More: docs/ECOSYSTEM.md.
From this repo
This checkout is a public monorepo, not npm install twzrd-x402-gate. CI is
root npm ci then npm run ci (Node 20). Do not npm ci inside
twzrd-x402-gate/ — gate typecheck needs sibling twzrd-log-verifier deps
from the root lockfile.
npm ci
npm run build
npm run typecheck
npm test --workspace=twzrd-x402-gate
npm run gate-eval-refuse --workspace=twzrd-x402-gategate-eval-refuse spends nothing and does not call the signer (signer_invocation_count: 0).
It needs egress to https://intel.twzrd.xyz. Artifact dirs (eliza-plugin/,
plugin-trustgate/, twzrd-mcp-server/) are dist/ mirrors — do not try to
build or demo them locally. Hosted MCP: https://intel.twzrd.xyz/mcp.
The pre-spend sequence
One order, whichever entry point you use. Free preflight advises; the gate on the pay path enforces.
Discover:
GET /v1/intel/resources(orlistDirectoryCallables), the callable x402 URLs with theirpayTo. Bazaars list; TWZRD sits beside them.Cold-start (optional):
npx twzrd-cold-startwrites a default-denypolicy.jsonfrom a pinned foreign 402 diet (0 USDC; not a TWZRD bazaar).Merchant card:
GET /v1/intel/merchant_card/{pay_to}. Refuse onwash_flagged: true;nullmeans never evaluated, not clean.Preflight:
POST /v1/intel/preflightreturns the readiness card (allow, warn or block). The curl is under Without code.Pay only when policy allows: the gate refuses before signing, so a block shows
signerInvocations === 0.Paid intel (Path A, optional):
GET /v1/intel/quick/{pay_to}($0.001,quickCheck: wash risk, tier and score, no receipt) or/trust($0.05, a signed V7 receipt you verify offline withtwzrd-receipt-verifier).Evidence: the gate can issue a portable
twzrd.payment_decision.v1record from its decision, signed by your own signer (npx twzrd-payment-decision --verify);exportEvidenceBundle/npx twzrd-evidence-bundlepackages the run.
Refuse-first demo (0 USDC): npx tsx twzrd-x402-gate/examples/commerce-kit.ts
Three-act showcase on Base USDC and Solana USDC (0 USDC, no keys, loopback only): examples/x402-guard-showcase
Walkthrough: docs/COMMERCE-KIT.md
Listing evidence (read-only endpoint)
The product-listing check is not part of the pre-spend path above. TWZRD's
signed listing evidence is served read-only at https://intel.twzrd.xyz/muse/mcp
(check_listing, get_claim, get_evidence, get_publication,
get_shopping_check); no tool there places an order, opens a checkout or moves
money, and authorizes_spend is always false. One reference card exists
(Vuori Kore Short, Ink, US). It is an observer card, a capture of the store's
public pages, not a merchant attestation, and it carries an expires_at.
curl -sS https://intel.twzrd.xyz/muse/mcp \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-H 'accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"check_listing","arguments":{"product_url":"https://checkout.vuoriclothing.com/products/kore-short-ink","declared_unit_price":"79"}}}' \
| sed -n 's/^data: //p' \
| jq '.result.structuredContent | {result, reason, price_check, needs_approval, authorizes_spend}'The reference card has lapsed, so today this returns result: "expired"
(reason: "expired_claim", needs_approval: true). While a card is current, a
declared price above the advertised one returns check_failed
(phantom_markup_detected), a lower price or a card with no price sets
needs_approval: true, and a URL no card covers returns unknown_seller
(unknown is not clean).
Check that the card is the one TWZRD published. get_publication returns
the publication record as JSON in its text field: verify_key (base64),
publication (the digests and a base64 signature) and signed_message (how
the signed bytes are built). Base64-decode verify_key to its 32 raw bytes and
compare their sha256 with the fingerprint below. This README is the independent
pin: a fingerprint taken from the same response as the key proves nothing.
Never refresh this value from a live surface when re-syncing the mirrors;
change it only when the key is deliberately rotated. Then verify the Ed25519
signature over the signed bytes with that key, and check that the sha256 of
the text returned by get_claim and get_evidence equals
publication.artifact_digest and publication.evidence_digest. A valid
signature shows that TWZRD published these bytes; it is not a merchant
attestation.
sha256:903d0d041e2d82fc0dd6f5252b4e904121e113e498d00b7385cad6061b4881afPackages & References
Package | Pin | Description |
| @0.27.0 | Buyer-side gate SDK ( |
| @3.0.1 | Compatible Solana client seat for the pre-payment gate |
| @^1.4.0 | Standalone offline verifier for Ed25519 V7 receipts (V5 and V6 still verify) |
| @0.6.6 | Local spend-capped auto-pay client (6 tools); prefer hosted MCP |
| @^0.3.12 | Eliza / facilitator adapter |
Document index (what is current, what is history): docs/README.md
Commerce loop (don't sign blind): docs/COMMERCE-KIT.md
Step-by-step Guide: QUICKSTART.md
Concepts & Architecture: docs/taxonomy.md
Receipt Specification (V7, with the V6 lineage): docs/receipt-v6-spec.md
Receipt Transparency Log: docs/transparency-log.md (
twzrd-log-verifieron npm, source in this repository)Receipt Verification & Ground Truth: REVIEW.md
Supported path and ownership: docs/SUPPORT_MATRIX.md · docs/ACCESS_AND_RECOVERY.md
Security Policy: SECURITY.md · docs/security-assurance.md
Security and verification
A V7 receipt (
TWZRD:AO_REPUTATION_RECEIPT_V7) bindsagent_id(the subject),score,confidence_bps,timestamp_unix,payer,settlement_tx/settlement_anchor, the reputation fields, and the freshness fieldsrecheck_after_unix,staleness_daysandscore_decay_modelinside the signedkeccak256leaf. Editing any of them fails verification. Spec: docs/receipt-v6-spec.md.The MCP registry key (
/.well-known/mcp-registry-auth) is a different key from the receipt signing key (/.well-known/twzrd-receipt-pubkey).Policy and assurance: SECURITY.md, docs/security-assurance.md, REVIEW.md.
Contributing and change control
Issues and pull requests on this repository. A sample that does not run exactly as shown is a bug. The release policy for twzrd-x402-gate is the manual publish workflow with an expected_version check and npm provenance; the published 0.27.0 carries a provenance attestation from this repository (npm view twzrd-x402-gate@0.27.0 dist.attestations). Earlier releases did not all follow that path; AGENTS.md records the fork history. A change to what the gate allows or refuses ships in a minor release with a CHANGELOG.md entry (policy). Artifact directories are resynced from the published tarball, never hand-edited (AGENTS.md). Tests pin the documentation: the current install pin, the pay-path contract, the refusal-code tables and the generated ecosystem block are all asserted by npm test, so a doc that drifts from the code fails CI.
License
MIT. See LICENSE. The hosted checks run on infrastructure TWZRD operates; the server package behind them is published separately as twzrd-agent-intel on PyPI, also MIT.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Loading tool schema changelog…
This server cannot be deployed
Maintenance
Related MCP Connectors
Pre-payment merchant trust checks for x402 agents on Base and Solana.
Trust and settlement for AI agents: portable attestations, escrow, x402/USDC payments on Solana.
Pre-sign Solana tx guard for agents: ALLOW/WARN/BLOCK verdict, x402 USDC pay-per-call.
Pre-trade token safety checks for AI agents on Solana and Base. x402 USDC per call, no key.
Related MCP Servers
- AlicenseAqualityBmaintenanceEnables AI agents to manage USDC wallets on Solana, allowing them to send payments, create invoices, and access paid APIs within human-defined spending limits. It uses threshold signatures to provide agents with financial autonomy while ensuring secure oversight and transaction approval.3670 npm4Apache 2.0
- AlicenseAqualityBmaintenanceThis tool library gives AI agents a discovery and "know before you pay" layer to find useful services and check the historic reputation across >200,000 endpoints in the public x402 ecosystem.15237 npm1MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceEnables AI agents to make autonomous payments on Solana with on-chain enforced spending limits, preventing unauthorized fund drainage.1MIT
- AlicenseAqualityBmaintenanceZero-key on-chain intelligence for Base, Ethereum, and Solana. Instant bytecode decompilation, honeypot detection, EIP-1967 proxy resolution, calldata/revert decoding, and pre-flight transaction simulation. No API keys or wallet connection required.7132MIT