btc-game-theory
Calculate Bitcoin mining game theory metrics: selfish-mining profitability threshold, 51% attack electricity cost, fee vs subsidy split, difficulty trajectory, and Nash equilibrium for honest mining.
Instructions
Bitcoin mining game theory and systems dynamics in one call. Returns: selfish-mining profitability threshold (Eyal-Sirer), 51%-attack electricity cost estimate, fee-vs-subsidy revenue split, difficulty epoch trajectory (expansion / contraction / neutral), Nash-equilibrium state for honest mining, and current epoch progress. Sourced from mempool.space and CoinGecko — no API key required. Use for miner-incentive analysis, network security assessment, and pre-investment regime detection.
Input Schema
TableJSON Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| connectivity_gamma | No | Assumed fraction of honest miners who extend the selfish chain when block heights are equal (0–1). Higher γ means better-connected selfish miner. Default 0 (worst-case for honest miners). | |
| electricity_kwh_usd | No | Assumed electricity cost in $/kWh for 51%-attack cost estimate. Default 0.07. | |
| efficiency_w_per_th | No | Assumed ASIC power efficiency in W/TH. Default 20 (representative of modern S21/M60 hardware). Lower = more efficient attackers. |