thalovant-mcp
OfficialSupports Thalovant device sign-in as the registered Home Assistant client (thalovant-home-assistant), requesting hubs:read, clients:read, and clients:write scopes. The approval page shows the platform’s verified name, and re-approval replaces the token Home Assistant already holds.
This server does not currently have a deployable release on Glama. Follow the repository's setup instructions to install and configure it for your MCP client, including any required credentials and local dependencies.
Thalovant MCP Server
Public-ready MCP server for Thalovant control-plane and hub runtime APIs.
It uses the official Thalovant Node.js SDK and the production MCP TypeScript SDK over stdio and Streamable HTTP, so it works with local MCP hosts such as Claude Desktop, Codex, Cursor, and remote MCP clients.
What It Includes
stdio transport for local agents.
Streamable HTTP transport at
/mcpfor remote agents.OAuth-style protected resource metadata at
/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource.Static bearer tokens for simple/private deployments.
JWT/JWKS and OAuth token introspection for production remote deployments.
Per-principal Thalovant credentials and tool policy.
Chat app tools: connectors, bridges and their status in words, pause and resume, chats, test messages and the plan's allowance. Bot tokens stay in the console.
Intercom tools: list the speakers of a hub, read or cancel an announcement, and (opt-in) say a short text aloud in a home, with the person's confirmation for urgent and every-speaker announcements. Not a safety system; neither the platform nor this server stores the text (an MCP client may keep it in its own history).
Host/origin validation, CORS, rate limiting, body limits, secure headers, and session binding.
Optional resumability event storage and JSONL audit logs.
Docker, Compose, Kubernetes, CI, npm package metadata, and MCP registry
server.json.
Related MCP server: rancher-mcp
Why TypeScript
Thalovant publishes SDKs for Python, Node.js, Go, Rust, .NET, Kotlin, Swift and embedded C. This server uses Node.js because @thalovant/sdk directly exposes the Thalovant control plane, identity loading, WSS/HTTPS/MQTT runtime clients, memory, analytics, and context helpers, while @modelcontextprotocol/sdk is the best-supported path for cross-agent stdio and Streamable HTTP servers.
Install
Run the published package with npx -y @thalovant/mcp-server, or build it from a checkout:
npm install
npm run buildNode.js 20 or newer is required.
Control-Plane Auth
Public hub discovery does not need Thalovant credentials. Private control-plane tools and runtime hub tools read credentials only from the MCP server environment or server-side principal credential files. Do not pass API tokens or passwords through chat or tool arguments.
The server selects control-plane auth in this order:
THALOVANT_API_TOKEN— a scoped Thalovant API token. Recommended.THALOVANT_ACCESS_TOKEN— a pre-issued session access token.THALOVANT_EMAIL+THALOVANT_PASSWORD— interactive-account login fallback.
When a token is set, the server never calls the login endpoint. thalovant_config_status reports the active mode as controlPlaneAuthMode without revealing token values.
With none of these configured, a person can sign the server in instead: through the browser on their own computer when the server runs over stdio (Browser Sign-In), or with a device code anywhere (Device Sign-In). The token a sign-in mints is used only when nothing above is configured.
Browser Sign-In
Over stdio the server usually runs on the person's own computer, so it can sign them in through their browser, as aws sso login does: the authorization code grant with PKCE on a loopback redirect (RFC 8252), through interactiveLogin() of @thalovant/sdk 0.11.0. Only a browser that shares the server's 127.0.0.1 can complete it, so a link or code sent to someone on another computer delivers nothing to the sender. That promise is the browser path's alone: a device login's code signs this server in as whoever approves it, from any device, so it is shown only to the person signing in. A tool call cannot wait for a person, so it is two tools:
thalovant_begin_browser_loginwith optionalmethod(auto, the default;browser;device),scopes,deviceName(what the consent page and the token list show, defaultthalovant-mcp on <hostname>; an empty string sends no name) andtimeoutMs(default 300000 for the browser, 900000 for a device login; on either transport the server stops polling for a device code past it, andexpiresInsays the shorter of the two; the code itself stays approvable at the API until its own expiry, but approving it then signs nothing in here, so the poll'sexpiredanswer tells the person not to).autosigns in through the browser when this computer can show one and the API offers it: never withCI,SSH_CONNECTIONorSSH_TTYset; on macOS and Windows yes; elsewhere only withDISPLAYorWAYLAND_DISPLAY. The server listens on127.0.0.1on a port the system picks, opens the browser at Thalovant's consent page (open,xdg-openorrundll32 url.dll,FileProtocolHandler), and answersloginId,method: "browser",authorizationUrl(to give the person if no browser opened; it must be opened on this same computer),intervalandexpiresIn.Otherwise, and when the API does not offer browser sign-in yet (its
GET /v1/auth/native/configanswers 404),autostarts a device login: the answer hasmethod: "device"withuserCode,verificationUri,verificationUriComplete,intervalandexpiresIn, asthalovant_begin_device_login's does. The server does not open that page; the person reads the code from the model.browserforces the browser and fails rather than become a device login;deviceforces a device login.The browser has to share the server's loopback interface. A stdio server started over SSH, or inside a container, has a
127.0.0.1of its own:autoalready picks a device login over SSH (SSH_CONNECTION,SSH_TTY) and without a display, but a forcedbrowserthere waits for an answer that never arrives unless the port is forwarded. Usemethod: "device"when the person's browser is not on the server's machine.
thalovant_poll_browser_loginwith thatloginIdasks the server once, without a request to the API.outcomeispending(poll again afterintervalseconds),approved(withtokenType,tokenId,scopesandexpiresAt),denied,expiredorerror(with the API'sstatus,codeanddetail). An ended sign-in's outcome is kept for five minutes past its wait; after that, or once a device code has expired at the API, a poll answers a tool error saying the sign-in expired or ended.methodsays which way it went. Once the browser was opened, its outcome stands: a denial or a timeout never turns into a device login.
The SDK prints the same prompt a command line shows (Opening your browser to sign in to Thalovant. If it does not open, visit: and the URL, or a device login's code). Over stdio, stdout is the MCP protocol stream, so the stdio server sends every console line to stderr, its log, which MCP clients show; the tool's answer carries the URL or code for the model. The PKCE verifier, the state, the device code and the token stay on the server, bound to the principal that began the sign-in; an approved token is used at once by every control-plane tool for that principal when nothing is configured, and thalovant_revoke_device_login signs it out like a device sign-in's token. A sign-in reaches only the configured API origin.
Over Streamable HTTP a hosted server's 127.0.0.1 is not the person's computer, so a browser sign-in could never come back to it. There, thalovant_begin_browser_login with method: "browser" is refused before any request, and auto or device starts a device login exactly as thalovant_begin_device_login does (polled with thalovant_poll_device_login). Device sign-in below is unchanged on both transports, and it is the one for a registered app such as Home Assistant (clientId). thalovant_config_status reports transport and browserLoginAvailable, and deviceLoginSignedIn is true after either sign-in.
Device Sign-In
A tool call cannot wait for a person, so the device flow (RFC 8628) is two tools:
thalovant_begin_device_loginwith optionalscopes(an empty list, like none, asks for the API's default),clientNameandclientIdanswersloginId,userCode,verificationUri,verificationUriComplete,intervalandexpiresIn. Show the person the URL and the code.clientIdsigns in as a registered app,thalovant-home-assistantfor Home Assistant: the approval page shows the platform's name for it as verified, and approving it again replaces the token it already holds. An id the API does not know is refused (400unknown_client).thalovant_poll_device_loginwith thatloginIdasks once.outcomeispending(poll again afterintervalseconds, already five seconds longer for good if the API asked to slow down),approved(withtokenId,scopesandexpiresAt),expiredordenied.
The device code and the token never reach the model: the server keeps both, bound to the principal that began the sign-in, for the life of the process. Once approved, every control-plane tool for that principal uses the token when no credential is configured. thalovant_revoke_device_login signs out: it revokes that token (a token may always revoke itself, and one already revoked counts as revoked) and forgets it; signing out again answers alreadyRevoked without a request, and configured tokens are never touched. A sign-in reaches only the configured API origin (THALOVANT_API_URL, or the default), since the verification URL it answers with is shown to a person. A Home Assistant link asks for hubs:read, clients:read and clients:write, which is also all a Free plan can approve.
API Tokens (Recommended For AI Agents And CI)
Scoped API tokens are the right credential for AI and automation use: they are minted from the Thalovant dashboard (or through a browser or device sign-in), carry only the scopes you grant, can be revoked individually, and never involve your account password or MFA. Tokens start with tvpat_.
export THALOVANT_API_TOKEN="tvpat_..."
export THALOVANT_API_URL="https://api.thalovant.com"
npm startMinimum scopes for the full control-plane tool surface:
Scope | Used by |
|
|
|
|
| All hub and runtime-group provisioning: |
|
|
|
|
| needed in addition to |
|
|
|
|
|
|
The hub scopes imply one another: hubs:write grants hubs:read, which grants hubs:inspect and hubs:preview. Minting a token with hubs:read is therefore enough for every discovery tool in the table above.
Scope is not the whole story for provisioning. Every hub and runtime-group write also requires a paid plan, and the API checks scope before the plan, so the two failure modes are ordered:
A token missing the scope fails
403 Insufficient scopes. Free-plan API tokens are capped athubs:read,clients:read, andclients:write, so on the free tier provisioning fails with this 403 and never reaches the 402.A correctly scoped token on a free plan fails
402 API access requires a paid plan.thalovant_install_runtime_group_skillcan fail with a second, distinct 402,This skill requires paid marketplace access for the tenant plan., when the plan is paid but does not includeaccess_tier: paidcatalog entries.
Discovery is deliberately not paid-gated: a free-tier token can browse the marketplace catalog and set hub ratings, but cannot install skills or provision hubs. Use thalovant_list_runtime_group_marketplace before installing — it reports installable, purchase_required, and access_message per skill, which turns an opaque 402 into a decision you can make up front. A skill the store does not install carries unavailable_reason (licensing or unpublished) with installable and purchase_required false, and is listed there only for a group that already has it.
Grant fewer scopes for narrower deployments: a read-only assistant needs only hubs:read and memory:read, and a discovery-only agent that browses skills but never provisions needs hubs:read alone. thalovant_get_analytics_overview with admin: true additionally requires an admin account with admin:analytics, which API tokens for regular use should not carry. Runtime hub tools (thalovant_ask, thalovant_send_action, and friends) use Thalovant client identities, not control-plane tokens.
Hub Etags
thalovant_update_hub and thalovant_delete_hub use optimistic locking and require the hub's current etag, sent as If-Match. The etag is only available in the body of the hub resource — the API sends no ETag response header — so an agent must call thalovant_get_hub first and pass the etag field from that response. A missing or stale value fails 412 ETag mismatch and changes nothing; re-fetch and retry. name, namespace, and domain are immutable after creation, so thalovant_update_hub does not accept them at all; send only the fields you are changing rather than round-tripping a whole hub resource. Runtime-group writes do not use etags.
Hub Skills
thalovant_list_hub_skills, thalovant_install_hub_skill, thalovant_update_hub_skill, and thalovant_remove_hub_skill select a hub's attached runtime group; all hubs sharing it are affected. A hub can start with no skills at all and gain them one at a time; a change applies live on the hub in about 15 seconds with no restart. hubId must be the hub UUID — the authenticated hub routes reject slugs.
thalovant_list_hub_skills returns the whole GET /v1/hubs/{hub_id}/skills envelope: hub_id, runtime_group_id, observed_at, source, the runtime's phase and message, and data, one row per skill (possibly empty) with skill, title, marketplace_skill_id, package_name, source_type, install_source, version, version_pin, installed_version, observed_version, previous_version, latest_version, available_version, update_available, changelog, active, state, the runtime's phase, message and last error, and last_transition_at. state is one of pending, installed, failed, removing, drifted, quarantined, or unmanaged; a change in progress shows as pending.
Each write answers 202 with operation_id, hub_id, runtime_group_id, skill, version (null for a removal), previous_version, and state (installing, updating, or removing); pass wait: true to poll that operation every 2 s until it converges (installed, or removed for a removal; a failed or timed_out operation raises an error carrying its error_message), with a 120 s default timeoutMs, or follow it yourself with thalovant_get_operation. Installing a skill that is already installed at another version performs an update; the same version fails 409 with code skill_version_already_installed. A hub with no runtime group fails 404 with code hub_without_runtime_group (a plain 404 means an unknown hub or a skill that is not installed), and an unresolvable latest or an invalid version fails 422. Errors are RFC 7807 problem bodies; the tool error keeps the short message, which appends the root code in parentheses, for example Thalovant API request failed with HTTP 409: Skill version already installed. (skill_version_already_installed), and then the code and the body's other fields (see Tool Errors). A skill the store does not install for licensing reasons (YouTube, YouTube Music, Spotify, SoundCloud and Bandcamp: the service's terms do not allow a hosted assistant to play its content) fails 409 with code skill_unavailable_licensing and reason: licensing, which thalovant_list_marketplace_skills announces per skill as unavailable_reason and installable; no plan, scope or version changes that. A skill with no published release fails 409 with code skill_unavailable_unpublished and reason: unpublished, before any paid-plan 402: it cannot be installed or bought until a release is published. A non-admin token does not see such a skill in thalovant_list_marketplace_skills at all.
Listing needs hubs:inspect (implied by hubs:read); the writes need hubs:write and a paid plan, and because scope is checked before plan a free-plan token sees 403, never 402. Hub-restricted tokens (a hub_ids allowlist) are honoured on all four routes. The server uses the published Node SDK hub-skill methods and preserves MCP cancellation checks during polling. A failed status read retains the accepted operation ID; use thalovant_get_operation with that ID instead of submitting the write again. No new poll starts at or after the polling deadline. That deadline does not cancel an HTTP request already in flight.
Login Fallback
export THALOVANT_EMAIL="you@example.com"
export THALOVANT_PASSWORD="..."
export THALOVANT_PROFILE="prod"
export THALOVANT_API_URL="https://api.thalovant.com"
npm startIf neither a token nor email/password is configured, authenticated control-plane tools fail with a clear error naming the supported options.
Configured API tokens and login credentials are bound to the origin of their
configured apiUrl or THALOVANT_API_URL (default https://api.thalovant.com).
A tool argument cannot redirect those credentials to another origin. Equivalent
URL spellings and paths on the same origin are allowed; custom origins must be
configured alongside their credentials. Anonymous public discovery may still
select a custom API URL.
Link Home Assistant
A home controller such as Home Assistant links to a hub with a connection of its own kind:
Sign in, when no token is configured: Device Sign-In.
thalovant_create_client_identitywithconnectionType: "home_assistant". The API must answer with the same kind; one that made an ordinary connection instead has it deleted again and the call fails. The result carriesclientId,connectionTypeandoperationId.thalovant_wait_for_admissionwith thatoperationId. A hub admits a new connection in about ninety seconds and refuses it until then.outcomeisadmitted,failedortimeout. A failure on the platform carries the operation'serrorCode(andstatusnull); the API refusing the wait itself carries itsstatus,codeanddetail. Atimeoutmeans the connection may still be admitted: call the tool again rather than creating another connection. A 429 is waited out for the time the API names (in its body, elseRetry-After, elseRateLimit-Reset); one asking for longer than is left is atimeoutat once. A token the API refuses (401, 403) and an API out of reach are tool errors of their own, each with a hint, never a failed admission. It reads only, honours cancellation, and never follows alinks.selfto another origin than the API's.
Each refusal of step 2 names what to do next after the API's own text (see Tool Errors): a kind the API does not know yet, a plan that does not allow the connection, a hub that already holds its one Home Assistant link (with the client_id holding it), or a token the API refused (sign in again). thalovant_delete_client removes a connection (If-Match, reading the etag first when none is given, retrying once on 412, and counting a connection already gone as deleted); it is a destructive tool the operator enables.
A home bridge (a connector connection, e.g. Music Assistant) is made the same way with connectionType: "connector" and connectors: ["music_assistant"] (each id once, from the connectors in the hub's capabilities, thalovant_list_hubs; home_assistant is never one). A link is made only on your own hub or one Thalovant runs, and the platform issues its credentials. The result carries serves, the account's own devices the link will serve on the hub, with a warning. Sending the same idempotencyKey again is answered without credentials: the tool then says replayed: true and returns no identity; download the connection's identity from the owner's own session, or delete it (thalovant_delete_client) and create it again with a new key. Refusals by code (connection_type_unavailable, connectors_invalid, *_owner_only_beside_home_link, hub_scale_out_breaks_links, idempotency_key_spent, skill_config_private_hub_only) are explained after the API's own text.
Answering the hub's requests afterwards is the integration's own long-lived job, on the data plane; an MCP tool call holds a hub connection only for its own length, so that part of the link is not a tool.
Chat Apps
A hub can answer in a chat network through a chat app: Telegram and Discord are offered, and Matrix, Mattermost and Twitch appear as beta when the API lists them. Each connection of a hub to a chat network is a bridge (/v1/bridges). The person makes the bot in the chat network, then connects it to a hub in the Thalovant console.
Tokens and secrets stay in the console. Creating a bridge and replacing its token or secrets need the bot's credential, and no tool of this server takes a credential as an argument (see Control-Plane Auth), so there is no tool for them. The descriptions and outputs say where to go instead: Connections > Add connection > Chat apps, or the hub's Chat apps tab, and Replace token on the bot. thalovant_update_bridge refuses a setting whose name looks like a token or secret, at any depth, before any request, naming it by its dotted path and never its value.
Tool | What it does | Kind |
| The chat apps ( | read-only |
| Networks offered and the plan's allowance ( | read-only |
| Bridges of one hub ( | read-only |
| One bridge, with its status in plain words | read-only |
| The chats, channels or rooms the bot can see, to choose from; | read-only, write scope |
|
| write |
|
| write |
| The chats it answers in ( | write |
| Posts a short "Connected to ." line in one allowed chat | write |
| Deletes the bridge and its stored token; opt-in like the other destructive tools | destructive |
Each bridge comes back with the API's own members (network, connector, state, allowed, require_mention, session_scope, paused, hold, bot, invite_links, secrets_set by name, etag, timestamps, and operation when the change queued one) and status:
reasonis the API's customer-safe status, andsummarysays it in words:Setup(no chats chosen yet),Starting,Connected,Paused,Unavailable,TokenMissingandTokenRejected(both send the person to Replace token in the console). A reason this server does not know yet is kept and named.phase,ready, andapplied:trueonce the bridge carries the latest change,falsewhile it is on its way,nullin setup.holdsays why the platform paused a bridge:plan_limit(the plan allows fewer running chat apps, after a downgrade; it resumes on its own once there is room) oraccount_suspended. It isnullfor the owner's own pause.
The platform's own diagnostic sentence and condition (status.message, status.operator_reason, sent to administrators' tokens) are never included. Outputs are built from the members the API documents rather than passed through, so a member added later does not reach the model unreviewed; settings and operation go through the usual secret redaction.
The write tools take an optional etag (the bridge's etag field; there is no ETag header), sent as If-Match: a stale one fails 412 and changes nothing. Telegram lists chats only while its bridge is paused (409 bridge_running), so the flow is pause, send /start@<bot> in the new group, list, update allowed, resume. A refusal keeps the API's code, sentence and fields (see Tool Errors) and adds a hint by code: the settings a bridge_settings_invalid or bridge_url_* refusal names (names only), the plan's allowance after 402 or 403 plan_limit, the wait after 429, and the console for anything about a token.
Reads need hubs:read, except thalovant_list_bridge_chats: it changes nothing, but it asks the chat network on the bot's behalf, so it needs hubs:write, the hub's owner or a workspace manager, and a paid plan, like the writes. Writes need the same, except pausing and deleting, which always work on any plan. THALOVANT_MCP_READONLY keeps the four reads a hubs:read token can call and leaves thalovant_list_bridge_chats out.
Intercom
Intercom lets an agent say a short sentence aloud on the speakers of a hub, in a home: "dinner is ready", "the delivery is at the door". It is announce-only: no two-way audio. Each speaker (a client of the hub) says the text with its own text-to-speech. Intercom does not record or store speech; while an urgent alert sounds, it only checks whether a reply the hub already hears is an acknowledgement ("I heard it", "I'm okay").
Intercom is not a certified safety system. It does not replace smoke or CO alarms, medical alert devices or emergency services, and an announcement can fail (offline speaker, do-not-disturb, no one in the room). Never use it, or tell anyone to rely on it, for an emergency.
It is off at every level, and each level is the household's to turn on:
Level | Default | Who changes it |
The hub's Intercom feature | off; never available on kid or public hubs; plan gate (paid plans that own hubs) | the hub's owner or an admin (console, or |
Each speaker's |
| the same, per speaker |
Do-not-disturb (quiet hours) | off; skips normal announcements only | the same, per speaker |
This server's announce tool | not registered | the operator sets |
Which hubs the tools may use | any hub the token reaches | the operator sets |
Tool | Route | Scope | Kind |
|
|
| read-only |
|
|
| read-only |
|
|
| write (idempotent, only stops speech); registered whenever read-only mode is off, with or without the announce opt-in |
|
|
| write, |
thalovant_intercom_announce checks everything it can before any request, and no check or error repeats the text:
text: the API's own rule, checked first: NFC-normalised and trimmed, 1 to 280 characters (counted after that), plain:<>(a speech engine may read them as SSML), control characters (a newline or a tab included), text-direction marks and other invisible format characters (the zero-width joiner and non-joiner are allowed), lone surrogates, private-use characters and line or paragraph separators are refused.lang, when given, is a language tag (en-US,fr).Explicit targets, one kind per call:
speakers(client ids or slugs, at most 50),rooms, orgroups. Speaking on every speaker needsallowAll: trueand no other target; naming nothing is refused, never read as everyone.priority: "urgent"needs the scopeintercom:urgentas well asintercom:send: when this server knows what the sign-in was granted (a token minted bythalovant_begin_browser_loginorthalovant_begin_device_login) and it lacksintercom:urgent, the call is refused before the person is asked to confirm and before any request (auditreason: urgent_scope_missing); for a token configured through the environment or a credential the scopes are not visible, so the API's own403 urgent_scope_requiredis the check and the error says how to sign in again with the scope. It repeats (up torepeatTimes1-10 times,repeatIntervalSeconds5-120, default 30; the interval is refused withoutrepeatTimes) until someone says they heard it, ignores do-not-disturb and answerssending(HTTP 202). Stop it withthalovant_intercom_cancel_announcement.A person confirms urgent and
allowAll. Before an urgent announcement, or one to every speaker, this server asks the person through MCP elicitation (elicitInput), showing the hub id, who would hear it (the targets), the priority and repeats, and the text, and sends only on an explicit yes. When the MCP client does not support elicitation, or the person declines, cancels or does not answer, the announcement is refused and nothing is sent.confirmUrgent: true(urgent) andallowAll: true(every speaker) stay required as extra checks, but they are the model's own assertions: an injected instruction can set them, so they never replace the prompt. A normal announcement to named speakers, rooms or groups asks nobody. Over Streamable HTTP the prompt travels on the call's own stream, soMCP_HTTP_ENABLE_JSON_RESPONSE=true(which cannot carry a server request) makes urgent andallowAllrefuse too.Hub allowlist.
THALOVANT_INTERCOM_ALLOWED_HUBSis a comma-separated list of hub UUIDs. Unset or empty, any hub the token reaches may be used; set, every intercom tool (the two reads, cancel, announce) refuses any other hub before any request. A list with no valid UUID allows nothing.Rate cap, per principal. On top of the API's per-hub limits (20 normal a minute, 10 urgent an hour,
429), this server lets one caller send 20 normal announcements a minute and 5 urgent ones an hour (THALOVANT_INTERCOM_RATE_NORMAL_PER_MINUTE,THALOVANT_INTERCOM_RATE_URGENT_PER_HOUR; each must be a whole positive integer, so200oops,2.5or a value below 1 keeps the default, and 10 000 is the ceiling), so an agent cannot use up the hub's urgent budget. An announcement the person declined does not count; one the API then refuses (a429 intercom_urgent_busy, a missingintercom:urgent) does, because the count is taken just before the request, and cancelling a running announcement does not give it back (the error's hint says so). Cancel and the reads are not capped.Idempotency. A new
Idempotency-Key(a UUID) is generated for every call; leaveidempotencyKeyout. A replay of a key returns the stored announcement and never speaks it again, whatever its status (kept 24 hours), so a key is never reused for a different announcement; a caller-supplied key must be a UUID, so a constant such asdinneris refused. The announce call is sent once and never retried. If the API cannot be reached, the answer's body is cut off or stalls, or a success comes back without the announcement'sidandstatusor with a body that is not a JSON object, the announcement may already have been spoken: the error says so, gives the key, and says to read the announcement first (thalovant_intercom_get_announcement) or ask the household; repeating with exactly the same key is safe for 24 hours after the first try (the time the API remembers a key; later the same key would speak it again), a new key would speak it again.After a
502(hub_unreachable) the error carriesannouncement_id(from the API's problem body) and tells the model to READ that announcement before any resend and never to retry automatically. Resending with the same key within 24 hours speaks nothing (the API returns the storedfailedannouncement). A 502 with noannouncement_id(a gateway 502) proves no stored announcement and the request may never have arrived: the same key still sends at most once, but that send would speak it, so ask first. Saying it again on purpose needs a new key, the person's go-ahead, and a check that nothing was spoken. Any other server error (5xx) of the announce call names the key too.The tool's description says the text is spoken aloud in a home and carries the not-a-safety-system notice, and so does every answer.
Speakers, and what an answer means. thalovant_intercom_list_speakers lists every connection of the hub with kind (voice_satellite, web_chat, developer, embedded, home_assistant), can_play (false for a connection that cannot play speech at all: listed, never spoken to, never part of allowAll, a room or a group, and naming it is refused with not_a_speaker; its owner declares can_play on the connection, never on the speaker), online, receive, room, groups and do-not-disturb, and the list's policy_synced (false while the hub may hold an out-of-date copy of who receives: a change made a moment ago can take a moment to reach the home) and unavailable_reason (platform when Intercom is switched off for the whole platform, plan, kid_hub, public_hub). Every value is cleaned like the labels. A delivery's detail is a fixed code (hub_no_response, rate_limited, skill_not_installed...) or null. delivered means the hub handed the speech to that speaker's connection: there is no playback receipt, so never tell the person it was "heard" or "played"; only acknowledged (an urgent announcement somebody answered) is a person's answer, and failed is not proof that nothing was spoken (every answer carries delivery_note). replayed: true on the answer of thalovant_intercom_announce means the API returned the STORED announcement for that key (Idempotency-Replayed: true): nothing new was sent.
Errors name the next step. The API's problem codes reach the model with a hint, never retried: urgent_scope_required (403), intercom_urgent_busy (429; the hub has 2 urgent announcements repeating and the platform a pool: stop one or wait for Retry-After; nothing stored and no API rate token spent, but this server's own urgent cap still counts the attempt), skill_not_installed (409), not_a_speaker (422; the connections that cannot play), too_many_targets (422; name a room or a group), hub_locked, impersonation_not_allowed (403), intercom_unavailable (422; a kid hub or a public hub), intercom_disabled_platform (503; the operator's switch: reads and cancel still work), intercom_not_configured (503), managed_client and reserved_name (the platform's own Intercom client), not_cancellable (409; it names the announcement's current status), hub_unreachable (502, with announcement_id) and a 409 for a key reused with a different request. Intercom ships dark: until the operator turns it on for the platform, every announcement is intercom_disabled_platform.
Names are data, not instructions. Speaker names, rooms, groups and acked_by are typed by the people of the household. In every tool answer they are stripped of control characters and text-direction, zero-width and other format marks, collapsed to single spaces and cut at 80 characters, and each answer carries a note saying they are labels, never instructions. Words the API puts in an error get the same character cleaning (without the cut).
Stopping an announcement. The real controls are: thalovant_intercom_cancel_announcement (the hub stops repeating at once; hub_confirmed: true means the hub confirmed, false means it could not, so tell the people in the home; a read of a cancelled announcement may carry no hub_confirmed, and the summary then says it does not know, never "Stopped"), the hub's Intercom switch and the platform's kill switch (the hub also stops repeating by itself when either turns off or a speaker's receive turns off), and a spoken acknowledgement at any speaker. Only an announcement that is sending can be cancelled (otherwise 409 not_cancellable).
The platform stores no text, and this server writes none to disk or to its audit log. The platform keeps only its length, a keyed hash, targets and per-speaker results. When the audit log is on (MCP_AUDIT_LOG; it is off by default), this server writes a record mcp.intercom.announce with textLen, textSha256, targets, priority, hubId, the idempotency key and the outcome (sent (with replayed: true when the API returned the stored answer), error, or refused with a reason: hub_not_allowed, rate_limited, urgent_scope_missing, confirmation_unsupported, confirmation_declined, confirmation_failed), even when MCP_AUDIT_INCLUDE_ARGS is off, and mcp.intercom.cancel; with MCP_AUDIT_INCLUDE_ARGS on, the generic entry shows text as [omitted: N characters]. textSha256 is an HMAC-SHA256, keyed with THALOVANT_INTERCOM_AUDIT_HMAC_KEY when set and otherwise with a random key of the running process, so a short sentence cannot be confirmed by guessing it from the log. Outputs are whitelisted (src/intercom-output.ts): the answer carries each speaker's result (delivered, acked, offline, skipped_dnd, skipped_not_receiving, failed), acked_by and a summary in words, never any text. The person's confirmation prompt (urgent and allowAll) shows the text to the person. Over Streamable HTTP the transport keeps that prompt in memory for the length of the stream, and it is never written to the file-backed event store: with MCP_EVENT_STORE_FILE set, elicitation/create messages are skipped (FileEventStore.storeEvent, src/index.ts; tested in test/http.test.ts). That holds for the platform and this server: the MCP client that sent the announcement can keep the text in its own conversation or tool-call history, which this server cannot control. For the two Intercom tools that cannot be undone (thalovant_intercom_announce, thalovant_intercom_cancel_announcement), an audit write that fails (a full disk, an unwritable MCP_AUDIT_LOG_FILE) is reported on stderr as mcp.audit_failed (the ids already in the record, never the text) and never replaces the answer, so the announcement's id and the idempotency key still reach the caller.
Other tools cannot speak in a home. thalovant_emit_event, thalovant_ask, thalovant_query and thalovant_send_action reach a hub as a client identity, and an identity allowed every event type (allowedTypes: ["*"]) could otherwise send the hub's intercom skill an announcement without any of the checks above. They now refuse, whatever MCP_TOOL_DENYLIST says, any message type that starts with thalovant.intercom. and any speak or ovos.utterance.speak type (src/bus-guard.ts): thalovant_emit_event refuses its eventType before it connects, and every runtime client this server creates has its transport guarded, so a frame of such a type is rejected for the other three tools (and thalovant_send_code) too. Denying the four tools is no longer needed for this. thalovant_config_status reports intercomAnnounceEnabled and intercomGuardrails (the refused types, what needs confirmation, the hub allowlist and the rate caps). A hub's own routines and skills speak through the hub's intercom skill under the hub's own per-speaker settings, which this server does not change.
THALOVANT_MCP_READONLY keeps the two reads and leaves the announce and cancel tools out, even with the opt-in. See Intercom in the docs.
Dependency note. The Node SDK's intercom methods (
announce,getAnnouncement,cancelAnnouncement,listIntercomSpeakers, ...) are not published yet. Until they are,src/intercom-sdk.tscalls the same routes directly (same origin, HTTPS and no-redirect rules as the SDK, no retry; ids that are empty,.or..are refused). Swap its four functions for the SDK's when@thalovant/sdkships them; nothing else changes.
Local Stdio
The server speaks MCP over stdio and does not write logs to stdout.
Runtime hub tools load local identities in this order:
identityFiletool argument.configPathorprofiletool argument.Thalovant SDK environment identity variables.
The default Thalovant SDK config profile.
Keep Thalovant identity files secret. The SDK expects protected config files such as ~/.config/thalovant/config.yaml with mode 0600.
Streamable HTTP
Remote mode uses MCP Streamable HTTP at /mcp and requires bearer authentication by default.
export MCP_TRANSPORT="http"
export MCP_HTTP_HOST="127.0.0.1"
export MCP_HTTP_PORT="3000"
export MCP_HTTP_AUTH_TOKEN="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
export MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_HOSTS="127.0.0.1:3000,localhost:3000"
npm run start:httpClients connect to:
http://127.0.0.1:3000/mcp
Authorization: Bearer <token>Health checks are available at /healthz and /readyz.
For public deployments, set the public URL and exact host/origin allowlists:
export MCP_HTTP_HOST="0.0.0.0"
export MCP_HTTP_PORT="3000"
export MCP_PUBLIC_URL="https://mcp.example.com"
export MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_HOSTS="mcp.example.com"
export MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS="https://agent.example.com"Remote Auth
Use static bearer tokens only for local, private, or single-tenant deployments:
export MCP_HTTP_AUTH_TOKEN="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
# or
export MCP_HTTP_AUTH_TOKENS="token-a,token-b"Use JWT/JWKS for production resource-server validation:
export MCP_HTTP_AUTH_MODE="jwt"
export MCP_OAUTH_ISSUER="https://auth.example.com/"
export MCP_OAUTH_JWKS_URL="https://auth.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json"
export MCP_OAUTH_AUDIENCE="https://mcp.example.com/mcp"
export MCP_OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_SERVERS="https://auth.example.com/"
export MCP_OAUTH_REQUIRED_SCOPES="mcp:thalovant"Use introspection when your authorization server issues opaque tokens:
export MCP_HTTP_AUTH_MODE="introspection"
export MCP_OAUTH_INTROSPECTION_URL="https://auth.example.com/oauth2/introspect"
export MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID="mcp-server-client"
export MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET="..."
export MCP_OAUTH_AUDIENCE="https://mcp.example.com/mcp"
export MCP_OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_SERVERS="https://auth.example.com/"
export MCP_OAUTH_REQUIRED_SCOPES="mcp:thalovant"The server publishes protected resource metadata at:
https://mcp.example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource401 responses include WWW-Authenticate with a resource_metadata pointer for MCP clients that support OAuth discovery.
Principal Credentials
For multi-user remote deployments, do not share one Thalovant access token across all MCP users. Map each authenticated MCP principal to its own Thalovant control-plane token, runtime identity, and tool policy.
Single file:
export THALOVANT_PRINCIPAL_CREDENTIALS_FILE="/run/secrets/thalovant-principals.json"Directory mode:
export THALOVANT_PRINCIPAL_CREDENTIALS_DIR="/run/secrets/thalovant-principals"Directory files are named <sha256(principal-id)>.json. The server checks the OAuth subject, principal id, and client id. See examples/principal-credentials.sample.json.
Keep this disabled for multi-user deployments unless you intentionally want every remote principal to use the server environment's Thalovant credentials:
export THALOVANT_ALLOW_SHARED_CREDENTIALS="false"Runtime identityFile, configPath, profile, and fromEnv tool arguments are disabled for remote principals by default. Set MCP_HTTP_ALLOW_CLIENT_CREDENTIAL_PATHS=true only for trusted private deployments.
Policy, Audit, And Resumability
Global tool policy:
export MCP_TOOL_ALLOWLIST="thalovant_*"
export MCP_TOOL_DENYLIST="thalovant_delete_memory_item"Per-principal credential files may also include allowedTools and deniedTools.
The runtime tools thalovant_emit_event, thalovant_ask, thalovant_query and thalovant_send_action can reach a hub as a client identity. They always refuse the message types that make speakers in a home talk (thalovant.intercom.*, speak, ovos.utterance.speak), whatever these lists say, so thalovant_intercom_announce is the only way to announce; see Intercom.
Both are call-time filters, and an empty allowlist means "allow everything". They cannot make a tool default-off or hide it from tools/list, which is why the two destructive control-plane tools are gated separately by THALOVANT_ENABLE_DESTRUCTIVE_TOOLS. See Destructive Tools.
Audit logs:
export MCP_AUDIT_LOG="stderr" # off, stderr, file, or both
export MCP_AUDIT_LOG_FILE="/var/log/thalovant-mcp/audit.jsonl"
export MCP_AUDIT_INCLUDE_ARGS="false"Audit entries are JSONL and credential-shaped fields are redacted.
Streamable HTTP resumability defaults to an in-memory event store. Use a file-backed store for single-instance restarts:
export MCP_EVENT_STORE_FILE="/var/lib/thalovant-mcp/events.jsonl"HTTP Hardening
Bearer auth is required unless
MCP_HTTP_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED=trueis explicitly set.Host headers are allowlisted to reduce DNS rebinding risk.
Browser
Originheaders are rejected unless they exactly matchMCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS.CORS exposes only MCP session/protocol headers.
Sessions use cryptographically random ids and are bound to the authenticated principal.
Request bodies are capped by
MCP_HTTP_MAX_BODY_BYTES, defaulting to 1 MiB.Fixed-window rate limiting defaults to 120 MCP requests per minute per client address.
Security headers include
nosniff,DENYframing, no referrer, and a restrictive CSP.
Useful HTTP environment variables:
MCP_HTTP_PATH=/mcp
MCP_HTTP_RATE_LIMIT_MAX=120
MCP_HTTP_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS=60000
MCP_HTTP_SESSION_TTL_MS=3600000
MCP_HTTP_MAX_BODY_BYTES=1048576
MCP_HTTP_ENABLE_JSON_RESPONSE=false
MCP_HTTP_TRUST_PROXY=falseClaude Desktop
Recommended: authenticate with a scoped API token so the MCP config never contains your account password.
{
"mcpServers": {
"thalovant": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@thalovant/mcp-server"],
"env": {
"THALOVANT_API_TOKEN": "tvpat_...",
"THALOVANT_PROFILE": "prod"
}
}
}
}Codex
Use the same stdio command in your MCP client config:
{
"mcpServers": {
"thalovant": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@thalovant/mcp-server"],
"env": {
"THALOVANT_API_TOKEN": "tvpat_...",
"THALOVANT_PROFILE": "prod"
}
}
}
}Tools
Read-only:
thalovant_config_statusthalovant_list_public_hubsthalovant_get_public_hubthalovant_list_hubsthalovant_get_hubthalovant_get_operationthalovant_wait_for_admissionthalovant_identity_statusthalovant_healthcheckthalovant_intent_inventorythalovant_wait_for_eventthalovant_get_analytics_overviewthalovant_list_memory_itemsthalovant_get_memory_summarythalovant_get_memory_item
Skill and runtime-group discovery (read-only):
thalovant_list_marketplace_skillsthalovant_list_runtime_group_marketplacethalovant_list_runtime_group_inventorythalovant_list_runtime_groupsthalovant_get_runtime_groupthalovant_get_runtime_group_configthalovant_get_hub_runtime_capabilities
Sign-in (see Browser Sign-In and Device Sign-In):
thalovant_begin_browser_loginthalovant_poll_browser_loginthalovant_begin_device_loginthalovant_poll_device_loginthalovant_revoke_device_login
Writes or hub events:
thalovant_create_client_identitythalovant_askthalovant_querythalovant_send_actionthalovant_send_codethalovant_emit_eventthalovant_create_memory_itemthalovant_update_memory_itemthalovant_delete_memory_item
Hub and runtime-group provisioning:
thalovant_create_hubthalovant_update_hubthalovant_release_hubthalovant_set_hub_ratingthalovant_clear_hub_ratingthalovant_create_runtime_groupthalovant_update_runtime_groupthalovant_update_runtime_group_configthalovant_release_runtime_groupthalovant_install_runtime_group_skillthalovant_uninstall_runtime_group_skill
Hub skills, acting on the hub’s shared runtime (see Hub Skills; the list tool is read-only):
thalovant_list_hub_skillsthalovant_list_hub_skill_historythalovant_install_hub_skillthalovant_update_hub_skillthalovant_remove_hub_skill
Chat apps (see Chat Apps; the first five are read-only, and thalovant_list_bridge_chats needs hubs:write):
thalovant_list_chat_app_connectorsthalovant_get_bridge_networksthalovant_list_bridgesthalovant_get_bridgethalovant_list_bridge_chatsthalovant_pause_bridgethalovant_resume_bridgethalovant_update_bridgethalovant_send_bridge_test_message
Destructive, not registered unless explicitly enabled (see Destructive Tools):
thalovant_delete_hubthalovant_delete_runtime_groupthalovant_delete_clientthalovant_delete_bridge
Tool outputs redact credential-shaped fields. thalovant_create_client_identity does not return secret identity material; pass savePath when you want the full identity written to a local file with mode 0600. savePath is confined to the server's identity directory (THALOVANT_MCP_IDENTITY_DIR, default <config-dir>/thalovant/identities): pass a plain filename, since absolute paths outside that directory and .. traversal are rejected, so a model cannot drop a credential file into a git working tree or synced folder. thalovant_config_status reports the active identityDir.
thalovant_intent_inventory uses the runtime identity and accepts languages,
describe, fallback, speakable, sentence, slots, exampleLimit, and a per-query/batch timeoutMs. It returns registered
intents and examples, fallback skills, fallbacks_known, listed_in, and
may_answer by requested language. listed_in names the hub language each
requested language was listed in. A hub lists nothing under a language it did
not load, so a language with no sentences is listed in its usual form (en-CA
in en-US) or in the closest language the hub loaded, and examples are
rendered in that language. When listed_in differs from what was asked, the
sentences are in another language, and presentation.notes says so. Fallback
skills come from ovos.skills.list, in skill id order, with priority: null:
the hub does not say in which order it tries them. A missing or denied
fallback-skill query remains unknown, rather than being reported as a known
empty list. The optional probe adds at most 1500ms. A silent listing can use engine manifests; disable this with
fallback: false. Both new tools are available in read-only mode and respect
per-principal policy. thalovant_get_operation reads an operation ID returned by
provisioning without replaying the write.
The additive presentation object contains the shared SDK inventory shape:
cache_version, hub_id, hub_name, source, generated_at, skills, notes,
and languages_present. Skill titles are derived from IDs. Runtime discovery
cannot prove catalog locales or hub display metadata, so those fields remain
unknown (empty lists/strings), with explanatory notes. Intent language order is
explicit and survives JSON key sorting. Each tool call retains its own identity
lease; the server does not persist inventory or share a session across callers.
Tool Errors
When the Thalovant API refuses a control-plane call, the tool result is an error whose text starts with the SDK's one-line message (which names the HTTP status and can be shortened) and then says what the API said, in full:
Thalovant API request failed with HTTP 403: Only an administrator can run an image the platform does not release: bus may be one of ghcr.io/thalovant/ovos-messagebus:2026.09.2, ... (platform_image_required)
code: platform_image_required
detail: Only an administrator can run an image the platform does not release: bus may be one of ghcr.io/thalovant/ovos-messagebus:2026.09.2, ghcr.io/thalovant/ovos-messagebus:2026.09.3-alpha.1, ghcr.io/thalovant/ovos-messagebus:2026.08.7; core may be any tag or digest of ghcr.io/thalovant/ovos-core.
fields: {"allowed_images":{"bus":[...],"core":[...]},"allowed_repositories":{"core":"ghcr.io/thalovant/ovos-core"},"component":"runtime_group","refused_images":{...}}codeis the API's machine-readable code, when it sent one.detailis the whole sentence, and appears only when the first line had to shorten it.fieldsis every other member of the error body as compact JSON (the Problem+JSONtype,title,statusandinstanceare left out), with the same secret redaction as every other tool output. A value a validation error echoes back from the request -- each entry'sinputin adetailorerrorslist, whatever its key or shape -- is replaced with"[omitted]"there and never reaches the first line. A plan refusal carriesresource,limit,usedandplanhere. A chat app refusal about settings or secrets carries the API's ownfieldslist here: their names, never their values. Its hint repeats the names.
A hint may follow for statuses that need one. A platform_image_required or
plan_limit 403 gets its own hint rather than the general scope hint.
A 409 skill_unavailable_licensing says the store refuses the skill for its
licensing and where the catalog announces it, instead of the version hint. A
409 skill_unavailable_unpublished says the skill cannot be installed because
no release of it has been published, that no plan, scope, version or retry
changes that and there is nothing to buy, and where the listings show it; any
other skill_unavailable_* code gets the store's refusal in general terms. A
memory create or update refused with 409 memory_limit (the plan's remembered
items are used up; a Free plan keeps one, limit and upgrade_plan are in the
fields) names the delete tool that frees a slot, the update tool that changes
the item that exists, and the plan to move to; other memory refusals carry the
SDK's message alone.
Request hints, embedded audio, and configuration merging
thalovant_ask accepts sttLang, an ordered pipeline, and location
with required city and optional region, country, timezone, latitude,
and longitude. Hints apply to the current request. Omit unused hints;
an empty pipeline is ignored, and blank language or city strings are rejected.
Ask and Query return language, ordered event metadata, hasAudio and
droppedMedia. Embedded hex stays out of text output. Opt into separate MCP
audio blocks with includeAudio: true; unknown formats become embedded binary
resource blocks. Clip and reply limits are 4 MiB and 16 MiB respectively,
checked by the SDK before retention. The client owns playback. No skill-supplied
path or URL is fetched. Inventory speakable: true renders examples without
changing the raw patterns; slots supplies illustrative slot values, and
exampleLimit limits examples per language to 1–20 (default 2).
Configuration updates default to merge: true: GET the revision, deep-merge
the caller's delta and PUT with expected_revision. Only HTTP 412 retries,
with a fresh read and at most three total attempts. This requires hubs:read,
hubs:write, and a paid plan. An older API without revision support fails before
writing. There is no unconditional fallback. Supplied personas replace;
omitted personas stay unchanged. For an intentional full replacement, pass
merge: false, requiring hubs:write, a paid plan, and coordination with other writers.
Guarded merges reject integers outside JavaScript's safe integer range in the
delta or stored configuration before writing. Store large identifiers as strings
or use an SDK that preserves large JSON integers.
Destructive Tools
thalovant_delete_hub, thalovant_delete_runtime_group, thalovant_delete_client and thalovant_delete_bridge are disabled by default. They are not merely blocked when called — they are never registered, so they do not appear in tools/list and a model cannot see or attempt them.
A long-lived control-plane token combined with an always-available delete tool is a categorically different risk from a read or update tool: deleting a hub also deletes its dependent clients and ACLs, and none of it is reversible. So these are opt-in:
export THALOVANT_ENABLE_DESTRUCTIVE_TOOLS="true"Accepted true values are 1, true, yes, and on; anything else, including unset, leaves the tools off. The flag is read when a server instance is created. Restart the server process with the updated environment after changing it. thalovant_config_status reports the current state as destructiveToolsEnabled and lists the tools the flag controls.
This is a separate mechanism from the existing tool policy, deliberately. MCP_TOOL_ALLOWLIST / MCP_TOOL_DENYLIST and the per-principal allowedTools / deniedTools are call-time filters where an empty allowlist means "allow everything"; they cannot express a tool that is off until an operator turns it on, and they cannot hide a tool from tools/list. Once THALOVANT_ENABLE_DESTRUCTIVE_TOOLS is set the delete tools are ordinary tools again and remain subject to that policy, so the two layers compose:
# Register delete tools, then deny their use by every principal.
export THALOVANT_ENABLE_DESTRUCTIVE_TOOLS="true"
export MCP_TOOL_DENYLIST="thalovant_delete_hub,thalovant_delete_runtime_group"The global deny applies to every principal and cannot be overridden by a principal's allowedTools. To restrict only selected principals, leave these tools out of the global denylist and use those principals' deniedTools instead.
Deleting a hub still requires a current etag (412 otherwise), and deleting a runtime group fails with 409 while it is the workspace default or still has hubs attached. Deleting a client cuts off the device or link using it; its etag is read first when none is given. Deleting a chat app bridge removes its stored token, so connecting the bot again means pasting the token in the console; to stop a bridge for now, pause it instead.
Non-Catalog Skill Sources
thalovant_install_runtime_group_skill installs from the vetted marketplace catalog by default. Any other source — notably sourceType: "git" with an arbitrary sourceRef repository URL — pulls code the marketplace never reviewed straight into a production runtime, and the control-plane validator is format-only with no host allowlist. Because the tools are driven by a model holding a long-lived token, non-catalog sources are refused unless an operator opts in:
export THALOVANT_ENABLE_GIT_SKILL_SOURCES="true"With the flag unset, a call with any sourceType other than catalog fails before any control-plane request is made. Accepted true values are 1, true, yes, and on. thalovant_config_status reports the state as gitSkillSourcesEnabled. The tool is annotated destructiveHint: true.
Read-Only Mode
Set THALOVANT_MCP_READONLY=1 to register only tools annotated readOnlyHint: true (the sign-in tools are not among them; thalovant_wait_for_admission is), less those the API serves only to a write scope: thalovant_list_bridge_chats changes nothing but needs hubs:write, which an observe-only agent's token does not carry. Write and destructive tools are then never registered and never appear in tools/list, so an operator can run an observe-only agent without hand-writing a denylist. Like the other registration-time gates it is read when a server instance is created; thalovant_config_status reports the state as readOnly.
HiveMind Runtime Compatibility
Runtime calls sharing the same hub client identity run sequentially within one MCP process. Use a distinct client identity for each independently running MCP server so the hub can keep their sessions separate.
Version 0.10.1 requires @thalovant/sdk ^0.11.0 (0.11.0 through versions below 0.12.0), which carries browserLogin() and interactiveLogin() for browser sign-in, as well as the chat app methods and ThalovantApiError.fields. Since 0.5.1 the server enforces
secure effective MQTT URLs and carries a single connection deadline through
MQTT setup and HTTP failure cleanup. Runtime tools support
HiveMind v3 Noise over WSS, HTTPS and MQTT over TLS. thalovant_healthcheck
reports readiness only after authentication; a reachable hub or broker alone
does not establish a runtime session.
The Zod 4 security migration preserves the 50 default tools and string-keyed record values. Its JSON Schema output inlines repeated records, identifies string property names, and omits additionalProperties: false on stripping objects; unknown input keys are still stripped before handlers receive them. UUID validation now enforces standard version/variant bits (plus nil/max UUIDs), and memory-list offsets must be safe integers. See the security audit for evidence and release gates.
Keep the SDK configuration directory persistent and private between server
restarts (~/.config/thalovant, or the configured XDG/Windows equivalent). It
contains the client Noise key and trusted server pins. An authentication
failure preserves those pins; replacing a server key requires an explicit,
verified trust change. HTTPS identities must advertise the hub's HTTPS plugin,
and MQTT requires the identity's broker credentials and topic prefix.
Runtime tools retain their identity lease through actual cleanup. If the close caller times out, a later tool waits up to six seconds for that cleanup before opening a session. A queued tool that reaches this deadline fails without executing later or releasing the previous session's identity. An actual cleanup failure marks the identity unavailable to later calls instead of risking concurrent sessions. These leases are process-local; separate server processes or replicas need distinct runtime identities or external coordination.
MCP request cancellation applies to queued runtime tools in both stdio and Streamable HTTP mode. A cancelled queued call never constructs a runtime client or executes later. Cancellation also reaches runtime connection setup, Ask, Query and event waits. Action/code sends, raw event publication and inventory queries check cancellation during connection setup, then retain ownership until the admitted SDK operation finishes. Cancelling the MCP request cannot undo an already admitted operation or its effects. The identity remains reserved through that work and actual cleanup; application requests are never automatically replayed. Control-plane tools do not gain runtime cancellation semantics in this release.
For example, an MCP TypeScript client can cancel a runtime query after ten seconds, including time spent waiting for its identity lease:
await mcpClient.callTool({
name: "thalovant_query",
arguments: { identityFile: "/secure/identity.json", text: "What is the weather?", timeoutMs: 30000 },
}, undefined, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10000) });Intent inventory retains its connection setup and per-query/batch budgets plus a separate optional fallback probe; it has no single inventory-wide deadline.
Development
npm run typecheck
npm test
npm run build
npm run test:smoke
npm run test:http
npm run bench
npm run bench:http
npm pack --dry-runLicense
MIT. This is the right default for a public integration server: it is permissive, compatible with the MIT Thalovant Node SDK and MCP TypeScript SDK, and does not force downstream agent or enterprise users into a reciprocal licensing model.
Credential-bearing control-plane calls require HTTPS. Explicit loopback HTTP
(localhost, 127.0.0.1, [::1]) remains supported for local development.
API redirects are rejected so password-login bodies cannot be forwarded.
Runtime clients are constructed only after acquiring their identity lease.
thalovant_query sends a routed HiveMind query; the hub may cascade it according
to its routing policy. It accepts text, timeoutMs, lang, sessionId,
requestId, queryId, context and replySettleMs, plus the runtime identity
options, and returns the same normalized reply shape as thalovant_ask. A query
may trigger actions, so read-only mode hides it. Conversation workflows use
sessionId with ask/query and the existing event-wait tool; MCP does not expose
one tool for every SDK conversation or event-listener method.
Shared-runtime skill management
The catalog has 64 default tools, 30 in read-only mode, and 68 with destructive tools enabled; THALOVANT_ENABLE_INTERCOM_ANNOUNCE adds one.
Hub-addressed skill methods select the runtime group attached to the hub UUID.
Every hub sharing that group sees the same skill changes and history. The API
requires a restricted token to cover all served hubs. Reads need hubs:inspect
(hubs:read implies it); writes need hubs:write, an eligible paid plan and ownership.
The history response contains newest-first event and operation entries,
including nullable actor/version fields. Its limit is 1–200 (50 where omitted).
An accepted mutation is not proof the skill is ready. Optional waiting polls the
operation, with a 120-second default timeout and two-second interval. Polling
never repeats an accepted mutation and starts no new read after its deadline;
an already-running HTTP request retains its normal request timeout.
Read history with thalovant_list_hub_skill_history (hubId, optional limit). This tool remains available in read-only mode.
Inventory sentence: true implies speakable rendering and capitalizes/punctuates
examples using bundled thalovant-languages 0.2.1 rules. Regional locale matching
follows OVOS distances; explicit slots override locale sample values. Complete
phrases rank first, and exampleLimit counts unique nonempty rendered results.
Raw intent definitions remain in the response; unknown locales retain bare text.
The CLI handles SIGTERM and SIGINT in stdio and HTTP modes, including when it runs as the container's PID 1. It closes sessions and HTTP connections before a successful exit, with a ten-second failure deadline for stalled cleanup.
Version 0.5.1 uses Node SDK 0.7.1 with Python 0.7.4-compatible inventory
and question detection, including Unicode question marks and omitted-language patterns. With sentence: true, Spanish questions receive their question
mark and complete French phrases keep their final period. Undescribed
languages remain bare.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Loading tool schema changelog…
This server cannot be deployed
Maintenance
Related MCP Connectors
MCP server for mandates, delegation, policy-gated execution, credential grants, and audit.
Guarded MCP server for agent-readable business truth, provenance, readiness, and discovery.
Ovanek MCP: Model Context Protocol server for Ovanek platform tools; writes are dry-run by default.
Streamable HTTP MCP server exposing planner flows, tasks, and squads.
Related MCP Servers
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceCentralized MCP control plane that proxies multiple upstream MCP servers with tool namespacing, filtering, policy enforcement, audit logging, and health checks.8 npmMIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceA standalone MCP server that exposes Rancher-side tools, forwards Authorization headers or uses configured credentials, and supports HTTP and stdio transports.MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceMCP server for the Mobilerun platform, exposing tools for device control, workflow automation, task management, and platform operations via a stateless HTTP or stdio interface with bearer-token authentication and policy-based access control.1Apache 2.0
- AlicenseBqualityBmaintenanceEnables managing Balena fleets, devices, releases, variables, tags, teams, and organizations from MCP clients, locally over stdio or remotely over Streamable HTTP.411GPL 3.0