talos-mcp

An MCP server that exposes Talos Linux cluster management to AI agents (Claude Code, OpenAI Codex, and any MCP-compatible client). Instead of pasting talosctl output into chat, the agent calls structured tools that return machine-readable JSON directly from the Talos gRPC API — zero token cost for intermediate output.

Connects to your cluster via the native Talos gRPC API using the same mTLS credentials as talosctl (~/.talos/config).

Installation

Via npm (no Go required, Linux/macOS, amd64/arm64):

npx talos-mcp

Via npm (global install) for persistent invocation from $PATH:

npm install -g talos-mcp

Installs the binary as <npm-prefix>/bin/talos-mcp. Verify with:

which talos-mcp        # path
talos-mcp --version    # version + commit hash
npm list -g talos-mcp  # npm's view of the installed version

Upgrade to the latest published release:

npm install -g talos-mcp@latest

New releases appear on npmjs.com within minutes of every feat: / fix: / perf: (or breaking) merge to main — see CONTRIBUTING.md § Post-merge release pipeline for the mechanism.

Download binary (Linux/macOS, amd64/arm64):

Download the latest release from GitHub Releases, extract, and place the binary in your $PATH.

Build from source (requires Go 1.21+):

git clone https://github.com/Nosmoht/talos-mcp-server
cd talos-mcp
go build -o talos-mcp ./cmd/talos-mcp

Configuration

Reads ~/.talos/config by default (the same file talosctl uses). Override via environment variables:

Compatibility

This server is tested against Talos Linux v1.9.x through v1.12.x.

The server logs a startup warning if the connected cluster's Talos version is outside the tested range. All 19 gRPC methods used have been stable since Talos v1.9.

Upgrade path validation

The talos_upgrade tool validates that the target version follows Talos's supported upgrade path — at most one minor version at a time (e.g. v1.11.x → v1.12.x). Upgrades that skip minor versions are rejected with an error.

If your image uses a custom or factory tag (e.g. factory.talos.dev/... or :latest) the tag cannot be parsed and validation is skipped automatically. To bypass validation explicitly, set TALOS_MCP_SKIP_VERSION_CHECK=true.

Client Setup

Claude Code

Add to your project's .mcp.json:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "talos": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "talos-mcp"]
    }
  }
}

Or globally in ~/.claude.json under "mcpServers". If you prefer a local binary, replace "command": "npx" with the path to the binary.

Claude Desktop

Add to ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "talos": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "talos-mcp"]
    }
  }
}

OpenAI Codex

Add to .codex/config.toml (project) or ~/.codex/config.toml (global):

[mcp_servers.talos]
command = "npx"
args = ["-y", "talos-mcp"]

[mcp_servers.talos.env]
TALOSCONFIG = "/path/to/talosconfig"

Generic MCP client

The server speaks the MCP protocol over stdio:

./talos-mcp

Tools

Read-only

Mutating

These tools modify cluster state and have explicit safety guards.

All tools accept an optional nodes field (list of node IPs or hostnames). When omitted, the active context from talosconfig is used.

Maintenance-mode (--insecure) operations

talos_apply_config, talos_get, talos_version, and talos_meta accept an insecure=true flag that targets a node in maintenance mode (booted but not yet configured). The transport is TLS-encrypted but bypasses mTLS — there is no client certificate and (by default) no server-certificate verification. This is required for bootstrapping fresh nodes (talosctl apply-config --insecure equivalent).

• Operator opt-in required. Set TALOS_MCP_ENABLE_INSECURE=true (or use the expert safety profile). Without it, every insecure=true call is refused.

• Endpoint allowlist required. Set TALOS_MCP_INSECURE_ALLOWED_NODES to a comma-separated list of permitted maintenance-mode IPs / CIDRs. The startup is aborted if it is missing or contains 0.0.0.0/0, ::/0, an IPv4 mask <16, or an IPv6 mask <48. Use /28 or narrower in production.

• Endpoint must be a bare IP. No hostnames, no host:port, no scheme, no IPv6 zone. Link-local (incl. 169.254.169.254 IMDS), loopback, multicast, and unspecified addresses are rejected.

• MITM mitigation via TOFU pinning. Pass cert_fingerprint=<64-hex> (server SHA-256 fingerprint, copied from the Talos console banner) to enable leaf-cert verification. Without it, the connection is MITMable by anyone on-path between the MCP server and the target node.

• META write/delete safelist. talos_meta write/delete is restricted to meta.UserReserved1/2/3. Privileged keys (Upgrade, StateEncryptionConfig, …) must be enumerated in TALOS_MCP_META_PRIVILEGED_KEYS (per-key, not a blanket flag).

Prompts

Resources and Subscriptions

The server exposes Talos COSI resources as MCP resources:

• talos://cluster/version — static cluster version info.

• talos://cluster/resource-definitions — discover resource types.

• talos://{node}/resource/{namespace}/{type}[/{id}] — list or get COSI resources on a specific node.

MCP clients that implement resources/subscribe (Claude Desktop, Cursor) receive notifications/resources/updated whenever the underlying resource changes — no polling required. Subscriptions are backed by the Talos COSI Watch / WatchKindAggregated streams and honour the same TALOS_MCP_ALLOWED_NODES allowlist as reads.

Subscribable resource types (canonical names):

• MachineStatuses.runtime.talos.dev (MachineStatus)

• Members.cluster.talos.dev (Member)

• NodeAddresses.net.talos.dev (NodeAddress)

• Services.v1alpha1.talos.dev (Service)

Aliases resolve to the canonical type before the allowlist check, so a client subscribing to talos://{node}/resource/runtime/ms/... (alias for MachineStatus) succeeds. Other COSI types reject with resource type %q is not subscribable. Static talos://cluster/* URIs are not subscribable (no COSI backing).

Delivery is rate-limited per (session, URI) via TALOS_MCP_SUBSCRIPTION_RATE / TALOS_MCP_SUBSCRIPTION_BURST; over-rate events are dropped and the client re-reads the resource to catch up. The initial Bootstrapped event is intentionally not forwarded — the client is expected to call resources/read once after subscribe for initial state.

Security Model

Trust Boundaries

MCP Client (Claude Code / Codex)
        │  stdio / JSON-RPC
        ▼
   talos-mcp  ◄── reads TALOSCONFIG (~/.talos/config)
        │  gRPC + mTLS
        ▼
  Talos API (each node)
        │
        ▼
    Node OS

Data flow warning: Tool responses flow directly into the LLM's context window and are sent to the LLM provider. Anything a tool returns — node IPs, hostnames, service configurations, kernel logs, file contents — becomes part of the prompt sent over the network. Do not use this server with clusters containing data you would not be comfortable sending to your LLM provider.

Talos RBAC is server-side enforced. The credentials in your talosconfig determine what operations are permitted on each node. talos-mcp cannot bypass Talos RBAC — a request that the API rejects will fail with an error, not silently succeed.

Tool Classification and Minimum Required RBAC Role

Safety Mechanisms

What Is Not in the Threat Model

• The LLM itself — prompt injection, hallucinated tool arguments, and LLM provider data retention are outside the scope of this server

• The MCP client — security of Claude Code, Codex, or other MCP clients is the responsibility of those projects

• Network path between talos-mcp and Talos nodes — protected by mutual TLS using the credentials in your talosconfig

Least-Privilege Credential Setup

Create a dedicated talosconfig with minimal permissions for use with this server:

Read-only access (recommended for most use cases):

# Generate a reader-only talosconfig
talosctl config new --roles=os:reader talosconfig-readonly

Then set TALOSCONFIG=/path/to/talosconfig-readonly and TALOS_MCP_READ_ONLY=true for maximum restriction. With this setup, the server exposes only read-only tools and the credentials cannot perform any mutating operations even if a tool were somehow bypassed.

Operator access (for service management, reboot, upgrade):

talosctl config new --roles=os:operator talosconfig-operator

This covers all tools except talos_patch_config (which requires os:admin).

Full access (required for config patching):

Use your default talosconfig or generate one with os:admin. Reserve this for setups where config patch capability is explicitly needed.

Verifying Downloads

Checksums (integrity)

Each release includes a talos-mcp_<version>_checksums.txt file with SHA-256 hashes of all archives. Verify the binary after downloading:

# Download archive and checksums
curl -LO https://github.com/Nosmoht/talos-mcp-server/releases/download/v<version>/talos-mcp_<version>_linux_amd64.tar.gz
curl -LO https://github.com/Nosmoht/talos-mcp-server/releases/download/v<version>/talos-mcp_<version>_checksums.txt

# Verify
sha256sum --check --ignore-missing talos-mcp_<version>_checksums.txt

This detects corruption or truncated downloads. It does not protect against a compromised release pipeline.

GitHub Artifact Attestations (SLSA L2 provenance)

Each release includes a GitHub-native build provenance attestation that cryptographically links the binary to the specific commit and workflow run that produced it:

gh attestation verify talos-mcp_<version>_linux_amd64.tar.gz \
  --repo Nosmoht/talos-mcp-server

This requires the GitHub CLI. A passing verification means the artifact was produced by the official release workflow in this repository, not a third-party build.

npm Package Provenance

The npm package is published with provenance attestation:

npm audit signatures

A passing result means the package was published by the official GitHub Actions release workflow via OIDC trusted publishing.

Development

# Build
go build -o talos-mcp ./cmd/talos-mcp

# Test
go test -race ./...

# Lint (requires golangci-lint v2)
golangci-lint run

# Format check
gofmt -l .

License

MIT