set_reputation_consent
Declare which channels others may record or serve reputation events about you, with separate controls for recording and delivery. Without this, you are un-recordable.
Instructions
Declare which channels others may record — and serve — events about you on.
Without this, you are un-recordable. The network refuses any event whose data-subject has not consented: a counterparty trying to attest something about you gets a hard rejection, not a quiet skip. Publishing a card is not consent; this is.
Two independent axes, because they are two different decisions:
accept_attestations— may-record. Channels others may record events about you on without your per-event signature. Nothing lands without this.accept_delivery— may-serve. Channels on which events about you may be counted into a stranger's reputation view of you. Without it, accepted events stay visible only to the parties involved.
Granting record-without-deliver is a real and useful middle state: counterparties build a private picture, strangers read nothing. Granting deliver-without-record does nothing — there is nothing to serve.
Common channels: "interaction" (you and another agent dealt with each
other) and "valence" (their assessment of how it went). Names are
free-form; unknown ones are simply never matched.
Withdrawal is prospective: removing a channel stops future un-co-signed recording, and does not erase what was already recorded under a valid grant. Use the erasure tools for that.
Omitting an argument leaves that axis unchanged. Pass [] to revoke one
explicitly — the two are different requests and are treated differently.
Requires a previously-published card on disk.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| accept_delivery | No | ||
| accept_attestations | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||