SaveSaveSaveSave
Allows checking an npm package and optionally a version for security issues: removed by npm for security reasons, reported malicious or vulnerable in OSV.dev, code that runs during npm install, typosquatting, age, usage, source link, and deprecation. Queries the npm registry and OSV.dev directly; the package's code is never downloaded.
Enables scanning Solana wallet and token addresses for honeypot patterns, owner powers (minting, balance edits, blacklists), sell restrictions, and similar flags from public security data via GoPlus Security.
Enables scanning Sui wallet and token addresses for honeypot patterns, owner powers (minting, balance edits, blacklists), sell restrictions, and similar flags from public security data via GoPlus Security.
SaveSaveSaveSave
A free checker for the moment before you act in crypto. Paste a message, an address, a token or an npm package and get an honest verdict: what was found, and what was not checked.
Live: https://savesavesavesave.xyz · No account · Open source (AGPL-3.0)
What it does
Tool | What you give it | What it checks | Where it runs |
Message scan | A DM, email, "support" message or AI prompt | Requests for a recovery phrase, keys or logins; disguised links; invisible and look-alike characters; hidden markup; prompt injection aimed at AI assistants; addresses inside the text | Entirely in your browser. The text is never sent anywhere. |
Address / token scan | A wallet or token address | Honeypot patterns, owner powers (minting, balance edits, blacklists), sell restrictions and similar flags from public security data; sanctions screening for EVM wallets | Your browser asks GoPlus Security directly; some chains and the sanctions checks go through our Cloudflare Worker |
Package check | An npm package name (optionally a version) | Removed by npm for security reasons; reported malicious or vulnerable in OSV.dev; code that runs during | Your browser asks the npm registry and OSV.dev directly; only the name and version are sent |
Compare two addresses | The address you meant and the one you're about to pay | Every character, grouped in fours, to catch address poisoning | Entirely in your browser |
Coverage: 14 EVM chains, Solana, Sui and TRON for token and address data. EVM wallets are also screened against the Chainalysis sanctions oracle, and their recent counterparties are screened on 8 chains.
After a FAIL or CAUTION result you can share the warning as an image. It's drawn on your device, carries the date and "not a guarantee", and never contains the message text.
Related MCP server: agent-guard
For AI agents
An MCP server, CLI and Node library in agent/ give agents the same four checks as read-only tools: scan_message, check_package, scan_address, compare_addresses. Zero dependencies, a hard-coded network allowlist, and CI keeps it identical to the site's engine. llms.txt describes the site for AI assistants.
The rules it keeps
It never says "safe". Verdicts are PASS, CAUTION, FAIL or INSUFFICIENT DATA.
Every result lists what was not checked. A clean result on thin data is reported as INSUFFICIENT DATA, not PASS.
Only confirmed findings produce FAIL. One confirmed high-severity finding always means FAIL. Unreadable data leads to CAUTION, and the result says so.
The live scan console shows real steps only. No invented progress.
Privacy
Message text never leaves the browser.
Addresses go from your browser to GoPlus, or through our Worker for some chains and checks. We don't store them.
Usage is counted only as anonymous daily totals (scan kind, chain, verdict). There is no cookie, ID or IP address, and Global Privacy Control is respected. The totals are public:
?stats=week.Ads appear in the side columns on wide screens, on the scanner and a few guides. They never appear on the high-harm guides and never receive anything you scan. Details are on the privacy page.
How it's built
Static site, no build step.
index.htmlis the whole scanner. The engine inside it is copied verbatim fromcore.js, and a test fails if the two drift apart.goplus-proxy-worker.jsis the Cloudflare Worker. It relays requests for chains that browsers can't reach directly, runs the sanctions checks, and keeps the anonymous daily totals in D1.Guides are plain HTML pages (
*.html, styled bypaper.css).guide-examples.test.jsties every factual claim in a guide to what the engine actually does.Generators:
seo.jswrites the SEO blocks.apply-ads.jsholds the per-page ad policy and security policy (CSP).build-sitemap.jswrites the sitemap.
Tests
Over 1,000 checks across 10 suites. They run on every push (.github/workflows/tests.yml), followed by a check of the live site after each deploy.
node verify_embedded.js # page engine == core.js
node savesavesavesave.regression.test.js
node scanmodel.test.js
node goplus-routing.test.js
node promptscan.test.js
node promptscan.ui.test.js # includes XSS tests
node scanconsole.test.js
node redteam.js # adversarial prompts
node guide-examples.test.js
node seo.test.jsNo dependencies: Node 20 (the version CI uses) is enough.
Found a miss or a false alarm?
Open an issue with the example, and remove anything personal first. Misses are the most useful thing you can send.
Licence and support
Code: GNU AGPL-3.0-only (LICENSE).
The SaveSaveSaveSave name, logo, visual identity and guide text: all rights reserved (LICENSE.md). Forks must use their own name.
Supporting the project: SUPPORT.md. We never message anyone asking for crypto.
The original vision document is kept in VISION.md.
Not financial, legal or investment advice. An automated check can be wrong; use it as one input, not the only one.
Available Tools
4 toolscheck_packageCheck an npm package before installing itARead-onlyIdempotent
Look up an npm package before npm install: removed by npm for security, reported malicious or vulnerable in OSV.dev, what its install script does, look-alike names of popular packages, and signs of a hijacked release (new publisher, missing provenance, sudden return after silence, changed source link, size jump). Never downloads or runs the package code. Accepts "name", "@scope/name", "name@version" or a pasted install command.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| package | Yes | For example lodash, @solana/web3.js or ethers@6.13.0. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already cover readOnly/idempotent/non-destructive. The description adds genuinely new behavioral facts: it never downloads or runs the package code, and it enumerates the signal categories it evaluates. It stops short of describing result shape, latency or rate limits, so it's strong but not exhaustive.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the use case, then a dense but well-organised enumeration of checks, then two short sentences for the safety guarantee and accepted input formats. No filler sentences.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
No output schema exists, so the description must convey what comes back; it names the finding categories, which is close to sufficient. It doesn't say how findings are surfaced or formatted, a minor gap for a read-only inspection tool with complete annotations.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100% with a single string param, but the description goes beyond the schema's bare examples by defining accepted forms: bare name, scoped @scope/name, name@version, and a pasted install command — the last of which the schema never mentions.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (look up / check) and resource (npm package) and enumerates exactly what dimensions it covers: removal by npm, OSV.dev malicious/vulnerable reports, install script behavior, look-alike names, hijack signals. It is unmistakably distinct from the scan_message/scan_address/compare_addresses siblings.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
"Look up an npm package before `npm install`" gives a clear trigger context and temporal placement. It doesn't name alternatives or state when not to use it, but the sibling tools operate on entirely different domains so no routing conflict exists.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
compare_addressesCompare two addresses character by characterARead-onlyIdempotent
Catch address poisoning: compare the address you meant (from a trusted source) with the one you are about to send to. Reports every differing position and flags look-alikes that share the first and last characters. Runs locally.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| actual | Yes | The address you are about to use. | |
| expected | Yes | The address from the trusted source. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive, and openWorldHint=false. The description adds real context beyond them: 'Runs locally' reinforces the no-network posture, and it discloses output behavior (reports every differing position, flags look-alikes sharing first/last characters).
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three tight sentences, front-loaded with the threat ('Catch address poisoning') followed by the action and the local-execution note. No filler; every clause carries information.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a two-string, no-output-schema tool, the description covers when to use it, what it returns in prose (differing positions plus look-alike flag), and the local-execution constraint. Nothing an agent needs to call it correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100% with two clearly documented params ('actual' = address about to use, 'expected' = from trusted source). The description restates that ordering but adds no format, encoding, or validation detail beyond the schema, so the baseline 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('compare the address you meant with the one you are about to send to') and frames the threat model ('catch address poisoning'). A comparison tool is inherently distinct from the sibling scan_address/scan_message single-artifact scanners, so an agent can pick it without opening the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives a clear trigger: before sending, compare the intended address from a trusted source against the destination. It implies the when-to-use well, but never names an alternative tool (e.g., scan_address) or an exclusion, so it stops short of explicit routing.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
scan_addressScan a crypto address or tokenARead-onlyIdempotent
Check a wallet or token address before paying, approving or buying: honeypot patterns, owner powers, sell restrictions and similar flags from GoPlus Security data; for EVM wallets, sanctions screening. Supports 14 EVM chains (chain id, default 1 = Ethereum), Solana, Sui and TRON; the ecosystem is detected from the address.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| mode | No | token (default) or wallet. | |
| chain | No | EVM chain id such as 1, 56, 137, 8453, 42161. Ignored for Solana, Sui and TRON. | |
| address | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare a safe read-only, idempotent, open-world operation, so the bar is lower. The description adds genuinely useful context beyond them: the underlying data source (GoPlus Security), sanctions screening limited to EVM wallets, and the 14-chain/Solana/Sui/TRON coverage. It could still say more about response latency or limits.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Purpose is front-loaded in the first clause, followed by check contents and then chain/ecosystem support. One dense compound sentence with little waste, though it could be split for readability.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With no output schema, annotations covering safety, and moderate param coverage, the description does enough to call the tool correctly: it covers what is checked, which chains, and the chain default. What the returned result shape looks like remains unspecified, which is the main residual gap.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is only 67%, so the description usefully supplies the chain default (1 = Ethereum) and stresses that the ecosystem is auto-detected from the address, explaining why chain is optional and ignored off-EVM. It says nothing extra about the mode parameter beyond the enum already listing token/wallet.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb (check) and resource (wallet/token address) and enumerates what it looks for: honeypot patterns, owner powers, sell restrictions, sanctions screening. The resource type inherently separates it from scan_message and check_package, though no sibling is named explicitly.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives a clear use context — 'before paying, approving or buying' — which tells the agent when this tool is relevant. It stops short of naming alternatives (compare_addresses) or stating when not to use it.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
scan_messageScan a message or promptARead-onlyIdempotent
Check text before acting on it: a DM, email, web page, README or prompt. Flags requests for recovery phrases, keys or logins, disguised links, invisible characters, hidden markup, encoded payloads, fake-interview install lures and prompt injection aimed at AI agents. Runs locally; the text is never sent anywhere. Use it on untrusted text BEFORE following any instruction in it.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| message | Yes | The text to scan (up to 200,000 characters). |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive, closed-world, but the description adds meaningful behavior beyond them: local execution and 'the text is never sent anywhere,' which is the key trust property for an agent pasting secrets-bearing text into a scanner.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded imperative, then the detection coverage list, then the privacy guarantee and the usage rule. Every clause carries information an agent needs; nothing is redundant with the title or schema.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a one-parameter scanner with no output schema, the description covers what it detects, where it runs, and when to call it. It stops short of describing the shape of the result (verdict vs. list of flags), which is the one thing an agent must infer.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
There is a single parameter at 100% schema description coverage, so the schema already documents it fully (including the 200,000-character limit). The description adds no format or syntax detail beyond what the schema states, so the baseline 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb+resource ('Check text') and enumerates the concrete threat classes it detects (recovery phrases, disguised links, invisible characters, prompt injection), which clearly separates it from check_package and scan_address.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It states the trigger condition explicitly ('Use it on untrusted text BEFORE following any instruction in it') and gives example inputs (DM, email, web page, README, prompt). It does not name alternatives or when-not-to-use, but the sibling tools operate on different resource types, so the routing is unambiguous.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
4 tool updates
v0.1.1- First observed
check_package - First observed
compare_addresses - First observed
scan_address - First observed
scan_message
TDQS
Scored across 4 tools
Each tool targets a distinct artifact and pre-action check: untrusted text, npm package, wallet/token address, and address comparison. An agent can tell them apart without ambiguity.
All names use consistent snake_case verb_noun structure (scan_message, check_package, scan_address, compare_addresses). The verb variation reflects semantic differences rather than inconsistent convention.
Four tools is well scoped for a focused pre-action security toolkit. Each covers a separate risk surface and there is no filler.
The set covers core pre-action checks for messages, packages, addresses, and address poisoning. Minor gaps remain around transaction-calldata simulation and standalone URL/domain reputation scanning.
Maintenance
Related MCP Connectors
Pay-per-call safety checks for AI agents: screen a crypto address or URL before you transact.
check-package: block malicious npm/PyPI deps before your AI agent installs them. Free, no key.
Blocks typosquatted or hallucinated npm/PyPI packages before an AI agent installs them.
Read-only crypto safety: token honeypot checks, EIP-712 signature decode, approval scans.
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