contract_audit

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries the full behavioral burden. It says what it detects but not whether the operation is read-only, whether it requires network/permission access, expected latency, or how results are structured. Only the analytical scope is disclosed.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single dense sentence, front-loaded with the resource and vulnerability classes. No filler, though it is a packed list rather than fully structured prose.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single analysis tool with no output schema and no annotations, the description specifies scope and coverage but omits what a result looks like, severity reporting, and routing against siblings. Adequate but with clear gaps.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so both parameters are already documented in the schema. The description adds a bit of meaning by naming supported chain families (EVM, Solana, Move) that loosely map to the network parameter, but adds no format or syntax detail beyond the schema. Baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific resource (smart contract) and enumerates the exact vulnerability classes it detects (honeypot, hidden transfer tax, proxy upgrade, mint backdoor) across EVM, Solana, and Move. This distinguishes it from sibling risk tools like solana_risk or mev_risk, though it lacks an explicit action verb ('audits').

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no guidance on when to use this tool versus the several sibling risk detectors (solana_risk, mev_risk, address_poisoning_detector). No prerequisites, no exclusions, and no mention of when NOT to use it. Usage is only implied by the vulnerability list.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.