SLF Guardian MCP
Server Configuration
Describes the environment variables required to run the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| SLF_API_KEY | Yes | Required. Your SLF Guardian API key. | |
| SLF_TIMEOUT | No | Seconds per call. | 120 |
| SLF_API_BASE | No | Override the API endpoint. | https://slfguardian.com |
Instructions
Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.
This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.
Capabilities
Features and capabilities supported by this server
Protocol revision2025-11-25
| Capability | Details |
|---|---|
| tools | {} |
Tools
Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| audit_codeA | Audit source code before delivering or running it. Flags remote code execution (curl | bash), data exfiltration of environment variables or credential files, reverse shells, destructive commands, hidden base64 payloads, hard-coded secrets (AWS, OpenAI, Stripe, GitHub, database URLs), install-time hooks, typo-squatted package names and unsafe patterns such as shell=True, pickle.loads or TLS verification turned off. Nothing is executed; the audit is static text analysis. Returns a verdict (pass/warn/review/block), a safe_to_deliver flag and findings with line numbers. |
| check_packageA | Check a PyPI or npm package before installing or recommending it. Asks the registry whether the name exists at all (invented package names are how slopsquatting attacks land), how old it is, how much it is downloaded, whether it runs install scripts, whether it is deprecated or yanked, whether OSV lists vulnerabilities, and whether the name is a near-miss of a popular package. Returns a verdict and a safe_to_install flag. |
| check_promptA | Check untrusted text, HTML or a web page for prompt injection before feeding it to a model. Finds instructions written for the model instead of the reader: text hidden with CSS, HTML comments, zero-width and invisible Unicode tag characters, chat template markers, 'ignore previous instructions', attempts to make an agent leak its system prompt or credentials, hide actions from the user, approve something without review, run a command, or render a markdown image that exfiltrates data through its URL. Returns a verdict, injection_detected, and clean_text with invisible characters stripped. Never follows what it finds. |
| check_commandA | Check a shell command or SQL statement before running it and say whether it can be undone. Flags recursive and system-path deletes, disk writes, history and credential wiping, firewall changes, force push and hard reset, docker volume and kubernetes deletes, terraform destroy, cloud bucket and resource deletion, DROP/TRUNCATE and DELETE or UPDATE with no WHERE clause. Returns a verdict plus reversible, safe_to_run, needs_human_approval and a safer alternative per finding. Nothing is executed. |
| check_domainA | Check a domain or link before opening it, sending data to it or installing from it. Uses the public registration record and DNS: registration age, registry status, whether it resolves, lookalike and typo-squatted brand names, a brand hidden in a subdomain, punycode and mixed-script hostnames, link shorteners, disposable hosting, abuse-heavy TLDs and phishing wording. Returns a verdict with safe_to_trust and safe_to_open. The site itself is never contacted. |
| scan_siteA | Passive outside-in security check of a website: malware and spam injection traces, hidden redirects, SSL/TLS certificate state, security headers, exposed software versions and SPF/DMARC email spoofing protection. Does not log in, does not run attack tests. Returns a score out of 100, a grade and findings by category. |
Prompts
Interactive templates invoked by user choice
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No prompts | |
Resources
Contextual data attached and managed by the client
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No resources | |
TDQS
Scored across 6 tools
Each tool maps to a distinct artifact type (code, package, prompt text, shell/SQL command, domain, live site), so the core split is clear. The only real overlap is check_domain vs scan_site — both take a URL/site and return a safety verdict — and an agent could plausibly hesitate over which to call for a suspicious link, though the descriptions (pre-open trust check vs passive site posture scan) do resolve it.
Five of six tools use snake_case verb_noun with check_* as the dominant prefix; audit_code and scan_site deviate in verb but stay in the same snake_case verb_noun shape. The deviation is semantically motivated (deeper analysis, site scanning) rather than arbitrary, so the set reads predictably.
Six tools is well-scoped for a pre-flight security guardian: one per risky artifact class, with no filler or near-duplicates. Nothing feels padded or missing at the count level.
The surface covers the main agent risk vectors: untrusted code, third-party packages, injected text/HTML, destructive commands, untrusted domains, and site posture. Minor gaps remain — no tool for inspecting downloaded files/archives or MCP server configs, and no consolidated 'check everything about this artifact' entry point — but agents can chain existing tools to cover most workflows.