SLF Guardian MCP
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Alternatives to SLF Guardian MCP
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- AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceAdaptive security for AI agents: assess inputs for prompt injection, scan outputs for credential/PII leaks, teach new attack patterns to semantic memory, harden prompts, and monitor metrics. Runs locally via MCP stdio.120 PyPIApache 2.0
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEnables coding agents to check npm packages, GitHub Action refs, and remote scripts before execution, returning deterministic ALLOW/DENY/REVIEW verdicts with evidence and a re-checkable manifest.MIT
- AlicenseAqualityBmaintenanceLocal security layer for coding agents: keeps secret values out of what Claude Code, Codex CLI, Cursor and OpenCode send to their model, and checks untrusted text for prompt injection. MIT, runs on your machine, no account.45MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceFull-stack security for AI agents — static analysis + MCP runtime interception. 31 rules detect prompt injection, data exfiltration, backdoors, tool poisoning, and cross-file attack chains. Includes MCP proxy for real-time blocking, Python AST taint tracking, multi-language injection detection (8 languages), and AI-powered deep analysis. Free, offline, zero-config.49 npm17MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceProvides security checks for AI agents, including secret scanning, CVE lookup, and dependency vulnerability scanning, all running locally except for CVE lookups.MIT
- AlicenseBqualityCmaintenanceGives AI coding agents on-demand security playbooks, a code scanner they can run on their own output, and live lookups against CISA KEV, NVD and OSV so they verify threats instead of guessing. Runs locally with no API keys or accounts, exposing skills, tools and a secure-build prompt to Claude Code, Codex, Cursor or any MCP client.13Apache 2.0
TDQS
Scored across 6 tools
Each tool maps to a distinct artifact type (code, package, prompt text, shell/SQL command, domain, live site), so the core split is clear. The only real overlap is check_domain vs scan_site — both take a URL/site and return a safety verdict — and an agent could plausibly hesitate over which to call for a suspicious link, though the descriptions (pre-open trust check vs passive site posture scan) do resolve it.
Five of six tools use snake_case verb_noun with check_* as the dominant prefix; audit_code and scan_site deviate in verb but stay in the same snake_case verb_noun shape. The deviation is semantically motivated (deeper analysis, site scanning) rather than arbitrary, so the set reads predictably.
Six tools is well-scoped for a pre-flight security guardian: one per risky artifact class, with no filler or near-duplicates. Nothing feels padded or missing at the count level.
The surface covers the main agent risk vectors: untrusted code, third-party packages, injected text/HTML, destructive commands, untrusted domains, and site posture. Minor gaps remain — no tool for inspecting downloaded files/archives or MCP server configs, and no consolidated 'check everything about this artifact' entry point — but agents can chain existing tools to cover most workflows.