pdf-verify-mcp
MCP server for verifying PDF authenticity, integrity, and conformance (signatures, tampering, PAdES, PDF/A, PDF/UA, ISO 32000), plus deterministic trust policy evaluation.
Verify signatures (
verify_signatures): cryptographic ByteRange/CMS verification, trust-chain evaluation against trust anchors, revocation checking (embedded or online), RFC 3161 timestamps.Detect tampering (
verify_integrity): incremental updates, changes after signing, DocMDP certification violations per P value, and object-level diffs of the revision chain.Detect PAdES levels (
detect_pades_level): B-B / B-T / B-LT / B-LTA with content-validated LTV data.Identify conformance (
identify_conformance): declared PDF/A and PDF/UA from XMP metadata.Validate conformance (
validate_conformance): PDF/A (ISO 19005) and PDF/UA (ISO 14289) via veraPDF when installed, otherwise a built-in rule subset.Check ISO 32000 clauses (
validate_clauses): constraints from the PDF spec body, includingneeds_external_facthandling.Evaluate trust policy (
evaluate_policy): deterministic 4-value verdict (trust_and_use / use_with_caution / human_review_required / reject) with contract, financial, legal, medical, and government profiles.Handles encrypted PDFs via optional password, and reports scope/truncation metadata so "not determined" is never mistaken for "fine".
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@pdf-verify-mcp verify the signatures on this contract PDF and give a trust verdict"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
pdf-verify-mcp
MCP server for PDF authenticity and conformance verification — cryptographic digital signature verification, tamper detection, PAdES baseline level detection, and PDF/A (ISO 19005) / PDF/UA (ISO 14289) validation.
Part of the PDF family alongside pdf-reader-mcp (structure analysis) and pdf-spec-mcp (specification reference). Where pdf-reader-mcp tells you what is in a PDF, pdf-verify-mcp tells you whether it is genuine.
Tools
Tool | Purpose |
| Cryptographic verification, trust chain evaluation against trust anchors, revocation checking (embedded OCSP/CRL or online), RFC 3161 timestamp verification |
| Tamper detection: incremental updates, changes after signing, DocMDP certification violations assessed per P value (below), and an object-level diff of the revision chain (which objects each update added, rewrote or freed). Incremental updates are legal, so the diff says what to review — no verdict rests on it. Where those objects sit on the page is pdf-reader-mcp |
| PAdES baseline level (B-B / B-T / B-LT / B-LTA) with content-validated LTV data |
| Declared PDF/A / PDF/UA conformance from XMP metadata |
| PDF/A (ISO 19005) and PDF/UA (ISO 14289) validation: veraPDF when installed, built-in rule subset otherwise |
| Constraints mapped from ISO 32000-1/-2 clauses — the specification body itself, which the PDF/A and PDF/UA profiles do not cover |
| Deterministic 4-value trust verdict (trust_and_use / use_with_caution / human_review_required / reject) from a fixed rule table over the verification facts, with domain profiles (contract, financial, legal, medical, government). The judge is code; the narrative is the LLM |
Related MCP server: pdf-mcp
Verdicts
Verdict | Meaning |
| ByteRange digest matches and the CMS signature is cryptographically valid |
| Digest mismatch or signature verification failure — possible tampering |
| Unsupported format or verification could not complete |
DocMDP certification permissions (v0.14)
A certification signature's P value states which kinds of change are allowed
(ISO 32000-2 Table 257). verify_integrity classifies the changes made after signing at the
object level and compares them against what that P permits.
P | Permitted changes | Is adding an annotation a violation? |
1 | none (DSS / document-timestamp incremental updates are the §12.8.2.2 exception) | yes |
2 | filling in forms, instantiating page templates, signing | yes — annotations start at 3 |
3 | as for 2, plus annotation creation, deletion and modification | no |
Objects that a permitted change necessarily drags along — the page whose /Annots grew, the
catalog, /Info, the XMP stream — are classified as housekeeping and are not counted as
violations. Counting them would make every certified document violate, since a lawful P=3
annotation addition moves all four.
violationAssessment is three-valued
Value | Meaning |
| every change after signing is of a kind |
| at least one change is outside it |
| it could not be determined (the xref chain could not be walked, or a changed object's kind could not be read) |
⚠️
indeterminateis not a pass. This server disproves, and "could not be disproved" is a different statement from "is fine" — the same discipline asvalidate_clausesreturningneeds_external_factrather than defaulting a check into a pass.
violatedByLaterChanges(boolean) is kept for compatibility and collapsesindeterminatetofalse. ReadviolationAssessmentwherever "could not tell" must not be mistaken for "fine".evaluate_policyraisesindeterminatetohuman_review_requiredas well.
A bare stream with no /Type is treated as not determined rather than as content: the same
bytes could be a form field's appearance stream (which P=2 permits) or a page's content stream
(which no P permits).
Response size (v0.29.0)
A JSON response is never cut by length. Lists are capped instead, and every cut is reported next to the list as { returned, total }: signatures / levels at 32 (verify_signatures does not verify the fields beyond the cap; evaluate_policy verifies all and caps only facts.signatures), revisions at 32, violations / results at 200 (counts such as compliant, failedRules, violations, notDecided cover all entries). A markdown response is cut at 50,000 characters with a visible marker.
Content inventory in evaluate_policy (v0.30.0)
evaluate_policy also counts what the document carries that acts, or that is unfinished, and
reports it under facts.content — the counts of ISO 32000-2 §12.8.7 Table 264 (legal content
attestations): JavaScriptActions, LaunchActions, URIActions, GoToRemoteActions,
HideAnnotationActions, MovieActions, SoundActions, plus SubmitFormActions, the URI hosts,
whether /OpenAction or a document /AA is present, the annotation count, and the number of
/Subtype /Redact annotations still in the file. Nested (direct) action dictionaries are walked,
so an inline /A on a link counts. Two rules read it:
POL-CAUTION-REDACT-PENDING— a redaction annotation is still present (ISO 32000-2 §12.5.6.23). An applied redaction leaves no annotation behind, so the content it marks has not been removed from the file.use_with_caution.POL-CAUTION-ACTIVE-CONTENT— ECMAScript, Launch, remote go-to, or SubmitForm/ImportData actions are present; the reason says whether/OpenAction//AAmakes some of it run on open.use_with_caution. URI actions never change the verdict; their hosts go to an advisory.
The inventory is an observation, not a verdict: null (could not be taken) is reported as
"not counted", never as 0, and unreadable objects make the counts lower bounds. Keys of
Table 264 that are not counted: AlternateImages, ExternalStreams, TrueTypeFonts,
ExternalRefXobjects, ExternalOPIdicts, NonEmbeddedFonts, DevDepGS_*.
Trust & revocation (v0.2)
Pass trust_anchors (PEM/DER file paths) or set the PDF_VERIFY_TRUST_ANCHORS env var (a directory of certificates) to evaluate the signer's chain: results are trusted / untrusted / not_evaluated with the certificate path. The validation time is a verified signature timestamp, else the earliest document timestamp covering the signature, else the current time (v0.27.0); the CMS signingTime attribute is written by the signer and is not used. The chosen time is reported as validationTime.
check_revocation controls revocation checking: embedded (default — OCSP/CRL data in the DSS, CMS SignedData.crls, or the CMS signed attribute adbe-revocationInfoArchival; reported as revocation.origin), online (additionally query OCSP responders and CRL distribution points over HTTP), or none (revocation.status: not_checked). CRLs and OCSP responses whose signatures cannot be verified, whose nextUpdate is before the validation time, or whose thisUpdate is more than revocation_freshness seconds (default 86400) before it give unknown (v0.28.0). Pass trusted_ocsp_responders to trust an OCSP responder issued by another CA. Each intermediate CA's result is reported in trust.chainRevocation. A revoked signer certificate gives revoked_after_validation_time (verdict unchanged) when a timestamp proves the signature predates the revocation; otherwise revoked with verdict indeterminate. In online mode, missing issuer certificates are fetched via AIA caIssuers to complete the chain (v0.4). When anchors are provided, TSA certificate chains of RFC 3161 timestamps are evaluated too (tsaTrust).
Step | What is checked | Network |
Integrity |
| none |
Signature value | Signature value verifies with the signer certificate's public key | none |
Certificate chain | Chains up to a trust anchor |
|
Revocation | OCSP / CRL for the signer certificate | none under |
Timestamp | RFC 3161 token and TSA signature | none |
verdict: valid means integrity and signature value passed (revoked turns it into indeterminate). online results reflect the CA's state at query time and can change later. See the site guide for each step and how to choose a mode.
Without trust anchors,
truststaysnot_evaluatedand avalidverdict asserts cryptographic integrity, not signer identity.
Encrypted PDFs are decrypted automatically when permission-encrypted (empty user password); pass password for reader-password PDFs. Supported: RC4 (R2–R4), AES-128, AES-256 (R6). Decryption recovers string metadata (field name, /M, /Reason, /Location) and XMP — a signature's /Contents is exempt from encryption, so verification never depends on it.
Supported SubFilters: ETSI.CAdES.detached (PAdES), adbe.pkcs7.detached, ETSI.RFC3161 (document timestamps). RFC 3161 signature timestamps are fully verified (imprint + TSA signature). Legacy MD5/SHA-1 signatures are verified via node:crypto and flagged as weak.
PDF/A validation (v0.3)
validate_conformance uses a hybrid engine. With veraPDF installed (PDF_VERIFY_VERAPDF env var or on PATH) validation is delegated for authoritative results. Otherwise a built-in subset of ~15 high-value ISO 19005 rules runs natively (encryption, trailer /ID, LZW, font embedding, JavaScript/prohibited actions, OutputIntent, transparency for A-1, XFA, and more), each reported with its clause reference.
Native results are honest about their limits: violations mean definitively non-compliant; all-passed means "no violations in the checked subset" — never certification.
PDF/A-4 (pdfa-4, pdfa-4e, pdfa-4f) is accepted. Note that PDF/A-4 has no conformance level — there is no pdfa-4b; e and f are variants. The native rules were written from ISO 19005-1/-2 and have not been checked against ISO 19005-4, so a PDF/A-4 report says outright that the native verdict ranks below veraPDF. Validate part 4 with veraPDF.
XMP extension schemas and TDMRep (v0.31.0)
ISO 19005 accepts an XMP property only when its schema is predefined (XMP Specification, pdfaid) or described in the packet by pdfaExtension:schemas (19005-1 6.7.8, 19005-2/-3/-4 6.6.2.3). veraPDF reports a breach as "XMP property is either not predefined, or is not defined in any XMP extension schema" and names the namespace only in the check context. From v0.31.0 validate_conformance carries that name into the violation detail — e.g. http://www.w3.org/ns/tdmrep/ (tdm:reservation, tdm:policy) — W3C TDM Reservation Protocol (TDMRep): … — and says how the two coexist: PDF/A and TDMRep are compatible when the packet describes the TDMRep schema (reservation as Integer, policy as URL). identify_conformance lists every namespace the packet declares, marked predefined / described / known, and notes the undescribed ones when PDF/A is declared. evaluate_policy repeats the named cause in an advisory. Measured with veraPDF 1.28.2: a PDF/A-3B packet with TDMRep and no extension schema fails 6.6.2.3.1 test1 and test2 on both properties; the same packet with the description raises no XMP failure.
ISO 32000 clause constraints (v0.9)
validate_clauses covers different ground: the body of the PDF specification, not the PDF/A or PDF/UA profiles. A file can be judged COMPLIANT by veraPDF and still violate ISO 32000 — embedding a CFF font program under /FontFile2 (Table 124) is a real example that surfaced only as a viewer warning.
The mapping from clauses to structural conditions, and its evaluation, live in @shuji-bonji/pdf-constraints. Every report names the version that decided it, because the rules move as constraints are added.
Each constraint resolves to one of four states:
State | Meaning |
| Nothing in this constraint could be disproved |
| Disproved, with the fact and its measured value as evidence |
| The clause does not apply to this document |
| A fact outside the file was not supplied, so the constraint was not decided |
Two things the report distinguishes deliberately:
needs_external_factis not a pass. Whether a font is a subset is known only to whoever made it — the PDF does not say. Supply it withgiven: { isSubset: true }; without it the constraint degrades rather than defaulting into silent approval.Some failures are traces, not violations. Where a clause addresses the PDF processor (the act of writing), a file can only show that someone broke it — §14.3.4 explicitly allows leaving an existing inconsistency alone, so the last writer is not necessarily at fault.
Because these are T1 clauses, a failure can be stated plainly and its clause ID quoted — retrieve the wording with pdf-spec-mcp's get_requirements.
PDF/UA validation (v0.6)
Pass flavour: "pdfua-1" (or "pdfua-2") to validate accessibility conformance against ISO 14289. veraPDF is delegated to with --flavour ua1 when installed; otherwise 12 native rules run: MarkInfo/Marked, StructTreeRoot, pdfuaid declaration, /Lang, DisplayDocTitle, document title, Figure /Alt, image tagging, heading hierarchy, table TH/TR, Link /Contents, and encryption barriers. Tags are resolved through /RoleMap.
PDF/UA native violations carry a severity: only error rules can prove non-conformance, while warning rules flag what needs human review. Accessibility is not fully machine-decidable — whether alt text is present is checkable, whether it is meaningful is not.
The native subset stops where pdf-lib does. Rules needing content-stream analysis — 7.1-3 (content marked as artifact or tagged), 7.2-34 (language of page content), 7.18.1-1 (annotations nested in Annot tags), 7.18.3-1 (/Tabs) — are left to veraPDF rather than approximated. Install veraPDF when accessibility matters.
Without an explicit flavour, PDF/UA is selected only when the document declares PDF/UA and not PDF/A. Use pdf-reader-mcp's
inspect_tagsto examine the structure tree itself; conformance judgment lives here.
Errors (v0.33.0, legacy names removed in v0.34.0)
A failed call returns isError: true with a JSON body in the PDF family shape. Branch on code, not on the sentence.
{
"error": "File not found: /path/to/no-such-file.pdf",
"code": "DOC_NOT_FOUND",
"retryable": false,
"hint": "Check that the file exists and the path is correct"
}
| When |
|
| Missing or relative path, a path that is not a regular file, an unknown |
|
| No file at the path |
|
| The file breaks an ISO 32000 structural clause named in |
|
| Encryption stops the check. Supply |
|
| The supplied password is wrong |
|
| Over the size limit |
|
| A signature's |
|
|
|
|
| veraPDF ran and returned no validation result |
|
| A failure of this server only |
|
The legacy names are gone from 0.34.0. Up to 0.32.x the body was { error: true, code, message, suggestion } with the codes FILE_NOT_FOUND, PARSE_FAILED, MISSING_PATH, RELATIVE_PATH, NOT_A_FILE and INVALID_FLAVOUR. 0.33.x, the transition release, also returned detail.legacyCode, message and suggestion; 0.34.0 removed them. Read error instead of message, hint instead of suggestion, and code (with detail.reason for INVALID_ARGUMENT) instead of the old code: FILE_NOT_FOUND → DOC_NOT_FOUND, PARSE_FAILED → INVALID_PDF, MISSING_PATH / RELATIVE_PATH / NOT_A_FILE / INVALID_FLAVOUR → INVALID_ARGUMENT.
Input that the MCP SDK rejects before the handler runs (for example a key the schema does not declare) keeps the SDK's own message.
Installation
As a plugin (via the shuji-bonji/claude-plugins marketplace, recommended):
/plugin marketplace add shuji-bonji/claude-plugins
/plugin install pdf-verify-mcp@shuji-bonjiOr add directly to your MCP config:
{
"mcpServers": {
"pdf-verify": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@shuji-bonji/pdf-verify-mcp@latest"]
}
}
}Use
@latest(or pin a version).npx -y <pkg>without a version keeps running whatever it cached the first time —-yonly skips the install prompt, it does not check for updates. To clear a stale cache:rm -rf ~/.npm/_npx.
Usage examples
"Verify the signatures in /path/to/contract.pdf — has it been altered since signing?"
"Was this certified PDF modified after certification?"
"Is this signature LTV-enabled (B-LT or B-LTA)?"
"Does this document declare PDF/A-2b conformance?"
Development
npm install
npm test # vitest (fixtures are generated in-memory)
npm run build
npm run check # biome lint + format
npm run test:fixtures # write sample signed/tampered PDFs to tests/fixtures/generated/Test fixtures (self-signed certificate + signed PDFs) are generated programmatically with pkijs + WebCrypto — no binary assets in the repository.
License
MIT © shuji-bonji
Dependencies: pkijs / asn1js (BSD-3-Clause), pdf-lib (MIT), normativepdf (MIT), @shuji-bonji/pdf-constraints (MIT), @modelcontextprotocol/sdk (MIT), zod (MIT).
Cross-reference sections are read by normativepdf, a clause-driven PDF library in which every behaviour is tied to an ISO 32000 clause. It is strict — an unreadable section is an error there. The recovery policy for damaged files (falling back to an older startxref, capping a cyclic /Prev chain, folding a linearised file's two sections back into one save) stays in this server, because it is a forensic judgement rather than a reading of the specification.
Available Tools
7 toolsdetect_pades_levelDetect PAdES Baseline LevelARead-onlyIdempotent
Observe which PAdES baseline level (ETSI EN 319 142) the structure of each signature matches.
This is an observation, not a conformance verdict. ETSI EN 319 142 is not in this family's spec corpus, and unlike PDF/A there is no third-party validator to delegate to — so the result says "the structure matches B-LT", never "conforms to PAdES B-LT". Every report carries normativeBasis: "T3" to make that explicit.
Detection is structural: B-B (CAdES signature), B-T (+ RFC 3161 signature timestamp), B-LT (+ DSS with validation data), B-LTA (+ document timestamp). Legacy adbe.pkcs7.detached signatures are reported as non-PAdES.
Args:
file_path (string): Absolute path to a local PDF file
response_format ('markdown' | 'json'): Output format (default: 'markdown')
Returns: An object of the form { scope, levels: [...] }. The top level changed from an array to an object in v0.21.0 - read .levels for the list.
Size (v0.29.0): at most 32 signatures are listed; levelsTruncated = { returned, total } says when the list was cut. JSON is never cut by length.
Every report begins with a "scope" object - how far the reading got, not a verdict: whether the cross-reference chain could be walked to the end (chainStop), whether this tool had to rebuild the cross-reference table itself (reconstructed - when true, the table is this tool's reconstruction and not the one the file carries), how many objects and sections were read, and whether an encrypted document could be opened. Read it before the verdict: "no violations" over a rebuilt table is not the same statement as "no violations" over the file's own table.
Per-signature level with evidence (signature timestamp, DSS, VRI, document timestamp presence).
Note: B-LT / B-LTA additionally require that the DSS revocation data actually covers the signer certificate (content-level LTV validation); otherwise the level is capped at B-T.
Examples:
Check if a signature is long-term validation (LTV) enabled
Audit whether archived contracts meet B-LTA requirements
Inputs: file_path (required), response_format.
evaluate_policyEvaluate Trust Policy (deterministic verdict)ARead-onlyIdempotent
Produce a deterministic 4-value trust verdict (trust_and_use / use_with_caution / human_review_required / reject) for a PDF.
Runs verify_signatures, verify_integrity and detect_pades_level internally (plus validate_conformance for long-term-preservation profiles) and folds the facts through a fixed rule table — the same facts and profile always yield the same verdict. The verdict is decided entirely by code; use the returned firedRules/advisories to explain the outcome, never to override it. It judges authenticity and integrity only, never the truth of the document's content.
Args:
file_path (string): Absolute path to a local PDF file
response_format ('markdown' | 'json'): Output format (default: 'markdown')
profile ('general' | 'contract' | 'financial' | 'legal' | 'medical' | 'government'): Judgment profile (default: 'general')
trust_anchors (string[], optional): Trust anchor certificate paths. Without them, signer identity stays not_evaluated and the verdict is capped at use_with_caution
check_revocation ('none' | 'embedded' | 'online'): Revocation mode (default: 'embedded')
revocation_freshness (integer seconds, default 86400): How long before the validation time a CRL / OCSP response may have been issued and still count as "good"
trusted_ocsp_responders (string[], optional): Certificates of locally trusted OCSP responders (RFC 6960 §4.2.2.2)
password (string, optional): Password for an encrypted PDF
Returns: Every report begins with a "scope" object - how far the reading got, not a verdict: whether the cross-reference chain could be walked to the end (chainStop), whether this tool had to rebuild the cross-reference table itself (reconstructed - when true, the table is this tool's reconstruction and not the one the file carries), how many objects and sections were read, and whether an encrypted document could be opened. Read it before the verdict: "no violations" over a rebuilt table is not the same statement as "no violations" over the file's own table.
Size (v0.29.0): the verdict is computed over EVERY signature; facts.signatures lists at most 32 of them and facts.signaturesTruncated = { returned, total } says when it was cut. JSON is never cut by length.
verdict, firedRules (rule IDs with per-rule verdict and reason), advisories (recommendations that do not affect the verdict), and the underlying facts summary.
Examples:
Gate incoming invoices before filing them (profile: financial)
Decide whether a countersigned contract can be relied on (profile: contract, with the counterparty CA as trust anchor)
Batch-audit a folder of received PDFs with a reproducible, model-independent verdict
Inputs: file_path (required), profile, password, trust_anchors, +4 more.
identify_conformanceIdentify PDF/A / PDF/UA DeclarationsARead-onlyIdempotent
Identify declared PDF/A (pdfaid) and PDF/UA (pdfuaid) conformance in a PDF's XMP metadata.
Args:
file_path (string): Absolute path to a local PDF file
response_format ('markdown' | 'json'): Output format (default: 'markdown')
Returns: Every report begins with a "scope" object - how far the reading got, not a verdict: whether the cross-reference chain could be walked to the end (chainStop), whether this tool had to rebuild the cross-reference table itself (reconstructed - when true, the table is this tool's reconstruction and not the one the file carries), how many objects and sections were read, and whether an encrypted document could be opened. Read it before the verdict: "no violations" over a rebuilt table is not the same statement as "no violations" over the file's own table.
Declared PDF/A part/conformance level and PDF/UA part, plus the PDF version.
IMPORTANT: This tool only IDENTIFIES the declared conformance — a declaration does not guarantee actual conformance. For real PDF/A rule checking use the validate_conformance tool (native rule subset, or veraPDF when installed).
Examples:
Check whether a document claims PDF/A-2b before archiving
Detect PDF/UA declarations for accessibility workflows
Inputs: file_path (required), response_format.
validate_clausesCheck ISO 32000 Clause ConstraintsARead-onlyIdempotent
Check a PDF against constraints mapped from ISO 32000-1/-2 clauses — the body of the PDF specification itself, not PDF/A or PDF/UA.
This covers what veraPDF does not look at. veraPDF judges PDF/A and PDF/UA profiles; a document can pass those and still violate ISO 32000 (for example embedding a CFF font program under /FontFile2, which Table 124 forbids).
The mapping and its evaluation live in @shuji-bonji/pdf-constraints; this tool reports which version decided the result. Same file plus same given facts always produce the same result.
Bundled domains: font-embedding, document-metadata, annotation
Args:
file_path (string): Absolute path to a local PDF file
response_format ('markdown' | 'json'): Output format (default: 'markdown')
domains (string[], optional): Restrict to specific domains
given (object, optional): External facts, e.g. { "isSubset": true }
Returns: Every report begins with a "scope" object - how far the reading got, not a verdict: whether the cross-reference chain could be walked to the end (chainStop), whether this tool had to rebuild the cross-reference table itself (reconstructed - when true, the table is this tool's reconstruction and not the one the file carries), how many objects and sections were read, and whether an encrypted document could be opened. Read it before the verdict: "no violations" over a rebuilt table is not the same statement as "no violations" over the file's own table.
Size (v0.29.0): results lists at most 200 entries (file order); violations and notDecided are counted over all of them and resultsTruncated = { returned, total } says when the list was cut. JSON is never cut by length.
Per-constraint results with the clause IDs they come from. Four states:
pass — nothing in this constraint could be disproved
fail — disproved, with the fact and its measured value as evidence
not_applicable — the clause does not apply to this document
needs_external_fact — a fact outside the file was not supplied, so the constraint was not decided (never defaulted into a pass)
Because these are T1 clauses, a failure can be stated plainly and the clause ID quoted — retrieve the wording with pdf-spec-mcp's get_requirements. Failures marked as traces are different: the clause addresses the PDF processor, so the file only shows that someone broke it, not that the last writer did.
Some failures carry a Context note. Those clauses are real and the failure is real, but the industry deviates from them deliberately — text markup QuadPoints are written in Z order by nearly every writer because following the clause literally breaks rendering in major viewers. Pass the context on; a failure reported without it reads as a defect.
Every result also carries observation — how far the reading got: whether the revision chain could be walked to the end, how many objects the cross-reference tables list, and whether the page tree was reached. This is the scope of the verdict, not a verdict. A subject count of zero means "not looked at" when the page tree was not reached; a chain that stopped early means the constraints were applied to part of the file. Read it before the numbers.
A result with no failures is not proof of conformance — only that nothing in the bundled constraints could be disproved.
Examples:
Find out why a viewer warns about a font that veraPDF considers fine
Check whether Info and XMP agree on the document dates (§14.3.4)
Verify a generated PDF before shipping it, beyond the PDF/A profile
Inputs: file_path (required), given, domains, response_format.
validate_conformanceValidate PDF/A and PDF/UA ConformanceARead-onlyIdempotent
Validate a PDF against a PDF/A flavour (ISO 19005, archiving) or a PDF/UA flavour (ISO 14289, accessibility).
Hybrid engine: when veraPDF is installed (PDF_VERIFY_VERAPDF env var or on PATH) validation is delegated to it for an authoritative result. Otherwise a built-in rule subset is checked natively:
PDF/A (15 rules): encryption, file ID, LZW, font embedding, JavaScript/prohibited actions, OutputIntent, transparency for A-1, XFA, and more
PDF/UA (12 rules): MarkInfo/Marked, StructTreeRoot, pdfuaid declaration, /Lang, DisplayDocTitle, document title, Figure /Alt, image tagging, heading hierarchy, table TH/TR, Link /Contents
Args:
file_path (string): Absolute path to a local PDF file
response_format ('markdown' | 'json'): Output format (default: 'markdown')
flavour (string, optional): e.g. "pdfa-2b", "pdfa-4", "pdfa-4f", "pdfua-1". Defaults to the XMP declaration (PDF/A wins when both are declared; fallback: pdfa-2b). PDF/A-4 has no A/B/U level, so there is no "pdfa-4b"
engine ('auto' | 'verapdf' | 'native'): Engine selection (default: 'auto')
password (string, optional): Password for an encrypted PDF. PDF/UA validation decrypts the document first so structure rules see real structures; permission-encrypted PDFs (empty user password) are decrypted automatically
When veraPDF does not run, the report says so before the numbers: authoritativeValidation.performed is false and names the reason ("not_installed", "configured_path_unusable" when PDF_VERIFY_VERAPDF points at something that is not executable, or "native_engine_requested"). A configured-but-unusable path is never silently replaced by another executable — with engine: "verapdf" it errors as VERAPDF_NOT_AVAILABLE.
Returns: Every report begins with a "scope" object - how far the reading got, not a verdict: whether the cross-reference chain could be walked to the end (chainStop), whether this tool had to rebuild the cross-reference table itself (reconstructed - when true, the table is this tool's reconstruction and not the one the file carries), how many objects and sections were read, and whether an encrypted document could be opened. Read it before the verdict: "no violations" over a rebuilt table is not the same statement as "no violations" over the file's own table.
Size (v0.29.0): violations lists at most 200 entries; failedRules and compliant are computed over all of them and violationsTruncated = { returned, total } says when the list was cut. JSON is never cut by length.
Per-rule results with ISO clause references. compliant is true/false for veraPDF; for the native engine, false means definitive violations were found and null means "no violations in the checked subset" (NOT certification). PDF/UA native violations carry a severity: only 'error' rules can prove non-conformance, 'warning' rules need human review. For an encrypted PDF that cannot be decrypted, structure-dependent PDF/UA rules are reported in skippedRules (not checked) rather than as violations. The PDF/A font-embedding rule looks at fonts that are actually rendered (text rendering mode 3 is invisible and needs no embedded program, ISO 32000-2 9.3.6); when the content streams cannot be read far enough to tell, that rule is reported in skippedRules instead of guessing.
Note: PDF/UA cannot be fully decided by machine — whether alt text is present is checkable, whether it is meaningful is not. Use pdf-reader-mcp's inspect_tags to examine the structure tree itself.
Examples:
Check whether a scanned archive PDF actually meets its declared PDF/A-2b
Verify a generated document is tagged and accessible before publishing (pdfua-1)
Find why a document fails PDF/A before submitting it to an archive system
Inputs: file_path (required), engine, flavour, password, +1 more.
verify_integrityVerify PDF Integrity (tamper detection)ARead-onlyIdempotent
Analyze a PDF for modifications after signing.
Reports: number of revisions (incremental updates), whether bytes were added after each signature's signed range, whether the last signature covers the entire file, DocMDP certification permissions and violations, and DSS presence.
DocMDP is assessed against what the P value actually permits (ISO 32000-2 Table 257): P=1 permits nothing, P=2 form fill-in and signing, P=3 additionally annotation creation/deletion/modification. The later changes are classified from the object-level diff (changeClass), so adding an annotation to a P=2 document is reported as a violation while the same change to a P=3 document is not. Objects a permitted change necessarily drags along — the page whose /Annots grew, the catalog, /Info, the XMP stream — are classified as housekeeping and do not by themselves constitute a violation. Per ISO 32000-2 §12.8.2.2, DSS/document-timestamp incremental updates after a P=1 certification are NOT violations (flagged as laterChangesAppearLtvOnly).
violationAssessment is three-valued: "permitted" / "violated" / "indeterminate". "indeterminate" is not a pass — it means the chain could not be walked or a changed object's kind could not be read, so nothing could be disproved. The boolean violatedByLaterChanges collapses indeterminate to false for backward compatibility; read violationAssessment when "could not tell" must not be mistaken for "fine".
Also reports an object-level diff of the incremental-update chain: for each revision, which objects were added, rewritten or freed, with the object's /Type and a plain-language role (annotation, form field widget, page object, content stream, …), plus the shortlist of objects written after the last signed range (objectChangesAfterLastSignature). Cross-reference and object streams are flagged as bookkeeping. Where the objects sit on the page is pdf-reader-mcp's answer, not this server's.
Limits of the diff — it is an observation, never a verdict:
Incremental updates are legal in PDF (ISO 32000-2 §7.5.6). A rewritten object says what to review, not that the file was tampered with. No verdict moves because of it.
revisions: null means the cross-reference chain could not be walked (revisionChain.status: 'unwalkable') — "not determined", NOT "nothing changed".
A non-null revisions list is not necessarily the whole history. revisionChain.status says which it is: 'complete' (walked from the newest cross-reference section back to the original revision), 'partial' (a list came back but revisionChain.missing names the end that is absent), or 'unwalkable' (the case above). revisionChain.missing holds 'oldest' when the chain ended before the original revision, and 'newest' when the last startxref did not point at a parseable section so an older entry point was used and the last append is not listed; both can be absent at once.
Only 'complete' makes "no such change appears in the list" mean "that change was not made." With a cut chain the surviving revision is reported as the original one — changeCount: 0, changes: null, objectChangesAfterLastSignature empty — so every other field reads as "nothing was appended". revisions are listed oldest first. Why the chain was cut (a damaged or cyclic /Prev, the revision cap, an unparseable section) stays in notes.
Objects stored inside an object stream are listed with inObjectStream: true and no type.
revisionCount counts "startxref" keywords; revisions lists the cross-reference sections the chain reached. The two differ lawfully, so revisionCountAgreement says whether the difference is explained: 'agree', 'accounted' (causes names 'linearised' and/or 'chain-incomplete'), or 'unaccounted' — the file holds a startxref the walked chain does not reach, which is the case worth looking at.
Linearised files (ISO 32000-2 Annex F) carry two cross-reference sections for one save; they are merged back into one revision rather than reported as an update, so revisionCount is one higher than the number of saves.
Args:
file_path (string): Absolute path to a local PDF file
response_format ('markdown' | 'json'): Output format (default: 'markdown')
Returns: Every report begins with a "scope" object - how far the reading got, not a verdict: whether the cross-reference chain could be walked to the end (chainStop), whether this tool had to rebuild the cross-reference table itself (reconstructed - when true, the table is this tool's reconstruction and not the one the file carries), how many objects and sections were read, and whether an encrypted document could be opened. Read it before the verdict: "no violations" over a rebuilt table is not the same statement as "no violations" over the file's own table.
Size (v0.29.0): revisions lists at most 32 revisions (newest first) and 25 changes per revision; revisionsTruncated / changesTruncated say when a list was cut. revisionCount and revisionChain cover the whole walk. JSON is never cut by length.
Integrity report, including revisionChain: { status, missing } — read it before treating the revision list as the file's whole history — and revisionCountAgreement: { status, causes } — read it before quoting revisionCount as the number of times the file was saved. Note that incremental updates after signing are legal in PDF (adding signatures, DSS/LTV data) — findings indicate what to review, not automatically tampering.
Examples:
Check whether a signed document was modified after signing
Verify a certified (DocMDP) document respects its declared permissions
Find out which objects an incremental update touched after a signature was made
Inputs: file_path (required), response_format.
verify_signaturesVerify PDF Digital Signatures (cryptographic)ARead-onlyIdempotent
Cryptographically verify the digital signatures in a PDF document.
For each signature this tool: recomputes the ByteRange digest and compares it with the CMS messageDigest attribute, verifies the CMS/PKCS#7 signature value against the signer certificate, verifies any RFC 3161 signature timestamp, evaluates the certificate chain against trust anchors, and checks revocation status.
Args:
file_path (string): Absolute path to a local PDF file
response_format ('markdown' | 'json'): Output format (default: 'markdown')
trust_anchors (string[], optional): Paths to trust anchor certificates (PEM/DER). Also reads the PDF_VERIFY_TRUST_ANCHORS env var (directory).
check_revocation ('none' | 'embedded' | 'online'): Revocation mode (default: 'embedded'; 'online' queries OCSP/CRL endpoints over HTTP)
revocation_freshness (integer seconds, default 86400): How long before the validation time a CRL / OCSP response may have been issued and still count as "good"
trusted_ocsp_responders (string[], optional): Certificates of locally trusted OCSP responders (RFC 6960 §4.2.2.2)
password (string, optional): Password for an encrypted PDF (permission-encrypted PDFs are decrypted automatically with the empty user password)
Returns: An object of the form { scope, signatures: [...] }. The top level changed from an array to an object in v0.21.0 - read .signatures for the list.
Size (v0.29.0): a JSON response is never cut by length. At most 32 signature fields are verified (file order); when the file has more, signaturesTruncated = { returned, total } is set and the remaining fields are NOT verified — evaluate_policy verifies every field. A markdown response is cut at 50,000 characters with a visible marker.
Every report begins with a "scope" object - how far the reading got, not a verdict: whether the cross-reference chain could be walked to the end (chainStop), whether this tool had to rebuild the cross-reference table itself (reconstructed - when true, the table is this tool's reconstruction and not the one the file carries), how many objects and sections were read, and whether an encrypted document could be opened. Read it before the verdict: "no violations" over a rebuilt table is not the same statement as "no violations" over the file's own table. For this tool it matters most: when scope.reconstructed is true, a signature the rebuild did not reach is absent from the list, so a short or empty list is not proof that the file carries no other signatures.
Per-signature verdict ('valid' / 'invalid' / 'indeterminate'), trust status ('trusted' / 'untrusted' / 'not_evaluated' with certificate path), revocation status ('good' / 'revoked' / 'revoked_after_validation_time' / 'unknown' / 'not_checked'; 'not_checked' when check_revocation is 'none') with source, origin ('dss' / 'cms_signed_data' / 'cms_revocation_info_archival'), revocationTime, thisUpdate and nextUpdate, per-intermediate-CA results in trust.chainRevocation, validationTime ({ time, source: 'signature_timestamp' | 'document_timestamp' | 'current_time' }), and signature timestamp verification.
Validation time: a verified timestamp (the signature's own, else the earliest document timestamp covering it) or, without one, the current time. The CMS signingTime attribute is written by the signer and is never used. A revoked signer certificate makes the verdict 'indeterminate' unless a timestamp proves the signature predates the revocation (then the status is 'revoked_after_validation_time' and the verdict is unchanged). CRLs and OCSP responses whose signatures cannot be verified, that expired before the validation time, or that were issued more than revocation_freshness seconds before it give 'unknown'.
Note: without trust_anchors (or the env var), trust is reported as not_evaluated — a 'valid' verdict then means cryptographic integrity, not signer identity assurance.
Complements pdf-reader-mcp's inspect_signatures, which inspects structure only.
Examples:
Verify a signed contract has not been altered since signing
Validate a signature against your organization's CA (trust_anchors)
Check whether the signer certificate has been revoked (check_revocation: "online")
Inputs: file_path (required), password, trust_anchors, response_format, +3 more.
Tool Schema Changelog
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TDQS
Scored across 7 tools
Each tool targets a distinct aspect of PDF verification: signature cryptography, integrity analysis, PAdES level detection, conformance identification, conformance validation, ISO clause checking, and policy evaluation. Even the related identify_conformance and validate_conformance are clearly separated by their stated purpose (declaration vs. actual validation).
All tool names follow a consistent verb_noun pattern in snake_case: detect_pades_level, verify_signatures, verify_integrity, identify_conformance, validate_conformance, validate_clauses, evaluate_policy. The verbs (detect, verify, identify, validate, evaluate) are semantically appropriate and used consistently.
With 7 tools, the server is well-scoped for its purpose of PDF verification. Each tool covers a distinct functional area needed for comprehensive document trust evaluation, and the set is neither sparse nor bloated.
The tool surface covers the full verification lifecycle: signature cryptographic verification, integrity/modification analysis, PAdES level detection, declared conformance identification, PDF/A-UGUA validation against external and native engines, ISO 32000 clause checking, and a composite policy verdict. No dead ends or obvious missing operations within the stated domain.
Maintenance
Related MCP Connectors
Send contracts for e-signature, track signing, get signed PDFs and audit trails, verify any PDF.
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PDFs signed in the browser and sealed with a signing certificate. Pay per action.
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