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Post-Quantum Cryptography MCP Server

Post-Quantum Cryptography MCP Server

by scottdhughes

pqc_sign

Sign a message using a post-quantum signature algorithm and signing key to create a quantum-resistant digital signature for verification.

Instructions

Sign a message using a PQC signature algorithm

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "algorithm": "<algorithm>",
      "message": "<message>"
    },
    "name": "pqc_sign"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
messageYesMessage to sign (will be UTF-8 encoded)
algorithmYesSignature algorithm name (e.g., 'ML-DSA-65')
secret_keyNoBase64-encoded secret/signing key
key_store_nameNoName of stored signing keypair

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.10.0

TDQS

C2.8/5.0
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are supplied, so the description carries the full disclosure burden, yet it says nothing beyond the one-line purpose. It omits whether the operation requires a key to exist in the key store, whether secret_key and key_store_name are mutually exclusive, how the signature is returned (there is no output schema), and whether the operation mutates state.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single short sentence, front-loaded and free of padding. However, the brevity reflects under-specification rather than efficiency: the same sentence count could have carried the key-source and return-value details.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 4-parameter cryptographic signing tool with no annotations and no output schema, the definition is too thin. An agent cannot tell from it how to supply the signing key, what the returned signature looks like, or how the algorithm string should be chosen beyond the schema's single example.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3: each parameter is documented in the schema. The description adds nothing about algorithm choices or the interaction between secret_key and key_store_name, but with complete schema coverage that is an acceptable gap rather than a critical one.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb and resource ('Sign a message') and scopes it to PQC signature algorithms, which is enough for an agent to distinguish it from symmetric or hash tools. It does not explicitly contrast with sibling pqc_verify (the inverse operation) or the hybrid signing tools, so it stops short of full sibling differentiation.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives no when-to-use guidance, no prerequisites, and no alternatives. It never mentions the key-provisioning path (inline secret_key vs. key_store_name), which is the main decision an agent must make before calling pqc_verify afterwards.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.