Post-Quantum Cryptography MCP Server
Server Configuration
Describes the environment variables required to run the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Instructions
Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.
This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.
Capabilities
Features and capabilities supported by this server
Protocol revision2025-11-25
| Capability | Details |
|---|---|
| tools | {
"listChanged": false
} |
| experimental | {} |
Tools
Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| pqc_list_algorithmsB | List all available post-quantum cryptographic algorithms (KEMs and signatures) |
| pqc_algorithm_infoB | Get detailed information about a specific PQC algorithm including security level, key sizes, and performance characteristics |
| pqc_generate_keypairC | Generate a post-quantum key pair for KEM or signature algorithm |
| pqc_encapsulateC | Encapsulate a shared secret using a KEM public key (key encapsulation) |
| pqc_decapsulateC | Decapsulate a shared secret using a KEM secret key |
| pqc_signC | Sign a message using a PQC signature algorithm |
| pqc_verifyC | Verify a signature using a PQC signature algorithm |
| pqc_hashC | Compute a quantum-safe hash digest (SHA3-256, SHA3-512, SHAKE128, SHAKE256) |
| pqc_security_analysisB | Educational estimate of security properties: maps NIST levels to classical/quantum equivalents. This is a static lookup, not a formal per-algorithm analysis. |
| pqc_hybrid_keygenA | Generate a hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 keypair bundle (suite: mlkem768-x25519-sha3-256). Research/prototyping only. |
| pqc_hybrid_encapB | Perform hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 key encapsulation. Returns combined shared secret + ciphertexts. |
| pqc_hybrid_decapC | Recover hybrid shared secret using both secret keys. |
| pqc_hybrid_sealA | Encrypt plaintext using hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 + AES-256-GCM. Anonymous sealed-box. Research/prototyping only. |
| pqc_hybrid_openC | Decrypt a hybrid sealed envelope using both secret keys. |
| pqc_hybrid_auth_sealB | Encrypt + sign: sender-authenticated hybrid sealed envelope using ML-DSA-65. Research/prototyping only. |
| pqc_hybrid_auth_openB | Verify sender + decrypt: authenticated hybrid envelope. Requires expected sender identity. Signature verified before decryption. |
| pqc_hybrid_auth_verifyA | Verify sender signature on an authenticated envelope WITHOUT decrypting. No secret keys needed. Checks sender binding, fingerprint consistency, ML-DSA-65 signature, and timestamp freshness. |
| pqc_fingerprintB | Compute SHA3-256 fingerprint of a public key. Returns lowercase hex. |
| pqc_envelope_inspectA | Inspect a sealed or authenticated envelope's metadata without decrypting. No secret keys needed. |
| pqc_benchmarkB | Benchmark a PQC algorithm: timed keygen, encap/sign, decap/verify, and key/ciphertext/signature sizes. |
| pqc_compareA | Compare a PQC algorithm against its classical counterpart. Side-by-side latency, key sizes, and performance ratios. Supports ML-KEM vs X25519 and ML-DSA vs Ed25519. |
| pqc_key_store_saveA | Save a keygen output by name for convenient reference. Session-scoped, no persistence. |
| pqc_key_store_loadC | Load a stored key by name. |
| pqc_key_store_listA | List all stored keys with metadata (names, types, fingerprints). No secret material shown. |
| pqc_key_store_deleteC | Delete a stored key by name. |
Prompts
Interactive templates invoked by user choice
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No prompts | |
Resources
Contextual data attached and managed by the client
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No resources | |
TDQS
Scored across 25 tools
Core PQC operations, hybrid operations, key-store operations, and envelope inspection are clearly separated by distinct names and descriptions. Minor overlap exists between pqc_compare/pqc_benchmark and pqc_algorithm_info/pqc_security_analysis, but the descriptions make their purposes distinguishable.
All tools use a consistent pqc_ snake_case prefix, and the hybrid/auth namespaces are predictable. A few tools use noun-style names (pqc_algorithm_info, pqc_security_analysis, pqc_fingerprint, pqc_envelope_inspect) rather than strict verb_noun, but the pattern remains readable.
At 25 tools, the surface is at the heavy end for this domain. Most tools earn their place, but some informational/benchmarking tools could potentially be consolidated.
The server covers algorithm discovery, key generation and storage, KEM encapsulation/decapsulation, signing/verification, hashing, hybrid sealed envelopes, authenticated envelopes, inspection, and benchmarking. No obvious lifecycle or workflow gaps are apparent for the stated PQC domain.