threat_model

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full disclosure burden. It hints at the output shape (a per-element worksheet plus AI threats) but says nothing about whether the tool is read-only, whether it needs an existing design doc, how long or deterministic the output is, or what depth of input it expects. For an analysis tool with zero annotation coverage, that is a real gap.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

One compact sentence with the output artifact front-loaded and no filler. Efficient, though the lack of any second sentence is part of why usage and parameter guidance are missing.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a one-parameter, no-output-schema analysis tool, the description covers what it produces but not how to invoke it well or what the agent gets back in practical terms (per-element table? narrative? findings list?). Adequate skeleton, missing the operational detail an agent would want.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0% and the single required parameter is undocumented, so the description must compensate. 'For a described feature or system' does signal that system_description should be free-text describing the design under review, but gives no guidance on expected depth, structure, or granularity. Partial compensation only.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a concrete artifact (STRIDE-per-element worksheet) plus an AI-specific threat layer, applied to a described feature or system. That is specific enough to distinguish it from sibling scanners (scan_code, scan_path) and CVE lookups. It stops short of a 5 because it uses no verb and does not explicitly contrast with the nearest analysis siblings.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no statement of when to reach for this tool versus scan_code, secure_coding_checklist, search_security, or recent_ai_threat_sources. The design-time intent is only inferable from the word 'worksheet'. No prerequisites, no exclusions.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.