Search CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog by CVE ID, vendor, product, or recent additions to identify actively exploited flaws and prioritize patching.
Search CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (actively exploited: patch first). query = CVE id, vendor, or product keyword; 'recent' for newest additions.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | ||
| query | Yes |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
v0.1.0Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations exist, so the description carries the full behavioral burden. "Search" implies a safe read of a public catalog and the parenthetical explains what a hit means, but nothing is said about result shape, pagination, or the fact that limit is capped at 50.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two tight sentences, zero filler, with the catalog scope and its practical implication front-loaded before the parameter guidance. Every clause carries information an agent needs.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple two-parameter read tool with no output schema and no annotations, the description covers the input side reasonably but omits the meaning and bounds of `limit` and gives no hint of what the results contain. Adequate, not complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate. It does well for `query`, enumerating accepted value forms and the special 'recent' token that the schema does not reveal, but `limit` is never mentioned, leaving half the parameters undocumented anywhere.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (Search) and a precisely scoped resource (CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog), which implicitly separates it from the general-purpose lookup_cve sibling. It does not name that sibling explicitly, so the differentiation is inferable rather than stated.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
"actively exploited: patch first" signals the situation where this catalog matters, and the query formats (CVE id, vendor, product keyword, 'recent') imply how to drive it. There is no explicit when-not guidance or named alternative such as lookup_cve for non-KEV CVE details.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.