MCP Trust Registry
Click on "Install Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@MCP Trust RegistryCheck the danger grade for mcp-reference-time"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
MCP Trust Registry
Check before you connect. A neutral, public danger grade for the MCP servers your AI agents rely on.
Live: mcp-trust.vercel.app
Not yet published to PyPI. Install from source using the Quickstart below.
Use as an MCP server
mcp-trust runs as a read-only MCP server so an agent can check a server's
danger grade before connecting — it serves a baked snapshot of real scan
grades with explicit per-record provenance, so no database or network is needed.
mcp-trust mcp-serve # from a source/dev install (works today)
uvx mcp-trust mcp-serve # once published to PyPITool | Description |
| Every graded MCP server with its A-F grade, transparency, and danger score. |
| Full grade, risk dimensions, and findings for one server by slug. |
| How the A-F grade and transparency axis are computed, plus the honesty model. |
Connecting an MCP server hands it influence over what your agent does. Tool poisoning, prompt injection, over-broad permissions, and rug-pull tool mutations are documented attack classes -- and today there's no quick way to vet a server before you wire it in. MCP Trust Registry scans public MCP servers and gives each one a single readable danger grade (A-F), a separate transparency signal, and the findings behind them.
Think OSV.dev / Socket.dev / haveibeenpwned, scoped to MCP servers.
Related MCP server: dominion-observatory
Prerequisites
Python >= 3.11
uv(used for dependency management and running the project)
How it works
register a server -> scan via engine -> derive grade -> persist -> serve at a stable URLThe registry does not reimplement vulnerability detection. It orchestrates a
pluggable scan engine -- the shipping backend wraps the public
mcp-audits (>=2.1) package -- and owns the
catalog, the public trust-grade normalization, persistence, and the lookup API.
Quickstart
git clone https://github.com/saagpatel/mcp-trust.git && cd mcp-trust
uv pip install -e ".[dev]" # core + dev deps (runs on the built-in StubEngine)
mcp-trust seed # load the seed catalog
mcp-trust scan mcp-reference-time # scan a catalog server, print its grade
mcp-trust check mcp-reference-time # look up the latest stored grade
mcp-trust serve # serve the API on http://127.0.0.1:8000For real scanning install the engine extra and select it:
uv pip install -e ".[dev,engine]"
MCP_TRUST_ENGINE=mcpaudit mcp-trust scan mcp-reference-timeScanning launches the server's process. For untrusted servers, isolate execution in a locked-down container (no network, read-only fs, dropped caps, resource limits):
MCP_TRUST_ENGINE=mcpaudit MCP_TRUST_SANDBOX=docker mcp-trust scan mcp-reference-timeThe default is no sandbox (safe only for servers you trust).
API
Method | Path | Purpose |
|
| web -- public catalog page (grade + transparency per server) |
|
| web -- server detail page + README badge-embed snippet |
|
| liveness |
|
| catalog + latest grade per server (JSON) |
|
| full latest scan record + metadata (JSON) |
|
| operator scan trigger; public deployments disable this route |
|
| shields.io-compatible README badge |
Every server has two orthogonal signals: a danger grade (A-F) and a transparency level (high/medium/low, from annotation coverage). Automated grades are not endorsements, certifications, or claims that a server is malicious. A low grade on a low-transparency server means "cannot verify safe," not "known dangerous."
HTTP scan triggering is fail-closed by default. Public deployments should set
MCP_TRUST_PUBLIC_READONLY=1, which makes POST /servers/{slug}/scan return
403 before any engine can run. Operator scans should normally run through the
CLI against the persistent registry DB, not through public traffic.
For local API demos with the deterministic StubEngine, set
MCP_TRUST_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_STUB_SCANS=1. Do not set that in public.
Token-gated API scan triggering is still available for private operator surfaces
by setting MCP_TRUST_SCAN_TOKEN and passing it as Authorization: Bearer <token> or X-MCP-Trust-Scan-Token.
Set MCP_TRUST_RECEIPTS_DIR=/data/mcp-trust/receipts during real scan runs to
archive a JSON receipt for each scan and store its portable artifact filename in
report_ref.
Manual refresh candidates
Create a review candidate without mutating the canonical registry, baked snapshot, static site, schedule, or deployment:
uv run --frozen --extra engine python scripts/refresh_candidate.py create \
--db ./registry.db \
--out-dir ./dist/refresh-candidatesThe command refuses local-process scans unless Docker and every catalog-pinned image are already available locally. Those sources run through the existing network-off, read-only, capability-dropped, resource-bounded sandbox. Remote endpoints are probed over their live network transport without a local process sandbox and are labeled accordingly. The immutable bundle contains receipts, catalog identity, scan times and ages, masked/failed/unknown evidence states, attributed scan drift, an honest static snapshot, and a content-bound manifest.
Candidate creation has no publication or deployment authority. A structurally
valid candidate must first pass verify, then receive a separate digest-bound,
short-lived approve receipt before publish may stage it in a local output
directory. verify exits successfully only for a current, complete,
reviewed-input-bound candidate that is eligible for publication. Eligibility
never grants approval, publication, deployment, or scheduling authority.
Status
Live at mcp-trust.vercel.app as a statically
generated catalog, regenerated from the local registry. The bundled catalog
snapshot contains 23 visible real mcp-audits grades; eight reviewed entries
are withheld by masked-grades.json and are absent from the public snapshot.
The bundled snapshot labels the visible local-process grades' network and
sandbox provenance as unknown; only a receipt-verified refresh candidate may
claim network-off execution. Every grade is labeled by provenance, so
demo/stub data can never read as a real scan, and an unscanned server never
shows a letter grade. The current production deployment is the 31-server
static catalog; grades are static since 2026-07-11, when the weekly re-scan
lane was disabled and its deploy authority removed (see
docs/CAPABILITY-RULING-2026-07-10.md).
The static front door is the low-ops launch path (see
DEPLOY-VERCEL.md); a weekly launchd job under
deploy/launchd/ remains installed but disabled. Its
compatibility entrypoint can create a local review candidate only; it cannot
publish or deploy. The live FastAPI service + VM path remains
documented in DEPLOY-VM.md as an alternative. See
SPEC.md for the full contract and LAUNCH-GATE.md
for launch history. The deployed catalog reports scan timestamps as its
freshness authority; static HTML does not claim to attest machine-local
scheduler state.
Contributing
uv.lock is intentionally committed to the repository to ensure reproducible
installs across environments. When adding or updating dependencies, commit the
updated uv.lock alongside your pyproject.toml changes.
License
MIT
This server cannot be installed
Maintenance
Resources
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Looking for Admin?
If you are the server author, to access and configure the admin panel.
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