ThreatLocker MCP Server
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@ThreatLocker MCP Servershow me all pending approval requests"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
ThreatLocker MCP Server
An MCP server for the ThreatLocker Portal API. ThreatLocker is a zero-trust endpoint security platform: only approved software runs on protected computers, and blocked users raise approval requests that the MSP reviews. This server lets an AI agent read computers and their check-ins, computer groups, approval requests, the unified audit log and child organizations. It is read-only.
Transport: MCP Streamable HTTP at
POST /mcp, health probe atGET /healthStateless and multi-tenant: credentials arrive on every request as HTTP headers and are never stored; every tool is listed from the first
tools/listPython 3.12, uv, FastMCP, httpx
License: Apache-2.0, Copyright 2026 MSPbots.ai
MSPbots Connector
The MCP Gateway built for MSPs: visible, controlled, and your data stays where it belongs.
Get started at connect.mspbots.ai →
MSPbots Connector gives your AI clients one MCP URL to reach your entire MSP stack (RMM, PSA, documentation, security, finance), and gives you control over who can call which tool and a record of everything that was called.
Hosted service: connect.mspbots.ai · Free to use.
Why Connector

Visible | Every tool call is logged: who, which vendor, when. Usage dashboard, CSV export, SIEM streaming. |
Controlled | Role-based, per-tool allowlist. Deny by default. |
Protected | Credentials encrypted per record. AI clients never see your vendor passwords or tokens. |
MSP-native | Built for the MSP stack only: RMM, PSA, documentation, security, finance. |
Quick start
Sign up at connect.mspbots.ai.
Connect your vendors. Pick from 150+ connectors and authorize each one on the vendor's own page, or bring your own API keys. No extra vendor accounts needed.
Set access. Create roles and decide which tools each role may call. Nothing is allowed until you allow it.
Add your MCP URL to your AI client. Copy the URL from your Connector dashboard into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, VS Code, Gemini, Codex, or any MCP-capable client.
Ask your AI to do real work, and watch every call appear in the audit log.
Features
Unified gateway
One MCP URL for all your AI clients
150+ connectors across the MSP stack
Custom MCP servers supported, free
Authorization happens on each vendor's own page; the AI never sees passwords or tokens
Bring your own credentials: use the vendor API keys you already have
Multiple accounts per app; connect once, reuse across AI clients
Tool search: finds the right action for the task
One sign-in; vendor credentials are injected behind the scenes and OAuth tokens refresh automatically
Visibility
Audit log for every tool call (who, which vendor, when)
Usage dashboard: call volume, top vendors, error rate, per-user activity
Export audit logs to CSV, or stream to Loki, Graylog, or LogScale (SIEM)
Optional recording of tool arguments and result summaries (off by default, enabled per organization)
Control
Per-role, per-tool allowlist, deny by default
owner / admin / member roles
SCIM provisioning with Entra ID, Okta, JumpCloud, and Google Workspace
Security
Credentials encrypted one record at a time (AES-256-GCM, per-record key)
AI clients authenticate with OAuth 2.1 + PKCE
Vendor responses are scanned for prompt-injection patterns and returned as structured data. This is one layer of defense, not a guarantee against every attack.
Static egress IP for customer firewall and API allowlisting
Pricing
Free.
Links: connect.mspbots.ai · mspbots.ai
Related MCP server: trmm-mcp
Authentication headers
Header | Required | Type | Default | Allowed values | Description | Example |
| Yes | string | none | - | ThreatLocker API key |
|
| Yes | string | the key's own organization | GUID | Organization the calls act on (sent as |
|
| No | string | detected | letter, e.g. | Portal instance in the API host |
|
Where to get them:
In the ThreatLocker portal an administrator creates an API user and its API key; grant it read permissions for computers, approval requests, the unified audit and organizations.
The organization id is shown in the portal for each organization; use the parent organization's id to work across its child organizations (
childOrganizations: true).The instance is the letter in your portal address (for example
portal.g.threatlocker.com->g). When it is not sent, the server tries each instance once and remembers which one accepts the key (only that letter is kept, keyed by a hash of the key).
How credentials are sent to ThreatLocker: every call goes to
https://portalapi.{instance}.threatlocker.com/portalapi/... with the raw key in the
Authorization header (no Bearer prefix) and the organization id in ManagedOrganizationId.
A request to /mcp without the key gets HTTP 401; an organization id that is not a GUID or an
unusable instance value does not block the request, and tools return invalid_argument instead.
Tools
All tools return a JSON string and are read-only. Paged tools take pageNumber (from 1) and
pageSize (default 25) and return {items, count, page, page_size, total, has_more, offset, next_offset}. They also take offset (record position from 0, overrides pageNumber): pass
next_offset as offset for the next records. ThreatLocker pages by number only, so when a page
is cut to fit the response size limit the rest of it is on no other page; next_offset then
starts right after the last record returned, and the tool reads the page that holds it.
Computer, group, organization and approval request ids are GUIDs.
Tool | Purpose | Parameters (required in bold) |
| Describe the tools of one area (changes nothing) | domain ( |
| Check the connection (key, organization, instance) and list the tool areas | - |
| List protected computers: name, group, organization, mode, version, last check-in | searchText, computerGroup, pageNumber, pageSize, childOrganizations |
| One computer's details | computerId |
| A computer's check-in history, newest first (heartbeats hidden) | computerId, pageNumber, pageSize |
| Computer groups with their computers | osType (numeric id), includeAllComputers, includeGlobal |
| Computer groups as id / name pairs | - |
| Approval requests by status, newest first | status (Pending by default, Approved, Rejected / Denied, Not Learned, Added To Application, Escalated, Self Approved), pageNumber, pageSize, searchText, childOrganizations |
| One approval request: requester, computer, file, hash, certificate, justification | approvalRequestId |
| Count of pending approval requests | - |
| What approving a request would permit | approvalRequestId |
| Search the unified audit (what ran or was blocked); default window the last 24 h. | searchText (file path contains), startDate, endDate, pageNumber, pageSize, childOrganizations, hostname, actionType |
| One audit entry in full; without sourceTableId, tables 1 then 2 are tried (search rows come from table 1) | eActionLogId (from a search row), sourceTableId (1-4), actionLogId (deprecated alias) |
| Audit history of one file on one computer | fullPath, hostname or computerId, sourceTableId, pageNumber, pageSize |
| Child (customer) organizations | searchText, pageNumber, pageSize |
| The organization's agent install key (a secret) | - |
| Organizations computers may be moved to | - |
Errors come back as a JSON envelope instead of an exception:
{"error": {"code": "unauthorized", "message": "ThreatLocker returned HTTP 401 for Computer/ComputerGetByAllParameters", "retryable": false}}code is one of not_configured, unauthorized, not_found, invalid_argument,
rate_limited, upstream_error. Every call is a read, so 429, 5xx and network errors are
retried with backoff.
Run locally
uv sync
uv run python -m threatlocker_mcp # listens on 0.0.0.0:8080or with Docker:
docker build --platform linux/amd64 -t threatlocker-mcp:dev .
docker run --rm -p 8080:8080 threatlocker-mcp:devConfiguration (environment variables, all optional): MCP_HTTP_HOST (default 0.0.0.0),
MCP_HTTP_PORT (default 8080), LOG_LEVEL (default INFO). Credentials are never read
from the environment.
Testing example
# list tools
curl -s http://localhost:8080/mcp \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Accept: application/json, text/event-stream" \
-H "X-Threatlocker-Api-Key: your-api-key" \
-H "X-Threatlocker-Organization-Id: 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000" \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/list","params":{}}'
# pending approval requests
curl -s http://localhost:8080/mcp \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Accept: application/json, text/event-stream" \
-H "X-Threatlocker-Api-Key: your-api-key" \
-H "X-Threatlocker-Organization-Id: 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000" \
-H "X-Threatlocker-Instance: g" \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"threatlocker_approvals_list","arguments":{"status":"Pending","pageSize":10}}}'Unit tests (no network access needed):
uv run pytestDelivery notes
Tool count (17). Kept as is because the tool names are an existing contract.
Read-only. No tool approves, denies or changes anything in ThreatLocker.
Install key.
threatlocker_organizations_get_auth_keyreturns a secret that lets anyone enroll computers; its description tells the agent to call it only on explicit request and not to repeat it elsewhere.API contract. Endpoints, parameters and body fields follow ThreatLocker's published Portal API specification (
/swagger/public/swagger.jsonon the API host). Ids are sent as GUIDs, the group OS type as its numeric id, and the audit search window defaults to the last 24 hours.No interactive prompts. Older versions asked the user for a search term, a status or a date range mid-call, which a stateless gateway cannot relay; defaults apply instead.
License
This server cannot be deployed
Maintenance
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