Diogenes Web3, DeFi & HTTP 402 Security MCP
This server provides Web3, DeFi, and HTTP 402 security tools for auditing smart contracts, evaluating token and MEV risk, verifying payments, and planning cross-chain settlements.
Audit smart contracts (
contract_audit): detect honeypots, hidden transfer taxes, proxy upgrade traps, and mint backdoors across EVM, Solana, and Move.Assess Solana SPL token risk (
solana_risk): check mint/freeze authority, top-holder concentration, and LP lock status.Evaluate DEX MEV risk (
mev_risk): quantify sandwich/frontrunning exposure and get optimal slippage in basis points.Detect address poisoning (
address_poisoning_detector): flag zero-value spoofing and vanity prefix/suffix lookalike attacks.Verify HTTP 402 challenges (
http402_challenge_verifier): validate L402 BOLT11, x402 Solana, and MPP Base payment demands for overcharge/recipient spoofing.Plan Bitcoin UTXO consolidation (
utxo_consolidation_planner): compute SegWit/Taproot vByte weights, dust thresholds, and optimal fee windows.Compare cross-chain bridge routes (
crypto_bridge_quote): quote non-KYC routes (THORChain, Liquid, Maya) for BTC, SOL, ETH, SUI, and USDC.Track Solana whale flows (
solana_whale_radar): monitor whale wallets and insider accumulation clusters.
Provides Bitcoin UTXO consolidation planning, including SegWit/Taproot vByte weight and dust threshold calculations, optimal mempool fee window selection, and cross-chain bridge route comparison for BTC settlement.
Provides Solana-focused security and risk tools: SPL token mint/freeze authority audits, holder concentration and LP lock checks, MEV sandwich/frontrunning risk evaluation, address poisoning detection, x402 Solana payment challenge verification, Solana smart contract honeypot auditing, and Solana whale wallet tracking.
Supports cross-chain bridge quote comparison for SUI settlement routes via non-KYC bridges such as THORChain, Liquid, and Maya, alongside BTC, SOL, ETH, and USDC.
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@Diogenes Web3, DeFi & HTTP 402 Security MCPaudit this EVM contract for honeypot and hidden fees: 0x1234567890abcdef"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
Diogenes Web3, DeFi & HTTP 402 Security MCP (diogenes-web3-security-mcp)
Diogenes Web3, DeFi & HTTP 402 Security MCP is a focused, zero-bloat Model Context Protocol (streamable-http) package powered by the Diogenes Autonomous Microservice Gateway.
Instead of loading all 85 gateway endpoints into your LLM's context window, installing this package exposes only the 15 specialized web3-security tools needed for Blockchain & Web3:
15 TDQS 5.0/5.0 Web3, DeFi & HTTP 402 security tools: EVM/Move contract auditor, Solana Anchor CPI scanner, SPL risk & liquidity inspectors, whale flow tracker, Jito fee estimator, EIP-712 & EVM calldata decoders, MEV evaluator, address-poisoning detector, 402 verifier, Bitcoin UTXO planner, and non-KYC bridge comparator.
1-Click Install (mcp.json) for Cursor, Claude Desktop & Windsurf
No API keys, user accounts, or local dependencies required. Add this scoped endpoint to .cursor/mcp.json or claude_desktop_config.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"diogenes-web3-security": {
"transport": "streamable-http",
"url": "https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/web3-security"
}
}
}Related MCP server: onchain-forensics
Included Tools in web3-security (15 Tools)
MCP Tool Name | Underlying REST Route | Settlement | Capability |
|
| 250 sats (L402) | Statically audits Solidity, Vyper, or Move smart contract source code for honeypot transfer taxes, hidden mint backdoors, proxy upgrade traps, and reentrancy. Use when auditing smart contract source code or bytecode before deploying or interacting with a protocol; for scanning Solana Anchor/Rust programs specifically for Cross-Program Invocation (CPI) signer/account vulnerabilities, use scan_solana_cpi_reentrancy instead. Read-only edge call (32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'code_or_address' ('chain' defaults to 'evm_solidity'), uses '?demo=true' or L402 (250 sats); HTTP 400 if invalid. |
|
| 160 sats (L402) | Scans Solana Anchor and native Rust program instructions for unverified Cross-Program Invocation (CPI) program IDs, missing signer checks, and PDA bump seed canonicalization bugs. Use when auditing Solana Rust/Anchor source code or instruction account structs for CPI privilege escalation; for checking live SPL token mint/freeze authorities and rug-pull risk by mint address, use evaluate_solana_token_risk instead. Read-only edge call (32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'rust_source_or_idl' ('framework' defaults to 'anchor'), uses '?demo=true' or L402 (160 sats); HTTP 400 if invalid. |
|
| 100 sats (L402) | Evaluates a Solana SPL token's rug-pull probability by checking active mint authority, freeze authority, mutable metadata, and top-holder concentration. Use when making a pre-trade security decision on whether a Solana SPL token is safe to buy; for retrieving SPL token symbol, decimals, and DEX liquidity pool metadata via x402, use inspect_solana_token_liquidity instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'token_address' ('risk_profile' defaults to 'strict_decentralized'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (100 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid. |
|
| 200 sats (x402) | Retrieves canonical Solana SPL token metadata including name, ticker symbol, decimal precision, and current mint/freeze authority addresses. Use when resolving SPL token decimals, ticker symbols, and registry metadata for portfolio or swap formatting; for computing a composite security risk score and binary should_transact verdict, use evaluate_solana_token_risk instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'mint' ('network' defaults to 'mainnet-beta'), supports '?demo=true' or x402 (200 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid. |
|
| 500 sats (x402) | Tracks 24-hour net accumulation or distribution flows across top Solana whale wallets and flags coordinated insider wallet clusters for a given SPL token. Use when analyzing on-chain smart-money order flow and holder clustering on Solana; for checking static SPL contract mint/freeze authority permissions, use evaluate_solana_token_risk instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'token' ('window' defaults to '1h'), supports '?demo=true' or x402 (500 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid. |
|
| 50 sats (x402) | Calculates optimal Solana compute-unit (CU) microlamport priority fees and Jito bundle tip lamports to achieve target block-inclusion probability. Use when setting SetComputeUnitPrice and Jito tips before broadcasting a Solana transaction; for querying Bitcoin L1 sat/vB mempool fee rates, use estimate_bitcoin_mempool_fees instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'priority_level' ('tx_type' defaults to 'simple_transfer'), supports '?demo=true' or x402 (50 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid. |
|
| 100 sats (L402) | Decodes EIP-712 and Uniswap Permit2 off-chain typed-data payloads to verify spender identity, detect unlimited (uint256.max) token approvals, and flag expired deadlines. Use when inspecting an off-chain eth_signTypedData_v4 or Permit2 payload before signing; for decoding raw on-chain hex transaction calldata (0x...) for eth_sendTransaction, use simulate_evm_transaction_calldata instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'typed_data_json' ('chain_id' defaults to '1'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (100 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid. |
|
| 90 sats (L402) | Decodes raw EVM hexadecimal transaction calldata (0x...) by 4-byte function selector to expose hidden ERC-20 approve/transferFrom calls, setApprovalForAll drains, and multicall bundles. Use when auditing raw hex transaction data (to, value, data) before broadcasting an on-chain EVM transaction; for inspecting off-chain EIP-712 JSON typed-data signatures, use decode_eip712_permit_signature instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'calldata_hex' ('network' defaults to 'base_mainnet'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (90 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid. |
|
| 150 sats (L402) | Evaluates decentralized exchange (DEX) swap parameters against pool depth and mempool visibility to quantify MEV sandwich risk and compute optimal slippage tolerance in basis points. Use when configuring slippage tolerance and private-RPC routing before executing an on-chain DEX token swap; for comparing cross-chain bridge settlement routes across different L1 blockchains, use compare_crosschain_bridge_routes instead. Read-only edge call (32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'pair' ('execution_venue' defaults to 'uniswap_v3_public'), uses '?demo=true' or L402 (150 sats); HTTP 400 if invalid. |
|
| 100 sats (L402) | Compares a target recipient wallet address against recent transaction history to detect vanity prefix/suffix lookalike spoofing and zero-value dusting attacks. Use when verifying a recipient EVM or Solana wallet address before sending funds; for decoding hex smart contract calldata payloads, use simulate_evm_transaction_calldata instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'target_address' ('address_standard' defaults to 'auto_detect'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (100 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid. |
|
| 60 sats (L402) | Decodes inbound HTTP 402 Payment Required challenges (L402 BOLT11 + Macaroon, x402 Solana USDC, MPP Base intents) to verify cryptographic payment-hash binding and block overcharge fraud. Use when auditing a 402 challenge header before an autonomous agent pays a Lightning invoice or USDC transfer; for checking on-chain Bitcoin L1 mempool feerates, use estimate_bitcoin_mempool_fees instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'www_authenticate' ('protocol_hint' defaults to 'L402'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (60 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid. |
|
| 50 sats (L402) | Fetches real-time Bitcoin mainnet mempool feerate recommendations in satoshis per virtual byte (sat/vB) across fastest, half-hour, hour, and economy confirmation tiers. Use when checking current Bitcoin L1 network congestion before broadcasting an on-chain BTC transaction; for calculating exact SegWit/Taproot UTXO batch consolidation vByte weights and dust thresholds, use plan_bitcoin_utxo_consolidation instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'confirmation_target', supports '?demo=true' or L402 (50 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid. |
|
| 80 sats (L402) | Analyzes a set of Bitcoin UTXO balances in satoshis to compute exact vByte transaction weight, identify uneconomical dust inputs, and recommend whether to consolidate now or hold. Use when optimizing on-chain Bitcoin treasury UTXO sets to minimize long-term miner fee drag; for fetching current live Bitcoin mempool sat/vB feerates alone, use estimate_bitcoin_mempool_fees instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'utxos_sats_json' ('script_type' defaults to 'p2wpkh_segwit'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (80 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid. |
|
| 100 sats (L402) | Calculates instantaneous spot exchange rates and equivalent USD, BTC, and satoshi values across BTC, ETH, SOL, SUI, and USDC. Use when converting a token amount into USD or satoshis for invoice pricing or accounting; for quoting executable non-KYC cross-chain bridge routes with bridge fees and settlement times, use compare_crosschain_bridge_routes instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'currency' ('amount' defaults to 'standard'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (100 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid. |
|
| 100 sats (L402) | Compares non-custodial, non-KYC cross-chain swap routes (THORChain native L1 swaps, Maya Protocol, Blockstream Liquid) by basis-point fee, net output sats, and settlement time. Use when routing cross-chain treasury settlements (e.g. Solana USDC or Base ETH into native Bitcoin); for calculating mid-market spot exchange rates without bridge routing fees, use calculate_spot_swap_rate instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'from_asset' ('to_asset' defaults to 'BTC_NATIVE'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (100 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid. |
Free Account-Less Demo Mode: Append
?demo=trueto any REST endpoint above for an instant HTTP 200 schema preview at zero cost.
Other Modular Diogenes MCP Packages
Install only the domain packages relevant to your workflow:
Package | Scoped MCP Endpoint | Spoke Repository |
1. Gemini Suite & Agents |
| |
2. Agent Guardrails & Sandbox |
| |
3. Web3, DeFi & 402 Security |
| |
4. EVE: Frontier Sui Move Suite |
| |
5. Context, Code & Solvers (15 Tools) |
| |
6. Dev, Data & Workflow Utilities (14 Tools) |
| |
7. Full Master Gateway (All 85 Services) |
|
TensorBlock & MCP Index Profile Metadata
Field | Value |
Category |
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Transport |
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Endpoint |
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Manifest |
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Health Check |
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Auth |
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Install Confidence |
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License |
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Verification |
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Maintainer |
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Docs |
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Support |
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Available Tools
8 toolsaddress_poisoning_detectorCInspect
Detects zero-value transfer spoofing and prefix/suffix vanity lookalike address poisoning attacks.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| candidate_address | Yes | ||
| known_trusted_addresses | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full behavioral burden. It does disclose what the detection logic looks for, which is useful substance, but it says nothing about whether a trusted-address list is required for meaningful results, whether the check requires network/data access, whether results are heuristic or authoritative, or the risk of false positives/negatives โ all critical for a security-detection tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single front-loaded sentence with no filler; the detection scope is stated immediately. It is efficient, though the terseness is partly the source of the missing usage and parameter context.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With no annotations, no output schema, and 0% parameter coverage, the description is the only source of information, and it stops at the detection taxonomy. An agent cannot tell from this definition what inputs to prepare, whether trusted addresses are needed, or what a result signifies.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% and the description supplies no parameter meaning at all. The relationship between the required candidate_address and the optional known_trusted_addresses list โ arguably the core semantic of the tool, since poisoning detection is comparison-based โ is never explained, nor is the accepted address format (chain, base58 vs hex).
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description names a specific verb ('Detects') and a precise resource ('address poisoning attacks'), then enumerates two concrete attack subtypes: zero-value transfer spoofing and prefix/suffix vanity lookalike spoofing. This is far more specific than a generic 'detect fraud' phrasing. It does not explicitly contrast itself with any sibling, but the sibling set (contract_audit, solana_risk, mev_risk, etc.) covers unrelated domains, so differentiation is implicitly clean rather than stated.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no when-to-use guidance: no statement of the workflow in which this belongs (e.g., before sending funds), no prerequisites, and no mention of when the optional known_trusted_addresses list is required versus omitted. The agent is left to infer the trigger condition entirely from the tool name.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
contract_auditCInspect
Smart contract honeypot, hidden transfer tax, proxy upgrade, and mint backdoor auditor across EVM, Solana, and Move.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| network | No | base, ethereum, solana, or sui | |
| code_or_address | Yes | Contract source or address |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full behavioral burden. It says what it detects but not whether the operation is read-only, whether it requires network/permission access, expected latency, or how results are structured. Only the analytical scope is disclosed.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single dense sentence, front-loaded with the resource and vulnerability classes. No filler, though it is a packed list rather than fully structured prose.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a single analysis tool with no output schema and no annotations, the description specifies scope and coverage but omits what a result looks like, severity reporting, and routing against siblings. Adequate but with clear gaps.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so both parameters are already documented in the schema. The description adds a bit of meaning by naming supported chain families (EVM, Solana, Move) that loosely map to the network parameter, but adds no format or syntax detail beyond the schema. Baseline 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description names a specific resource (smart contract) and enumerates the exact vulnerability classes it detects (honeypot, hidden transfer tax, proxy upgrade, mint backdoor) across EVM, Solana, and Move. This distinguishes it from sibling risk tools like solana_risk or mev_risk, though it lacks an explicit action verb ('audits').
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no guidance on when to use this tool versus the several sibling risk detectors (solana_risk, mev_risk, address_poisoning_detector). No prerequisites, no exclusions, and no mention of when NOT to use it. Usage is only implied by the vulnerability list.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
crypto_bridge_quoteCInspect
Compares non-KYC cross-chain settlement routes (THORChain, Liquid, Maya) for BTC, SOL, ETH, SUI, and USDC.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| amount | Yes | ||
| to_asset | Yes | ||
| from_asset | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full behavioral burden. It discloses the non-KYC scope and providers, but does not say whether this is read-only, whether it executes or only quotes, what auth or rate limits apply, or what the response contains.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single front-loaded sentence with no filler. It efficiently states the action, route type, providers, and asset universe.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With no annotations, no output schema, and 0% schema description coverage, the description is too thin for an agent to call the tool reliably. It does not explain the quote output, route selection criteria, or parameter formatting expectations.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the schema provides only parameter names and types. The description names supported assets but does not map them to from_asset/to_asset, explain amount units, or specify whether assets should be symbols, chain IDs, or contract addresses.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb, 'Compares', and a specific resource, 'non-KYC cross-chain settlement routes', while naming providers and supported assets. It is clear what the tool does, but it does not explicitly differentiate itself from any sibling tool.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description states the comparison scope but gives no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives, no prerequisites, and no exclusions. An agent must infer usage entirely from the single sentence.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
http402_challenge_verifierCInspect
Verifies inbound HTTP 402 (L402 BOLT11, x402 Solana, MPP Base) payment challenges against overcharge and recipient spoofing.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| advertised_max_sats | No | ||
| www_authenticate_header | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full behavioral burden. It does disclose the specific checks (overcharge and recipient spoofing), but it omits whether the tool is read-only, what a failed verification looks like, what the return value is, and any permission or rate-limit constraints.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single sentence front-loaded with the verb and the exact standards covered. It contains no filler and is appropriately sized for the stated purpose.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a verification tool with no output schema, the description should explain the return shape or failure behavior. It also leaves both parameters undocumented and gives no when-to-use guidance, making it materially incomplete against the task complexity.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% for both parameters. The description's mention of 'overcharge' loosely relates to advertised_max_sats and 'HTTP 402 challenges' loosely relates to www_authenticate_header, but it gives no format, units, or interpretation; with zero schema documentation, it fails to compensate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb ('Verifies') and resource ('inbound HTTP 402 payment challenges') plus named standards (L402 BOLT11, x402 Solana, MPP Base). It is clearly distinct from siblings like contract_audit or solana_risk, but it does not explicitly differentiate itself from any alternative tool.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No when-to-use guidance, no alternatives, and no prerequisites are given. It does not say under what circumstances to call this tool versus handling a 402 challenge manually, so the agent must infer usage entirely.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
mev_riskBInspect
Pre-swap MEV sandwich and frontrunning risk evaluator returning optimal slippage in basis points.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| dex | Yes | ||
| token_in | Yes | ||
| token_out | Yes | ||
| slippage_bps | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are supplied, so the description carries the full behavioral burden. It does disclose the output conceptually ('optimal slippage in basis points') and implies a read/evaluation operation with no mutation, which is meaningful beyond structured data. It omits permissions, latency, determinism, and any side-effect profile, leaving notable gaps.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single dense sentence with the evaluative purpose and the output value front-loaded, and no wasted clauses. It is efficiently sized for a one-line tool description.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With no output schema and no annotations, the description should explain what the evaluation actually returns besides a slippage figure (e.g., a risk score or sandwich warning), and it should document the required token/dex inputs. As written, an agent could call it but would not know the full response shape or how to interpret a risk result.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% across all four parameters, so the description must compensate. It hints at slippage_bps via 'slippage in basis points' but gives no meaning for dex, token_in, or token_out, which are the three required inputs. Coverage of parameter semantics is well short of what a 0%-coverage schema demands.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description names a specific verb-and-resource pair: a pre-swap MEV sandwich and frontrunning evaluator. It clearly scopes the tool's domain (MEV risk ahead of a swap), which an agent can distinguish from audit-oriented siblings like contract_audit or solana_risk. It stops short of explicitly contrasting itself with any named sibling, so a 4 rather than a 5.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
'Pre-swap' signals the timing context (call before executing a swap), which is useful implied guidance. However, there is no explicit statement of when-not to use it, what alternatives exist, or prerequisites for interpreting the result. Usage is inferable but not spelled out.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
solana_riskBInspect
Audits Solana SPL token mint authority, freeze authority, top-holder concentration, and LP lock status.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| token_address | Yes | Solana mint or wallet pubkey |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full disclosure burden. It usefully enumerates the four risk dimensions inspected, which is real behavioral content, but says nothing about whether the call is read-only, whether it touches external RPC/indexer services, rate limits, or what shape the findings take.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
One sentence, front-loaded with the verb and target, listing the checked dimensions without filler. Nothing could be removed without losing information.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
There is no output schema, so the description should set expectations about what comes back (a risk score, per-check flags, a verdict). It names the checks but not the resulting output, leaving the agent to guess the return shape for a tool whose entire value is the report.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100% with a single documented parameter ('Solana mint or wallet pubkey'), so the baseline is 3. The description only loosely narrows the input scope to SPL tokens and adds no format, encoding, or validation detail beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a concrete verb ('Audits') and a precise resource (Solana SPL token) and enumerates the exact checks performed (mint authority, freeze authority, holder concentration, LP lock). That is much more specific than a tautology. It does not, however, explicitly differentiate itself from the closest sibling (solana_whale_radar or contract_audit).
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description never says when to reach for this tool versus siblings like solana_whale_radar or contract_audit, nor does it name any prerequisite (e.g., that the input must be an SPL mint rather than an arbitrary account). Usage is only inferable from the tool name.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
solana_whale_radarCInspect
Tracks high-conviction Solana whale wallets and insider accumulation clusters.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| token_address | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full behavioral burden. It never states that this is a read-only lookup, what data source it draws on, how fresh the whale data is, or what happens when no whale activity is found โ all significant gaps for an analytics tool with zero annotation coverage.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
It is a single short sentence with no filler, which is structurally fine. But the brevity reflects under-specification rather than disciplined conciseness โ nothing is front-loaded beyond a vague capability claim.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With one required parameter, no output schema, and no annotations, the description needs to carry the full load and does not: it omits the input's meaning, the return shape, and any safety or freshness context. An agent could not call this correctly with confidence.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% and the sole parameter, token_address, is never mentioned in the description, so nothing explains its expected format (mint address vs. symbol) or scope. The description does not compensate for the undocumented parameter at all.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description names a verb ('Tracks') and a resource ('Solana whale wallets and insider accumulation clusters'), so the general domain is clear. However, 'high-conviction' is vague marketing language and it never says what is actually returned or computed, nor does it differentiate itself from siblings like solana_risk or contract_audit that also concern Solana tokens.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no guidance on when to reach for this tool versus solana_risk or the other siblings, and no mention of prerequisites or the fact that a token address is mandatory. The agent must infer everything about invocation context.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
utxo_consolidation_plannerCInspect
Computes exact SegWit/Taproot vByte weights, dust thresholds, and optimal mempool fee windows for UTXO batching.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| utxos | Yes | ||
| current_mempool_sat_vb | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden. It says what it computes but not whether it is read-only, whether utxos must be spendable/sorted, what fee assumptions it makes, or what the returned plan looks like. For a computation tool with zero annotation coverage this is a meaningful gap.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single tightly packed sentence with the verb front-loaded and no filler. Efficient, though it packs three distinct outputs into one clause rather than structuring them.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
No output schema and no annotations, so the description must carry both input and output context. It sketches the computed outputs conceptually, which is useful, but leaves the required utxos input contract and the shape of the returned plan entirely unspecified.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% for both parameters. The description mentions 'mempool fee windows' which loosely hints at current_mempool_sat_vb, but never explains what the required utxos array must contain (raw txids? amounts? scripts?) or how current_mempool_sat_vb changes the result. The description does not compensate for the coverage gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (Computes) and concrete outputs (SegWit/Taproot vByte weights, dust thresholds, mempool fee windows) scoped to UTXO batching. An agent can distinguish it from the risk/audit siblings. It does not explicitly name a sibling alternative, keeping it short of 5.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No when-to-use guidance, no prerequisites, and no mention of when this is preferable to manual estimation or other siblings. The purpose is inferable but the trigger conditions are left entirely to the agent.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
8 tool updates
v1.4.0- First observed
address_poisoning_detector - First observed
contract_audit - First observed
crypto_bridge_quote - First observed
http402_challenge_verifier - First observed
mev_risk - First observed
solana_risk - First observed
solana_whale_radar - First observed
utxo_consolidation_planner
TDQS
Scored across 8 tools
Most tools target clearly distinct threats: MEV, address poisoning, HTTP 402 verification, UTXO consolidation, bridge quotes, and Solana whale tracking. There is some overlap among contract_audit, solana_risk, and solana_whale_radar on Solana token/security analysis, but the descriptions differentiate their scopes enough to guide selection.
All tool names use consistent snake_case noun-phrase conventions with no mixed camelCase or verb-style inconsistencies. The pattern is predictable and readable throughout.
Eight tools is well-scoped for a Web3, DeFi, and HTTP 402 security server. Each tool covers a distinct security or planning concern without obvious redundancy.
The surface covers a broad range of Web3 security concerns, including contract auditing, MEV, address poisoning, HTTP 402 verification, UTXO planning, bridge quotes, and whale tracking. Minor gaps exist, such as token approval/allowance checks, phishing or site verification, and challenge generation for HTTP 402, but agents can work around these.
Maintenance
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