ningen-shikkaku
Click on "Install Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@ningen-shikkakuCreate a burn-after-reading secret for my API key"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
ningen-shikkaku
Burn-after-reading secrets for AI agents.
ningen-shikkaku ships two small Rust binaries — dazai (the session-bound daemon) and motokano (a self-immolating one-shot MCP server).
Your MCP configs are full of plaintext API keys, and every agent you run can read all of them — and they keep working long after the agent is done. dazai inverts that: secrets live in locked, non-swappable RAM, are served to agents over MCP, and are destroyed after N reads — or the instant your session dies.

motokano --calls 1 --tool 'name=get_key,kind=static,value=s3cr3t' --armPoint any MCP client at it and call get_key once → you receive s3cr3t
→ the server wipes the value out of locked memory and SIGKILLs itself. Call
again → the process is gone.
Install
# prebuilt binaries (macOS arm64/x86_64, Linux x86_64/arm64)
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/New1Direction/ningen-shikkaku/releases/latest/download/dazai-installer.sh | sh
# or homebrew
brew install New1Direction/tap/dazai New1Direction/tap/motokano
# or from source (required for the Linux seccomp build)
git clone https://github.com/New1Direction/ningen-shikkaku
cd ningen-shikkaku/rs
cargo build --release # -> target/release/{dazai, motokano}
cargo build --release --features seccomp # Linux: seccomp syscall allowlistPrebuilt binaries are built with default features; the seccomp-confined daemon
is a from-source build (it links libseccomp — install libseccomp-dev +
pkg-config first).
Related MCP server: MCP-Secrets-Vault
Use it with Claude Code
# a one-shot secret an agent can read exactly once:
claude mcp add burn-once -- motokano --calls 1 --arm \
--tool 'name=get_key,kind=static,value=YOUR-SECRET'
# or the session-bound daemon: agents register their PID and get SIGKILLed
# the moment your session dies
dazai daemon --arm --grace 5 &
claude mcp add dazai -- dazai mcpAny MCP client works the same way — the transport is plain stdio.
And the second act: a dead-man's switch for your agents
The same daemon is a session kill-switch. Any MCP client registers its PID;
when your shell/SSH session dies, your heartbeat stops, or a panic signal
arrives, dazai SIGKILLs every registered process, overwrites its secrets
with a wipe the compiler can't optimize away, and exits. Walk away: agents
die, secrets burn.
dazai daemon --ping-timeout 15 # terminal A (dry-run by default; --arm makes it real)
dazai client --interval 5 # terminal B
# close terminal B -> the daemon wipes its secrets and exitsIt runs only on your own machine, on your own secrets and your own configured tools. It never touches another process, file, or host.
What's in the box
It ships in two layers:
a hardened Rust daemon + tooling — the real thing:
mlock(no swap),madvise(MADV_DONTDUMP)+prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0)(no core dumps / no ptrace), a seccomp syscall allowlist (noexecve/open/connect/…), and a non-elidableexplicit_bzero/memset_swipe; anda Python reference implementation — the original proof-of-concept that established the mechanism (see
python-reference.md).
Component | What it does |
| The watchdog: holds |
| The heartbeat client — ties the daemon's life to a shell / SSH session. |
| An MCP server exposing the daemon as tools, so any agent can register its PID for session-bound protection (it gets |
| A standalone self-immolating MCP server: serve N tool calls, then wipe secret state and exit. |
Python reference |
|
Architecture
flowchart LR
A["MCP client / AI agent<br/>(stdio transport)"]
subgraph Daemon["dazai daemon (kikka Watchdog)"]
D["dazai daemon<br/>mlock'd SecretBuffers (goodnight)<br/>seccomp-confined on Linux (kekkai)"]
SOCK[("UNIX socket 0600<br/>HELLO heartbeat + REGISTER / ARM / STATUS")]
end
MCPD["dazai mcp<br/>(rei · rmcp server)"]
HB["dazai client<br/>(heartbeat: HELLO / PING)"]
MOTO["motokano<br/>(self-immolating MCP server)<br/>static values in SecretBuffer"]
KILL{{"wipe (explicit_bzero / memset_s)<br/>+ SIGKILL"}}
A -->|"register pid / status / panic"| MCPD
A -->|"get_key (static, N reads)"| MOTO
MCPD -->|"relay verbs + signals via pidfile"| SOCK
HB -->|"holds liveness connection"| SOCK
SOCK --- D
MOTO -. "optional --dazai-socket: register + monitor" .-> SOCK
D ==>|"on trigger: SIGKILL registered PIDs, then wipe + self-SIGKILL"| KILL
MOTO ==>|"after N calls / EOF / daemon death: wipe + exit"| KILL
HB -. "drop / ping-timeout / panic signal" .-> DThreat model
daZai shrinks the window and the surface in which plaintext secrets are reachable, and makes session-end deterministically destroy them.
It protects against:
Risk | How |
Secrets paged to swap |
|
Secrets captured in core dumps |
|
Session loss leaving secrets resident | heartbeat drop / logout → wipe + |
Secrets lingering in process memory after use |
|
A confined process escaping | seccomp allowlist denies |
ptrace snooping the daemon |
|
It does NOT protect against (and the project is deliberately honest about this):
GPU VRAM. If an attached LLM/agent copies a secret into GPU memory, killing the host process does not wipe VRAM. daZai controls host RAM and the processes it supervises — not an accelerator's memory.
exec-tool stdout.motokano'skind=exectools return a command's stdout, which is OS-buffered and not held in a locked buffer. Usekind=static(a pre-loaded, locked, wipeable value) when you need the wipe guarantee.Managed-runtime residue (Python reference). CPython copies
bytesfreely, so a secret may transiently live in unlocked heap before/after the locked buffer. The Rust implementation eliminates this for its own buffers (data is written into the locked mapping and never copied to a GC heap); the Python tier is a reference, not a hard guarantee.A privileged or same-UID attacker on the live box (root,
/proc/<pid>/mem, a debugger) reading memory before the wipe.mlockstops swap, not memory reads; seccomp +PR_SET_DUMPABLEraise the bar on Linux, but an adversary who already has privileged access to your running machine is out of scope.Cold-boot / DMA / physical attacks on RAM.
A hard crash (kernel OOM, an external
kill -9, power loss): the wipe path can't run, so nothing is zeroed. The mechanism is best-effort on these paths and never claims otherwise.
In short: daZai is not, and cannot be, a guarantee against an attacker who already owns your running machine. It is a sharp tool for making secrets ephemeral and session-bound, with every limitation stated up front.
Verification
66 tests across the Rust workspace (secure memory, the panic policy, the wire protocol, the MCP layer, the one-shot lifecycle) plus the 29-test Python reference.
Linux seccomp is validated on both architectures under the real
KillProcessfilter —aarch64(locally) andx86_64(CI) — where the daemon installs the live filter and the full integration suite runs against it with noSIGSYS.Every push runs the whole suite (default and
--features seccomp),clippy -D warnings, andrustfmt --checkon x86_64 Linux as a permanent regression gate.
Deep technical docs (per-crate design, the seccomp allowlist, the
adversarial-review history) live in rs/README.md; the Python
proof-of-concept is in python-reference.md.
The name
Named for the novelist Osamu Dazai, whose work circles themes of disappearance and self-erasure — fitting for software whose defining act is to wipe itself out the moment it is no longer being watched over. The repository takes its name from his novel No Longer Human (人間失格, Ningen Shikkaku). It's flavor, not a manifesto; the software just self-destructs on cue.
License
MIT © 2026 New1Direction.
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