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sops-mcp

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Python
Hybrid

sops_update_external

Update an external secret in a SOPS-encrypted file after rotating an upstream API key. Recomputes derived secrets referencing the changed key and rejects generated or derived entries.

Instructions

Replace the value of an 'external' secret (e.g. after the user rotated an upstream API key). Rejects attempts to update 'generated' or 'derived' secrets — use sops_rotate_generated for those. Recomputes any derived secrets that reference this key. Requires a private key for the domain.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
valueYesNew plaintext value
domainNoName of the key domain to encrypt to / decrypt with. Optional. Defaults to the domain recorded in the file's _meta_unencrypted block, and failing that to 'default'. Call sops_list_domains to see what this server has configured.
key_nameYesKey to update
encrypted_contentYesContents of an existing secrets.enc.yaml file

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changedv0.11.0
    • addedInput schema / properties / domain
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "Name of the key domain to encrypt to / decrypt with. Optional. Defaults to the domain recorded in the file's _meta_unencrypted block, and failing that to 'default'. Call sops_list_domains to see what this server has configured.",
+  "type": "string"
+}
  2. First observedv0.10.0

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does well: it discloses a prerequisite ('Requires a private key for the domain'), a rejection rule, and an important side effect ('Recomputes any derived secrets that reference this key'). It leaves the mutation semantics and return shape implicit, which prevents a 5, but this is unusually rich for an unannotated mutation tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences, zero filler, and the core action is front-loaded ahead of the constraints and side effects. Each sentence carries a distinct obligation (action, exclusion/alternative, side effect + prerequisite).

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For an unannotated mutation tool with no output schema, the description covers usage, restrictions, side effects, and auth requirements adequately; return-value detail is absent but arguably not needed. The main residual gap is that it never states the operation is a write/mutation explicitly, relying on 'Replace' to imply it.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so both the value, key_name, domain, and encrypted_content semantics are already documented in the schema, including the domain defaulting logic and the sops_list_domains pointer. The description adds only the contextual framing that value is a rotated upstream key, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Replace the value of an external secret') and scopes it tightly to the 'external' secret class, naming the alternative tool for the other classes. An agent can distinguish it from sops_rotate_generated and sops_add_secrets without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives an explicit triggering condition ('after the user rotated an upstream API key') and an explicit exclusion with the redirect ('Rejects attempts to update generated or derived secrets — use sops_rotate_generated for those'). When-to-use, when-not-to-use, and the alternative are all present.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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