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Pletopay MCP Server

Pletopay MCP Server

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by pletopay

Rotate the signing secret

rotate_webhook_secret
Destructive

Replace a webhook endpoint's signing secret and return the new secret only in this response; future deliveries are signed with it.

Instructions

Rotate the signing secret.

Replace the endpoint’s signing secret. The new secret is returned only in this response, and deliveries are signed with it from now on.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesThe webhook endpoint id (`we_…`).

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv1.0.0

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the destructive, non-idempotent annotations, it discloses two critical behaviors: the new secret is returned only in this response, and deliveries are signed with it from that point onward. This provides essential secret-capture and timing information that is absent from the structured fields.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is short and places the operation before its important one-time-return and signing consequences. However, 'Rotate the signing secret' and 'Replace the endpoint’s signing secret' largely repeat each other and the title.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a simple one-parameter operation, the target, mutation, return sensitivity, and effective timing are sufficiently covered despite the absence of an output schema. It could be more complete by explicitly warning that the prior secret is invalidated and that the new value must be captured before the response is discarded, although both are strongly implied.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The sole id parameter is fully documented in the schema, including its webhook-endpoint role and we_ prefix, so the high-coverage baseline applies. The description’s reference to 'the endpoint' adds no parameter syntax, validation, or selection detail beyond that schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states that the tool replaces a webhook endpoint’s signing secret, making both the action and resource unambiguous. It does not explicitly differentiate this operation from update_webhook_endpoint or other webhook-endpoint siblings.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied for rotating an endpoint’s signing credential, and the immediate effect on deliveries clarifies the operation’s scope. There is no explicit when-to-use or when-not-to-use guidance, such as rotation after compromise versus updating or deleting an endpoint.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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