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MCP Security Guard

Find out if the MCP servers you installed are lying to your AI.

Local audit for tool poisoning, rug pulls, tool shadowing, hidden Unicode and leaked secrets, mapped to the OWASP MCP Top 10. Nothing leaves your machine unless you opt in.

npm version npm downloads Glama CI status License: MIT OWASP MCP Top 10


🚀 Quick Install

Cursor

Add to Cursor

Click the button above, or use this deep link: cursor://anysphere.cursor-deeplink/mcp/install?name=mcp-security-guard&config=eyJjb21tYW5kIjoibnB4IiwiYXJncyI6WyIteSIsIm1jcC1zZWN1cml0eS1ndWFyZCJdfQ==

Or manually add to .cursor/mcp.json:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "mcp-security-guard": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "mcp-security-guard"]
    }
  }
}

Claude Code

/plugin marketplace add petrovicistefan/mcp-security-guard
/plugin install mcp-security-guard@mcp-security-guard

Then run /mcp-audit or ask Claude "are my MCP servers safe?"

Via CLI

claude mcp add mcp-security-guard -- npx -y mcp-security-guard

Claude Desktop

Add to your Claude Desktop config (~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json on macOS, %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json on Windows):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "mcp-security-guard": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "mcp-security-guard"]
    }
  }
}

VS Code

Add to VS Code

Click the button above, or manually add to .vscode/mcp.json:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "mcp-security-guard": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "mcp-security-guard"]
    }
  }
}

Command Line

npx -y mcp-security-guard audit --project-only

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Related MCP server: depguard

📋 Table of Contents


Why MCP Security Guard?

Your code is covered by other tools. This one checks the MCP servers that inject text into your AI's context.

MCP Security Guard audits every MCP server Claude (and other AI clients) can reach: servers you configured, servers that plugins bring, and servers from Claude Desktop and other clients on your machine.

How It Compares

As of October 2026. Corrections welcome.

Feature

MCP Security Guard

snyk/agent-scan

cisco-ai-defense/mcp-scanner

riseandignite/mcp-shield

Claude Code native plugin

✅

❌

❌

❌

Runtime hooks (pre/post tool-use)

✅

❌

❌

❌

Rug-pull pinning (SHA-256)

✅ Tools, skills, CLAUDE.md

Limited

❌

❌

OWASP MCP Top 10 mapping

✅ Every finding

❌

❌

❌

SARIF output

✅ GitHub Action

❌

❌

❌

CycloneDX BOM export

✅ Agent inventory

❌

❌

❌

Fully local (zero network)

✅ Default

Varies

Varies

Varies

Supply-chain checks

✅ OSV, npm, PyPI

Varies

Varies

Varies

Tool poisoning detection

✅ 26/27 attacks

Varies

Varies

Varies

License

MIT

Apache 2.0

MIT

MIT

Our differentiators:

  • Native Claude Code integration with a /mcp-audit slash command and runtime protection

  • Comprehensive rug-pull protection: pins and verifies tool definitions, skills, commands, subagents, and CLAUDE.md files

  • Every finding mapped to OWASP MCP Top 10 for compliance and remediation guidance

  • GitHub Action with SARIF for code scanning alerts on pull requests

  • Agent Bill of Materials (BOM) in CycloneDX 1.6 format for audits and compliance

  • Privacy-first: everything runs locally by default; network access is explicit opt-in


Use Cases

1. Individual Developers

Protect your local AI setup.

  • Audit MCP servers before and after installation

  • Get warned if a server's tool definitions change (rug pulls)

  • Runtime protection: block credentials from being sent, detect poisoned outputs

  • Pin trusted servers and skills for continuous verification

# Scan before installing a new server
npx mcp-security-guard scan server-config.json --confirm-launch

# Pin your reviewed servers
npx mcp-security-guard pin

# Check everything is still safe
npx mcp-security-guard audit

2. Pull Request CI Checks

Block risky MCP servers and poisoned skills in code review.

Fail PRs that add:

  • MCP servers with tool poisoning, unpinned packages, or privileged Docker images

  • Skills or CLAUDE.md files with instruction overrides or credential exfiltration

  • Vulnerable dependencies or typosquatted packages

Findings appear in GitHub's code scanning interface with OWASP MCP Top 10 references.

- uses: petrovicistefan/mcp-security-guard@main
  with:
    fail-on: high

3. Teams and Enterprises

Central security policy for your organization.

With the Team plan:

  • Admins publish one policy (allowed/blocked servers, plugins, pinned versions)

  • Everyone's plugin enforces it automatically, even offline

  • Approval flow: developers request, admins approve

  • Fleet inventory: see what MCP servers your team runs (opt-in with consent)

  • Compliance evidence: OWASP MCP Top 10 coverage report for audits


What It Checks

MCP Security Guard discovers servers from every place AI clients load them: user, local and project scope, servers shipped inside installed plugins, claude_desktop_config.json, Claude Desktop extensions, organization-managed managed-mcp.json, other clients on the machine (Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf), and claude.ai connectors you've used.

It scans everything a server puts into the AI's context: tools, server instructions, prompts, resources and resource templates.

Check

What It Catches

Tool poisoning

Instruction overrides, "don't tell the user", <IMPORTANT> tags, directives to read secrets (~/.ssh, .env), conversation harvesting, exfiltration via URLs/parameters/Markdown images, HTML comments, encoded payloads

Full-schema poisoning

Same checks on parameter names, descriptions, defaults, enums, required, plus non-schema text in type

Hidden text

Zero-width, bidi-control and Unicode-tag characters, ANSI terminal escapes, homoglyph tool names

Tool shadowing

Server descriptions referencing another server's tools, tool-name collisions between servers

Rug pulls

Tool definitions or launch commands that changed after you pinned them (SHA-256 per tool). Skills, commands, subagents, CLAUDE.md and hooks of a plugin that changed after pinning (plugins changing files under the same version are flagged high). Re-checked automatically at every session start

Capabilities & score

Per-tool classification (execute, delete, write, egress), unauthenticated remote write access, 0–100 score and A–F grade per server, recommended permission rules

Supply chain

OSV vulnerabilities and malicious versions, typosquats, missing or brand-new packages, install scripts, publisher changes (opt-in network check)

Runtime

Hooks on every MCP call: ask before credentials are sent, warn on injected instructions or credentials in outputs, content-free audit log

Policy

.mcp-security.json approved/blocked servers and hosts, enforced in audits, CI and at session start

Toxic flows

Servers holding all three legs of the "lethal trifecta" (untrusted input, private data, egress capability), on their own or together. A posture note (low or info), not a defect

Agent context

Skills and their scripts, slash commands, subagents, rules, CLAUDE.md and plugin hooks: instruction overrides, "don't tell the user", invisible text, HTML comments addressed to the model, directives to read credential files, commands that upload credentials, download-and-run, encoded execution, infostealer scripts, pre-approved unrestricted Bash

Configuration

Plaintext secrets in env/headers/args/URLs, plain-HTTP remotes, unpinned npx/uvx packages, privileged or unpinned Docker images, pipe-to-shell launches, duplicate names across scopes

Everything runs locally. Nothing is sent anywhere unless you opt in.


OWASP MCP Top 10 Coverage

Every finding is tagged with its OWASP MCP Top 10 id, in reports and in SARIF.

ID

Risk

Coverage

MCP01

Token Mismanagement & Secret Exposure

✅ Plaintext secrets in env, headers, args and URLs. At runtime, asks before a credential is sent to an MCP server and warns when one comes back

MCP02

Privilege Escalation via Scope Creep

✅ Capability inventory (execute, delete, write, egress), ready-to-paste permissions.ask rules, privileged or broadly mounted containers

MCP03

Tool Poisoning

✅ 26/27 published techniques detected, including full-schema poisoning, shadowing and name collisions, plus rug-pull pinning

MCP04

Supply Chain Attacks

✅ Unpinned packages, images and git sources; OSV vulnerabilities and malicious versions; typosquats; new packages; install scripts; publisher changes

MCP05

Command Injection & Execution

✅ Flags tools that can execute commands; adversarial_test finds injectable parameters in servers you own

MCP06

Prompt Injection via Contextual Payloads

✅ In tool metadata and, at runtime, in tool outputs (English patterns)

MCP07

Insufficient AuthN/AuthZ

✅ Plain-HTTP remotes; remote servers exposing write or exec tools without authentication; OAuth detection

MCP08

Lack of Audit and Telemetry

✅ Local, content-free audit log of every MCP call, with query_audit_log

MCP09

Shadow MCP Servers

✅ Discovery across user, project, local, plugin and Claude Desktop configs; approved-server policy enforced in audits, CI and at session start

MCP10

Context Injection & Over-Sharing

✅ Conversation and system-prompt harvesting, Markdown-image exfiltration, credentials in outputs, network-egress inventory

What a local tool cannot do (planned for hosted Team plan): org-wide discovery and audit aggregation, OAuth scope review.


Quick Demo (1 Minute)

Try a synthetic offline comparison with no dependencies, account, or API key needed:

git clone https://github.com/petrovicistefan/mcp-security-guard.git
cd mcp-security-guard
node scripts/offline-demo.mjs

The demo checks two saved tool descriptions: one produces instruction-override and sensitive-path findings; the clean counterpart produces no findings. Run the scans yourself and generate an HTML report.


Tools

Tool

Network

Launches

Description

list_mcp_servers

❌

❌

Lists every MCP server configured for this project (user, local and project scope in Claude Code, plus Claude Desktop) with its transport. Read-only; launches nothing.

audit_mcp_config

❌

❌

Static audit of MCP server configuration: plaintext secrets in env/headers/args/URLs, plain-HTTP remote servers, unpinned npx/uvx packages, unpinned or privileged Docker containers, pipe-to-shell launch commands, and duplicate server names. Read-only; launches nothing.

audit_server_tools

❌

✅ Confirm

Connects to selected MCP servers, lists their tools, and checks every name, description and schema for tool poisoning, cross-server tool shadowing, and rug pulls. Never calls the scanned tools. Requires confirm_launch: true.

pin_tools

❌

✅ Confirm

Records a SHA-256 hash of every tool definition in ~/.claude/mcp-security/pins.json for rug-pull detection. Pin only after reviewing an audit. Requires confirm_launch: true.

audit_agent_context

❌

❌

Scans CLAUDE.md, skills, slash commands, subagents, rules and plugin hooks for instruction overrides, requests to hide things from users, invisible text, credential exfiltration, and encoded execution. Read-only; launches nothing.

pin_context

❌

❌

Records SHA-256 of every skill, command, subagent, rule, CLAUDE.md and plugin hook config in ~/.claude/mcp-security/context-pins.json for rug-pull detection in plugins. Pin only after reviewing an audit.

analyze_tool_definitions

❌

❌

Offline analysis of tool definitions you provide (e.g., tools/list output from a server you're developing). Useful in CI or before publishing. Never connects to anything.

check_supply_chain

✅ Confirm

❌

For npx/uvx servers, checks packages on npm/PyPI and OSV database: vulnerabilities, malicious versions, typosquats, install scripts, deprecation, publisher changes. Sends package names and versions only. Requires confirm_network: true.

apply_fixes

Conditional

Conditional

Fixes findings in project files: adds permissions.ask rules (needs confirm_launch), pins unpinned packages (needs confirm_network), or replaces literal secrets with ${VAR} references. Dry run by default; backs up files before writing.

security_dashboard

❌

Conditional

Opens interactive dashboard with scores, grades, findings by severity, OWASP MCP Top 10 breakdown, and pin buttons. scan="config" is read-only; scan="full" requires confirm_launch: true. MCP App hosts render it inline.

generate_policy

❌

❌

Returns a .mcp-security.json policy that approves exactly the currently configured servers. Commit it to flag shadow servers in CI and audits. Read-only; does not write the file.

team_status

✅ Confirm

❌

Syncs organization policy from team backend and shows org name, role, policy version, and fleet reporting status. Requires team API key and confirm_network: true.

request_approval

✅ Confirm

❌

Creates an approval request for a blocked server or plugin when the team policy requires it. Admin decides via CLI. Requires confirm_network: true.

team_report

✅ Confirm

❌

Shows what a fleet report would send (server/plugin names, versions, transports; never paths, args, env, secrets). With confirm_send: true, sends it if admin enabled fleet visibility.

export_bom

❌

❌

Agent bill of materials: inventory of MCP servers, plugins, skills, commands, subagents, CLAUDE.md and hooks with SHA-256, pin status, scores and OWASP evidence. CycloneDX 1.6 JSON or Markdown summary. Static; launches nothing.

query_audit_log

❌

❌

Summarizes the local runtime audit log: MCP tool calls per server/tool, and calls where credentials were sent/returned or outputs contained injected instructions. Log stores hashes and sizes only, never arguments or outputs.

adversarial_test

❌

✅ Confirm

Calls tools with command-injection and path-traversal payloads to find vulnerable parameters. Only for servers you own/operate. Requires i_own_this_server: true and confirm_launch: true. Destructive tools skipped by default.


CI / GitHub Action

Fail pull requests that add risky MCP servers to .mcp.json, and show findings in GitHub code scanning:

name: MCP security
on: [pull_request]
permissions:
  contents: read
  security-events: write
jobs:
  audit:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - uses: petrovicistefan/mcp-security-guard@main
        id: mcp
        with:
          fail-on: high          # critical | high | medium | low | info | none
      - uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
        if: always()
        with:
          sarif_file: ${{ steps.mcp.outputs.sarif-file }}

To also fail PRs that add poisoned skills, commands or CLAUDE.md, set context: true (second SARIF file in context-sarif-file).

Command line:

# Audit project-level MCP servers
npx mcp-security-guard audit --project-only --format sarif --output mcp.sarif

# For MCP server authors: analyze a saved tools/list result
npx mcp-security-guard analyze-tools tools.json --name my-server

# Scan skills, commands, subagents and CLAUDE.md
npx mcp-security-guard audit-context --project-only --fail-on high

# Pin what you've reviewed
npx mcp-security-guard pin-context

# Scan a server before installing it
npx mcp-security-guard scan server-config.json --confirm-launch

# Test your own server for command injection (calls tools)
npx mcp-security-guard adversarial my-server.mcp.json --server my-server --i-own-this-server --confirm-launch

# Fix what the audit found
npx mcp-security-guard fix --pin-versions            # npx pkg → pkg@x.y.z
npx mcp-security-guard fix --env-refs --write        # secrets → ${VAR} references
npx mcp-security-guard fix --permissions --confirm-launch --write

# Generate a team policy from current configuration
npx mcp-security-guard policy-init && git add .mcp-security.json

Output formats: --format markdown|json|sarif|html (HTML is a self-contained report file).

Exit codes: 0 clean, 1 findings at or above --fail-on, 2 usage error.


Interactive Dashboard

security_dashboard is an MCP App that hosts supporting MCP Apps (Claude Desktop, claude.ai, VS Code Copilot) render inline.

Shows every server with its score and grade, findings filterable by severity and server, OWASP MCP Top 10 breakdown, recommended permission rules, and Full scan and Pin buttons.

To use in Claude Desktop:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "mcp-security-guard": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": ["/path/to/mcp-security-guard/plugin/dist/index.mjs"]
    }
  }
}

Ask Claude to "open the MCP security dashboard".

Develop locally: npm run dashboard:dev -- /path/to/project


Runtime Hooks

Hook

What It Does

Setting

PreToolUse on mcp__*

Asks for confirmation when arguments contain credentials

MCP_SECURITY_SECRET_GUARD=ask (default), deny, or off

PostToolUse on mcp__*

Warns when output contains injected instructions, hidden characters, exfiltration markup, or credentials

Always on

Audit log

~/.claude/mcp-security/audit.jsonl: server, tool, time, input hash and sizes. Never arguments or outputs. Rotates at 10 MB

MCP_SECURITY_AUDIT_LOG=off to disable

Hooks add ~40ms per MCP call.

Session-start check re-verifies pinned servers and stays silent unless something changed:

  • MCP_SECURITY_SESSION_CHECK=full (default): compare configs and re-list tools

  • MCP_SECURITY_SESSION_CHECK=config: compare configs only, launch nothing

  • MCP_SECURITY_SESSION_CHECK=off: disable


Team Plan (paid, opt-in)

Team keys are issued by hand for now: write to me.

With a team API key (MCP_SECURITY_API_KEY or plugin key setting), you get:

  • Central policy pushed by admin, enforced next to user/project policy (repository cannot loosen it)

  • Approved plugins (allowedPlugins, blockedPlugins) enforced in audits, CI, and at session start

  • Fleet inventory (opt-in with consent): names, versions, scopes, transport, packages/hostnames — never paths, args, env, secrets

  • Approval flow: team request, team approve, Slack-compatible webhook alerts

  • Keys and seats: admin creates/revokes per-developer keys; purchase sets seat limit

  • Web dashboard at /v1/team/dashboard: fleet, approvals, policy, keys, settings

  • Email alerts (up to 20/hour per org) next to webhook

  • Compliance evidence: team compliance writes Markdown report with OWASP MCP Top 10 controls, evidence, violations, and pending approvals

Admin actions are CLI only (not MCP tools), so injected text cannot trigger them.

mcp-security-guard team status
mcp-security-guard team report --dry-run
mcp-security-guard team request plugin some-plugin --note "for docs site"
mcp-security-guard team approvals --status pending      # admin
mcp-security-guard team approve apr_… --note ok         # admin
mcp-security-guard team policy-push policy.json         # admin
mcp-security-guard team keys create ana                 # admin
mcp-security-guard team settings --fleet on --webhook https://hooks.slack.com/… --email alerts@acme.example

Everything above stays free. Free plugin is fully functional. See PRIVACY.md for what is sent.


Benchmark Results

Measured: detects 26/27 attacks from a corpus of publicly documented techniques, with 0 false positives on 13 hard benign samples and on 17 real servers (83 tools).

Techniques covered: tool poisoning and <IMPORTANT> tags (Invariant Labs), line jumping and ANSI escape deception (Trail of Bits), full-schema poisoning (CyberArk), tool shadowing, name collisions, zero-width/Unicode-tag/bidi smuggling, homoglyph names, base64 payloads, HTML comments, exfiltration via URLs/parameters/Markdown images.

See bench/RESULTS.md for full methodology and results.


Development

npm install
npm run build      # bundles to plugin/dist/ (committed, so plugin runs without npm install)
npm test
npm run bench      # false-positive gate on real servers (network; Docker images optional)

test/fixtures/poisoned-server.mjs is a deliberately malicious server used by the end-to-end test.


Contributing

Small, reproducible contributions are welcome: benign regression samples, synthetic detection cases, client configuration tests, and clearer examples.

See CONTRIBUTING.md for guidelines.

Contribution guide · Open tasks · Report a false positive


Security & Privacy

Trust model:

  • Read-only (except pin files, audit log, and policy-init)

  • Network only with explicit opt-in

  • Secrets masked in all output

  • Static checks reduce risk but don't prove a server safe


License

MIT License

Copyright (c) 2026 Stefan Petrovici

Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:

The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.

THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.

See LICENSE for the complete license text.


Limitations

Remote servers that require OAuth (most hosted MCP servers) cannot be scanned at the tool level: the scanner cannot reuse Claude Code's tokens. Their configuration is still audited.


About the Author

I'm Stefan Petrovici: passionate about IT, a husband and a father. I built MCP Security Guard on my own. I'm looking for a job.

I build web applications end to end—frontend, backend, APIs and deployment—and I'm happy to work on anything else that needs building. This repository shows how I work: tests, CI, careful documentation and attention to security.

I also build WordPress and WooCommerce plugins, available at pluginsforstores.com.

If your team is hiring, write to me at hello@petrovicistefan.ro.


⭐ Support This Project

Found this useful? Star this repository!

A GitHub star helps other developers discover the project and lets you save it for later. Thanks for supporting open source!


MCP Security Guard is not affiliated with Anthropic, Snyk, Cisco, or any other security vendor mentioned in this document.

Available Tools

17 tools
adversarial_testAdversarial test of your own MCP serverA

CALLS every non-destructive tool of one configured server with command-injection payloads (each would only create an empty canary file) and path-traversal payloads, then reports which parameters reach a shell or the file system unchecked. Only for servers the user develops or operates, ideally a test instance in a container. Destructive tools are skipped unless include_destructive is true.

Inputs: server (required), confirm_launch (required), i_own_this_server (required), canary_dir, +3 more.

analyze_tool_definitionsAnalyze tool definitions (offline)A
Read-only

Runs the tool-poisoning checks on tool definitions you pass in (e.g. the output of tools/list from a server you are developing), without connecting to anything. Useful in CI or before publishing an MCP server.

Inputs: tools (required), server_name (required).

apply_fixesApply recommended fixesA
Idempotent

Fixes findings in the project's own files. permissions: adds the recommended permissions.ask rules for tools that execute code, delete data or write files to .claude/settings.json (needs confirm_launch, because the servers are listed to classify their tools). pin-versions: pins unpinned npx/uvx packages in .mcp.json to the registry's current version (needs confirm_network). env-refs: replaces literal secrets in .mcp.json env/headers with ${VAR} references. Without write=true it only shows the planned edits. Every written file is backed up under ~/.claude/mcp-security/backups/ first; ~/.claude.json is never modified.

Inputs: fixes (required), write, servers, project_dir, +2 more.

audit_agent_contextAudit skills, commands, agents and CLAUDE.mdA
Read-only

Scans the text files Claude reads besides MCP tools: CLAUDE.md, skills (and their bundled scripts), slash commands, subagents, rules and the hook configs of installed plugins, from the user, the project and every enabled plugin. Flags instruction overrides, requests to hide things from the user, invisible text, HTML comments addressed to the model, directives to read credential files, commands that upload credentials, download-and-run and encoded execution, credential-stealing scripts, and pre-approved unrestricted shell access. Read-only; launches nothing and sends nothing.

Inputs: project_dir, project_only.

audit_mcp_configAudit MCP configurationA
Read-only

Static audit of MCP server configuration: plaintext secrets in env/headers/args/URLs, plain-HTTP remote servers, unpinned npx/uvx packages, unpinned or privileged Docker containers, pipe-to-shell launch commands, and duplicate server names across scopes. Read-only; launches nothing.

Inputs: project_dir.

audit_server_toolsAudit MCP tool definitionsA
Read-only

Connects to the selected MCP servers, lists their tools, and checks every name, description and schema string for tool poisoning (instruction overrides, concealment requests, hidden tags, invisible Unicode, sensitive file paths, exfiltration wording, encoded payloads), cross-server tool shadowing, and changes since the tools were last pinned (rug pulls). Never calls the scanned tools.

Inputs: servers (required), confirm_launch (required), project_dir, timeout_seconds.

check_supply_chainCheck MCP server packages (npm/PyPI)A
Read-only

For servers launched with npx/uvx and similar, checks the package on its registry and in the OSV database: known vulnerabilities, known malicious versions, typosquats of popular MCP packages, non-existent names, very new packages or releases, install scripts, deprecation and npm publisher changes. Sends package names and versions to registry.npmjs.org, pypi.org and api.osv.dev; nothing else leaves the machine.

Inputs: confirm_network (required), servers, project_dir, scan_images.

export_bomExport the agent bill of materialsA
Read-only

Inventory of everything the agent can run or read here: MCP servers, plugins, skills, commands, subagents, CLAUDE.md and hook configs, with SHA-256, pin status, scores and OWASP MCP Top 10 evidence. format=summary is a Markdown overview for audits; format=cyclonedx is a CycloneDX 1.6 JSON document. Static and local: nothing is launched or sent, and it holds no paths, arguments, environment or secrets.

Inputs: format, project_dir, project_only.

generate_policyGenerate an approved-server policyA
Read-only

Returns a .mcp-security.json policy that approves exactly the MCP servers configured now (and their remote hosts) and requires pinned versions. Commit it to the repository so CI, session checks and audits flag any server added later that is not on the list (shadow MCP servers). Read-only: returns the JSON, does not write it.

Inputs: project_dir.

list_mcp_serversList configured MCP serversA
Read-only

Lists every MCP server configured for this project (user, local and project scope in Claude Code, plus Claude Desktop) with its transport. Reads config files only; launches nothing.

Inputs: project_dir.

pin_contextPin skills, commands, agents and CLAUDE.mdA
Idempotent

Records a SHA-256 of every skill, command, subagent, rule, CLAUDE.md, plugin hook config and bundled script (user, project and each installed plugin) in ~/.claude/mcp-security/context-pins.json, so later scans and the session-start check report anything that changed after you approved it. A plugin that changes files without a new version is the rug-pull pattern. Pin only after the user has reviewed an audit_agent_context report; origins with critical or high findings are skipped unless force is true. Reads files only; launches nothing.

Inputs: force, origins, project_dir.

pin_toolsPin MCP tool definitionsA
Idempotent

Records a SHA-256 hash of every tool definition of the selected servers in ~/.claude/mcp-security/pins.json, so later audits can detect rug pulls. Pin only after the user has reviewed an audit_server_tools report for these servers. Launches the servers like audit_server_tools.

Inputs: servers (required), confirm_launch (required), project_dir, timeout_seconds.

query_audit_logQuery the MCP call audit logA
Read-only

Summarises the local audit log written by the plugin's hooks: MCP tool calls per server and tool, and every call where a credential was sent, a credential came back, or the output contained injected instructions. The log stores hashes and sizes only, never arguments or outputs.

Inputs: since_hours.

request_approvalAsk the admin to approve a server or pluginA
Idempotent

Creates an approval request in the user's organisation for an MCP server (e.g. project:linear) or a plugin, when the team policy blocks it or does not list it. Use it only when the user asks. The admin decides on the command line; this tool cannot approve anything.

Inputs: kind (required), identity (required), confirm_network (required), note.

security_dashboardSecurity dashboardA
Read-only

Opens the interactive mcp-security-guard dashboard: every configured MCP server with its score and grade, findings filterable by severity and server, the OWASP MCP Top 10 breakdown, recommended permission rules, and pin buttons. scan='config' reads files only. scan='full' starts the servers to list their tools, prompts and resources (no tool is called) and needs confirm_launch=true; ask the user first.

Inputs: scan, project_dir, confirm_launch.

team_reportReport servers and plugins to the teamA
Idempotent

Shows exactly what a fleet report would send (server names, scopes, transport, package names and versions or remote hostnames, pinned or not; plugin names and versions; never paths, arguments, environment, headers or secrets). With confirm_send=true it sends it, if the admin turned fleet visibility on. Only when the user asks.

Inputs: project_dir, confirm_send.

team_statusTeam plan statusA
Idempotent

Syncs the organisation's policy from the team backend (it is then enforced next to the user's own policy) and shows the organisation, the role, the policy version and whether fleet reporting is on. Needs a team API key (MCP_SECURITY_API_KEY or the plugin's setting). Sends only the API key; the answer is cached locally.

Inputs: confirm_network (required).

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

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    TDQS

    A3.9/5.0

    Scored across 17 tools

    Disambiguation4/5

    The audit and pin families overlap conceptually, but each tool names a distinct target: agent context files, MCP config, server tool definitions, or supply-chain packages. The only mild ambiguity is between audit_server_tools, analyze_tool_definitions, adversarial_test, and security_dashboard scan='full', though their scopes and side effects are explicitly differentiated.

    Naming Consistency4/5

    Most tools use predictable snake_case verb_noun names such as audit_mcp_config, pin_tools, and generate_policy. A few outliers like team_status, adversarial_test, and security_dashboard are noun-oriented, but they remain readable and do not break the overall convention.

    Tool Count4/5

    At 17 tools, the set is slightly heavy but reasonable for a security lifecycle covering audit, pinning, reporting, remediation, policy, and dashboard workflows. No tool appears redundant enough to remove, though the surface is near the upper comfortable range for agent selection.

    Completeness4/5

    The toolset covers context and configuration auditing, tool poisoning checks, supply-chain review, adversarial testing, pinning, policy generation, remediation, export, logging, and team reporting. Minor gaps exist around unpinning management and broader runtime enforcement, but core security workflows are well covered.

    Maintenance

    ActivityNo data
    ResponsivenessOutdated data

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