mcp-security-guard
One-line summary: An MCP security auditor that discovers, audits, pins and scores the MCP servers configured on your machine — reading config files locally, and only launching servers or touching the network when you explicitly confirm.
Discovery & config audit —
list_mcp_serverslists every configured server (user/local/project scope) with its transport;audit_mcp_configstatically flags plaintext secrets, plain-HTTP remotes, unpinnednpx/uvxpackages, unpinned/privileged Docker images, pipe-to-shell launches and duplicate names.Tool-poisoning scan —
audit_server_toolslaunches selected servers (initialize + list only, never calls a tool) and checks names, descriptions and schemas for instruction overrides, concealment, hidden Unicode, sensitive paths, exfiltration and shadowing.Rug-pull detection —
pin_toolsrecords SHA-256 hashes of tool definitions in~/.claude/mcp-security/pins.jsonso later audits reveal changed tools or launch commands.Offline analysis —
analyze_tool_definitionsruns the same poisoning checks on a suppliedtools/listpayload, for server authors and CI.Supply chain (opt-in network) —
check_supply_chainqueries npm, PyPI and OSV for vulnerabilities, malicious versions, typosquats, new packages, install scripts and publisher changes.Adversarial testing (opt-in) —
adversarial_testcalls your own server's non-destructive tools with command-injection and path-traversal payloads to find unchecked parameters.Dashboard —
security_dashboardopens an interactive MCP App view with per-server score/grade, filterable findings, OWASP MCP Top 10 breakdown and pin buttons (full scan needs confirmation).Remediation & policy —
apply_fixes(dry-run first) pins versions, converts literal secrets to${VAR}refs and addspermissions.askrules with backups;generate_policyreturns a.mcp-security.jsonapproving the current servers.Audit log —
query_audit_logsummarises the local hook log: calls per server/tool, plus credential-sent, credential-returned and injected-instruction events (hashes and sizes only).Scope note — server-schema tools only; README-described agent-context, BOM/export and team-plan tools are absent here, and it audits servers rather than your own code.
Inspects Docker-based MCP server launches, flagging privileged or unpinned images and broadly mounted containers in the configuration audit.
Provides a GitHub Action that audits MCP server configurations on pull requests, fails the build on findings at or above a chosen severity, and emits SARIF for upload to GitHub code scanning.
Queries npm for the packages referenced by MCP launch commands: flags unpinned npx packages, typosquats, missing or brand-new packages, install scripts, publisher changes and known vulnerabilities, and can pin packages to exact versions.
Tags every finding with its OWASP MCP Top 10 identifier and reports coverage of the ten risk categories in both reports and SARIF output.
Queries PyPI for uvx/Python-based MCP server packages, checking versions, typosquats, new or missing packages and known vulnerabilities, and pinning them to exact versions.
MCP Security Guard
Find out if the MCP servers you installed are lying to your AI.
Local audit for tool poisoning, rug pulls, tool shadowing, hidden Unicode and leaked secrets, mapped to the OWASP MCP Top 10. Nothing leaves your machine unless you opt in.
🚀 Quick Install
Cursor
Click the button above, or use this deep link: cursor://anysphere.cursor-deeplink/mcp/install?name=mcp-security-guard&config=eyJjb21tYW5kIjoibnB4IiwiYXJncyI6WyIteSIsIm1jcC1zZWN1cml0eS1ndWFyZCJdfQ==
Or manually add to .cursor/mcp.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"mcp-security-guard": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "mcp-security-guard"]
}
}
}Claude Code
Via Plugin (recommended)
/plugin marketplace add petrovicistefan/mcp-security-guard
/plugin install mcp-security-guard@mcp-security-guardThen run /mcp-audit or ask Claude "are my MCP servers safe?"
Via CLI
claude mcp add mcp-security-guard -- npx -y mcp-security-guardClaude Desktop
Add to your Claude Desktop config (~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json on macOS, %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json on Windows):
{
"mcpServers": {
"mcp-security-guard": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "mcp-security-guard"]
}
}
}VS Code
Click the button above, or manually add to .vscode/mcp.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"mcp-security-guard": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "mcp-security-guard"]
}
}
}Command Line
npx -y mcp-security-guard audit --project-only⭐ Star this repository to support the project and stay updated! → Give a star
Related MCP server: depguard
📋 Table of Contents
Why MCP Security Guard?
Your code is covered by other tools. This one checks the MCP servers that inject text into your AI's context.
MCP Security Guard audits every MCP server Claude (and other AI clients) can reach: servers you configured, servers that plugins bring, and servers from Claude Desktop and other clients on your machine.
How It Compares
As of October 2026. Corrections welcome.
Feature | MCP Security Guard | snyk/agent-scan | cisco-ai-defense/mcp-scanner | riseandignite/mcp-shield |
Claude Code native plugin | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
Runtime hooks (pre/post tool-use) | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
Rug-pull pinning (SHA-256) | ✅ Tools, skills, CLAUDE.md | Limited | ❌ | ❌ |
OWASP MCP Top 10 mapping | ✅ Every finding | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
SARIF output | ✅ GitHub Action | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
CycloneDX BOM export | ✅ Agent inventory | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
Fully local (zero network) | ✅ Default | Varies | Varies | Varies |
Supply-chain checks | ✅ OSV, npm, PyPI | Varies | Varies | Varies |
Tool poisoning detection | ✅ 26/27 attacks | Varies | Varies | Varies |
License | MIT | Apache 2.0 | MIT | MIT |
Our differentiators:
Native Claude Code integration with a
/mcp-auditslash command and runtime protectionComprehensive rug-pull protection: pins and verifies tool definitions, skills, commands, subagents, and CLAUDE.md files
Every finding mapped to OWASP MCP Top 10 for compliance and remediation guidance
GitHub Action with SARIF for code scanning alerts on pull requests
Agent Bill of Materials (BOM) in CycloneDX 1.6 format for audits and compliance
Privacy-first: everything runs locally by default; network access is explicit opt-in
Use Cases
1. Individual Developers
Protect your local AI setup.
Audit MCP servers before and after installation
Get warned if a server's tool definitions change (rug pulls)
Runtime protection: block credentials from being sent, detect poisoned outputs
Pin trusted servers and skills for continuous verification
# Scan before installing a new server
npx mcp-security-guard scan server-config.json --confirm-launch
# Pin your reviewed servers
npx mcp-security-guard pin
# Check everything is still safe
npx mcp-security-guard audit2. Pull Request CI Checks
Block risky MCP servers and poisoned skills in code review.
Fail PRs that add:
MCP servers with tool poisoning, unpinned packages, or privileged Docker images
Skills or CLAUDE.md files with instruction overrides or credential exfiltration
Vulnerable dependencies or typosquatted packages
Findings appear in GitHub's code scanning interface with OWASP MCP Top 10 references.
- uses: petrovicistefan/mcp-security-guard@main
with:
fail-on: high3. Teams and Enterprises
Central security policy for your organization.
With the Team plan:
Admins publish one policy (allowed/blocked servers, plugins, pinned versions)
Everyone's plugin enforces it automatically, even offline
Approval flow: developers request, admins approve
Fleet inventory: see what MCP servers your team runs (opt-in with consent)
Compliance evidence: OWASP MCP Top 10 coverage report for audits
What It Checks
MCP Security Guard discovers servers from every place AI clients load them: user, local and project scope, servers shipped inside installed plugins, claude_desktop_config.json, Claude Desktop extensions, organization-managed managed-mcp.json, other clients on the machine (Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf), and claude.ai connectors you've used.
It scans everything a server puts into the AI's context: tools, server instructions, prompts, resources and resource templates.
Check | What It Catches |
Tool poisoning | Instruction overrides, "don't tell the user", |
Full-schema poisoning | Same checks on parameter names, descriptions, defaults, enums, |
Hidden text | Zero-width, bidi-control and Unicode-tag characters, ANSI terminal escapes, homoglyph tool names |
Tool shadowing | Server descriptions referencing another server's tools, tool-name collisions between servers |
Rug pulls | Tool definitions or launch commands that changed after you pinned them (SHA-256 per tool). Skills, commands, subagents, CLAUDE.md and hooks of a plugin that changed after pinning (plugins changing files under the same version are flagged |
Capabilities & score | Per-tool classification (execute, delete, write, egress), unauthenticated remote write access, 0–100 score and A–F grade per server, recommended permission rules |
Supply chain | OSV vulnerabilities and malicious versions, typosquats, missing or brand-new packages, install scripts, publisher changes (opt-in network check) |
Runtime | Hooks on every MCP call: ask before credentials are sent, warn on injected instructions or credentials in outputs, content-free audit log |
Policy |
|
Toxic flows | Servers holding all three legs of the "lethal trifecta" (untrusted input, private data, egress capability), on their own or together. A posture note ( |
Agent context | Skills and their scripts, slash commands, subagents, rules, |
Configuration | Plaintext secrets in env/headers/args/URLs, plain-HTTP remotes, unpinned |
Everything runs locally. Nothing is sent anywhere unless you opt in.
OWASP MCP Top 10 Coverage
Every finding is tagged with its OWASP MCP Top 10 id, in reports and in SARIF.
ID | Risk | Coverage |
MCP01 | Token Mismanagement & Secret Exposure | ✅ Plaintext secrets in env, headers, args and URLs. At runtime, asks before a credential is sent to an MCP server and warns when one comes back |
MCP02 | Privilege Escalation via Scope Creep | ✅ Capability inventory (execute, delete, write, egress), ready-to-paste |
MCP03 | Tool Poisoning | ✅ 26/27 published techniques detected, including full-schema poisoning, shadowing and name collisions, plus rug-pull pinning |
MCP04 | Supply Chain Attacks | ✅ Unpinned packages, images and git sources; OSV vulnerabilities and malicious versions; typosquats; new packages; install scripts; publisher changes |
MCP05 | Command Injection & Execution | ✅ Flags tools that can execute commands; |
MCP06 | Prompt Injection via Contextual Payloads | ✅ In tool metadata and, at runtime, in tool outputs (English patterns) |
MCP07 | Insufficient AuthN/AuthZ | ✅ Plain-HTTP remotes; remote servers exposing write or exec tools without authentication; OAuth detection |
MCP08 | Lack of Audit and Telemetry | ✅ Local, content-free audit log of every MCP call, with |
MCP09 | Shadow MCP Servers | ✅ Discovery across user, project, local, plugin and Claude Desktop configs; approved-server policy enforced in audits, CI and at session start |
MCP10 | Context Injection & Over-Sharing | ✅ Conversation and system-prompt harvesting, Markdown-image exfiltration, credentials in outputs, network-egress inventory |
What a local tool cannot do (planned for hosted Team plan): org-wide discovery and audit aggregation, OAuth scope review.
Quick Demo (1 Minute)
Try a synthetic offline comparison with no dependencies, account, or API key needed:
git clone https://github.com/petrovicistefan/mcp-security-guard.git
cd mcp-security-guard
node scripts/offline-demo.mjsThe demo checks two saved tool descriptions: one produces instruction-override and sensitive-path findings; the clean counterpart produces no findings. Run the scans yourself and generate an HTML report.
Tools
Tool | Network | Launches | Description |
| ❌ | ❌ | Lists every MCP server configured for this project (user, local and project scope in Claude Code, plus Claude Desktop) with its transport. Read-only; launches nothing. |
| ❌ | ❌ | Static audit of MCP server configuration: plaintext secrets in env/headers/args/URLs, plain-HTTP remote servers, unpinned npx/uvx packages, unpinned or privileged Docker containers, pipe-to-shell launch commands, and duplicate server names. Read-only; launches nothing. |
| ❌ | ✅ Confirm | Connects to selected MCP servers, lists their tools, and checks every name, description and schema for tool poisoning, cross-server tool shadowing, and rug pulls. Never calls the scanned tools. Requires |
| ❌ | ✅ Confirm | Records a SHA-256 hash of every tool definition in |
| ❌ | ❌ | Scans CLAUDE.md, skills, slash commands, subagents, rules and plugin hooks for instruction overrides, requests to hide things from users, invisible text, credential exfiltration, and encoded execution. Read-only; launches nothing. |
| ❌ | ❌ | Records SHA-256 of every skill, command, subagent, rule, CLAUDE.md and plugin hook config in |
| ❌ | ❌ | Offline analysis of tool definitions you provide (e.g., |
| ✅ Confirm | ❌ | For npx/uvx servers, checks packages on npm/PyPI and OSV database: vulnerabilities, malicious versions, typosquats, install scripts, deprecation, publisher changes. Sends package names and versions only. Requires |
| Conditional | Conditional | Fixes findings in project files: adds |
| ❌ | Conditional | Opens interactive dashboard with scores, grades, findings by severity, OWASP MCP Top 10 breakdown, and pin buttons. |
| ❌ | ❌ | Returns a |
| ✅ Confirm | ❌ | Syncs organization policy from team backend and shows org name, role, policy version, and fleet reporting status. Requires team API key and |
| ✅ Confirm | ❌ | Creates an approval request for a blocked server or plugin when the team policy requires it. Admin decides via CLI. Requires |
| ✅ Confirm | ❌ | Shows what a fleet report would send (server/plugin names, versions, transports; never paths, args, env, secrets). With |
| ❌ | ❌ | Agent bill of materials: inventory of MCP servers, plugins, skills, commands, subagents, CLAUDE.md and hooks with SHA-256, pin status, scores and OWASP evidence. CycloneDX 1.6 JSON or Markdown summary. Static; launches nothing. |
| ❌ | ❌ | Summarizes the local runtime audit log: MCP tool calls per server/tool, and calls where credentials were sent/returned or outputs contained injected instructions. Log stores hashes and sizes only, never arguments or outputs. |
| ❌ | ✅ Confirm | Calls tools with command-injection and path-traversal payloads to find vulnerable parameters. Only for servers you own/operate. Requires |
CI / GitHub Action
Fail pull requests that add risky MCP servers to .mcp.json, and show findings in GitHub code scanning:
name: MCP security
on: [pull_request]
permissions:
contents: read
security-events: write
jobs:
audit:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: petrovicistefan/mcp-security-guard@main
id: mcp
with:
fail-on: high # critical | high | medium | low | info | none
- uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
if: always()
with:
sarif_file: ${{ steps.mcp.outputs.sarif-file }}To also fail PRs that add poisoned skills, commands or CLAUDE.md, set context: true (second SARIF file in context-sarif-file).
Command line:
# Audit project-level MCP servers
npx mcp-security-guard audit --project-only --format sarif --output mcp.sarif
# For MCP server authors: analyze a saved tools/list result
npx mcp-security-guard analyze-tools tools.json --name my-server
# Scan skills, commands, subagents and CLAUDE.md
npx mcp-security-guard audit-context --project-only --fail-on high
# Pin what you've reviewed
npx mcp-security-guard pin-context
# Scan a server before installing it
npx mcp-security-guard scan server-config.json --confirm-launch
# Test your own server for command injection (calls tools)
npx mcp-security-guard adversarial my-server.mcp.json --server my-server --i-own-this-server --confirm-launch
# Fix what the audit found
npx mcp-security-guard fix --pin-versions # npx pkg → pkg@x.y.z
npx mcp-security-guard fix --env-refs --write # secrets → ${VAR} references
npx mcp-security-guard fix --permissions --confirm-launch --write
# Generate a team policy from current configuration
npx mcp-security-guard policy-init && git add .mcp-security.jsonOutput formats: --format markdown|json|sarif|html (HTML is a self-contained report file).
Exit codes: 0 clean, 1 findings at or above --fail-on, 2 usage error.
Interactive Dashboard
security_dashboard is an MCP App that hosts supporting MCP Apps (Claude Desktop, claude.ai, VS Code Copilot) render inline.
Shows every server with its score and grade, findings filterable by severity and server, OWASP MCP Top 10 breakdown, recommended permission rules, and Full scan and Pin buttons.
To use in Claude Desktop:
{
"mcpServers": {
"mcp-security-guard": {
"command": "node",
"args": ["/path/to/mcp-security-guard/plugin/dist/index.mjs"]
}
}
}Ask Claude to "open the MCP security dashboard".
Develop locally: npm run dashboard:dev -- /path/to/project
Runtime Hooks
Hook | What It Does | Setting |
| Asks for confirmation when arguments contain credentials |
|
| Warns when output contains injected instructions, hidden characters, exfiltration markup, or credentials | Always on |
Audit log |
|
|
Hooks add ~40ms per MCP call.
Session-start check re-verifies pinned servers and stays silent unless something changed:
MCP_SECURITY_SESSION_CHECK=full(default): compare configs and re-list toolsMCP_SECURITY_SESSION_CHECK=config: compare configs only, launch nothingMCP_SECURITY_SESSION_CHECK=off: disable
Team Plan (paid, opt-in)
Team keys are issued by hand for now: write to me.
With a team API key (MCP_SECURITY_API_KEY or plugin key setting), you get:
Central policy pushed by admin, enforced next to user/project policy (repository cannot loosen it)
Approved plugins (
allowedPlugins,blockedPlugins) enforced in audits, CI, and at session startFleet inventory (opt-in with consent): names, versions, scopes, transport, packages/hostnames — never paths, args, env, secrets
Approval flow:
team request,team approve, Slack-compatible webhook alertsKeys and seats: admin creates/revokes per-developer keys; purchase sets seat limit
Web dashboard at
/v1/team/dashboard: fleet, approvals, policy, keys, settingsEmail alerts (up to 20/hour per org) next to webhook
Compliance evidence:
team compliancewrites Markdown report with OWASP MCP Top 10 controls, evidence, violations, and pending approvals
Admin actions are CLI only (not MCP tools), so injected text cannot trigger them.
mcp-security-guard team status
mcp-security-guard team report --dry-run
mcp-security-guard team request plugin some-plugin --note "for docs site"
mcp-security-guard team approvals --status pending # admin
mcp-security-guard team approve apr_… --note ok # admin
mcp-security-guard team policy-push policy.json # admin
mcp-security-guard team keys create ana # admin
mcp-security-guard team settings --fleet on --webhook https://hooks.slack.com/… --email alerts@acme.exampleEverything above stays free. Free plugin is fully functional. See PRIVACY.md for what is sent.
Benchmark Results
Measured: detects 26/27 attacks from a corpus of publicly documented techniques, with 0 false positives on 13 hard benign samples and on 17 real servers (83 tools).
Techniques covered: tool poisoning and <IMPORTANT> tags (Invariant Labs), line jumping and ANSI escape deception (Trail of Bits), full-schema poisoning (CyberArk), tool shadowing, name collisions, zero-width/Unicode-tag/bidi smuggling, homoglyph names, base64 payloads, HTML comments, exfiltration via URLs/parameters/Markdown images.
See bench/RESULTS.md for full methodology and results.
Development
npm install
npm run build # bundles to plugin/dist/ (committed, so plugin runs without npm install)
npm test
npm run bench # false-positive gate on real servers (network; Docker images optional)test/fixtures/poisoned-server.mjs is a deliberately malicious server used by the end-to-end test.
Contributing
Small, reproducible contributions are welcome: benign regression samples, synthetic detection cases, client configuration tests, and clearer examples.
See CONTRIBUTING.md for guidelines.
Contribution guide · Open tasks · Report a false positive
Security & Privacy
Found a vulnerability? See SECURITY.md
What is read, written and sent: PRIVACY.md
Changes: CHANGELOG.md
Trust model:
Read-only (except pin files, audit log, and policy-init)
Network only with explicit opt-in
Secrets masked in all output
Static checks reduce risk but don't prove a server safe
License
MIT License
Copyright (c) 2026 Stefan Petrovici
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
See LICENSE for the complete license text.
Limitations
Remote servers that require OAuth (most hosted MCP servers) cannot be scanned at the tool level: the scanner cannot reuse Claude Code's tokens. Their configuration is still audited.
About the Author
I'm Stefan Petrovici: passionate about IT, a husband and a father. I built MCP Security Guard on my own. I'm looking for a job.
I build web applications end to end—frontend, backend, APIs and deployment—and I'm happy to work on anything else that needs building. This repository shows how I work: tests, CI, careful documentation and attention to security.
I also build WordPress and WooCommerce plugins, available at pluginsforstores.com.
If your team is hiring, write to me at hello@petrovicistefan.ro.
⭐ Support This Project
Found this useful? Star this repository!
A GitHub star helps other developers discover the project and lets you save it for later. Thanks for supporting open source!
MCP Security Guard is not affiliated with Anthropic, Snyk, Cisco, or any other security vendor mentioned in this document.
Available Tools
17 toolsadversarial_testAdversarial test of your own MCP serverA
CALLS every non-destructive tool of one configured server with command-injection payloads (each would only create an empty canary file) and path-traversal payloads, then reports which parameters reach a shell or the file system unchecked. Only for servers the user develops or operates, ideally a test instance in a container. Destructive tools are skipped unless include_destructive is true.
Inputs: server (required), confirm_launch (required), i_own_this_server (required), canary_dir, +3 more.
analyze_tool_definitionsAnalyze tool definitions (offline)ARead-only
Runs the tool-poisoning checks on tool definitions you pass in (e.g. the output of tools/list from a server you are developing), without connecting to anything. Useful in CI or before publishing an MCP server.
Inputs: tools (required), server_name (required).
apply_fixesApply recommended fixesAIdempotent
Fixes findings in the project's own files. permissions: adds the recommended permissions.ask rules for tools that execute code, delete data or write files to .claude/settings.json (needs confirm_launch, because the servers are listed to classify their tools). pin-versions: pins unpinned npx/uvx packages in .mcp.json to the registry's current version (needs confirm_network). env-refs: replaces literal secrets in .mcp.json env/headers with ${VAR} references. Without write=true it only shows the planned edits. Every written file is backed up under ~/.claude/mcp-security/backups/ first; ~/.claude.json is never modified.
Inputs: fixes (required), write, servers, project_dir, +2 more.
audit_agent_contextAudit skills, commands, agents and CLAUDE.mdARead-only
Scans the text files Claude reads besides MCP tools: CLAUDE.md, skills (and their bundled scripts), slash commands, subagents, rules and the hook configs of installed plugins, from the user, the project and every enabled plugin. Flags instruction overrides, requests to hide things from the user, invisible text, HTML comments addressed to the model, directives to read credential files, commands that upload credentials, download-and-run and encoded execution, credential-stealing scripts, and pre-approved unrestricted shell access. Read-only; launches nothing and sends nothing.
Inputs: project_dir, project_only.
audit_mcp_configAudit MCP configurationARead-only
Static audit of MCP server configuration: plaintext secrets in env/headers/args/URLs, plain-HTTP remote servers, unpinned npx/uvx packages, unpinned or privileged Docker containers, pipe-to-shell launch commands, and duplicate server names across scopes. Read-only; launches nothing.
Inputs: project_dir.
audit_server_toolsAudit MCP tool definitionsARead-only
Connects to the selected MCP servers, lists their tools, and checks every name, description and schema string for tool poisoning (instruction overrides, concealment requests, hidden tags, invisible Unicode, sensitive file paths, exfiltration wording, encoded payloads), cross-server tool shadowing, and changes since the tools were last pinned (rug pulls). Never calls the scanned tools.
Inputs: servers (required), confirm_launch (required), project_dir, timeout_seconds.
check_supply_chainCheck MCP server packages (npm/PyPI)ARead-only
For servers launched with npx/uvx and similar, checks the package on its registry and in the OSV database: known vulnerabilities, known malicious versions, typosquats of popular MCP packages, non-existent names, very new packages or releases, install scripts, deprecation and npm publisher changes. Sends package names and versions to registry.npmjs.org, pypi.org and api.osv.dev; nothing else leaves the machine.
Inputs: confirm_network (required), servers, project_dir, scan_images.
export_bomExport the agent bill of materialsARead-only
Inventory of everything the agent can run or read here: MCP servers, plugins, skills, commands, subagents, CLAUDE.md and hook configs, with SHA-256, pin status, scores and OWASP MCP Top 10 evidence. format=summary is a Markdown overview for audits; format=cyclonedx is a CycloneDX 1.6 JSON document. Static and local: nothing is launched or sent, and it holds no paths, arguments, environment or secrets.
Inputs: format, project_dir, project_only.
generate_policyGenerate an approved-server policyARead-only
Returns a .mcp-security.json policy that approves exactly the MCP servers configured now (and their remote hosts) and requires pinned versions. Commit it to the repository so CI, session checks and audits flag any server added later that is not on the list (shadow MCP servers). Read-only: returns the JSON, does not write it.
Inputs: project_dir.
list_mcp_serversList configured MCP serversARead-only
Lists every MCP server configured for this project (user, local and project scope in Claude Code, plus Claude Desktop) with its transport. Reads config files only; launches nothing.
Inputs: project_dir.
pin_contextPin skills, commands, agents and CLAUDE.mdAIdempotent
Records a SHA-256 of every skill, command, subagent, rule, CLAUDE.md, plugin hook config and bundled script (user, project and each installed plugin) in ~/.claude/mcp-security/context-pins.json, so later scans and the session-start check report anything that changed after you approved it. A plugin that changes files without a new version is the rug-pull pattern. Pin only after the user has reviewed an audit_agent_context report; origins with critical or high findings are skipped unless force is true. Reads files only; launches nothing.
Inputs: force, origins, project_dir.
pin_toolsPin MCP tool definitionsAIdempotent
Records a SHA-256 hash of every tool definition of the selected servers in ~/.claude/mcp-security/pins.json, so later audits can detect rug pulls. Pin only after the user has reviewed an audit_server_tools report for these servers. Launches the servers like audit_server_tools.
Inputs: servers (required), confirm_launch (required), project_dir, timeout_seconds.
query_audit_logQuery the MCP call audit logARead-only
Summarises the local audit log written by the plugin's hooks: MCP tool calls per server and tool, and every call where a credential was sent, a credential came back, or the output contained injected instructions. The log stores hashes and sizes only, never arguments or outputs.
Inputs: since_hours.
request_approvalAsk the admin to approve a server or pluginAIdempotent
Creates an approval request in the user's organisation for an MCP server (e.g. project:linear) or a plugin, when the team policy blocks it or does not list it. Use it only when the user asks. The admin decides on the command line; this tool cannot approve anything.
Inputs: kind (required), identity (required), confirm_network (required), note.
security_dashboardSecurity dashboardARead-only
Opens the interactive mcp-security-guard dashboard: every configured MCP server with its score and grade, findings filterable by severity and server, the OWASP MCP Top 10 breakdown, recommended permission rules, and pin buttons. scan='config' reads files only. scan='full' starts the servers to list their tools, prompts and resources (no tool is called) and needs confirm_launch=true; ask the user first.
Inputs: scan, project_dir, confirm_launch.
team_reportReport servers and plugins to the teamAIdempotent
Shows exactly what a fleet report would send (server names, scopes, transport, package names and versions or remote hostnames, pinned or not; plugin names and versions; never paths, arguments, environment, headers or secrets). With confirm_send=true it sends it, if the admin turned fleet visibility on. Only when the user asks.
Inputs: project_dir, confirm_send.
team_statusTeam plan statusAIdempotent
Syncs the organisation's policy from the team backend (it is then enforced next to the user's own policy) and shows the organisation, the role, the policy version and whether fleet reporting is on. Needs a team API key (MCP_SECURITY_API_KEY or the plugin's setting). Sends only the API key; the answer is cached locally.
Inputs: confirm_network (required).
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TDQS
Scored across 17 tools
The audit and pin families overlap conceptually, but each tool names a distinct target: agent context files, MCP config, server tool definitions, or supply-chain packages. The only mild ambiguity is between audit_server_tools, analyze_tool_definitions, adversarial_test, and security_dashboard scan='full', though their scopes and side effects are explicitly differentiated.
Most tools use predictable snake_case verb_noun names such as audit_mcp_config, pin_tools, and generate_policy. A few outliers like team_status, adversarial_test, and security_dashboard are noun-oriented, but they remain readable and do not break the overall convention.
At 17 tools, the set is slightly heavy but reasonable for a security lifecycle covering audit, pinning, reporting, remediation, policy, and dashboard workflows. No tool appears redundant enough to remove, though the surface is near the upper comfortable range for agent selection.
The toolset covers context and configuration auditing, tool poisoning checks, supply-chain review, adversarial testing, pinning, policy generation, remediation, export, logging, and team reporting. Minor gaps exist around unpinning management and broader runtime enforcement, but core security workflows are well covered.
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