AgentSentinel MCP Gateway
Server Configuration
Describes the environment variables required to run the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| SENTINEL_ROOT_DIR | No | Root boundary for filesystem operations and working directories. Defaults to the current working directory (process.cwd()). | |
| SENTINEL_COOLDOWN_MS | No | Cooldown duration in milliseconds before half-open retry. | 30000 |
| SENTINEL_MAX_FAILURES | No | Number of consecutive tool errors before circuit trips OPEN. | 3 |
| SENTINEL_AUDIT_LOG_PATH | No | Filepath for append-only structured audit records. | .sentinel-audit.jsonl |
| SENTINEL_RATE_LIMIT_RPM | No | Maximum tool invocations allowed per minute. | 60 |
Instructions
Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.
This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.
Capabilities
Features and capabilities supported by this server
Protocol revision2025-11-25
| Capability | Details |
|---|---|
| tools | {} |
Tools
Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| sentinel_safe_execA | Execute shell commands inside an AST-inspected security sandbox with command chaining prevention, timeout enforcement, and automated DLP secret redaction. |
| sentinel_safe_fsA | Perform sandboxed filesystem operations (read, write, list, stat) with strict chroot directory containment and zero-trust secret masking. |
| sentinel_safe_fetchB | Perform HTTP/HTTPS network requests with SSRF protection against cloud metadata IPs (169.254.169.254) and private subnets, plus DLP payload redaction. |
| sentinel_policy_checkB | Pre-flight permission evaluator enabling autonomous agents to check whether an intended action complies with security policy before execution. |
| sentinel_audit_inspectB | Query the immutable structured audit ledger, circuit breaker state, and runtime metrics for compliance inspection. |
Prompts
Interactive templates invoked by user choice
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No prompts | |
Resources
Contextual data attached and managed by the client
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No resources | |
TDQS
Scored across 5 tools
Each tool targets a clearly distinct security capability: shell execution, filesystem operations, network fetching, policy pre-checking, and audit inspection. Although safe_exec could overlap with safe_fs or safe_fetch via shell commands, the sandbox descriptions make the intended boundaries clear.
All tools use snake_case with a consistent sentinel_ prefix, which is highly predictable. The pattern shifts slightly from sentinel_safe_<action> for operational tools to sentinel_<noun>_<verb> for policy and audit tools, but remains readable and coherent.
Five tools is well-scoped for a security gateway, covering execution, filesystem, network, policy, and audit without redundancy. Each tool earns its place in the minimal surface.
The core agent action surfaces are covered, plus policy evaluation and audit inspection. Minor gaps exist: safe_fs lacks explicit delete/remove, and there is no tool to manage policies or reset circuit breakers, but agents can likely work around these limitations.