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AgentSentinel MCP Gateway

πŸ›‘οΈ AgentSentinel MCP Gateway

Industrial-Grade Zero-Trust MCP Gateway, DLP Secret Firewall & Circuit Breaker for Autonomous AI Agents

CI License: MIT Node.js Model Context Protocol

AgentSentinel is an enterprise-grade execution firewall and reliability gateway sitting between AI Agent clients (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, Antigravity, OpenCode, AutoGen, CrewAI) and host capabilities. It solves the three most critical operational barriers facing autonomous agents in production.


🎯 The Three Core Pillars

                     [ Autonomous AI Agent / LLM Client ]
                    (Claude, Cursor, Antigravity, OpenCode)
                                       β”‚
                                       β”‚  JSON-RPC 2.0 (stdio)
                                       β–Ό
  β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”
  β”‚                        AGENTSENTINEL GATEWAY                           β”‚
  β”‚                                                                        β”‚
  β”‚  1. ⚑ RELIABILITY & CIRCUIT BREAKER                                   β”‚
  β”‚     - Sliding-window rate limiter (60 RPM)                             β”‚
  β”‚     - Runaway failure detector (trips OPEN on 3 consecutive failures)  β”‚
  β”‚                                                                        β”‚
  β”‚  2. πŸ”’ ZERO-TRUST PRE-EXECUTION FIREWALL                               β”‚
  β”‚     - AST Command Sanitizer (blocks chaining ";", "&&", `subshell`)   β”‚
  β”‚     - Chroot Path Guard (rejects "../../" directory traversal)        β”‚
  β”‚     - SSRF Guard (blocks 169.254.169.254 metadata & private subnets)   β”‚
  β”‚                                                                        β”‚
  β”‚  3. πŸ” DATA LOSS PREVENTION (DLP) SECRET MASKING                       β”‚
  β”‚     - Scans inputs and outputs for 25+ secret patterns                 β”‚
  β”‚     - Redacts AWS, GitHub, OpenAI, Claude, JWT, DB URIs before LLM    β”‚
  β”‚                                                                        β”‚
  β”‚  4. πŸ“œ STRUCTURED AUDIT LEDGER                                         β”‚
  β”‚     - Append-only JSONL log with duration, verdict & hash              β”‚
  β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜
                                       β”‚
                                       β–Ό
                         [ Sandboxed Host Execution ]

1. πŸ”’ Zero-Trust Pre-Execution Gateway & DLP Engine

  • Command Injection Defense: Intercepts shell execution before it reaches the OS. Blocks command chaining (;, &&, ||, |), subshell execution (`...`, $(...)), and denylisted destructive binaries (rm, del, format, dd, mkfs, curl | sh).

  • Path Traversal Containment: Canonical path resolution strictly chroots execution within the approved workspace root directory.

  • SSRF Link-Local Protection: Blocks outbound calls to cloud metadata IP (169.254.169.254), loopbacks (127.0.0.1, localhost, ::1), and private RFC-1918 subnets (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16).

  • Automated DLP Redaction: Pre-flight and post-execution token scanner with zero-trust redaction for:

    • AWS Access Keys (AKIA...)

    • GitHub Personal Access Tokens (ghp_..., github_pat_...)

    • Anthropic & OpenAI API Keys (sk-ant-..., sk-proj-...)

    • RSA & OpenSSH Private Keys (-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----)

    • JWT Tokens (eyJ...)

    • Database URI passwords (postgres://user:password@host...)

    • Slack Tokens & Stripe Secret Keys

2. ⚑ Circuit Breakers & Runaway Loop Prevention

  • Runaway Loop Breaker: When an autonomous agent enters a broken loop (e.g., retrying an erroneous query repeatedly), the circuit breaker transitions from CLOSED to OPEN after $N$ consecutive failures.

  • Token Spend Protection: Rejects all further tool invocations during cooldown, preventing catastrophic API token spend and CPU exhaustion.

  • Sliding-Window Rate Limiter: Enforces strict requests-per-minute (RPM) limits per session to throttle runaway concurrency.

  • Self-Healing Recovery: Automatically transitions to HALF-OPEN after cooldown, allowing probe attempts to restore normal operation.

3. πŸš€ Local-First, Zero-Heavy-Infra Architecture

  • Zero Kubernetes or Heavy Cloud Setup: Runs as a lightweight, single-process Node.js daemon directly on your workstation or server.

  • Native MCP Protocol Compliant: Integrates instantly into Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, or custom AI agent loops over standard STDIO JSON-RPC 2.0.

  • Deterministic Structured Audit Ledger: Writes an append-only JSONL audit log capturing caller session, duration, tool name, security verdict, and DLP metrics without external observability dependencies.


Related MCP server: OpsMCP

πŸ› οΈ Provided MCP Tools

Tool Name

Description

Security Controls Applied

sentinel_safe_exec

Executes shell commands safely.

Allowlist, AST chaining block, timeout, DLP output redaction.

sentinel_safe_fs

Sandboxed file ops (read, write, list, stat).

Path chroot containment, traversal block, secret masking.

sentinel_safe_fetch

Secure HTTP client (GET, POST, etc.).

SSRF metadata blocker, header & body DLP redaction.

sentinel_policy_check

Pre-flight permission validator.

Lets agents query policy verdicts before attempting actions.

sentinel_audit_inspect

Query audit trail and circuit telemetry.

Read-only inspection of runtime logs and breaker state.


πŸš€ Quickstart & Installation

Option A: Use directly with npx or node

# Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/opuhassan001-alt/agent-sentinel-mcp.git
cd agent-sentinel-mcp

# Install dependencies and build
npm install
npm run build

# Run the test suite (100% pass)
npm test

Option B: Configure with Claude Desktop (claude_desktop_config.json)

Add AgentSentinel to your Claude Desktop configuration:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "agent-sentinel": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": [
        "E:/work station/opu-portfolio/agent-sentinel-mcp/dist/index.js"
      ],
      "env": {
        "SENTINEL_ROOT_DIR": "E:/work station/opu-portfolio",
        "SENTINEL_MAX_FAILURES": "3",
        "SENTINEL_RATE_LIMIT_RPM": "60"
      }
    }
  }
}

Option C: Configure with Cursor IDE (.cursor/mcp.json)

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "agent-sentinel": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": ["dist/index.js"]
    }
  }
}

βš™οΈ Configuration Reference

AgentSentinel can be configured via environment variables or a configuration object:

Environment Variable

Default

Description

SENTINEL_ROOT_DIR

process.cwd()

Root boundary for filesystem operations and working directories.

SENTINEL_AUDIT_LOG_PATH

.sentinel-audit.jsonl

Filepath for append-only structured audit records.

SENTINEL_MAX_FAILURES

3

Number of consecutive tool errors before circuit trips OPEN.

SENTINEL_COOLDOWN_MS

30000

Cooldown duration in milliseconds before half-open retry.

SENTINEL_RATE_LIMIT_RPM

60

Maximum tool invocations allowed per minute.


πŸ§ͺ Testing & Verification

AgentSentinel includes an automated unit & integration test suite using the Node.js native test runner:

npm test
β–Ά CircuitBreaker & Runaway Loop Protection (6 tests)
β–Ά DLP Secret Scanner & Redaction Engine (7 tests)
β–Ά PolicyEngine & AuditLogger (5 tests)
β–Ά Security Firewall Guards (12 tests)
β–Ά Industrial MCP Tools Suite (11 tests)
βœ” All 41 tests passed cleanly

🐳 Docker Deployment

Run AgentSentinel inside a sandboxed container:

docker build -t agent-sentinel-mcp .
docker run -i --rm -v $(pwd):/workspace -e SENTINEL_ROOT_DIR=/workspace agent-sentinel-mcp

πŸ“„ License

Released under the MIT License. Copyright Β© 2026 Estakball Hossain (Opu).

Available Tools

5 tools
sentinel_audit_inspectB

Query the immutable structured audit ledger, circuit breaker state, and runtime metrics for compliance inspection.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
limitNoNumber of recent audit records to retrieve (default: 20)

TDQS

B3.4/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations exist, so the description carries the full burden. 'Query' plus 'immutable' ledger implies a non-mutating read, which is a useful safety signal, but there is no disclosure of auth/permission requirements, rate limits, pagination behavior, or how circuit breaker state and metrics are surfaced.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

One front-loaded sentence with no filler; the verb and resource set come first. It is efficiently sized, though it is single-sentence and offers no structural separation of the three data domains it queries.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a zero-annotation, no-output-schema tool, the description should ideally sketch the shape of what is returned (ledger entries vs. breaker state vs. metrics) and ordering. It names the three sources but leaves the agent guessing how results are combined and ordered.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the single 'limit' parameter is fully documented in the schema (count of recent records, default 20). The description adds nothing about the parameter, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb ('Query') and three concrete resources (immutable structured audit ledger, circuit breaker state, runtime metrics) plus the intent (compliance inspection). This clearly differentiates it from the sentinel_safe_* and sentinel_policy_check siblings, which are operation-oriented rather than inspection-oriented, though no sibling is named explicitly.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The phrase 'for compliance inspection' implies the context of use, so the agent can infer this is the read path for audit/compliance queries. However, there is no explicit when-to-use condition, no exclusion, and no pointer to an alternative (e.g. sentinel_policy_check) for policy evaluation.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

sentinel_policy_checkB

Pre-flight permission evaluator enabling autonomous agents to check whether an intended action complies with security policy before execution.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
argsYesArguments payload to validate against security rules
toolYesTarget tool name to evaluate

TDQS

B3.3/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden. It usefully discloses that this is a non-executing evaluator ('pre-flight', 'before execution'), which implies no side effects. It says nothing about verdict semantics, whether the policy source is fixed, or what occurs on violation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single tight sentence that front-loads the core purpose. Slightly jargon-heavy ('enabling autonomous agents') but every clause earns its place and nothing is redundant.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema and no annotations, so the description must explain the return/verdict behavior of a decision tool – allow, deny, reasons, or errors – and it does not. For a tool whose entire value is the evaluation result, this is a meaningful gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% – both 'tool' and 'args' are documented in the schema. The description adds no syntax, format, or nesting detail for the nested 'args' payload beyond what the schema already provides, so baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (evaluate/check) and resource (security policy compliance for an intended action), and the 'pre-flight ... before execution' framing implies a non-executing check. However, it never names or distinguishes itself from siblings like sentinel_safe_exec, so an agent must infer the boundary.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The phrase 'before execution' implies usage timing, and the pre-flight evaluator framing suggests calling it prior to a mutating action. It stops short of naming when-not-to-use or routing to an alternative sibling such as sentinel_safe_exec, so guidance remains implied rather than explicit.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

sentinel_safe_execA

Execute shell commands inside an AST-inspected security sandbox with command chaining prevention, timeout enforcement, and automated DLP secret redaction.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
cwdNoOptional relative or absolute directory path (must be within sandboxed root)
commandYesThe shell command line to execute (e.g., "git status", "npm test")
timeoutMsNoOptional execution timeout in milliseconds (default: 15000)

TDQS

A3.5/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does disclose meaningful enforcement behavior: AST inspection, command-chaining prevention, timeout enforcement, and automated DLP secret redaction of output. It does not say what happens when a command is blocked, how failures/exit codes are surfaced, or whether redaction alters stderr, leaving some behavioral gaps.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single sentence with the imperative verb front-loaded and three parallel enforcement clauses, each of which adds distinct information about the sandbox's guarantees. No filler, no restatement of the tool name, nothing to trim.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

No annotations and no output schema exist, so the description should ideally describe return shape (exit code, stdout/stderr, redaction effects) and failure modes. It covers the security envelope well but leaves the agent guessing about results and error behavior for a relatively complex execution tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% – cwd, command, and timeoutMs are each documented in the schema, including the default timeout and the sandbox-root constraint on cwd. The description adds no parameter-level detail beyond that, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Execute shell commands') plus the execution environment ('AST-inspected security sandbox'), so the agent knows exactly what the tool does. It does not explicitly differentiate itself from siblings like sentinel_policy_check or sentinel_audit_inspect, but the sandboxed-exec framing is distinct enough from fs/fetch siblings to be actionable.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description never states when to use this tool versus alternatives such as sentinel_policy_check, nor any preconditions (e.g., that commands must pass policy, or when to prefer sentinel_safe_fs for file work). Usage is only inferable from the verb 'Execute shell commands' and the tool name, with no exclusions or routing guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

sentinel_safe_fetchB

Perform HTTP/HTTPS network requests with SSRF protection against cloud metadata IPs (169.254.169.254) and private subnets, plus DLP payload redaction.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
urlYesTarget public URL to fetch
bodyNoOptional request body string
methodNoHTTP method (default: "GET")
headersNoOptional HTTP request headers
timeoutMsNoRequest timeout in milliseconds (default: 10000)

TDQS

B3.3/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does disclose meaningful behavior: SSRF blocking of cloud metadata IPs and private subnets, plus DLP payload redaction. However, it omits what happens on a blocked request (error vs. sanitized response), whether redaction mutates the body or the response, redirect handling, and any rate limits or auth requirements. Partial but valuable disclosure.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single front-loaded sentence that leads with the core verb and resource, then appends the two differentiators. Every clause earns its place; there is no filler or repetition.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 5-parameter tool with a nested headers object and no output schema, the description covers purpose and security posture but says nothing about the return value, error/block semantics, or redirect/retry behavior. Given the absence of both annotations and an output schema, more behavioral context would be expected.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents url, body, method (with enum), headers, and timeoutMs, establishing a baseline of 3. The description adds no parameter-level detail (e.g., interaction between method, body, and content-type headers) beyond what the schema provides.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource ('Perform HTTP/HTTPS network requests') and adds two distinctive behavioral guarantees (SSRF protection, DLP redaction). An agent can tell this is the network-egress tool among sentinel_safe_exec, sentinel_safe_fs, sentinel_policy_check, and sentinel_audit_inspect, though it never explicitly names or contrasts those siblings.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

No when-to-use guidance, no when-not-to-use, and no named alternative. The agent is left to infer that this is the tool for outbound HTTP calls versus the exec/fs siblings. Some minimal implied usage exists from the name, but nothing actionable is stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

sentinel_safe_fsA

Perform sandboxed filesystem operations (read, write, list, stat) with strict chroot directory containment and zero-trust secret masking.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
pathYesFile or directory path relative to the sandboxed workspace root
actionYesFilesystem operation to perform
contentNoContent to write (required for "write" action)
encodingNoOptional file encoding (default: "utf8")

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does disclose two meaningful traits: strict chroot containment and zero-trust secret masking. However, it omits mutation semantics for 'write' (overwrite vs append, irreversibility), permission requirements, and anything about return payloads, leaving notable gaps for a tool that includes a write action.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single front-loaded sentence that names the resource, enumerates the actions, and appends the two key safety constraints. Nothing is wasted and the core purpose leads.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 4-parameter tool with no annotations and no output schema, the description covers containment and masking but leaves write semantics, error behavior, and return shape unaddressed. Adequate but with clear gaps given the mutation capability.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so path, action, content, and encoding are all documented in the schema itself. The description only restates the action set and adds no format, encoding, or path-syntax detail beyond the schema, so the baseline of 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (perform filesystem operations) and resource (sandboxed filesystem), and enumerates the four supported actions (read, write, list, stat). The 'sandboxed/chroot' framing clearly distinguishes it from sentinel_safe_exec, sentinel_safe_fetch, and the policy/audit siblings.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description implies usage (sandboxed file operations) but never states when to choose this tool over sentinel_safe_exec or sentinel_safe_fetch, nor any prerequisites or exclusions. Usage context is inferable from the action enum but not stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. 5 tool updatesv1.0.0
    • First observedsentinel_audit_inspect
    • First observedsentinel_policy_check
    • First observedsentinel_safe_exec
    • First observedsentinel_safe_fetch
    • First observedsentinel_safe_fs

TDQS

A3.7/5.0

Scored across 5 tools

Disambiguation5/5

Each tool targets a clearly distinct security capability: shell execution, filesystem operations, network fetching, policy pre-checking, and audit inspection. Although safe_exec could overlap with safe_fs or safe_fetch via shell commands, the sandbox descriptions make the intended boundaries clear.

Naming Consistency4/5

All tools use snake_case with a consistent sentinel_ prefix, which is highly predictable. The pattern shifts slightly from sentinel_safe_<action> for operational tools to sentinel_<noun>_<verb> for policy and audit tools, but remains readable and coherent.

Tool Count5/5

Five tools is well-scoped for a security gateway, covering execution, filesystem, network, policy, and audit without redundancy. Each tool earns its place in the minimal surface.

Completeness4/5

The core agent action surfaces are covered, plus policy evaluation and audit inspection. Minor gaps exist: safe_fs lacks explicit delete/remove, and there is no tool to manage policies or reset circuit breakers, but agents can likely work around these limitations.

Maintenance

ActivityMaintained
ResponsivenessNo issues

Related MCP Connectors

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