woodpecker-ci-mcp
Use this MCP server to inspect and operate a Woodpecker CI instance end-to-end, with guarded write and destructive actions.
Browse, activate, configure, repair, move, chown, and delete repositories; inspect permissions, branches, and pull requests.
List, get, trigger, restart, cancel, approve, decline, and delete pipelines; inspect pipeline configs, metadata, queue state, and decoded step logs.
Manage secrets, container registry credentials, and cron jobs at repository, organization, or global scope.
Administer organizations, users, agents, forges, queue state, and server log level; check server health/version and the authenticated account.
Apply safety controls: read-only mode, allow/deny tool filters, redacted agent tokens, write-only secret values, untrusted-content marking, and human confirmation for destructive or privilege-escalating actions.
woodpecker-ci-mcp
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Woodpecker CI, the lightweight container-native CI engine — it runs your pipelines, and this reads and drives them.
Lets MCP clients like Claude Code, Claude Desktop or Codex see which pipelines failed, read the build log of the step that broke, and act on it — restart it, cancel a runaway, approve a blocked one, rotate a secret, fix a cron — with the irreversible operations put to a person first and the write tools switchable off entirely.
71 tools is the ceiling, not the floor: WOODPECKER_ALLOW_TOOLS=essential
registers a curated eight instead, and a model picks the right tool far more
reliably from eight than from 71 — see
choosing which tools load.

What makes it different
It covers the whole API, not the read half. Repositories, pipelines, logs, secrets, registries, crons, organizations, users, agents, forges, the queue and the log level — 71 tools against Woodpecker 3.18.0. The point of an MCP server for a CI system is doing something about what it tells you.
Logs arrive as text. Woodpecker returns a step's output as an array of
base64-encoded chunks with line numbers. get_step_logs decodes them, puts them
back in order, reports the step's exit code, and returns the end of the log
by default — a failing step explains itself in its last lines, and the first 4000
lines of npm ci answer nothing.
Agent tokens do not reach the model. GET /agents returns every agent's
token in clear text, and that token is enough to attach a machine to the server
and receive pipeline workloads with their secrets. Listing agents through this
server redacts it. create_agent still returns one — that is the only way to get
it — and says what it is.
It knows where this API is sharp. /version and /healthz sit outside the
/api prefix that the Swagger document claims for them, so GET /api/version
returns the web UI with HTTP 200 rather than a 404 (3.19 adds them under /api
and 4.0 drops the root routes, so get_server_info falls back to the prefix); a repository that exists in
the forge is a 404 here until it is activated; perPage above 50 is clamped
without a word; a cron schedule is five fields, not six; and a secret with no
event list is refused, because the defaults people expect live in the web UI, not
in the API.
Related MCP server: gitlab-ci-mcp
Requirements
Node.js ≥ 24
A Woodpecker personal access token — your user settings, "CLI and API". There are no scopes: the token carries the full authority of your account.
Configuration
Variable | Required | Description |
| yes | Root URL of the server, e.g. |
| yes | Personal access token from your user settings |
| no |
|
| no | Comma-separated tool names, |
| no | Same syntax; removed from whatever |
| no |
|
| no | Path of the API below the root, default |
| no |
|
WOODPECKER_URL is the server root, not the API root:
https://woodpecker.example.com, not https://woodpecker.example.com/api. Both
are accepted — the suffix is trimmed — because the Swagger page spells every
example the long way.
Crow CI, a Woodpecker fork, serves its API under /api/v1 since 5.0: set
WOODPECKER_API_PREFIX=/api/v1. That makes the API reachable, not identical —
this server speaks the Woodpecker 3 API, and Crow ignores a few of its fields.
See Crow CI.
Use
https://. Over plain http the token travels unencrypted; the server prints a warning unless the host is local. For self-signed certificates prefer a proper internal CA overWOODPECKER_INSECURE_TLS.
Without configuration the server still starts and lists its tools (so registries
and inspectors can introspect it); every call then fails with setup instructions
instead of reaching the API. get_server_info works without a token, which makes
it the first thing to call when nothing else does: if it answers,
WOODPECKER_URL is right and the problem is the token.
Admin-only tools. Woodpecker inherits repository and organization permissions
from the forge, and reserves users, agents, forges, the queue and the log level
for instance administrators. Those tools are registered for everyone and answer
403 for accounts that may not use them; get_current_user reports which kind of
account the token belongs to, and WOODPECKER_DENY_TOOLS is the tidy way to stop
offering them at all.
Choosing which tools load
WOODPECKER_ALLOW_TOOLS and WOODPECKER_DENY_TOOLS take comma-separated tool
names; a trailing * matches a whole family. essential is a curated preset —
list_repositories, get_repository, list_pipelines, get_pipeline,
get_step_logs, trigger_pipeline, restart_pipeline and cancel_pipeline —
marked as such in the
tool reference.
WOODPECKER_ALLOW_TOOLS=essential
WOODPECKER_ALLOW_TOOLS=list_*,get_pipeline,get_step_logs
WOODPECKER_DENY_TOOLS=delete_*,pause_queue,create_user,update_userWith 71 tools this is not a nicety. Every visible tool costs context on every
request, and a server that offers delete_forge next to get_step_logs is a
server nobody should point at their production CI without narrowing it first.
An entry that matches no tool aborts startup and names it, so a typo cannot
silently hide a tool — an absent tool is not something anyone traces back to an
environment variable. A filtered tool is never registered, so it is absent from
tools/list and unknown to tools/call alike, exactly like a write tool under
WOODPECKER_READ_ONLY.
If you run several of these servers at once, mcp-hub
is the other answer — its /hub endpoint replaces every server's tools with six
meta-tools.
Installation
Claude Code
claude mcp add woodpecker-ci -- npx -y @ni-c/woodpecker-ci-mcpClaude Desktop
{
"mcpServers": {
"woodpecker-ci": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@ni-c/woodpecker-ci-mcp"],
"env": {
"WOODPECKER_URL": "https://woodpecker.example.com",
"WOODPECKER_TOKEN": "…"
}
}
}
}Codex
[mcp_servers.woodpecker-ci]
command = "npx"
args = ["-y", "@ni-c/woodpecker-ci-mcp"]
env = { WOODPECKER_URL = "https://woodpecker.example.com", WOODPECKER_TOKEN = "…" }Docker
docker run --rm -i \
-e WOODPECKER_URL=https://woodpecker.example.com \
-e WOODPECKER_TOKEN=… \
ghcr.io/ni-c/woodpecker-ci-mcpIf your Woodpecker is only resolvable through your host's split DNS, add
--dns <resolver>: a container does not inherit the host's resolver
configuration, and the public answer for an internal name is usually an address
that does not respond.
Through mcp-hub
A client that cannot spawn a local process — ChatGPT connectors, Claude on the web,
Cursor, LibreChat — reaches woodpecker-ci-mcp through mcp-hub: one
container serves many stdio MCP servers over Streamable HTTP, with an OAuth 2.1 login
behind a single password and long-lived tokens for the clients that cannot do OAuth. Its
/hub endpoint puts every server behind six meta-tools, so one connector reaches all of
them without N×tool schemas in the model's context, and it speaks both protocol revisions
— a question this server asks travels through it to the person at the far end.
Its /config/mcp.json uses Claude Code's format, so the entry is the one you already
have:
{
"mcpServers": {
"woodpecker-ci": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@ni-c/woodpecker-ci-mcp"],
"env": {
"WOODPECKER_URL": "https://woodpecker.example.com",
"WOODPECKER_TOKEN": "…"
}
}
}
}allowTools and denyTools there are the hub's own per-server filter, which is not
the same thing as *_ALLOW_TOOLS in env — the difference, and the mistake it invites,
are in the client guide.
Tools
Read tools are always registered. 🛡 marks the ones that need an instance
administrator; 👤 marks the ones that ask a person before acting, through MCP
elicitation, falling back to a two-call confirm_token where the client cannot
show a dialog.
Every tool declares an outputSchema and answers with structuredContent
alongside the text block, so a client can use the result without parsing prose.
Seventeen tools that answered with a sentence — "Pipeline 12 was cancelled." —
now answer with the fields as well, and the sentence stays where a reader wants
it. get_step_logs keeps its rendered header-plus-log in the text and states
the exit code, the line count and the output as fields.
The tools that report pushed content carry untrusted: true and
source: "woodpecker" as fields; branch names, commit messages, pipeline titles
and above all build logs — the raw stdout of arbitrary containers — are written
by whoever can push. The list follows the call sites: a tool is marked exactly
when it already routed its answer through the untrusted wrapper.
Woodpecker's objects are described as open objects with the top-level keys this server builds. The upstream Go models change what they serialize between releases, and the SDK validates each result against its schema before it goes out — a strict shape would turn a field a release adds into a tool that fails outright. The tool reference has the parameters.
Repositories
Tool | Description |
| Repositories, optionally including ones not yet activated |
| One repository with all its Woodpecker settings |
| Turns |
| What this account may do here — answers "why that 403" |
| Branches, as Woodpecker sees them in the forge |
| Open pull requests and their index |
| Turns Woodpecker on for a forge repository |
| Config file, timeout, visibility, approval mode; 👤 to grant trust |
| Re-installs the webhook; 👤 only for the whole-instance variant |
| Follows a repository that moved in the forge |
| Takes ownership, so the token Woodpecker uses is yours |
| Removes it from Woodpecker with all its history |
Pipelines and logs
Tool | Description |
| Pipelines with branch, event, status and time filters |
| One pipeline with its workflows, steps and step ids |
| The YAML this run was built from |
| The |
| What is waiting, across all repositories |
| A step's output as text, tail first, with its exit code |
| Starts a pipeline on a branch |
| Runs an existing one again, at the same commit |
| Stops a pending or running pipeline |
| Releases a blocked one — it runs fork code with your secrets |
| Refuses a blocked one |
| Deletes a pipeline and its logs |
| Deletes one step's output — for when a step printed a secret |
| 👤 The same for every step of a pipeline |
Secrets, registries and crons
scope selects the level: repository, organization or global.
Tool | Description |
| Secrets at one level. Values are never returned by Woodpecker |
| One secret's events, images and note |
| Creates one. At least one event is required |
| Rotates the value (👤), or replaces the event and image lists |
| Deletes one; pipelines using it run without it |
| Container registry credentials at one level |
| One entry. The password is stripped by Woodpecker |
| Stores credentials for pulling private images |
| Changes username or password |
| Removes them |
| Scheduled runs and when each fires next |
| One cron job |
| Schedules a run — five-field cron or |
| Changes it, including |
| Runs it now, without touching the schedule |
| Removes the schedule |
Accounts, organizations and instance administration
Tool | Description |
| Which account the token belongs to, and whether it is admin |
| The latest pipeline of every visible repository, in one call |
| Organizations known to the instance |
| One organization |
| Turns a name into the id org-level tools need |
| Member and admin flags for this account |
| Removes it with its org-level secrets, registries and agents |
| Accounts that have ever logged in |
| One account — |
| Pre-creates a record; 👤 only when it grants admin |
| Changes email; 👤 to grant admin |
| Removes an account — transfer its repositories first |
| Build agents, with tokens redacted |
| One agent, token redacted |
| What an agent is running right now |
| Registers one and returns its token — a credential |
| Rename, relabel, or drain with |
| Removes it and invalidates its token |
| Forges this instance authenticates against |
| One forge; the OAuth secret is never returned |
| Adds a forge — a way to sign in, so it asks first |
| Changes one — a wrong value locks everyone out |
| Removes one |
| Version and health. Works without a token |
| The server-side queue and agent statistics |
| Current server log level |
| Stops scheduling for the whole instance |
| Starts it again |
| Changes it; 👤 to silence the server |
Not exposed, on purpose
POST/DELETE /user/token. They return and rotate the personal access token of the account this server authenticates as. A tool that hands the model its own credential is not a feature, and one that invalidates the server's own configuration mid-session is worse. The web UI does both, in front of a person.POST /hook. The forge webhook endpoint. Calling it means forging a push event, which is a way to run a pipeline while making it look like someone committed something.trigger_pipelineis the honest version./debug/pprof/*. Nine endpoints of Go profiling data. A heap dump is not something to put in a model's context./stream/eventsand/stream/logs. Server-sent event streams do not fit a request/response tool. Pollget_pipelineinstead.Badge endpoints. They return SVG and XML for embedding, not information.
Safety
Twenty-four operations ask a person. Every
delete_*, plusmove_repository,chown_repository, the whole-instancerepair_repository,create_forge,update_forge,pause_queueandapprove_pipeline— and six more only in the direction that escalates:update_usergrantingadmin,create_usercreating one,update_repositorygranting atrusted_*flag or lowering the fork gate (require_approvaldown,visibilitytopublic),update_secretoverwriting a value or widening who may read it,update_registryreplacing a password, andset_log_levelsilencing the server.Where the client supports MCP elicitation that is a real dialog the model cannot answer on its behalf. Where it does not, the first call returns a short-lived token bound to those exact arguments and only a second call carrying it acts — which proves the call was made twice with the same arguments and nothing more, and the text says so. Either way an approval for one repository is not one for another, and one for a tool is not one for another.
ELICITATION=falsetakes the fallback deliberately; it never removes the guard. See Asking a person.Agent tokens are redacted on read — see above.
create_agentis the exception, by necessity.Secret values and registry passwords are never returned, and not because this server hides them: Woodpecker strips them from every response, including the one immediately after creating them. Store the value somewhere else too.
Build logs, commit messages and pipeline metadata are marked as untrusted data, because they are written by whoever can push to the repository. Confirmation prompts never quote anything that came from the API.
Error bodies are truncated, HTML error pages are dropped, and every response has a byte ceiling enforced while it streams. Log output has a much smaller budget of its own, and says when it was cut.
WOODPECKER_READ_ONLY=truedoes not register the write tools at all, andWOODPECKER_DENY_TOOLScuts finer along the same line — a filtered tool is never built, not refused at call time.The token is deleted from
process.envonce it has been read, is never sent to a redirect target, and is never echoed into an error message.
Documentation
The full guide, tool reference and security notes live at
woodpecker-ci-mcp.ni-c.de (source in docs/).
Development
npm install
npm run lint && npm run build && npm run test:coverageReleasing
Add the CHANGELOG entry and bump
package.json.npm run lint && npm run build && npm run test:coverageCommit, then push a signed tag:
git tag -s vX.Y.Z -m "vX.Y.Z" && git push origin main vX.Y.Z
The release workflow publishes to npm (Trusted Publishing, with provenance), creates the GitHub release from the CHANGELOG section and updates the MCP Registry entry.
Contributing
Issues, discussions and pull requests are welcome — see CONTRIBUTING.md. For vulnerabilities please use private reporting rather than a public issue; the policy is in SECURITY.md.
License
MIT © Willi Thiel
Available Tools
71 toolsactivate_repositoryActivate repositoryAIdempotent
Turns on Woodpecker for a repository that exists in the forge, which installs the webhook and makes pipelines run. Takes the forge-side id, NOT an owner/name pair and not a Woodpecker id — call list_repositories with include_inactive=true and read forge_remote_id from the entry.
Inputs: forge_remote_id (required). Returns: truncated
approve_pipelineApprove a blocked pipelineADestructive
Releases a pipeline that is waiting for approval (status "blocked") and lets it run. Read what you are approving first: pipelines are usually blocked because they come from a fork, and approving one runs code from that fork with this repository's secrets.
Inputs: number (required), repo_id (required), confirm_token. Returns: source, truncated, untrusted
cancel_pipelineCancel a running pipelineAIdempotent
Stops a pipeline that is pending or running. Its steps are killed where they are, so anything half-written stays half-written. The pipeline can be restarted afterwards.
Inputs: number (required), repo_id (required). Returns: truncated
chown_repositoryTake ownership of a repositoryADestructiveIdempotent
Makes the authenticated account the repository's owner in Woodpecker. The owner's forge token is what Woodpecker uses to read the repository and report build status, so this is the fix when the previous owner left. Asks a person first; where the client cannot show a dialog, call once to receive a token and again with it.
Inputs: repo_id (required), confirm_token. Returns: truncated
create_agentCreate an agentA
Registers a new build agent and returns its token. THE TOKEN IS A CREDENTIAL: whoever holds it can attach a machine to this server, receive pipeline workloads and read every secret those pipelines use. It is part of this answer because it is the only way to get it — put it straight into the agent's configuration and do not paste it anywhere else.
Inputs: name (required), org_id, no_schedule, custom_labels. Returns: truncated
create_cronCreate a cron jobA
Schedules a pipeline run. The pipeline runs with event "cron", so steps and secrets restricted to other events do not apply to it — a cron job whose steps all have "when: event: push" runs and does nothing.
Inputs: name (required), repo_id (required), schedule (required), branch, +1 more. Returns: truncated
create_forgeAdd a forgeA
Registers an additional forge. Admin only, and two-step: a forge is a way to sign in, and Woodpecker grants administrator rights by login name alone, so an account on the new forge spelled like an admin is one. The OAuth application has to exist on the forge side first, with this Woodpecker as its callback.
Inputs: url (required), type (required), client (required), oauth_client_secret (required), +3 more. Returns: truncated
create_registryAdd registry credentialsA
Stores credentials for a container registry so pipelines can pull private images from it. The address is the identifier — there is no separate name — so "docker.io" and "index.docker.io" are two different entries.
Inputs: scope (required), address (required), password (required), username (required), +2 more. Returns: truncated
create_secretCreate a secretA
Creates a secret at the chosen level. The value is write-only: it is never readable again through the API, so store it somewhere else too. At least one event is required — the API has no defaults, and a secret without pull_request is invisible to pull-request builds.
Inputs: name (required), scope (required), value (required), events (required), +4 more. Returns: truncated
create_userCreate a userA
Registers an account ahead of its first login. Admin only. This does not create anything in the forge and grants no access there — the person still signs in through the forge; this only pre-creates the Woodpecker record, which is how you make someone an admin before they first log in. Passing admin=true asks a person first.
Inputs: login (required), admin, email, confirm_token. Returns: truncated
decline_pipelineDecline a blocked pipelineAIdempotent
Refuses a pipeline that is waiting for approval. It ends as "declined" and never runs; the pipeline entry and its metadata stay.
Inputs: number (required), repo_id (required). Returns: source, truncated, untrusted
delete_agentDelete an agentADestructiveIdempotent
Removes an agent and invalidates its token. Anything it was running is lost and has to be restarted. Drain it first with update_agent no_schedule=true. Two-step.
Inputs: agent_id (required), org_id, confirm_token. Returns: truncated
delete_cronDelete a cron jobADestructiveIdempotent
Removes a scheduled run. If you only want it to stop for now, update_cron with enabled=false keeps the definition. Two-step.
Inputs: cron_id (required), repo_id (required), confirm_token. Returns: truncated
delete_forgeDelete a forgeADestructiveIdempotent
Removes a forge from Woodpecker. Admin only. Everyone who signs in through it loses access, and its repositories can no longer be read. Two-step.
Inputs: forge_id (required), confirm_token. Returns: truncated
delete_organizationDelete an organizationADestructiveIdempotent
Removes an organization from Woodpecker together with its org-level secrets, registries and agents. Admin only. It does not touch the forge, and it does not delete the repositories — but anything of theirs that relied on an org-level secret stops working. Two-step.
Inputs: org_id (required), confirm_token. Returns: truncated
delete_pipelineDelete a pipelineADestructiveIdempotent
Removes a pipeline and everything attached to it, including its logs. A running pipeline cannot be deleted — cancel it first. Two-step.
Inputs: number (required), repo_id (required), confirm_token. Returns: truncated
delete_pipeline_logsDelete all logs of a pipelineADestructiveIdempotent
Deletes the stored output of every step of a pipeline. The pipeline and its step results stay, so it still shows which step failed — just not why. Two-step.
Inputs: number (required), repo_id (required), confirm_token. Returns: truncated
delete_registryDelete registry credentialsADestructiveIdempotent
Removes stored credentials for a registry. Pipelines that pull private images from it start failing at the pull step. Two-step.
Inputs: scope (required), address (required), org_id, repo_id, +1 more. Returns: truncated
delete_repositoryDelete repositoryADestructiveIdempotent
Removes a repository from Woodpecker: the webhook, every pipeline, all logs, secrets, registries and cron jobs of that repository. The forge repository itself is untouched. Two-step.
Inputs: repo_id (required), confirm_token. Returns: truncated
delete_secretDelete a secretADestructiveIdempotent
Deletes a secret. Any pipeline that reads it starts failing — or worse, keeps running with an empty value. Two-step.
Inputs: name (required), scope (required), org_id, repo_id, +1 more. Returns: truncated
delete_step_logsDelete the logs of one stepADestructiveIdempotent
Deletes the stored output of a single step. The step and the pipeline stay, their logs do not. This is what you use when a step printed a secret. Two-step. Rotate the leaked credential as well — the log was readable until now, and deleting it does not un-read it.
Inputs: number (required), repo_id (required), step_id (required), confirm_token. Returns: truncated
delete_userDelete a userADestructiveIdempotent
Removes an account from Woodpecker. Admin only. Repositories the account owned keep running on a token that no longer exists, which shows up later as pipelines that stop starting — chown_repository moves ownership to someone else, and doing that first is the point. Two-step.
Inputs: login (required), forge_id (required), confirm_token. Returns: truncated
get_agentGet an agentARead-onlyIdempotent
Returns one agent. Admin only. Its token is redacted; an agent that lost its token needs a new one, which means delete_agent and create_agent.
Inputs: agent_id (required). Returns: truncated
get_cronGet a cron jobARead-onlyIdempotent
Returns one cron job, including the variables it passes.
Inputs: cron_id (required), repo_id (required). Returns: truncated
get_current_userGet the authenticated accountARead-onlyIdempotent
Returns the account WOODPECKER_TOKEN belongs to, including whether it is an instance administrator. This is the first thing to call when a tool answers 403: the admin-only tools need admin=true here.
Inputs: no named parameters. Returns: truncated
get_forgeGet a forgeARead-onlyIdempotent
Returns one forge configuration. Admin only. The OAuth client secret is not part of the read model and is never returned.
Inputs: forge_id (required). Returns: truncated
get_log_levelGet the server log levelARead-onlyIdempotent
Returns the current log level of the Woodpecker server. Admin only.
Inputs: no named parameters. Returns: truncated
get_organizationGet an organizationARead-onlyIdempotent
Returns one organization by its numeric id.
Inputs: org_id (required). Returns: truncated
get_organization_permissionsGet organization permissionsARead-onlyIdempotent
What the authenticated account may do in this organization: member and admin. Org-level secrets and agents need admin here.
Inputs: org_id (required). Returns: truncated
get_pipelineGet pipelineARead-onlyIdempotent
Returns one pipeline with its workflows and steps, including each step id — which is what get_step_logs needs. Step state and exit_code say which step to look at.
Inputs: number (required), repo_id (required). Returns: source, truncated, untrusted
get_pipeline_configGet pipeline configurationARead-onlyIdempotent
Returns the pipeline YAML files this run was built from, as they were at that commit. This is the config that actually ran, not the one currently in the branch.
Inputs: number (required), repo_id (required). Returns: source, truncated, untrusted
get_pipeline_feedGet the pipeline feedARead-onlyIdempotent
The activity feed of the authenticated account: the latest pipeline of every repository it can see, newest first. This is the "what is the state of everything" call — one request instead of list_pipelines per repository.
Inputs: no named parameters. Returns: source, truncated, untrusted
get_pipeline_metadataGet pipeline metadataARead-onlyIdempotent
Returns the metadata Woodpecker exposes to the pipeline itself — the CI_* environment a step sees, plus the previous pipeline of the same workflow. Useful when a step behaves differently than its config suggests.
Inputs: number (required), repo_id (required). Returns: source, truncated, untrusted
get_queue_infoGet queue informationARead-onlyIdempotent
The server-side build queue: what is pending, running and waiting on an agent, plus the agent statistics. Admin only. Together with list_queued_pipelines this is the whole answer to "why is my build not starting".
Inputs: no named parameters. Returns: truncated
get_registryGet a registry entryARead-onlyIdempotent
Returns one registry entry — its address and username. The password is stripped by Woodpecker (Registry.Copy), so it is never in the answer.
Inputs: scope (required), address (required), org_id, repo_id. Returns: truncated
get_repositoryGet repositoryARead-onlyIdempotent
Returns the full Woodpecker configuration of one repository: trusted flags, timeout, approval mode, config file path and the extension endpoints.
Inputs: repo_id (required). Returns: truncated
get_repository_permissionsGet repository permissionsARead-onlyIdempotent
What the authenticated account may do with this repository: pull, push and admin. Woodpecker inherits these from the forge, so this answers "why was that 403" without guessing.
Inputs: repo_id (required). Returns: truncated
get_secretGet a secretARead-onlyIdempotent
Returns one secret's metadata: which events and images it applies to, and its note. The value is not part of the answer — Woodpecker strips it from every response, including the one right after creating it.
Inputs: name (required), scope (required), org_id, repo_id. Returns: truncated
get_server_infoGet server version and healthARead-onlyIdempotent
Returns the Woodpecker version and whether the server reports itself healthy. Works without a token, which makes it the call to use when nothing else does: if this answers, WOODPECKER_URL is right and the problem is WOODPECKER_TOKEN.
Inputs: no named parameters. Returns: note, truncated
get_step_logsGet step logsARead-onlyIdempotent
Returns the output of one pipeline step as text, newest end first by default — a failing step almost always explains itself in its last lines. The step id comes from get_pipeline (workflows[].steps[].id). Woodpecker returns these lines base64-encoded; this tool decodes and reassembles them.
Inputs: number (required), repo_id (required), step_id (required), from, +1 more. Returns: note, lines, output, source, +6 more
get_userGet a userARead-onlyIdempotent
Returns one account by its login. Admin only. forge_id is required — see list_users for the value.
Inputs: login (required), forge_id (required), forge_remote_id. Returns: truncated
list_agentsList agentsARead-onlyIdempotent
Lists the build agents, with their platform, capacity, version and last contact — the call that answers "why is nothing being built". Without org_id this is the instance-wide list and needs an administrator. Agent tokens are redacted.
Inputs: page, org_id, per_page. Returns: truncated
list_agent_tasksList an agent’s tasksARead-onlyIdempotent
The work an agent is currently running. Admin only. This is how you find out what is occupying a busy agent, and which pipeline to cancel.
Inputs: agent_id (required). Returns: truncated
list_cronsList cron jobsARead-onlyIdempotent
Lists the scheduled pipeline runs of a repository, with the next execution time of each.
Inputs: repo_id (required), page, per_page. Returns: truncated
list_forgesList forgesARead-onlyIdempotent
Lists the forges this Woodpecker authenticates against. Admin only. The forge_id shown here is what get_user and delete_user require.
Inputs: page, per_page. Returns: truncated
list_organizationsList organizationsARead-onlyIdempotent
Lists the organizations known to this Woodpecker instance. Admin only. Note that an entry with is_user=true is a personal account, not a real organization — Woodpecker models both the same way, and org-level secrets work for both.
Inputs: page, per_page. Returns: truncated
list_pipelinesList pipelinesARead-onlyIdempotent
Lists a repository's pipelines, newest first, summarised to what a list needs. Filters are applied by the server. Note that "number" — not the pipeline id — is what every other pipeline tool takes.
Inputs: repo_id (required), ref, page, after, +5 more. Returns: source, truncated, untrusted
list_pull_requestsList open pull requestsBRead-onlyIdempotent
Lists the open pull requests of a repository, with the index a pipeline ref like "refs/pull/42/head" refers to.
Inputs: repo_id (required), page, per_page. Returns: source, truncated, untrusted
list_queued_pipelinesList queued pipelinesARead-onlyIdempotent
Lists the pipelines waiting in the server queue across all repositories. This is the instance-wide view: what is stuck, and behind what. get_queue_info adds the agent side of the same picture.
Inputs: no named parameters. Returns: source, truncated, untrusted
list_registriesList container registriesARead-onlyIdempotent
Lists the container registry credentials at one level. These are what let a pipeline pull private images. Passwords are never returned.
Inputs: scope (required), page, org_id, repo_id, +1 more. Returns: truncated
list_repositoriesList repositoriesARead-onlyIdempotent
Lists repositories. By default the ones the authenticated account can see in Woodpecker; with include_inactive it also lists repositories that exist in the forge but were never activated, which is where the forge_remote_id for activate_repository comes from. scope="instance" lists every repository on the server and needs an administrator.
Inputs: name, page, scope, per_page, +1 more. Returns: truncated
list_repository_branchesList branchesARead-onlyIdempotent
Lists the branches of a repository, as Woodpecker sees them in the forge. Useful before trigger_pipeline, which fails with a bare 400 on a branch that does not exist.
Inputs: repo_id (required), page, per_page. Returns: source, truncated, untrusted
list_secretsList secretsARead-onlyIdempotent
Lists the secrets at one level — repository, organization or instance-wide. Values are never returned by Woodpecker, not even here; you get names, events and image restrictions. Note that a pipeline sees all three levels, so a name missing here may still exist one level up.
Inputs: scope (required), page, org_id, repo_id, +1 more. Returns: truncated
list_usersList usersARead-onlyIdempotent
Lists the accounts known to this Woodpecker instance. Admin only. Woodpecker creates an account the first time someone logs in, so this is everyone who has ever used it, not a managed roster.
Inputs: page, per_page. Returns: truncated
lookup_organizationLook up an organization by nameARead-onlyIdempotent
Resolves an organization name to its id — the id every other org-level call needs, including org-scoped secrets and registries.
Inputs: name (required). Returns: truncated
lookup_repositoryLook up a repository by nameARead-onlyIdempotent
Resolves an "owner/name" pair to a repository id. Every other repository tool takes the numeric id, and this is how you get one. A repository that exists in the forge but was never activated in Woodpecker answers 404 — use list_repositories with include_inactive to find it.
Inputs: full_name (required). Returns: truncated
move_repositoryMove repository to a new ownerADestructiveIdempotent
Tells Woodpecker that a repository moved to a different owner or name in the forge. It does NOT move anything in the forge — do that first, then call this so Woodpecker follows. Two-step. IMPORTANT on older instances: verified against 3.11, this endpoint performs the move and THEN answers HTTP 500 ("could not determine repo for permission") when the caller is an instance administrator. The move has happened — read the repository back with get_repository before deciding anything, and do not retry, which would move it a second time. Verified against 3.18, the call answers cleanly. Most of the time it is not needed at all: forges that send webhooks report a rename and Woodpecker follows it by itself, and calling this afterwards fails on a duplicate redirection.
Inputs: to (required), repo_id (required), confirm_token. Returns: truncated
pause_queuePause the build queueAIdempotent
Stops the server from handing new work to agents. Running pipelines finish; everything else queues up. Admin only, and instance-wide — this stops CI for everybody, and it stays paused until someone calls resume_queue. Two-step.
Inputs: confirm_token. Returns: truncated
repair_repositoryRepair repository webhooksAIdempotent
Re-installs the forge webhook and refreshes the stored repository data. This is the fix for "pushes no longer start a pipeline" after a repository was renamed or the Woodpecker URL changed. With scope="instance" it does that for every repository on the server, which is two-step and hits the forge API once per repository.
Inputs: scope, repo_id, confirm_token. Returns: truncated
restart_pipelineRestart a pipelineADestructive
Runs an existing pipeline again, at the same commit and with the same config it used then. The re-run gets a new number; the original is kept. Every call is another run — a retry after a timeout starts a second one, and Woodpecker offers no idempotency key to prevent that.
Inputs: number (required), repo_id (required), event, deploy_to. Returns: source, truncated, untrusted
resume_queueResume the build queueAIdempotent
Lets the server hand work to agents again. Admin only. Queued pipelines start at once, so expect a burst.
Inputs: no named parameters. Returns: truncated
run_cronRun a cron job nowADestructive
Starts the cron job's pipeline immediately, without waiting for its schedule. The schedule itself is unchanged, and the run counts as a cron event — which is the point: this is how you test that a nightly job works before waiting a night for it. Every call is another run; a retry after a timeout starts a second one.
Inputs: cron_id (required), repo_id (required). Returns: source, truncated, untrusted
set_log_levelSet the server log levelAIdempotent
Changes the log level of the running Woodpecker server, without a restart. Admin only. "debug" and "trace" are loud — set it back when you are done, and remember that trace logs request bodies.
Inputs: level (required), confirm_token. Returns: truncated
trigger_pipelineTrigger a pipelineADestructive
Starts a pipeline manually on a branch. It runs the config as it is in that branch right now, with event "manual". A branch that does not exist is rejected with a bare 400, so check list_repository_branches first. Not idempotent and there is no way to make it so — Woodpecker has no idempotency key — so a retry after a timeout starts a second pipeline. Read list_pipelines before calling again.
Inputs: branch (required), repo_id (required), message, variables. Returns: source, truncated, untrusted
update_agentUpdate an agentADestructiveIdempotent
Changes an agent. Admin only. no_schedule=true is the drain switch: the agent finishes its current work and takes nothing new.
Inputs: agent_id (required), name, org_id, no_schedule, +1 more. Returns: truncated
update_cronUpdate a cron jobADestructiveIdempotent
Changes a cron job. Only the fields you pass are touched — including "enabled", which is how a schedule is paused without losing it.
Inputs: cron_id (required), repo_id (required), name, branch, +3 more. Returns: truncated
update_forgeUpdate a forgeADestructiveIdempotent
Changes a forge configuration. Admin only, and two-step: this is the setting every login and every repository read depends on, and a wrong value locks everyone out of the instance — including whoever is fixing it.
Inputs: forge_id (required), url, type, client, +4 more. Returns: truncated
update_registryUpdate registry credentialsADestructiveIdempotent
Changes the username or password of a registry entry. The address itself cannot be changed — it is the identifier; delete and re-create instead.
Inputs: scope (required), address (required), org_id, repo_id, +3 more. Returns: truncated
update_repositoryUpdate repository settingsADestructiveIdempotent
Changes Woodpecker settings of a repository. Only the fields you pass are touched. Note that "trusted" grants pipelines of this repository elevated container privileges and is an administrator-only change.
Inputs: repo_id (required), timeout, allow_pr, visibility, +8 more. Returns: truncated
update_secretUpdate a secretADestructiveIdempotent
Changes a secret. Only the fields you pass are touched — but "events" and "images" are replaced wholesale, not merged, so pass the complete list. Passing "value" rotates the secret.
Inputs: name (required), scope (required), note, value, +5 more. Returns: truncated
update_userUpdate a userADestructiveIdempotent
Changes an account. Admin only. The one that matters is "admin": granting it gives full control of the instance, including every secret of every repository. Fields you do not pass are preserved.
Inputs: login (required), forge_id (required), admin, email, +1 more. Returns: truncated
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
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TDQS
Scored across 71 tools
Tools are mostly distinct with detailed descriptions that differentiate similar operations. However, some related tools like get_queue_info vs list_queued_pipelines, and the repository lifecycle tools (activate/repair/move/chown/update) could be confused without careful reading, though descriptions mitigate.
Consistent snake_case verb_noun pattern throughout, with lookup_ used consistently for id resolution. No mixing of conventions.
71 tools far exceeds the recommended 3-15 range; while each covers a distinct operation, the sheer number increases selection burden and cognitive load for an agent. The scope is large but the count is excessive.
Comprehensive CRUD coverage for most entities, but lifecycle gap: activate_repository exists without a corresponding deactivate_repository to disable a repo without deleting it. Other minor gaps possible but core workflows covered.
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