Skip to main content
Glama

dispatch_webhook_audit

Dispatches a cryptographically signed HMAC-SHA256 audit payload to a remote webhook endpoint, enabling tamper-evident delivery of evidence bundles.

Instructions

Dispatches a cryptographically signed HMAC-SHA256 audit payload to a remote webhook endpoint.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "bundleId": "<bundleId>",
      "webhookUrl": "<webhookUrl>"
    },
    "name": "dispatch_webhook_audit"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
headersNoOptional additional HTTP request headers.
bundleIdYesThe unique identifier of the evidence bundle to dispatch.
timeoutMsNoNetwork timeout in milliseconds.
maxRetriesNoMaximum transient failure retry attempts with exponential backoff.
webhookUrlYesTarget HTTP or HTTPS webhook URL.
secretTokenNoOptional secret key for HMAC-SHA256 signature (X-Evidence-Signature).
includeProofNoGenerate and attach portable Ed25519 verification proof.
workspacePathNoOptional workspace path hint to locate the bundle.
allowPrivateNetworkNoPermit local/private/loopback network webhook targets (disabled by default for SSRF protection).

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Addedv1.4.0

TDQS

C2.9/5.0
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are supplied, so the description carries the full behavioral burden, and it discloses only that the payload is HMAC-SHA256 signed. It says nothing about this being an outbound, side-effecting network operation whose effects on the remote endpoint are irreversible, nothing about retry/backoff semantics or failure surfacing, and nothing about the SSRF-protected private-network default or the proof-attachment behaviour that materially change what happens on the wire.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

One front-loaded sentence with no filler, redundancy, or buried qualifiers. It is efficient, but at this brevity it is efficient at the cost of the omission noted elsewhere rather than because everything necessary fit.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 9-parameter, nested-object, outbound network tool with no annotations and no output schema, a single sentence is not sufficient. Nothing tells the agent what a successful dispatch returns or how the result is reported, whether repeats are idempotent, or how partial failures after N retries are represented.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% across all 9 parameters (including the nested headers object), so the schema already explains bundleId, webhookUrl, secretToken, includeProof, allowPrivateNetwork, retries and timeout. The description adds only the signing algorithm (HMAC-SHA256), which the schema already ties to secretToken/X-Evidence-Signature, so baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb (dispatches) and a specific resource (a cryptographically signed HMAC-SHA256 audit payload) plus the destination class (remote webhook endpoint). That is concrete enough to separate it from capture/verify/export siblings, though it never explicitly contrasts itself with export_evidence_report or export_verification_proof, which also move evidence out of the system.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no when-to-use guidance: no prerequisites (e.g. that the bundle must already exist or be signed), no statement about when a webhook dispatch is preferable to export_evidence_report, and no exclusions. The agent must infer the entire selection context from the single sentence.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.