Evidence MCP
Server Configuration
Describes the environment variables required to run the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Instructions
Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.
This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.
Capabilities
Features and capabilities supported by this server
Protocol revision2025-11-25
| Capability | Details |
|---|---|
| tools | {
"listChanged": true
} |
Tools
Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| create_evidence_bundleB | Creates a new evidence bundle for a task and primary workspace (with optional additional monorepo packages) with in_progress status. |
| capture_git_evidenceA | Safely inspects and captures Git state (status, branch, HEAD commit, diff check) without mutating the repo. |
| record_command_resultA | Records the self-reported execution result of a command supplied by the agent (provenance: agent_reported). Does not execute shell commands or independently verify command output. |
| snapshot_filesB | Computes SHA-256 hashes and file sizes for regular files strictly inside the workspace. Rejects sensitive files and symbolic links. |
| add_assertionB | Links a stated claim to one or more supporting evidence IDs. Rejects assertions with zero evidence. |
| verify_evidence_bundleA | Re-checks Git state and file hashes against live workspace. Returns verified, stale, failed, or unverifiable status. |
| export_evidence_reportC | Produces an evidence report in Markdown, JSON, HTML, or SARIF v2.1.0 format with clear distinction between verified and agent-reported evidence. |
| sign_evidence_bundleB | Cryptographically signs an evidence bundle using an Ed25519 keypair for author attestation and tamper detection. |
| execute_verified_commandB | Executes an approved dev/test command in a sandboxed, isolated environment within the workspace and records independently verified execution evidence (provenance: server_executed). |
| register_workspaceB | Registers an additional named workspace or package within a monorepo or multi-repo evidence bundle. |
| capture_ast_evidenceB | Extracts AST symbols, signatures, and computes semantic diffs (with Git HEAD comparison and breaking change detection) for target source files. |
| export_verification_proofC | Verifies an evidence bundle and issues a cryptographically signed, portable Ed25519 verification proof saved to .evidence-mcp/proofs/. |
| verify_replay_proofC | Verifies the cryptographic signature and bundle consistency of an exported verification proof. |
| endorse_evidence_bundleC | Appends an independent, cryptographically signed peer review endorsement to an evidence bundle. |
| check_bundle_quorumC | Evaluates consensus quorum rules across all peer endorsements on an evidence bundle. |
| evaluate_evidence_policyB | Evaluates an evidence bundle against declarative compliance rules defined in evidence.policy.json or an inline policy. |
| dispatch_webhook_auditC | Dispatches a cryptographically signed HMAC-SHA256 audit payload to a remote webhook endpoint. |
| register_trusted_agentB | Registers or updates an authorized agent public key and role in the workspace trusted agent registry. |
| revoke_trusted_agentA | Revokes a trusted agent key in the workspace registry, invalidating future endorsements or attestations. |
| capture_sbom_evidenceB | Generates a CycloneDX v1.5 SBOM from workspace package manifests/lockfiles and records verifiable supply-chain evidence on the bundle. |
| notarize_evidence_bundleB | Anchors only the anonymized bundle SHA-256 digest to a remote transparency notary service and stores the signed Ed25519 receipt. |
| export_slsa_provenanceB | Generates and optionally Ed25519-signs an in-toto v1 / SLSA v1.0 Provenance attestation envelope from an evidence bundle. |
| generate_client_configB | Generates or writes ready-to-paste MCP client configuration snippets for Claude Desktop, Cursor, Gemini, and VS Code Cline. |
| submit_rekor_entryC | Submits an evidence bundle digest and attestation signature to a Sigstore Rekor transparency log (default: rekor.sigstore.dev). |
Prompts
Interactive templates invoked by user choice
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No prompts | |
Resources
Contextual data attached and managed by the client
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No resources | |
TDQS
Scored across 24 tools
Most tools have clearly distinct purposes across capture, signing, verification, policy, transparency, and trust-registry workflows. Some clusters are easy to confuse at a glance—especially sign/endorse, verify bundle/replay proof/quorum/policy, and notarize/Rekor/export proof—but the descriptions provide enough separation to guide selection.
All tool names use snake_case with a consistent verb_noun structure such as create_evidence_bundle, capture_git_evidence, verify_evidence_bundle, and revoke_trusted_agent. The naming is highly predictable throughout the set.
At 24 tools the server is on the heavy side, but the scope spans evidence capture, cryptographic attestation, peer endorsement, policy evaluation, transparency logging, supply-chain evidence, reporting, and agent trust. Most tools appear non-redundant and earn their place, though the surface is close to being too broad.
The evidence-bundle lifecycle is well covered: creation, workspace registration, capture, assertions, signing, endorsement, verification, policy checks, proofs, and multiple export formats. The main gap is discovery/management of existing bundles—there is no list/get/archive or explicit status-transition tool—but most core workflows can proceed using the bundle ID returned at creation.