storefront-guard-mcp-server
Server Configuration
Describes the environment variables required to run the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| PAY_TO_ADDRESS | No | The wallet address to receive payouts for x402 payment settlement. This is a placeholder by default, set it to your real payout address before charging real money. |
Instructions
Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.
This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.
Capabilities
Features and capabilities supported by this server
Protocol revision2025-11-25
| Capability | Details |
|---|---|
| tools | {
"listChanged": true
} |
Tools
Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| verify_storefrontA | Checks whether a merchant storefront looks like the same legitimate entity it appeared to be recently, BEFORE an agent commits payment to it. This is the mirror image of merchant-side agent-verification protocols (e.g. Visa's Trusted Agent Protocol): those let a merchant confirm an incoming agent is legitimate. This tool lets the AGENT confirm the MERCHANT is legitimate before paying. It does NOT guarantee a storefront is safe - it is a fast, explainable pre-purchase signal built from free public data sources (domain registration history via RDAP, SSL certificate issuance history via Certificate Transparency logs, HTTPS validity, and a known-scam-domain check). Treat a "high" risk result as a strong reason to pause and get human confirmation before paying, and a "low" risk result as one input among others, not a guarantee. Args:
Returns: { "domain": string, "trustScore": number, // 0-100, higher = more trustworthy "riskLevel": "low" | "medium" | "high" | "unknown", "confidence": "low" | "medium" | "high", // how many signals could actually be resolved "reasons": string[], // human-readable explanation for the score "recommendation": "proceed" | "pause_for_confirmation" | "do_not_proceed", "recommendationReason": string, // one-line explanation of why this recommendation was made "signals": { ...raw signal data for audit/debugging... }, "checkedAt": string // ISO timestamp - this is a point-in-time result, do not cache it } Recommendation values and suggested agent behavior:
Examples:
Error Handling:
|
Prompts
Interactive templates invoked by user choice
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No prompts | |
Resources
Contextual data attached and managed by the client
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No resources | |
TDQS
Scored across 1 tool
With only one tool, there is no possibility of confusion or overlap. The tool's purpose is singular and clearly defined, so agents cannot misselect between alternatives.
The single tool name 'verify_storefront' follows the verb_noun pattern consistently. With one tool, there are no naming inconsistencies or mixed conventions to evaluate.
The server has only one tool, which feels thin for a domain that could reasonably include additional operations like reporting a scam or checking verification history. However, the narrow purpose of storefront verification is adequately covered by this single comprehensive tool, making it borderline appropriate.
For the stated purpose of pre-purchase storefront verification, the tool covers all necessary signals (domain registration, SSL, HTTPS, scam list) and returns actionable recommendations. There are no obvious gaps or dead ends for the defined use case.