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watsonx Platform MCP Server

watsonx Platform MCP Server

by manjotsidhu

authenticate

Idempotent

Sets the session's target environment and credentials for IBM watsonx SaaS or CPD, so other tools use that current connection; calling it again replaces the active target.

Instructions

Establish (or replace) this session's target environment and credentials.

All other tools operate against the current authenticated session — there is no per-call credential parameter. Calling this again replaces the session's target; v1 supports one active target per session, not multiple concurrent ones.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
stageNoSaaS only — deployment stage. Each stage pairs a different IAM authority with its dataplatform host (dev's dataplatform uses test's IAM; test's uses prod's IAM) — see spec/01-auth-and-environments.md. This parameter extends the tool beyond 02-tools.md's literal signature, which predates the discovery of this third resolution axis.prod
apikeyNoIBM Cloud apikey (saas) or platform API key (cpd, ZenApiKey/bearer). Never echoed back.
passwordNoCPD fallback only, used instead of apikey for /v1/authorize. Never echoed back.
usernameNoRequired for environment='cpd'.
verify_sslNoVerify TLS certificates when calling `region_or_url` (the CPD cluster itself, including its own /v1/authorize) — NOT the SaaS IAM token endpoint, which is a public IBM-operated host and is always verified regardless of this setting. Set to false only for a trusted CPD cluster with a self-signed or internal-CA certificate you cannot otherwise validate. Disabling this removes protection against man-in-the-middle attacks on that connection — prefer `ca_bundle_path` when you have the cluster's CA certificate instead.
environmentYes
region_or_urlYesSaaS: a region code (us-south [default], eu-de, eu-gb, jp-tok, au-syd, ca-tor). CPD: the full cluster base URL (e.g. https://cpd-cpd-instance.apps.my-cluster.example.com), always supplied in full — there is no derivable pattern for CPD.
ca_bundle_pathNoPath to a CA bundle/certificate file to trust for calls to `region_or_url`, instead of disabling verification outright. Takes precedence over `verify_ssl` when set.
prefer_zen_api_keyNoCPD only: prefer the no-round-trip ZenApiKey header over the /v1/authorize bearer flow when an apikey is supplied.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only declare readOnlyHint=false and idempotentHint=true, and the description adds real behavioral context: the effect is session-scoped state mutation, re-invocation replaces rather than accumulates targets, and credentials have no per-call analog elsewhere. It still does not say whether credentials are validated eagerly at call time or lazily on first use, nor what a successful call returns.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences, front-loaded with the action and followed by the two constraints an agent most needs (session scope, replacement semantics). No filler or repetition, though the parenthetical '(or replace)' is partially restated by the 'Calling this again replaces the session's target' sentence.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema and nine parameters including writeOnly secrets, the definition should say more about outcomes: whether bad credentials fail here or later, and what a caller can assume after success. The session/replacement model is well covered, but the success-failure contract is left unstated.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 89%, so parameters like stage, verify_ssl, ca_bundle_path, prefer_zen_api_key, and region_or_url are already documented in detail in the schema. The description mentions no parameters at all, adding nothing beyond the structured fields. Baseline 3 is appropriate because the schema carries the parameter burden.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description uses a specific verb and resource ('Establish (or replace) this session's target environment and credentials') and explicitly positions the tool against every sibling: all other tools operate against the current authenticated session. An agent can identify this as the session-bootstrap tool without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It states the prerequisite relationship clearly (other tools depend on the current session, and there is no per-call credential parameter, so this call is the setup step). It also warns that repeat calls replace the target and that v1 allows only one active target per session, which is an implicit exclusion against concurrent multi-target use. It does not spell out what to do when authentication fails or when a target must be switched mid-workflow.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.