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mesh_untrust_agent

Revoke trust in a mesh peer by removing its node_id from your contact-policy allowlist. Unlisted peers trigger a no-op, not an error.

Instructions

Remove a peer's node_id from this operator's own contact-policy allowlist (~/.config/macula-mcp/contact_policy.json), added earlier by mesh_trust_agent or by hand. Never changes contact_policy itself either way -- untrusting one peer says nothing about whether "allowlist" should still be the standing answer for everyone else on it, so that decision is left to the operator. A peer that was never listed is a no-op, not an error. The file lives at /root/.config/macula-mcp/contact_policy.json unless MACULA_MCP_CONTACT_POLICY_FILE overrides the path.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
node_idYesThe peer to remove: a node_id from mesh_agents or the allowlist itself, or a petname -- petname resolution needs the peer in your CURRENT roster (mesh_agents), so it may not resolve someone trusted long ago who has since gone stale/offline; use their raw node_id from the allowlist file in that case.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.28.7

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the behavioral burden and does substantial work: it names the file, notes the env-var path override, clarifies that the standing contact_policy mode is not changed, and defines unlisted-peer behavior as a no-op rather than an error. It stops short of describing return values or persistence side effects.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The main action is front-loaded, but the middle sentence about not changing contact_policy is convoluted ('Never changes contact_policy itself either way...') and could confuse an agent. The no-op and path details are useful, but the explanation is longer than necessary.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter mutation with no annotations and no output schema, the description provides enough to call it correctly: target file, path override, no-op semantics, and what is intentionally not changed. The only notable omission is what the tool returns on success.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the node_id schema description already explains source options (mesh_agents, allowlist, petnames) and the current-roster caveat. The tool description adds file-path context but no additional parameter semantics beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific action ('Remove a peer's node_id') and a specific resource (this operator's contact-policy allowlist file), and names mesh_trust_agent as the operation that added it, distinguishing this tool from its trust counterpart.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Clearly frames this as the inverse of mesh_trust_agent and specifies the no-op case for unlisted peers. It does not explicitly state 'use mesh_trust_agent to trust' or list exclusions, but the context makes the intended call scenario clear.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.