mesh_trust_agent

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so richly: it names the file written, the policy side effect (ask -> allowlist, closed/open left as-is), that the reply reports which happened, and that changes take effect immediately with no restart. It also flags the mutation's asymmetry so the caller is not surprised.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the action and effect, then constraints; every clause carries distinct information (side effect, identity rationale, immediacy). Somewhat long for a single-parameter tool, but not padded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a one-param mutation with no annotations and no output schema, it discloses the file touched, the policy mutation behavior, the return hint, and immediacy. Nothing needed to call it correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3, but the description adds real meaning: node_id is the only verified signed identity, and operator_name/session_name/petname are unsafe as a trust boundary. That rationale goes well beyond the schema's list of value sources.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource (add a peer's node_id to the operator's contact-policy allowlist) and its concrete effect (next ring auto-accepted, no ask round-trip). It is clearly distinguished from siblings mesh_untrust_agent and mesh_answer_ring.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly says when to call it: 'once you have decided a peer is trustworthy, e.g. right after mesh_answer_ring accepted their ring, or from mesh_ring's/mesh_agents' own node_id.' The trigger conditions are concrete and tied to sibling workflows.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.