vuln_vulnerable_devices__list_device_vulnerabilities

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly, idempotent, openWorld and non-destructive, so the safety profile is covered. The description earns credit for disclosing a genuinely non-obvious behavioral trait beyond the structured data: results are denormalized, one row per vulnerability per device, which changes how an agent must aggregate or count the response.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, appropriately short, with the most decision-relevant fact (per-vulnerability row granularity) front-loaded after the lead clause. Minor waste in repeating the tool name and endpoint in the lead sentence and in the circular phrase "vulnerabilities fit the criteria".

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

All six parameters are optional and fully documented in the schema, annotations cover the safety and idempotency profile, and the one thing structured data cannot convey for an endpoint with no output schema — that responses are one row per vulnerability — is stated explicitly. Nothing an agent needs in order to call and interpret this tool is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, and the schema itself explains deviceUuid, deviceGroupUuid, vulnerabilityScope and pagination in detail. The description adds no parameter-level meaning beyond the vague "criteria from the request", so the baseline of 3 is correct.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource ("List device vulnerabilities") and pins it to an endpoint (GET /v1/device-vulnerabilities), plus a notable result-granularity trait: each vulnerability is returned as its own row even when multiple belong to one device. It does not, however, differentiate itself from the very close siblings list_device_os_vulnerabilities and list_vulnerable_devices, which an agent would need to disambiguate.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no explicit when-to-use or when-not-to-use guidance. The phrase "where the vulnerabilities fit the criteria from the request" only restates that filters exist — it never names the near-identical alternatives (OS-level vulnerabilities, vulnerable-device rollup) or the condition that should route an agent to one over another, so selection must be inferred from the tool name alone.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.