ESET-MCP
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TDQS
Scored across 51 tools
Most resources have a clean list/get split, but there are near-duplicate pairs: incident_detections__list_detections_v1 and _v2, plus a third composite latest_detections that explicitly tells the agent not to use the raw list endpoints. Similar overlap exists between device_devices__list_devices, eset_search, and device_full_profile. The descriptions do steer the agent, but the versioned twins and raw-vs-composite overlap create real misselection risk.
The bulk of the surface follows a predictable `<domain>_<resource>__<verb>_<noun>` snake_case pattern (list_incidents, get_device, list_quarantined_objects). Four composite convenience tools (eset_search, device_full_profile, incident_full_context, latest_detections) break the verb_noun convention with bare noun phrases, but they are few and clearly purposeful. Minor deviation, not chaotic.
51 tools is heavy for a single MCP surface, and the bulk is read-only list/get boilerplate spanning ~12 sub-domains (incidents, devices, policies, patches, vulns, quarantine, IAM, NAP, WAP). Several slots are spent on redundant v1/v2 detection endpoints and overlapping composite wrappers. Trimming the versioned duplicates and folding some list/get pairs would make this far more usable.
Read coverage is genuinely broad — incidents, detections, devices, groups, policies, tasks, patches, vulnerabilities, quarantine, users, installers — with sensible count and history endpoints. However, the surface is entirely GET-only: no incident resolution/update, no comment creation (list/get only), no policy assignment writes, no task creation, and no quarantine release/remediation actions. For an EDR/incident response domain, those missing mutations are notable gaps that would dead-end many agent workflows.