keel
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<img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/lutfizp/keel/main/assets/logo.png" alt="Keel" width="520"/>
# Keel
### The MCP control plane that turns scanner noise into hunter-grade, non-destructive proofs
<!-- mcp-name: io.github.lutfizp/keel -->
[](https://www.python.org/)
[](https://github.com/lutfizp/keel/blob/main/LICENSE)
[](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/)
[](https://pypi.org/project/keel-pentest/)
[](https://github.com/lutfizp/keel)
[](https://github.com/lutfizp/keel)
**Thirteen MCP tools. Semantic dedup. Per-host rate limits. Safe proofs that show what a hunter can do — without damaging the target.**
[Why Keel](#why-keel) · [Install](#installation) · [Clients](#mcp-client-setup) · [Proofs](#safe-proofs-that-still-prove-impact) · [Tools](#mcp-tools)
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---
Dumping 150 tools on an agent is easy. The hard problems are **dedup across tools**, **exploitable vs noise**, and **not hammering the target**. Keel is the control plane for those three.
An AI client talks to Keel, not to `httpx`, `nuclei`, or a shell. Keel drafts one wave at a time, enforces scope and rate limits, merges scanner hits into semantic cards, and runs **GET-only playbooks on tester-owned data**. When a playbook returns `proven`, you get a curl replay a hunter can follow — still without writes, shells, or payload spam.
Use it on programs you are authorized to test.
## Why Keel
| Hard problem | What scanner dumps do | What Keel does |
|---|---|---|
| Dedup across tools | One Nuclei template id per row; the same IDOR appears five times | Semantic key from vulnerability class + normalized route + method + parameter. UUID/id/hex tokens collapse. Compatible observations merge. |
| Exploitable vs noise | High severity = "ship it" | Cards move through `observed` → `hypothesis` → `corroborated` → `proven` / `refuted`. Informational and hardening stay hidden. Typed exploitability names the missing evidence and the negative control. |
| Not hammering the target | Fire every template at once, retry on 429 | One active wave per host, token buckets, Nuclei concurrency 1, no OAST, no redirects, no unsigned templates, no dos/fuzz/bruteforce/intrusive tags. HTTP 429 becomes a cooldown. |
A wrapper that shells out to a huge toolbox does not have that layer. Keel does — in the scheduler, in the adapters, and in the proof broker.
## Architecture
```mermaid
flowchart TD
A[AI coding client] -->|stdio MCP| B[Keel]
B --> C[Scope and rate gate]
C --> W[Background job and wave scheduler]
W --> H[httpx: one target]
W --> N[nuclei: HTTP templates, bounded]
C --> P[Proof broker: GET only]
P --> T[Tester-owned resource]
H --> S[Semantic card store]
N --> S
P --> S
S --> Q[Triage and evidence states]
```
1. `begin_engagement` with the hostname you are authorized to test.
2. `draft_waves` proposes reachability plus template micro-waves. No traffic yet.
3. `execute_wave` returns a job immediately. Poll `wave_status`. `cancel_wave` kills the scanner.
4. `query_cards` returns hunter-relevant cards. `assess_exploitability` says what would prove it.
5. `draft_proof` then `execute_proof` run a GET-only playbook against tester data. `proven` means the invariant held. `protected` means the control worked.
## Installation
macOS (Homebrew). `pipx` is a separate tool — install it first. Apple's `/usr/bin/python3` is often 3.9 and cannot install Keel.
```bash
brew install pipx python@3.12
pipx ensurepath
# open a new terminal, then:
pipx install keel-pentest
keel-pentest setup
keel-pentest doctor
```
If `python3.12` is already on the machine and you do not want Homebrew pipx:
```bash
python3.12 -m pip install --user pipx
python3.12 -m pipx ensurepath
python3.12 -m pipx install keel-pentest
```
`setup` downloads ProjectDiscovery `httpx` and `nuclei` into `~/.keel/bin`. Keel finds them there even when a GUI client has a thin `PATH`. No extra `KEEL_HTTPX_BIN` for a first scan.
Then point your MCP client at the `keel-pentest` executable:
```bash
claude mcp add --scope user --transport stdio keel -- keel-pentest
codex mcp add keel -- keel-pentest
hermes mcp add keel --command keel-pentest
```
OpenCode: `"command": ["keel-pentest"]`.
Python 3.10+. Do not `pip install keel` — that is a different project. OS notes and pip/venv: [INSTALL.md](INSTALL.md). Client shapes: [clients/README.md](clients/README.md).
Optional later: `KEEL_APPROVAL_FILE` for a team manifest that pins scope, template IDs, and proof targets. Default mode is self-attested — `begin_engagement` is the authorization. Rate limits, one-wave-per-host, signed templates, and sanitized evidence still apply.
## Safe proofs that still prove impact
Scanner output is a hypothesis. Keel proves (or refutes) it with disposable tester accounts and a unique canary. Every playbook is GET-only, budgeted, and returns a curl replay. The replay is the report artifact: *if this is not fixed, a hunter with a normal account can do this*.
| Playbook | Proves | How, without damage |
|---|---|---|
| `cross_account_read` | IDOR / BOLA | Tester A reads its canary; tester B GETs the same A-owned URL. Identical canary + 2xx = `proven`. 401/403/404 or 2xx without the canary = `protected` (refuted). |
| `reflected_marker` | Reflected XSS / HTML injection | Inject a unique marker plus a harmless `<keel>` probe. Unescaped reflection = `proven`. HTML-encoded reflection = `protected`. Control GET must not already contain the probe. |
| `open_redirect_canary` | Open redirect | Point the redirect parameter at `https://keel-proof.invalid/<marker>`. A 3xx whose Location host is that canary = `proven`. |
| `unauth_access_probe` | Missing authZ | Tester A baseline must show the canary; the same URL with no credentials must not. 2xx + canary unauthenticated = `proven`. |
| `own_session_marker` | Reachability only | A reads its own canary. This is `corroborated`, never vulnerability proof. |
`execute_proof` stores status codes, canary booleans, truncation flags, hashes, hunter impact text, and the repro script. It does not persist response bodies or secrets.
Plant a non-secret canary in a tester-owned object before `cross_account_read` / `unauth_access_probe`. Reflected XSS and open redirect inject the marker themselves.
## MCP tools
| Tool | Role |
|---|---|
| `begin_engagement` | Register scope and traffic ceilings |
| `draft_waves` | Propose reachability + template micro-waves; no traffic |
| `execute_wave` | Queue one background job |
| `wave_status` | Stage, progress, result; omit `job_id` to list |
| `cancel_wave` | Stop a queued or running scanner |
| `query_cards` | Prioritized semantic cards |
| `second_look` | Re-run only the originating Nuclei template |
| `assess_exploitability` | Candidate impact, missing evidence, negative control, playbooks |
| `state_impact` | Record a hunter hypothesis |
| `draft_proof` | Allowlisted proof plan; no traffic |
| `execute_proof` | Run the GET-only playbook |
| `engagement_health` | Cooldowns, budgets, pending waves |
| `engagement_audit` | Append-only application events |
`begin_engagement` needs `engagement_id` and `scope_hosts` (plain hostnames, e.g. `target.example`). Defaults: 3 req/s, one host at a time, 120s / 120 requests per wave. `allow_safe_proof=true` enables proofs. Pass tester credential *names* only; put secrets in `KEEL_CREDENTIALS_FILE`.
## Example prompt
```text
Use only Keel MCP tools. Do not shell out to httpx, nuclei, curl, or exploit tools.
1. begin_engagement for bb-2026-01 with scope_hosts ["target.example"], 3 req/s.
Set allow_safe_proof true if I will run proofs.
2. draft_waves for https://target.example.
3. execute_wave for each wave. Poll wave_status until completed, retryable_failed,
terminal_failed, or cancelled.
4. query_cards (include_noise false), then assess_exploitability on candidates.
5. For a card with a safe playbook, draft_proof then execute_proof using tester
credential names and the canary I planted. Treat protected as refuted.
6. Summarize duplicates, evidence state, hunter_impact, and the repro_script.
Claim exploitable only when Keel reports proven.
```
## Traffic controls
- Exact scope and exclusions on draft, admit, ingest, and proof
- One wave per host; same-host jobs wait
- Shared global and per-host token buckets
- Persistent request reservations; retries consume a new reservation
- Nuclei: signed HTTP templates, no OAST, no redirects, no retries, exclude dos/fuzz/bruteforce/intrusive
- Isolated empty scanner configs; proxy and ProjectDiscovery-cloud env vars stripped
- HTTP 429 stops the wave and honors Retry-After
- Bounded response reads; evidence without raw bodies
## Troubleshooting
```bash
keel-pentest doctor
keel-pentest setup # if doctor reports missing httpx/nuclei
```
`begin_engagement` after a client restart restores the SQLite engagement. If you changed scope, use a new `engagement_id`.
Proofs need `allow_safe_proof=true` and, for session playbooks, `KEEL_CREDENTIALS_FILE` mapping names like `tester-a` to Authorization or Cookie.
##
<div align="center">
[](https://glama.ai/mcp/servers/lutfizp/keel)
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## License
MIT. Copyright (c) 2026 [Lutfi Z.P.](https://github.com/lutfizp)
PyPI: **keel-pentest**. MCP Registry: **io.github.lutfizp/keel**. Source: [github.com/lutfizp/keel](https://github.com/lutfizp/keel).
##
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[](https://glama.ai/mcp/servers/lutfizp/keel)
</div>TDQS
Scored across 9 tools
Each tool targets a distinct resource and action: engagements, waves, proofs, and cards are cleanly separated. The two execute tools are disambiguated by proof vs wave, and the two draft tools by waves vs proof, so an agent should not confuse them.
Most tools follow a clear verb_noun snake_case pattern like execute_proof, begin_engagement, draft_waves, and query_cards. engagement_health and second_look break the pattern by using noun phrases, but the overall convention remains readable and predictable.
Nine tools is a well-scoped size for this domain, covering engagement setup, wave and proof execution, and card interaction without unnecessary redundancy or bloat.
The core loop is represented, but there is no explicit admission step for drafted waves before execute_wave, and engagements lack update/close lifecycle operations. These are notable workflow gaps that could stall end-to-end operations.