Summarize the environment: how many attack routes are open, how many are runtime-confirmed, how many assets and relationships are mapped, and which sensitive assets an attacker can currently reach. Start here to orient before enumerating anything: it also gives the names the other tools take - the sensitive assets routes_to_target accepts and the applications app arguments accept.

List the ranked routes from internet exposure to a sensitive asset, highest triage priority first. score is the modelled end-to-end exploit probability and priority (0-100, banded P1/P2/P3) is the triage order that also weighs corroboration and target sensitivity. IMPORTANT: these probabilities are expert estimates, not measurements calibrated against real outcomes - call get_score_trust before presenting any of them as a probability, and prefer the ranking over the absolute values. It returns one page: when nextOffset is not null more routes exist, and passing it as offset returns the next ones. Routes an analyst has suppressed are listed too, marked suppressed.

Give the full kill chain for one route: every hop, the relationship type, that hop's probability, where the probability came from (kev/epss/runtime are observed evidence; cvss/severity/heuristic are estimates), and the MITRE ATT&CK technique. Use this before explaining or acting on a route - the hop provenance is what tells you which parts of the story are evidence and which are assumption.

Enumerate the k best distinct routes that reach a named sensitive asset. Answers 'how many ways in are there, and do they share a choke point' - which single-path views hide. Cutting a hop that every route traverses removes them all; cutting one that appears in a single route removes one. Each route comes with its hops, ready to hand to simulate_fix. It returns the best k and has no further page.

Return the remediation plan: the fewest changes that remove the most risk, choke points first, each with the share of critical-path risk it eliminates and how many routes it cuts. This is usually the right answer to 'what should we do' - a hundred routes typically collapse into a handful of changes.

Ask what actually happens if specific relationships are cut: re-runs the whole simulation with those edges removed and reports how many routes disappear and how the compromise probability moves. This is the tool to reach for before recommending a change - it is a deterministic counterfactual over the real graph, not an estimate, so it settles 'would this help' instead of arguing about it. It changes nothing: the graph, the environment and every recorded decision stay as they are, so it needs no confirmation and can be repeated freely.

Full-text search across indexed assets and findings by name, CVE id, or keyword. Use it to resolve a name a human mentioned into the node ids the other tools take. It needs OpenSearch on the deployment: where that is off it answers with an error saying so, never with an empty list, and get_posture and list_attack_paths are then where names come from. It returns the best size matches and has no further page: narrow the query instead.

Report how well the engine's probabilities have matched reality, measured against recorded red-team or BAS outcomes: the verdict (well-calibrated / calibrated-on-average / overconfident / underconfident / insufficient-data; calibrated-on-average means only the average matches, so no individual score may be quoted as a probability), the predicted-versus-observed rates, and what to do about the gap. Call this before quoting any score as a probability. If it reports insufficient-data, the numbers are expert estimates and must be presented as the model's own estimate, not as odds. It also reports discrimination - whether the score, and separately the triage Priority order, put confirmed paths above refuted ones (AUC with a 95% interval). Do not present the ranking as evidence of which path is most dangerous unless priorityDiscrimination reads 'discriminates'; 'insufficient-data' or 'indistinguishable-from-chance' means the order has not been shown to beat a coin, and must be said so.