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kiraa06
by kiraa06

health_report

Read-only

Audit stored passwords for weak, reused, expired, stale, or unused entries, optionally checking breaches via HaveIBeenPwned k-anonymity, and assign an A-F grade.

Instructions

Audit the vault: weak, reused, expired/expiring, stale, unused and (optionally) breached passwords via HaveIBeenPwned k-anonymity (only 5 hash chars leave the machine). Graded A–F.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
check_pwnedNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv1.1.0

TDQS

A3.8/5.0
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Adds genuinely useful behavioral detail beyond the annotations: the optional breached check, the HaveIBeenPwned k-anonymity mechanism, and that only 5 hash chars leave the machine. However, this external call to HaveIBeenPwned conflicts with the openWorldHint=false annotation, which claims no external-world interaction, creating an inconsistency.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two tight sentences that front-load the verb and scope, then the privacy mechanism and return format. No wasted words for the amount of information conveyed.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a read-only audit tool whose safety profile is covered by annotations, the description conveys scope, the optional network check, and the A–F result. It could say a bit more about the result structure, but that is minor given no output schema exists.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0%, so the description must carry the burden, and it does: "(optionally) breached passwords via HaveIBeenPwned" explains exactly what the sole check_pwned parameter toggles. Minor gap in that it doesn't restate the default (false) semantics.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Specific verb ("Audit") plus resource ("vault"), with an explicit enumeration of what is checked (weak, reused, expired/expiring, stale, unused, breached) and the output shape ("Graded A–F"). This clearly distinguishes it from siblings like audit_log (event log) and vault_status (state check).

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The audit purpose implies when you'd call it, but there is no explicit trigger or routing versus alternatives such as audit_log, vault_status, or find_credentials. Usage is inferable from the description rather than stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.