Retrieve paginated domain, hostname, IP, service, and certificate assets from a saved report. Use report_id to access attack-surface data for analysis.
保存済みレポートのドメイン、ホスト名、IP、サービス、証明書をページ単位で返す。
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | ||
| offset | No | ||
| report_id | Yes | ||
| asset_type | No |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| total | Yes | ||
| assets | Yes | ||
| offset | Yes | ||
| has_more | Yes | ||
| returned | Yes | ||
| report_id | Yes |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
v0.1.0Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
readOnlyHint already marks this as a safe read operation, and the description adds the useful fact that results are paged and scoped to saved reports. It does not describe filtering behavior or any special constraints beyond this, but there is no contradiction with the annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single sentence with no filler; the resource types are front-loaded and the paging behavior is stated at the end. Every word contributes.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The read-only listing behavior and asset scope are adequately conveyed, and an output schema exists to specify return values. However, the description lacks explicit sibling routing and leaves parameter-level semantics to be inferred, so it is functional but not fully complete on its own.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
With 0% schema description coverage, the description partially compensates by enumerating asset_type values (domain, hostname, IP, service, certificate) and implying limit/offset through 'ページ単位で返す'. It does not explicitly explain report_id, limit, or offset, so parameter meaning is only partially conveyed.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description names a precise action (returns) and resource scope: domains, hostnames, IPs, services, and certificates from saved reports, with page-based output. This is enough to distinguish it from sibling tools like list_reports and list_vulnerabilities.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The use case is implied rather than explicit: it lists assets belonging to a saved report, and the page-unit note indicates pagination use. However, it never states when to prefer this over siblings such as list_vulnerabilities or what prerequisites are needed (e.g., obtaining a report_id).
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.