FractalAI MCP Server
Server Configuration
Describes the environment variables required to run the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| FRACTALAI_BASE_URL | No | Override the endpoint base URL. | https://fractalai.net.co |
Instructions
Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.
This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.
Capabilities
Features and capabilities supported by this server
Protocol revision2025-11-25
| Capability | Details |
|---|---|
| tools | {
"listChanged": true
} |
Tools
Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| verify_proofA | Verify a post-quantum (ML-DSA-65 / Dilithium-3, NIST FIPS 204) signature against its public key. Free, no payment. Returns { valid, verdict }. A valid result proves the exact bytes in signed_message_b64 were signed by the given key; it says nothing about their truthfulness. For a signature from pqc_sign over a hex digest D, signed_message_b64 = base64(utf8(D)). |
| x402_checkoutA | Return the live x402 (HTTP 402) payment requirements for a paid FractalAI resource: price, network, USDC asset, payTo address and the accepts[] entries (EIP-3009 gasless and txHash fallback). Free — it never moves funds. Use it before pqc_sign / seal_provenance / attest_decision to learn exactly how much and how to pay. Pass resource='manifest' for the full .well-known/x402.json. |
| pqc_signA | Pay $0.02 USDC (x402) for one post-quantum ML-DSA-65 / Dilithium-3 (NIST FIPS 204) signature over your message (its sha256 is signed) or a hex hash (signed directly). Returns { digest, signature, public_key, payment }. Without payment_tx_hash you get the payment challenge, not a signature. The signature proves these exact bytes were signed by this server's PQC key — nothing about their truthfulness, and 'quantum-resistant per NIST' is not 'unbreakable'. |
| seal_provenanceA | Pay $0.05 USDC (x402) for a post-quantum provenance seal over content: a drand round (League of Entropy, not backdateable) + a self-contained ML-DSA-65 / Dilithium-3 signature over the seal + an on-chain anchor attempt (this server's node-bound Dilithium-2 key) over the content hash. Useful for EU AI Act (Art. 10/50/53) provenance. It is a provenance record, not a content audit. Without payment_tx_hash you get the payment challenge. |
| attest_decisionA | Pay $0.05 USDC (x402) to seal an AI agent's declared decision: its input hash, output, model and timestamp are chained in an append-only Black Box and anchored on-chain (VAID-1, this server's node-bound Dilithium-2 key). You also get back a self-contained ML-DSA-65 / Dilithium-3 signature over the same canonical decision bytes for independent offline verification. Returns a re-verifiable receipt. Built for EU AI Act Art.12 record-keeping. It notarizes the decision as declared; it does not judge whether the decision was correct. Without payment_tx_hash you get the payment challenge. |
Prompts
Interactive templates invoked by user choice
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No prompts | |
Resources
Contextual data attached and managed by the client
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No resources | |
TDQS
Scored across 5 tools
Three tools (seal_provenance, pqc_sign, attest_decision) all produce a paid ML-DSA-65 signature, distinguished only by what is being signed (content, arbitrary bytes, agent decision). The descriptions do work to separate them, but the boundaries are conceptual rather than structural, and an agent could easily reach for pqc_sign when seal_provenance is intended.
All names use snake_case consistently, which is the important part. The patterns mix verb_noun (seal_provenance, verify_proof, attest_decision) with prefix-style names (x402_checkout, pqc_sign), a minor but noticeable deviation.
Five tools is a well-scoped surface for a narrow signing/attestation service: one payment discovery tool, one free verifier, and three seal/sign operations. Nothing feels padded or missing at the count level.
signature-level verification exists via verify_proof, but there is no tool to re-verify a seal_provenance record or an attest_decision receipt end-to-end (drand round, on-chain anchor, Black Box chain), despite both being advertised as re-verifiable. An agent that seals something has no symmetric read/verify path for that artifact.