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FractalAI MCP Server

FractalAI MCP Server

by johnInarti

FractalAI MCP Server

A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that exposes FractalAI's live post-quantum cryptography and x402 micropayment capabilities as tools any MCP client (Claude Desktop, IDEs, agent frameworks) can call over stdio.

It talks to the real, public FractalAI deployment at https://fractalai.net.co — nothing here is mocked.

What it does

Tool

Cost

What it does

verify_proof

free

Verify a post-quantum ML-DSA-65 / Dilithium-3 / NIST FIPS 204 signature against its public key. Returns { valid, verdict }.

x402_checkout

free

Return live x402 (HTTP 402) payment requirements for a paid resource — price, network, USDC asset, payTo, and the accepts[] entries. Also fetches the full .well-known/x402.json manifest.

pqc_sign

$0.02 USDC

Buy one ML-DSA-65 / Dilithium-3 signature over a message (its sha256 is signed) or a hex hash (signed directly).

seal_provenance

$0.05 USDC

Buy a PQC + drand provenance seal over content: a drand round + a self-contained ML-DSA-65 / Dilithium-3 signature + an on-chain anchor attempt (this server's node-bound Dilithium-2 key) over the content hash.

attest_decision

$0.05 USDC

Seal an AI agent's declared decision (input hash, output, model, timestamp) — chained in an append-only Black Box, anchored on-chain (VAID-1, node-bound Dilithium-2 key), and returned with a self-contained ML-DSA-65 / Dilithium-3 signature for independent offline verification.

Related MCP server: obolpay-x402-mcp

Honest scope (read this)

  • The signature every tool here serves/verifies directly is ML-DSA-65 / Dilithium-3 (NIST FIPS-204, Cat-3). seal_provenance and attest_decision ALSO write a separate on-chain anchor (VAID-1) using this server's node-bound Dilithium-2 key — additive, not the signature returned to you.

  • Dilithium-3 is resistant to known classical and quantum attacks per NIST FIPS 204 — it is NOT "unbreakable". A signature proves the exact bytes you submitted were signed by this server's post-quantum key. It says nothing about the truthfulness of the signed content.

  • seal_provenance produces a provenance record, not a content audit.

  • attest_decision notarizes a decision as declared; it does not judge whether the decision was correct.

  • The paid tools run a real HTTP 402 flow. Without a payment_tx_hash they return the payment challenge (accepts[]) — they never fabricate a result.

Payment model (x402)

Paid tools are gated by x402: pay in USDC on Base to the service's treasury, then the tool returns the resource. This server uses the facilitator-less txHash settlement path, which needs no facilitator account:

  1. Call the tool once with no payment_tx_hash. You get back the accepts[] block: the exact USDC amount, the asset (USDC on Base), and the payTo treasury address.

  2. Send that USDC transfer on Base yourself.

  3. Call the tool again with payment_tx_hash set to the confirmed transaction hash. One txHash buys exactly one call (anti-replay is enforced server-side).

verify_proof and x402_checkout are always free.

Install & build

cd integrations/mcp
npm install
npm run build

Configure in an MCP client

Claude Desktop (claude_desktop_config.json)

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "fractalai": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": ["/absolute/path/to/integrations/mcp/dist/index.js"]
    }
  }
}

Any stdio MCP client

Run the built entrypoint: node dist/index.js. It speaks MCP over stdio; all logging goes to stderr so stdout stays a clean JSON-RPC channel.

Environment

  • FRACTALAI_BASE_URL — override the endpoint base (defaults to https://fractalai.net.co).

Example flows

Verify a signature (free):

{
  "name": "verify_proof",
  "arguments": {
    "signed_message_b64": "<base64 of the exact bytes that were signed>",
    "signature": "<base64 ML-DSA-65 / Dilithium-3 signature>",
    "public_key": "<base64 ML-DSA-65 / Dilithium-3 public key>"
  }
}

Price a signature (free), then buy it (paid):

{ "name": "x402_checkout", "arguments": { "resource": "sign" } }
{ "name": "pqc_sign", "arguments": { "message": "hello world" } }

The first pqc_sign call (no payment_tx_hash) returns the payment challenge. Pay the USDC, then call again:

{
  "name": "pqc_sign",
  "arguments": { "message": "hello world", "payment_tx_hash": "0x…" }
}

About FractalAI

FractalAI is an AI-native Layer 1 blockchain (chain id 62124) written in Rust with post-quantum cryptography (ML-DSA-65 / Dilithium-3 signatures, Kyber encryption). These x402 endpoints sell post-quantum proof, provenance and decision-attestation services to autonomous agents. See https://fractalai.net.co and the discovery manifest at https://fractalai.net.co/.well-known/x402.json.

License

MIT

Available Tools

5 tools
attest_decisionSeal an AI agent decision (VAID-1)A

Pay $0.05 USDC (x402) to seal an AI agent's declared decision: its input hash, output, model and timestamp are chained in an append-only Black Box and anchored on-chain (VAID-1, this server's node-bound Dilithium-2 key). You also get back a self-contained ML-DSA-65 / Dilithium-3 signature over the same canonical decision bytes for independent offline verification. Returns a re-verifiable receipt. Built for EU AI Act Art.12 record-keeping. It notarizes the decision as declared; it does not judge whether the decision was correct. Without payment_tx_hash you get the payment challenge.

Inputs: input (required), output (required), agent_id (required), model, +2 more.

pqc_signBuy a post-quantum signatureA

Pay $0.02 USDC (x402) for one post-quantum ML-DSA-65 / Dilithium-3 (NIST FIPS 204) signature over your message (its sha256 is signed) or a hex hash (signed directly). Returns { digest, signature, public_key, payment }. Without payment_tx_hash you get the payment challenge, not a signature. The signature proves these exact bytes were signed by this server's PQC key — nothing about their truthfulness, and 'quantum-resistant per NIST' is not 'unbreakable'.

Inputs: hash, payer, message, payment_tx_hash.

seal_provenanceBuy a PQC + drand provenance sealA

Pay $0.05 USDC (x402) for a post-quantum provenance seal over content: a drand round (League of Entropy, not backdateable) + a self-contained ML-DSA-65 / Dilithium-3 signature over the seal + an on-chain anchor attempt (this server's node-bound Dilithium-2 key) over the content hash. Useful for EU AI Act (Art. 10/50/53) provenance. It is a provenance record, not a content audit. Without payment_tx_hash you get the payment challenge.

Inputs: payer, content, content_hash, payment_tx_hash.

verify_proofVerify a post-quantum signatureA

Verify a post-quantum (ML-DSA-65 / Dilithium-3, NIST FIPS 204) signature against its public key. Free, no payment. Returns { valid, verdict }. A valid result proves the exact bytes in signed_message_b64 were signed by the given key; it says nothing about their truthfulness. For a signature from pqc_sign over a hex digest D, signed_message_b64 = base64(utf8(D)).

Inputs: signature (required), public_key (required), signed_message_b64 (required).

x402_checkoutGet x402 payment requirementsA

Return the live x402 (HTTP 402) payment requirements for a paid FractalAI resource: price, network, USDC asset, payTo address and the accepts[] entries (EIP-3009 gasless and txHash fallback). Free — it never moves funds. Use it before pqc_sign / seal_provenance / attest_decision to learn exactly how much and how to pay. Pass resource='manifest' for the full .well-known/x402.json.

Inputs: resource (required).

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

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    TDQS

    A4/5.0

    Scored across 5 tools

    Disambiguation3/5

    Three tools (seal_provenance, pqc_sign, attest_decision) all produce a paid ML-DSA-65 signature, distinguished only by what is being signed (content, arbitrary bytes, agent decision). The descriptions do work to separate them, but the boundaries are conceptual rather than structural, and an agent could easily reach for pqc_sign when seal_provenance is intended.

    Naming Consistency4/5

    All names use snake_case consistently, which is the important part. The patterns mix verb_noun (seal_provenance, verify_proof, attest_decision) with prefix-style names (x402_checkout, pqc_sign), a minor but noticeable deviation.

    Tool Count5/5

    Five tools is a well-scoped surface for a narrow signing/attestation service: one payment discovery tool, one free verifier, and three seal/sign operations. Nothing feels padded or missing at the count level.

    Completeness3/5

    signature-level verification exists via verify_proof, but there is no tool to re-verify a seal_provenance record or an attest_decision receipt end-to-end (drand round, on-chain anchor, Black Box chain), despite both being advertised as re-verifiable. An agent that seals something has no symmetric read/verify path for that artifact.

    Maintenance

    ActivitySlowing
    ResponsivenessNo recent community issues

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