search_cve

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description adds useful behavioral context: the database is local and searches have zero latency. It still omits important operational details such as result format, matching behavior, result limits, or whether it is strictly read-only, leaving some burden unmet.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is a single front-loaded sentence with no wasted words. It efficiently combines purpose, accepted input forms, and a key performance trait.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a simple one-parameter search tool, the description covers the core purpose and input modes. However, with no output schema and no annotations, it does not explain what results look like or when an agent should move from search to get_cve_details.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the sole query parameter is already well documented. The description reinforces that the query can be a CVE ID, package name, or keyword, but adds little beyond what the schema examples already provide.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description gives a specific verb and resource: searching a local CVE database. It also names the accepted lookup modes (CVE ID, package name, keyword), making the tool distinguishable from a detail-fetching sibling, but it does not explicitly differentiate itself from get_cve_details.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description implies appropriate usage by listing lookup modes such as CVE ID, package name, and keyword. However, it does not explicitly state when to use this search tool versus get_cve_details, audit_manifest, or get_safe_recommendation, nor does it give exclusions.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.