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Zabbix MCP Server

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Python
Remote

authentication_get

Read-only

Retrieve Zabbix global authentication settings to review internal, LDAP, SAML, HTTP, password, login-limit, and MFA configuration.

Instructions

Get the global authentication settings. Returns the server-wide configuration for authentication methods: internal auth, LDAP defaults, SAML settings, HTTP authentication, password complexity requirements, login attempt limits, and MFA enforcement. This is a singleton object -- there are no IDs to filter by.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
outputNoProperties of the authentication object to return. Pass 'extend' for all, 'count' for the number of matches only, or a comma-separated list of property names. Default when omitted: 'extend'. Properties: authentication_type, disabled_usrgrpid (6.4+), http_auth_enabled, http_case_sensitive, http_login_form, http_strip_domains, jit_provision_interval (6.4+), ldap_auth_enabled (6.4+), ldap_base_dn (removed in 6.2), ldap_bind_dn (removed in 6.2), ldap_bind_password (removed in 6.2), ldap_case_sensitive, ldap_configured (removed in 6.4), ldap_host (removed in 6.2), ldap_jit_status (6.4+), ldap_port (removed in 6.2), ldap_search_attribute (removed in 6.2), ldap_userdirectoryid (6.2+), mfa_status (7.0+), mfaid (7.0+), passwd_check_rules (6.0+), passwd_min_length (6.0+), saml_auth_enabled, saml_case_sensitive, saml_encrypt_assertions (removed in 6.4), saml_encrypt_nameid (removed in 6.4), saml_idp_entityid (removed in 6.4), saml_jit_status (6.4+), saml_nameid_format (removed in 6.4), saml_sign_assertions (removed in 6.4), saml_sign_authn_requests (removed in 6.4), saml_sign_logout_requests (removed in 6.4), saml_sign_logout_responses (removed in 6.4), saml_sign_messages (removed in 6.4), saml_slo_url (removed in 6.4), saml_sp_entityid (removed in 6.4), saml_sso_url (removed in 6.4), saml_username_attribute (removed in 6.4).
serverNoTarget Zabbix server. Available: default. Defaults to 'default' if omitted.
raw_jsonNoStrips the security disclaimer preamble from the response so it is pure JSON. Default: false. Requires the bearer token to have 'allow_raw_json' explicitly enabled by an operator in the admin portal - tokens without that policy receive a PolicyError instead. WARNING: setting true bypasses the prompt-injection mitigation marker that wraps untrusted Zabbix data (host names, item descriptions, problem text). LLM clients (Claude, GPT, Cursor, ...) should leave this false; only programmatic non-LLM consumers (Python scripts, n8n workflows that json.loads the result) should set true.
extra_paramsNoOther native authentication.get parameters, merged into the request as-is. authentication.get has no parameters beyond the typed ones. Any other key is refused here, because Zabbix would silently ignore it. For a parameter you are sure exists on your release but is not listed, use zabbix_raw_api_call.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
resultYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv1.41.0

TDQS

A3.6/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

readOnlyHint=true already tells the agent this is a safe read, and the singleton note adds structural insight. What is missing is the behavioral trait that matters most for this API: it likely requires elevated privileges (super-admin) to read server-wide auth settings, which the description never states.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three tightly written sentences: purpose first, then returned contents, then the singleton invocation constraint. Every sentence earns its place and nothing is redundant.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With an output schema present and 100% parameter coverage, return values and args are well covered, and the readOnly annotation carries the safety profile. The remaining gap is the undisclosed privilege requirement for reading global auth configuration.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and every parameter (output, server, raw_json, extra_params) carries a detailed description, so the baseline of 3 applies. The only description-side addition is the singleton/no-ID constraint, which the schema already effectively conveys.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Get the global authentication settings') and enumerates the returned configuration areas (LDAP, SAML, HTTP auth, password rules, MFA), which distinguishes it from siblings like userdirectory_get or mfa_get that cover narrower slices. It does not explicitly name a sibling to route away from, so it stops short of a 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description implies usage (read the server-wide auth config) and usefully notes it is a singleton with no IDs to filter, which guides invocation. However it gives no explicit when-to-use/when-not guidance or alternatives (e.g., user_checkauthentication for per-user checks), leaving the agent to infer the boundary.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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