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Glama
infraveilhq

infraveil-guard

Official
by infraveilhq
OverviewSchemaSourceRelated ServersDiscussionsAdmin
Python
Local

Server Configuration

Describes the environment variables required to run the server.

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
INFRAVEIL_GUARD_HOMENoWhere the ledger and approval queue live.~/.infraveil-guard
INFRAVEIL_GUARD_MODENoenforce blocks dangerous actions; audit logs everything but never blocks.enforce
INFRAVEIL_GUARD_THRESHOLDNoGate actions at/above this severity: none|low|medium|high|critical.high

Instructions

Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.

This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.

Capabilities

Features and capabilities supported by this server

Protocol revision2025-11-25

CapabilityDetails
tools
{
  "listChanged": false
}
prompts
{
  "listChanged": false
}
resources
{
  "subscribe": false,
  "listChanged": false
}
experimental
{}

Tools

Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions

NameDescription
guard_actionA

Check an action BEFORE you run it. Pass the exact command, SQL statement, or tool invocation you are about to execute.

Returns JSON with proceed (true/false). If proceed is false and decision is "blocked", the action is dangerous and a human must approve it out of band: tell the user to run infraveil-guard approve <action_id> in their own terminal, then call this tool again with the one-time approval_code they give you. You cannot approve your own action. Every decision is recorded in a local tamper-evident ledger.

action: the exact command/SQL/tool call about to run (required). approval_code: the one-time code a human produced via the CLI (optional).

assess_actionA

Classify the blast radius of an action WITHOUT recording or gating it. Use this to reason about risk; use guard_action when you actually intend to run it. Returns risk (none/low/medium/high/critical), whether it is reversible, the specific dangerous capabilities found, and a recommendation.

action: the command/SQL/tool call to assess (required).

verify_ledgerA

Verify the local guard ledger's hash chain - proves no decision has been edited, deleted, reordered, or inserted. Returns ok plus where any tampering was found. This is the 'trust by inspection' check; it reads only local files and trusts nothing remote.

recent_decisionsA

Return the most recent guard decisions from the local ledger (newest first): what was allowed, blocked, or approved, with risk and timestamps.

limit: how many entries to return (1-500, default 20).

Prompts

Interactive templates invoked by user choice

NameDescription

No prompts

Resources

Contextual data attached and managed by the client

NameDescription

No resources

Deploy Server
One endpoint for every MCP toolRayrun runs every MCP server behind one URL and holds the credentials. Each call is decided per client, tool, and argument, then recorded.ray.runAd

TDQS

A4.6/5.0

Scored across 4 tools

Disambiguation5/5

Each tool has a distinct purpose: assess_action for risk assessment without recording, guard_action for pre-execution gating, recent_decisions for history review, and verify_ledger for integrity verification. No overlap.

Naming Consistency5/5

All tool names follow a consistent verb_noun pattern in snake_case: assess_action, guard_action, recent_decisions, verify_ledger. No deviations.

Tool Count5/5

With 4 tools, the set is well-scoped for a security guard/audit domain. Each tool serves a clear function without redundancy or omission.

Completeness5/5

The set covers the full lifecycle: risk assessment (assess_action), action gating (guard_action), audit review (recent_decisions), and integrity verification (verify_ledger). No obvious gaps.

Maintenance

ActivitySlowing
ResponsivenessSyncing

Resources