SSH MCP Server
SSH MCP Server – Remote-Server-Tools für KI-Agenten
Er nutzt den OpenSSH-Client, der bereits auf Ihrem Rechner ist: Ihre Schlüssel, Ihre ~/.ssh/config, Ihre Jump-Hosts, Ihr Agent-Forwarding. Nichts wird mitgeliefert, nichts muss kompiliert werden, keine nativen Bindungen.
Funktioniert mit Claude Code, Codex CLI, opencode, Gemini CLI, Qwen Code, Hermes und anderen MCP-Clients.
Installation · Werkzeuge · Einrichtung · Sicherheit · Roadmap · Dokumentation · Changelog
Installation in 30 Sekunden
Keine globale Installation erforderlich. npx lädt das Paket bei der ersten Verwendung herunter:
npx -y @hypnosis/ssh-mcp-serverFügen Sie es Claude Code für jedes Projekt hinzu:
claude mcp add ssh -s user \
-e SSH_PROFILES_FILE="$HOME/.claude/ssh-profiles.json" \
-- npx -y @hypnosis/ssh-mcp-serverErstellen Sie dann ~/.claude/ssh-profiles.json mit mindestens einer Maschine:
{
"profiles": {
"production": {
"host": "server.example.com",
"username": "admin",
"privateKeyPath": "~/.ssh/your_private_key"
}
}
}Das reicht, um sich zu verbinden.
Codex, opencode, Qwen Code und andere Clients werden in Einrichtung des SSH-MCP-Servers behandelt.
Voraussetzungen
Node.js 18+ und ein System-ssh-Client im PATH. Verwenden Sie unter Windows ein schlüsselbasiertes Profil; Passwort- und Passphrase-Profile sind derzeit nicht verfügbar.
Bevorzugen Sie eine feste Version, Offline-Arbeit oder eine Registry-Prüfung weniger pro Start: npm install -g @hypnosis/ssh-mcp-server, und verwenden Sie dann ssh-mcp-server als Befehl statt npx.
Related MCP server: cygnus-ssh-mcp
Für wen das gedacht ist
DevOps- und SRE-Teams, die schnellere Audits, Incident-Checks und routinemäßige Serverarbeiten wünschen.
Vibe-Coder und Indie-Builder, die mit einem KI-Assistenten entwickeln und das, was sie bauen, auf eigenen Servern betreiben.
Sysadmins und Plattformingenieure, die strukturierte Werkzeuge statt einer uneingeschränkten Roh-Shell wollen.
Entwickler und kleine Teams, die eine eigene VPS ohne dediziertes Betriebsteam betreiben.
Homelab-, NAS- und Router-Besitzer, deren nützliche Hardware ihre modernen Protokolle überlebt hat.
Warum ein SSH-MCP-Server statt einer rohen Shell
Weniger Tokens, geringere KI-Kosten
Eine rohe Shell gibt einem KI-Agenten einen Feuerwehrschlauch: wiederholte Befehle, ASCII-Tabellen und Log-Dumps. Es verbrennt Tokens, um dieses Rauschen in ein Bild des Servers zu verwandeln – Ihr Geld.
Schnelleres Server-Debugging
Speziell entwickelte Werkzeuge bündeln Routineprüfungen, begrenzen lautes Output und liefern den Teil, der zählt. Der Agent verbringt weniger Zeit damit, Terminalausgaben zu übersetzen, und kommt schneller zur Lösung.
Weniger Rätselraten, weniger KI-Fehler
Strukturierte Antworten sagen, was gefunden wurde, was nicht gemessen werden konnte und was abgeschnitten wurde. Das lässt dem Agenten weniger Raum, Lücken mit einer Halluzination zu füllen – und gibt Ihnen weniger schlechte Fixes, ruhigere Deploys und zuverlässigeren Code.
SSH-Kompatibilität: moderne Server, Altgeräte und Windows
Nutzen Sie Ihre bestehende OpenSSH-Einrichtung
Keine gebündelte SSH-Implementierung, keine nativen Bindungen, kein Neubau pro Plattform. Befehle nutzen den System-ssh-Client, sodass Ihre Schlüssel, Ihre ~/.ssh/config, Ihre Jump-Hosts und Ihr Agent-Forwarding genau so funktionieren wie im Terminal. Wenn unterstützt, bedeutet eine gemeinsame multiplexte Verbindung pro Ziel, dass Sie sich einmal authentifizieren, nicht bei jedem Befehl.
SSH-Unterstützung für ältere Server, Router und NAS-Geräte
Senden Sie eine Datei an einen Router mit einem modernen scp, und Sie erhalten Folgendes:
scp app.conf router:/etc/
# scp: subsystem request failed on channel 0Nichts ist kaputt – ein aktuelles scp spricht das neue Protokoll, und der Router kennt es nicht. In einem Terminal gehen Sie jetzt ein Forum lesen und kommen mit einem zusätzlichen Flag zurück. Hier tun Sie nichts: Die Übertragung wird versucht, die Ablehnung erkannt, das alte Protokoll stattdessen verwendet, und diese Maschine wird gemerkt, sodass die nächste Datei direkt dorthin geht.
Fallbacks für ältere SSH-Clients und fehlende Tools
Alte Geräte bekommen einen Fallback, keine Sackgasse. Wenn eine moderne Funktion fehlt, nimmt der Server, wo möglich, den älteren Weg:
Ihre Maschine | Was Sie bekommen |
Ein Router oder NAS, zu klein für modernen Dateitransfer | Die Datei landet trotzdem – das alte Protokoll wird automatisch verwendet |
Ein Server von vor zehn Jahren | Der Workflow funktioniert weiterhin; er öffnet nur eine frische Verbindung pro Befehl, statt eine wiederzuverwenden |
Ein abgespecktes Image ohne Möglichkeit, eine Datei zu hashen | Der Upload sagt „konnte nicht verifiziert werden“ statt eine Übereinstimmung zu behaupten, die niemand geprüft hat |
Eine Box, auf der ein Werkzeug einfach nicht installiert ist | Die Antwort sagt „nicht gemessen“ – nie eine Null, die wie „nichts da“ liest |
Entwickelt für das Model Context Protocol
Auf der offiziellen MCP-SDK aufgebaut, durchgängig TypeScript, über 2500 Unit-Tests plus eine Live-Suite, die gegen echte Container statt Mocks läuft.
Rohes SSH vs. ein SSH-MCP-Server: dieselbe Aufgabe, beide Wege
SSH-Server-Gesundheitscheck
Situation: Ein Deploy ist gerade rausgegangen. Der Server fühlt sich langsam an, und Sie wissen nicht, ob Festplatte, Speicher, Dienste, Container oder Fehler schuld sind.
Frage: „Ist diese Box gesund?“
Rohes SSH
$ uptime
10:42:17 up 18 days, 3:21, 2 users, load average: 0.42, 0.31, 0.28
$ df -hT
Filesystem Type Size Used Avail Use% Mounted on
/dev/sda1 ext4 40G 35G 5.0G 87% /
overlay overlay 40G 35G 5.0G 87% /var/lib/docker/overlay2/...
$ free -h
total used free shared buff/cache available
Mem: 7.7Gi 4.9Gi 612Mi 121Mi 2.2Gi 2.5Gi
$ systemctl --failed
UNIT LOAD ACTIVE SUB DESCRIPTION
● api-worker.service loaded failed failed API background worker
$ docker ps -a
CONTAINER ID IMAGE STATUS PORTS
8e14d0b41c2a api:latest Up 3 minutes 0.0.0.0:8080->8080/tcp
65b894af2430 worker:latest Exited (1) 2 minutes ago
$ ss -tulpn
Netid State Local Address:Port Process
tcp LISTEN 0.0.0.0:22 users:(("sshd",pid=842,fd=3))
tcp LISTEN 0.0.0.0:8080 users:(("docker-proxy",pid=1942,fd=4))
$ journalctl -p err --since -1h | tail -50
Aug 20 10:39:14 prod api-worker[22104]: database connection timed out
Aug 20 10:39:14 prod systemd[1]: api-worker.service: Failed with result 'exit-code'.Das ist immer noch ein gekürztes Ergebnis. Ein vollständiger Check benötigt weitere Befehle für CPU, Dienstzustände, Containeranzahl und aktuelle Fehler, jeweils mit eigenem Ausgabeformat. Schlimmer noch: Eine Box ohne ss kann so aussehen, als hätte sie null Listener, wenn der Port-Check nie lief.
Strukturiertes MCP-Ergebnis
ssh_snapshot({ "profile": "production" }){
"disk_pct": 87,
"mem_pct": 64,
"cpu_pct": 12,
"load": "0.42 0.31 0.28",
"containers": 7,
"ports": 14,
"services_running": 3,
"recent_errors": 21,
"unavailable": []
}Was der Agent gewinnt
Rohes SSH | Strukturiertes MCP | Ihr Gewinn |
Mehrere Befehle und ASCII-Tabellen | Benannte Felder in einem Ergebnis | Ein Aufruf, benannte Felder und weniger Roundtrips |
Ein fehlendes Werkzeug kann wie leere Ausgabe aussehen |
| Weniger Rätselraten und weniger schlechte Fixes |
Sie sortieren durch Festplatten, Dienste und Fehler | Die Problemsignale sind bereits sichtbar | Schnelleres Debugging |
Ein vollständiges ssh_audit_baseline-Ergebnis kann länger sein als ein paar rohe Befehlsausgaben – etwa 1.077 Tokens gegenüber 765 in unserer Labormessung. Die Ersparnis kommt vom vollständigen Workflow, nicht davon, eine Antwort kürzer zu machen.
In einer echten Troubleshooting-Sitzung reduzierten speziell entwickelte Werkzeuge 49 einzelne Befehlsaufrufe auf 4 MCP-Aufrufe. Jeder weitere Aufruf startet eine weitere Modellrunde mit dem angesammelten Gespräch. Prompt-Caching kann die Kosten für wiederholte Eingaben senken, aber neue Befehle und ihre Ausgabe verbrauchen weiterhin Kontext. Weniger Roundtrips bedeuten weniger Tokens über die Sitzung, weniger wiederholte Analyse und einen schnelleren Weg zur Antwort.
Brauchen Sie das ganze Bild statt nur den Puls? ssh_audit_baseline bündelt System, Festplatte, Speicher, Ports, sshd, fehlgeschlagene Units, Docker, Firewall und Updates. Ergebnisse erscheinen als KRITISCH / WARNUNG / OK; nicht gemessene Abschnitte werden benannt, statt still als Null zu lesen.
Linux-Server-Logsuche
Situation: Die API läuft in Timeouts, aber dieselbe Meldung kann in nginx, syslog, journald oder einem Anwendungslog sein, das Sie mit Ihrem normalen Benutzer nicht lesen können.
Frage: „Woher kam dieser Fehler?“
Rohes SSH
$ grep -i "timeout" /var/log/nginx/error.log
2026/08/20 10:38:54 [error] upstream timed out while reading response header
$ grep -i "timeout" /var/log/syslog
Aug 20 10:39:14 prod api-worker[22104]: database connection timed out
$ grep -i "timeout" /var/log/app/*.log 2>/dev/null
$ journalctl -u api --since "1 hour ago" | grep -i timeout
Aug 20 10:39:14 prod api[22104]: database connection timed out after 30000msDer dritte Befehl sieht sauber aus, aber 2>/dev/null hat auch einen Berechtigungsfehler versteckt. „Nichts gefunden“ und „nichts gelesen“ sehen jetzt identisch aus. Ein vielbeschäftigtes Log kann auch Tausende von Zeilen zurückgeben und den Rest des Vorfalls aus dem Kontext des Agenten drängen.
Strukturiertes MCP-Ergebnis
ssh_log_search({ "profile": "production",
"path": ["/var/log/nginx/error.log", "/var/log/syslog", "/var/log/app/*.log"],
"query": "timeout", "context": 2, "since": "1h" }){
"matches": 34,
"lines": [
{ "file": "/var/log/nginx/error.log", "line": 4821,
"text": "upstream timed out while reading response header", "context": false },
{ "file": "/var/log/nginx/error.log", "line": 4822,
"text": "client closed connection", "context": true }
],
"files_searched": 6,
"files_unreadable": ["/var/log/app/private"],
"files_skipped": 12,
"files_undated": [],
"limited": false,
"truncated": false
}Was der Agent gewinnt
Rohes SSH | Strukturiertes MCP | Ihr Gewinn |
Vier Suchen und vier Ausgaben | Eine Suche über Dateien und Globs | Weniger Tokens und Roundtrips |
Berechtigungsfehler können verschwinden |
| Keine falsche „Logs sind sauber“-Schlussfolgerung |
Ausgabe kann ohne nützliche Obergrenze wachsen |
| Sicherere Entscheidungen aus Teilergebnissen |
since verwendet die Serveruhr, namesOnly: true gibt nur passende Pfade zurück, und ssh_log_tail liest die letzten N Zeilen aus mehreren Logs in einem Aufruf.
Sichere Remote-Konfigurationsänderungen
Situation: Sie müssen eine nginx-Konfiguration auf einem Live-Server ersetzen. Eine abgebrochene Verbindung, falscher Modus oder ungeprüfter Kopiervorgang könnten den Dienst mit einer kaputten Datei zurücklassen.
Frage: „Kann ich diese Konfiguration ersetzen, ohne eine partielle Datei zu hinterlassen?“
Rohes SSH
$ sudo sh -c 'cat > /etc/nginx/conf.d/api.conf' <<'EOF'
server {
listen 80;
location / { proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8080; }
}
EOF
$ echo $?
0Exit-Code Null sagt, dass die Shell fertig wurde. Es beweist nicht, welche Bytes gelandet sind, und > hat die alte Datei abgeschnitten, bevor das erste Byte der neuen ankam. Wenn die Verbindung mitten im Schreiben abbricht, bleibt der Dienst mit einer partiellen Konfiguration zurück.
Strukturiertes MCP-Ergebnis
ssh_file_write({ "profile": "production",
"files": [{ "path": "/etc/nginx/conf.d/api.conf",
"content": "server {\n listen 80;\n location / { proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8080; }\n}\n",
"mode": "644", "sudo": true, "verify": true }] }){
"files": [{ "path": "/etc/nginx/conf.d/api.conf", "written": true,
"verified": "verified", "reason": null, "bytes": 79 }]
}Was der Agent gewinnt
Raw SSH | Strukturiertes MCP | Ihr Vorteil |
Das Ziel wird abgeschnitten, bevor der Kopiervorgang abgeschlossen ist | Eine vollständige temporäre Datei ersetzt es mit einer einzigen Umbenennung | Keine halb geschriebene Konfiguration |
Nur Exit-Code | Bytes und Verifikationsergebnis sind benannt | Sie wissen, was tatsächlich angekommen ist |
Berechtigungen leben im Shell-Text |
| Vorhersehbare Eigentümerschaft und weniger Anführungszeichenfehler |
verified hat drei ehrliche Ergebnisse: verified, unavailable wenn der Server kein Hash-
Werkzeug hat, und skipped wenn die Verifikation nicht angefordert wurde. Für Lesevorgänge
akzeptiert ssh_file_read eine Liste von Pfaden; ssh_file_list behandelt Glob-Muster,
Rekursion, Größen und Modi.
Batch-SSH-Befehle mit sudo ausführen
Situation: Ein Deployment ist bereit, aber nginx-Syntax, Dienststatus und aktuelle Fehler müssen alle geprüft werden, bevor der Traffic umgeleitet wird. Ein fehlgeschlagener Check sollte nicht in einem kombinierten Dump verschwinden.
Frage: „Haben alle Preflight-Checks bestanden?“
Raw SSH
$ ssh admin@server.example.com 'sudo nginx -t'
nginx: configuration file /etc/nginx/nginx.conf test is successful
$ ssh admin@server.example.com 'sudo systemctl is-active nginx'
active
$ ssh admin@server.example.com 'sudo tail -5 /var/log/nginx/error.log'
2026/08/20 10:38:54 [error] upstream timed out while reading response headerDrei Verbindungen liefern drei unzusammenhängende Ausgaben. Wenn die Befehle mit ; verbunden
werden, meldet die Shell nur den letzten Exit-Code; wenn sie mit && verbunden werden,
verschwinden spätere Checks nach dem ersten Fehler.
Strukturiertes MCP-Ergebnis
ssh_exec({ "profile": "production",
"command": ["nginx -t", "systemctl is-active nginx",
"tail -5 /var/log/nginx/error.log"],
"sudo": true }){
"commands": [
{ "command": "nginx -t", "exit_code": 0, "truncated": false, "clipped_bytes": 0,
"stdout": "", "stderr": "nginx: configuration file /etc/nginx/nginx.conf test is successful\n" },
{ "command": "systemctl is-active nginx", "exit_code": 0, "truncated": false,
"clipped_bytes": 0, "stdout": "active\n", "stderr": "" },
{ "command": "tail -5 /var/log/nginx/error.log", "exit_code": 0, "truncated": false,
"clipped_bytes": 0, "stdout": "2026/08/21 09:14:02 [error] upstream timed out\n", "stderr": "" }
],
"job_id": null
}Was der Agent gewinnt
Raw SSH | Strukturiertes MCP | Ihr Vorteil |
Drei Aufrufe und unzusammenhängende Ausgaben | Eine geordnete Befehlsliste | Weniger Roundtrips |
Eine kombinierte Shell kann Zwischenstatus verbergen | Jeder Befehl behält seinen eigenen | Kein übersehener fehlgeschlagener Check |
|
| Weniger Anführungszeichenfehler |
Die Schutzprüfung für destruktive Befehle prüft die vollständige Liste, bevor der erste Befehl ausgeführt wird. Wenn ein Eintrag abgelehnt wird, werden alle anderen Einträge als nicht ausgeführt markiert und nichts wird an den Server gesendet.
Jeder Befehl trägt sein eigenes stdout und stderr. Ein Befehl, der ausgeführt wurde und
nichts ausgegeben hat, hat einen leeren String; ein Befehl, der nie ausgeführt wurde, hat
überhaupt kein solches Feld, sodass die beiden nicht verwechselt werden können. Ausgabe über
128 KB pro Befehl behält beide Enden — den Kopf für Tabellen, das Ende für Logs — mit einer
Naht dazwischen, die die Menge benennt, und clipped_bytes sagt, wie viel abgeschnitten wurde.
Das Abschneiden erfolgt an Byte-Grenzen und tritt zurück an die Kante eines Zeichens, sodass
eine abgeschnittene Antwort niemals ein Ersatzzeichen trägt.
sudo erreicht den Server ohne Terminal: Wenn das Profil ein Passwort hat, wird es sudo
über die Standardeingabe übergeben. Ein Profil, das sich per Schlüssel authentifiziert, hat
kein Passwort anzubieten, daher funktioniert sudo dort nur, wo es bereits passwortlos
eingerichtet ist — und ein Befehl, der seine eigene Standardeingabe liest, bekommt niemals
das Passwort, das sonst in den Daten landen würde.
Lang laufende SSH-Jobs ausführen
Situation: Ein Backup oder eine Migration läuft länger als die Agent-Sitzung. Die Verbindung kann geschlossen werden, aber Sie benötigen später weiterhin ihren Status, ihre Ausgabe und ihren Exit-Code.
Frage: „Überlebt dieser Job das Gespräch?“
Raw SSH
$ ssh admin@server.example.com 'pg_dump app | gzip > /srv/backups/app.sql.gz'
client_loop: send disconnect: Broken pipeDas Terminal ist weg. Sie müssen sich jetzt neu verbinden, den Prozess finden, die Zieldatei prüfen und raten, ob das Backup abgeschlossen oder auf halbem Weg gestoppt wurde.
Strukturiertes MCP-Ergebnis
ssh_exec({ "profile": "production",
"command": "pg_dump app | gzip > /srv/backups/app.sql.gz",
"detach": true }){
"commands": [{
"command": "pg_dump app | gzip > /srv/backups/app.sql.gz",
"exit_code": null,
"truncated": false,
"timed_out": false,
"blocked": false,
"blocked_reason": null,
"not_run": false,
"warning": null
}],
"job_id": "mst0f2q1-9ab3c4d5"
}Was der Agent gewinnt
Raw SSH | Strukturiertes MCP | Ihr Vorteil |
Der Job ist an eine SSH-Sitzung gebunden | Der entfernte Job hat eine persistente ID | Sichere Trennungen und Neustarts |
Neuverbinden bedeutet Suchen nach Prozessen und Dateien | Status und Exit-Code haben benannte Zustände | Kein Raten, ob er fertig ist |
Erneutes Lesen der Ausgabe wiederholt alten Text | Die Ausgabe wird ab einem Byte-Offset fortgesetzt | Geringerer Token-Verbrauch bei langen Jobs |
Der Job-Status liegt auf der entfernten Festplatte, nicht im Speicher dieses Servers.
ssh_job_status unterscheidet running, finished und lost; ssh_job_output setzt ab dem
letzten Byte-Offset fort; und ssh_job_kill signalisiert die gesamte Prozessgruppe statt nur
ihrer Shell.
Dateien auf Legacy-Router und NAS-Geräte übertragen
Situation: Ein aktueller OpenSSH-Client versucht SFTP, aber der Router oder das NAS versteht nur das klassische scp-Protokoll. Die Datei muss trotzdem intakt ankommen und ihr Ziel sicher ersetzen.
Frage: „Kann dieses alte Gerät weiterhin eine verifizierte Datei empfangen?“
Raw SSH
$ scp app.conf operator@router:/etc/app.conf
subsystem request failed on channel 0
scp: Connection closedDer übliche nächste Schritt ist, sich an das Legacy-Flag zu erinnern, den Kopiervorgang zu wiederholen und dann einen separaten Hash-Befehl auszuführen — falls das Gerät überhaupt ein Hash-Werkzeug hat.
Strukturiertes MCP-Ergebnis
ssh_upload({ "profile": "router", "local_path": "./app.conf",
"remote_path": "/etc/app.conf", "sudo": true,
"mode": "644", "owner": "root:root", "verify": true }){
"files": [{
"path": "/etc/app.conf",
"written": true,
"verified": "verified",
"reason": null,
"bytes": 1284
}]
}Was der Agent gewinnt
Raw SSH | Strukturiertes MCP | Ihr Vorteil |
Moderner SFTP-Modus stoppt beim ersten Fehler | Klassischer scp-Fallback ist automatisch und wird gemerkt | Alte Geräte funktionieren weiter |
Ein erfolgreicher Kopiervorgang beweist keine Integrität | SHA-256-Verifikation hat ein benanntes Ergebnis | Korruption wird nicht mit Erfolg verwechselt |
Direktes Ersetzen kann ein partielles Ziel hinterlassen | Eine temporäre Datei wird nach der Übertragung an Ort und Stelle verschoben | Die Arbeitsdatei überlebt Unterbrechungen |
Wenn das Gerät weder sha256sum noch openssl hat, sagt das Ergebnis unavailable und
benennt den Grund, statt eine falsche Übereinstimmung zu melden. Ganze Verzeichnisse verwenden
recursive: true und verifizieren ihre Hashes in einer Batch.
Schutz vor destruktiven Befehlen für KI-Agenten
Die Schutzprüfung läuft lokal, bevor ein Befehl SSH erreicht. Sie trennt Operationen, die wiederhergestellt werden können, von solchen, die den Container zerstören, der die Daten enthält, und sie prüft die Befehlsreihenfolge innerhalb von Ketten und Batches.
Eine destruktive Kette stoppen, bevor sie beginnt
Eine sichere Backup-und-Ersetzen-Sequenz:
cp -r /srv/app /srv/app.bak && mv /srv/app /srv/app-old && rm -rf /srv/appDieselben Operationen in der falschen Reihenfolge:
rm -rf /srv/app && cp -r /srv/app /srv/app.bak && mv /srv/app /srv/app-old
# REFUSED before the first command runsDie Shell würde das Verzeichnis löschen und erst dann feststellen, dass die Backup-Quelle
verschwunden ist. Die Schutzprüfung sieht, dass spätere Schritte ein Ziel lesen, das bereits
durch einen früheren Schritt zerstört wurde, also bleibt der gesamte Aufruf auf Ihrer Maschine.
Dieselbe Prüfung erfasst dropdb app && pg_dump app > backup.sql.
Irreversiblen Verlust verweigern, vor wiederherstellbaren Änderungen warnen
Verweigert — der Container selbst | Nur gewarnt — sein Inhalt |
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docker compose down -v wird verweigert, weil -v benannte Docker-Volumes entfernt,
einschließlich eines Datenbank-Volumes. Ohne -v wird das Stoppen der Dienste nicht als
dieselbe irreversible Aktion behandelt.
Rekursives Löschen des Dateisystem-Roots, eines Home-Verzeichnisses oder von Systembäumen wie
/etc, /var und /usr wird ebenfalls verweigert, auch wenn ein Symlink dorthin führt. Ein
unaufgelöstes Ziel wie rm -rf "$DIR"/* wird ebenfalls verweigert: „konnte nicht geprüft
werden“ wird nicht als „sicher“ behandelt.
Einen beabsichtigten destruktiven Befehl bestätigen
Nichts ist dauerhaft verboten. Fügen Sie # CONFIRMED-DESTRUCTIVE zu einem geprüften Befehl
hinzu und er wird durchgelassen. Wenn die Schutzprüfung einen Eintrag in einer Batch ablehnt,
stoppt die gesamte Batch vor der Ausführung, sodass der Server niemals nach einer halb
ausgeführten Operation zurückgelassen wird.
Die Schutzprüfung arbeitet innerhalb eines einzelnen Aufrufs. Sie kann ein Löschen in einer Aufrufung nicht mit einem Lesen in der nächsten verbinden oder über Werkzeuge nachdenken, die sie nicht erkennt. Sie ist ein Sicherheitsgurt, keine Policy-Engine: Wiederherstellbare Operationen bleiben Ihre Entscheidung. Pfadbeschränkungen und Anführungszeichenregeln sind in docs/security.md dokumentiert.
SSH-MCP-Werkzeuge für Serveroperationen
18 Werkzeuge. Vollständige Parameter und Beispiele finden Sie in docs/tools.md.
MCP-Werkzeug-Sicherheitsannotationen
Standard-MCP-Annotationen teilen Clients mit, welche Werkzeuge schreibgeschützt, destruktiv, idempotent oder offen sind. Siehe die vollständige Tabelle.
SSH-Befehle ausführen und entfernte Dateien verwalten
Werkzeug | Was es tut |
| Einen Befehl oder eine Batch ausführen, mit der Schutzprüfung für destruktive Befehle und optionalem Detach |
| Eine oder mehrere Dateien lesen, Text oder Binär |
| Dateien mit atomarer Umbenennung und optionaler SHA-256-Verifikation schreiben |
| Ein Verzeichnis auflisten, mit optionalem Glob und Rekursion |
Lang laufende SSH-Jobs überwachen
Werkzeug | Was es tut |
| Status eines Hintergrundjobs: running, finished oder lost |
| Gesammelte Ausgabe ab einem Byte-Offset lesen |
| Jobs auflisten, abgeschlossene nach Ablauf ihrer TTL entfernen |
| Die gesamte Prozessgruppe eines Jobs signalisieren |
Logs durchsuchen und Servergesundheit prüfen
Werkzeug | Was es tut |
| Letzte N Zeilen eines oder mehrerer Logs, Glob unterstützt |
| Mustersuche über Logs |
| Einmaliger Gesundheits-Snapshot: Dienste, Ressourcen, Docker, Netzwerk, Fehler |
| Transportsteuerung: stats, reload, test, list, close |
Dateien über SSH hoch- und herunterladen
Binärsichere Übertragungen mit Integritätsprüfungen. Details in docs/transfer.md.
Werkzeug | Was es tut |
| Eine Datei oder ein Verzeichnis hochladen |
| Eine Datei oder ein Verzeichnis herunterladen |
Für Binärdateien und große Dateien verwenden Sie
ssh_upload/ssh_download— Base64- Chunks und Heredocs sind nicht binärsicher oder atomar.
Linux-Server über SSH auditieren
Schreibgeschützt und in einem einzigen Roundtrip gebündelt. Details in docs/audit.md.
Werkzeug | Was es tut |
| System, Festplatte, Speicher, Netzwerk, ssh, Dienste, Docker, Firewall, Updates |
| Zertifikatsablauf, SAN, Kette und Erneuerungs-Hook für eine Domain |
| Wohin die Festplatte ging: |
|
|
Windows-SSH-Kompatibilitätsmodus
Windows verwendet den Kompatibilitätsmodus automatisch. Wenn Verbindungs-Multiplexing nicht verfügbar ist, wechselt der Server auf eine Verbindung pro Befehl. Dieselben Tools bleiben über schlüsselbasiertes SSH verfügbar – keine separate Einrichtung oder Windows-spezifische Implementierung erforderlich.
Der Schutz vor destruktiven Befehlen wird in Schutz vor destruktiven Befehlen für KI-Agenten behandelt.
SSH-MCP-Server einrichten
Führen Sie zuerst das Paket aus In 30 Sekunden installieren aus, und erstellen Sie dann eine Profildatei.
SSH-Verbindungsprofile erstellen
Legen Sie sie dort ab, wo Sie möchten – neben der eigenen Konfiguration Ihres Agenten ist die übliche Wahl. Die Beispiele unten verwenden ~/.claude/ssh-profiles.json; für andere Agenten tauschen Sie das Verzeichnis aus (~/.codex/, ~/.qwen/, ~/.config/opencode/):
{
"profiles": {
"production": {
"host": "server.example.com",
"username": "admin",
"port": 22,
"privateKeyPath": "~/.ssh/your_private_key"
}
}
}Ein SSH-Profil explizit auswählen
Es gibt kein Profil, auf das der Server zurückfällt: Jedes ist eine andere Maschine, und ein Befehl, der an die falsche Maschine gesendet wird, kann durch eine Fehlermeldung im Nachhinein nicht rückgängig gemacht werden. Fragen Sie ohne Namen, und die Antwort listet die Namen zur Auswahl auf:
ssh_exec({ command: "uptime" })
→ No profile specified. Name one explicitly: productionEin Profil, das der Server nicht für SSH verwenden kann – kein host, kein username oder mode: "local" – wird ohne Beschwerde übersprungen, und Felder, die er nicht erkennt, werden unangetastet gelassen, sodass die Datei mit anderen Tools geteilt werden kann. Ein Profil mit einem defekten Feld ist ein anderer Fall: Es wird zusammen mit dem Feld und dem Wert benannt, und seine gesunden Nachbarn funktionieren weiter.
Jedes Profil akzeptiert optional einen pathSecurity-Block, der Pfade, die Datei-Tools berühren dürfen, auf eine Whitelist oder Blacklist setzt – siehe docs/security.md.
SSH-Passwörter und Passphrasen aus Profilen heraushalten
Schlüssel bevorzugen. Wenn ein Passwort oder eine Passphrase für verschlüsselte Schlüssel unvermeidbar ist, bewahren Sie sie in einer separaten Secrets-Datei auf, niemals im Profil selbst:
{
"secretsFile": "~/.config/ssh-mcp/secrets.json",
"profiles": {
"production": {
"host": "server.example.com",
"username": "admin"
}
}
}Die Secrets-Datei ist nach Profilname verschlüsselt – siehe secrets.json.example:
{
"production": { "password": "..." }
}Die Secrets-Datei darf nur von Ihnen lesbar sein (chmod 600). Relative Pfade werden von der Profildatei aus aufgelöst; Secrets bleiben aus argv heraus und werden in Protokollen maskiert. Siehe Sicherheit der Anmeldedaten.
Claude Code, Codex und andere MCP-Clients konfigurieren
Wählen Sie den Client, den Sie verwenden, und zeigen Sie auf dieselbe Profildatei.
Claude Code
Ein Befehl; -s user macht den Server in jedem Projekt verfügbar:
claude mcp add ssh -s user \
-e SSH_PROFILES_FILE="$HOME/.claude/ssh-profiles.json" \
-- npx -y @hypnosis/ssh-mcp-serverCodex CLI
codex mcp add ssh \
--env SSH_PROFILES_FILE="$HOME/.codex/ssh-profiles.json" \
-- npx -y @hypnosis/ssh-mcp-serveropencode
Fügen Sie es in ~/.config/opencode/opencode.json ein:
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"ssh": {
"type": "local",
"command": ["npx", "-y", "@hypnosis/ssh-mcp-server"],
"enabled": true,
"environment": {
"SSH_PROFILES_FILE": "~/.config/opencode/ssh-profiles.json"
}
}
}
}Qwen Code
Ein Befehl, derselbe wie die anderen:
qwen mcp add ssh \
-e SSH_PROFILES_FILE="$HOME/.qwen/ssh-profiles.json" \
npx -y @hypnosis/ssh-mcp-serverAndere MCP-Clients
Gemini CLI, Hermes, Cline, ein Editor-Plugin oder Ihr eigener Agent funktionieren auf dieselbe Weise. Alles, was sie brauchen, ist ein auszuführender Befehl und eine Umgebungsvariable.
MCP-Client neu starten
Starten Sie den Client neu und führen Sie dann ssh_monitor({ action: "list" }) aus, um zu bestätigen, dass das Profil geladen wurde.
SSH-MCP-Server-Konfiguration
Variable | Was sie tut | Standard |
| Pfad zur Profile-JSON – erforderlich | — |
|
|
|
| Fallback, nur verwendet, wenn |
|
| Zeitstempel in Protokollzeilen |
|
| Sekunden, die eine gemeinsame Verbindung nach dem letzten Befehl aktiv bleibt; |
|
| Wo Control-Sockets liegen |
|
| Profil-Cache-TTL, ms |
|
| Profildatei neu laden, wenn sie sich ändert |
|
Die gemeinsame Verbindung überlebt diesen Prozess absichtlich: Sie beim Beenden zu schließen, würde den Kanal abschneiden, den ein anderes Fenster auf derselben Maschine verwendet.
Einschränkungen des SSH-MCP-Servers
Abbruch: Das Schließen von SSH kann den Remote-Befehl weiterlaufen lassen. Verwenden Sie getrennte Jobs, wenn Kontrolle wichtig ist.
Atomare Schreibvorgänge: BSD und macOS können Dateisystem-übergreifende Umbenennungen nicht vorab prüfen.
Roadmap des SSH-MCP-Servers
Vollständiger Testlauf gegen macOS-SSH-Hosts
End-to-End-Kompatibilitätslauf auf Windows
Multi-Host-Audits – Gesundheitszustand über mehrere SSH-Profile in einem Aufruf vergleichen
Profile aus der vorhandenen
~/.ssh/configimportierenFortsetzbare Übertragungen für große Dateien und instabile Verbindungen
Remote-Operations-Zeitachse – Befehle, Übertragungen und Schutzentscheidungen in einem Audit-Trail
Fertige SSH-Fehlerbehebungs-Playbooks
Antworten, die das Modell erreichen– ERLEDIGT: Befehlsausgabe, übereinstimmende Protokollzeilen, Maschinennamen und Snapshot-Abschnitte reisen in den Feldern, nicht nur im TextKleinere MCP-Tool-Schemas– ERLEDIGT: Die Tool-Liste wurde um 10 % leichter, und ein getrennter Job zeigt jetzt die letzten Zeilen, die er geschrieben hat, anstatt blind abgefragt zu werden
SSH-MCP-Server entwickeln und testen
npm install
npm run build # tsc
npx tsc --noEmit # types, plus dead declarations
npm run test:unit # unit tests
npm run lab:up # start the two test containers
npm run test:live # live suite against those containersDie Live-Suite läuft gegen echte Container – einen BusyBox, einen coreutils – weil die beiden sich leise widersprechen, und ein Mock stimmt mit dem überein, der es geschrieben hat. Siehe docs/architecture.md für das Layout.
Gefällt Ihnen der SSH-MCP-Server? ⭐
Wenn Ihnen das Tool gefällt, geben Sie ihm einen Stern auf GitHub – das hilft mehr Menschen, das Projekt zu entdecken.
Zum SSH-MCP-Server beitragen
Issues und Pull-Requests sind willkommen unter github.com/hypnosis/ssh-mcp-server.
Lizenz
MIT – siehe LICENSE.
Available Tools
18 toolsssh_audit_baselineARead-only
Reports how a machine is set up: sshd, firewall, pending updates, failed services, docker, listening ports and disk, each section marked CRITICAL, WARNING or OK. Reads only, in one round trip instead of a dozen commands. For load and health at this moment rather than settings, use ssh_snapshot.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| compact | No | Trim the long sections. false = whole, much larger answer. Default: true | |
| include | No | system, disk, mem, net, ssh, services, docker, firewall, updates. Default: all | |
| profile | Yes | Machine name. | |
| include_sudo_sections | No | Run the sections that need root as root: sshd -T for ssh, ufw and iptables rules for firewall. Without it those sections name what they could not read instead of guessing. Default: false |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| os | No | |
| net | No | |
| ssh | No | |
| disk | No | |
| load | No | |
| docker | No | |
| kernel | No | |
| legend | No | What the words in this answer mean. A key names the field before the value — "state=limited", "jobs[].state=lost" — and only the values this answer actually used are listed. |
| memory | No | |
| uptime | No | |
| updates | No | |
| date_utc | No | |
| firewall | No | |
| hostname | No | |
| services | No | |
| red_flags | No | |
| unavailable | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The annotation already declares readOnlyHint=true, and the description reinforces this with 'Reads only'. It adds useful behavioral context beyond the annotation by stating that sections are marked CRITICAL/WARNING/OK and that it replaces 'a dozen commands' in one round trip. No contradiction with annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three sentences with no filler: the first defines purpose and output shape, the second states safety and efficiency, and the third routes to the sibling tool. The most important scoping information is front-loaded.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a read-only audit tool, the description covers what it reports, how the output is categorized, why it is efficient, and which sibling to use in the alternate use case. Combined with full parameter documentation and an output schema, nothing essential is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, with every parameter documented including defaults and allowed values. The tool description contributes high-level context but does not need to compensate for missing parameter docs, so the baseline 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Reports how a machine is set up', then enumerates exact domains (sshd, firewall, updates, services, docker, ports, disk) and the severity marking scheme. It also distinguishes itself from ssh_snapshot, so an agent can tell it apart from the closest sibling.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives explicit routing guidance: 'For load and health at this moment rather than settings, use ssh_snapshot.' It also frames the tool as a one-round-trip setup audit, making the intended use case clear without ambiguity.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
ssh_disk_breakdownARead-only
Finds what filled a disk: free space per filesystem, the largest directories under each path given, and what docker, journald and package caches hold. Reads only, nothing is deleted. For how full the disks are at all, ssh_snapshot answers in one line.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| sudo | No | Read as root. Straight away for places a plain user cannot read (/root, /var/lib/docker); otherwise retry with true when the answer names what it could not read. Default: false The cache section then reads root's home, not the profile user's. | |
| paths | No | Where to look. Naming the suspect beats walking the whole filesystem. Default: ["/"] | |
| top_n | No | Largest directories named per path. Default: 20 | |
| profile | Yes | Machine name. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| cache | No | |
| docker | No | |
| largest | No | |
| var_log | No | |
| journald | No | |
| unreadable | No | Not looked into: the sizes above leave these out |
| filesystems | No | |
| unavailable | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, and the description reinforces this with 'Reads only, nothing is deleted.' It adds useful context about what areas are inspected (docker, journald, package caches) without contradicting the annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two tight sentences. The first explains scope and read-only behavior, and the second routes to the alternative for a different need. There is no filler or repeated schema content.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With a rich input schema, an output schema, and a readOnlyHint annotation, the description covers what an agent needs: what it inspects, that it is safe, and how it relates to ssh_snapshot. No critical behavioral or selection information is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description does not add parameter-specific meaning beyond the schema, but it does relate the tool's purpose to the 'paths' concept. It neither improves nor harms parameter understanding.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb-resource pair ('Finds what filled a disk') and enumerates the concrete outputs: free space per filesystem, largest directories per path, and cache contents. It also differentiates itself from ssh_snapshot by framing this as the detailed breakdown versus the one-line fullness answer.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives a clear alternative and selection rule: use ssh_snapshot when only overall disk fullness is needed, and this tool when a breakdown is required. It could be slightly more explicit about when not to use the tool, but the guidance is strong enough for an agent to make the right choice.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
ssh_downloadADestructiveIdempotent
Copies a file or directory from a server to this machine, checked by sha256 on both sides. To read a text file rather than keep it, ssh_file_read skips the disk.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| sudo | No | For /root and the like. A root copy stages in /tmp, is fetched and removed — the machine needs room. Default: false | |
| verify | No | sha256 on both sides, per file. "unavailable" = no sha256 on the machine = delivered, not broken. "mismatched" fails the call and replaces nothing. Default: true | |
| profile | Yes | Machine name. | |
| timeout | No | Milliseconds. No ceiling by default — a transfer runs as long as it takes. | |
| recursive | No | Only to force it — a directory is recognised on its own. | |
| local_path | Yes | Where it lands on this machine. | |
| remote_path | Yes | What to fetch from the server. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| files | No | |
| legend | No | What the words in this answer mean. A key names the field before the value — "state=limited", "jobs[].state=lost" — and only the values this answer actually used are listed. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already provide idempotentHint and destructiveHint, and the description adds meaningful behavioral detail: 'checked by sha256 on both sides.' This goes beyond the annotations by explaining the verification mechanism. It does not explicitly state that an existing local_path may be overwritten, but the destructiveHint annotation covers the general risk, and the schema's verify parameter adds mismatch semantics.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two concise sentences with no redundant wording. The core action and verification detail are front-loaded, and the sibling alternative follows in a clearly conditional form. Every sentence contributes useful information.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the rich input schema, output schema, and annotations, the description is complete enough for an agent to know what the tool does, when to use it, and when not to. It covers direction, verification, and the key sibling alternative, with no missing information necessary for correct invocation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all seven parameters in detail. The description adds no parameter-level meaning beyond the schema; it only restates the overall transfer and verification behavior. A baseline of 3 is appropriate since the schema carries the semantic weight.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific action and resource: 'Copies a file or directory from a server to this machine.' This clearly identifies the tool's direction and purpose. It also differentiates from ssh_file_read by noting the alternative is for reading text without keeping a copy, and the title 'Download from a server' reinforces the intent.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly provides an alternative and a usage condition: 'To read a text file rather than keep it, ssh_file_read skips the disk.' This tells an agent when to prefer a sibling tool instead. The copy direction is unambiguous, so there is no confusion with ssh_upload.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
ssh_execADestructive
Runs one command or a list of them on a server, each with its own exit code, stdout and stderr. Work measured in minutes belongs in detach, not in a longer timeout. Reach for it last — files, logs, transfers, health and jobs each have a tool that batches the round trips and parses the answer.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| cwd | No | Directory to start in, detached jobs included. Cannot be entered -> the command stops, it does not run elsewhere. | |
| sudo | No | Execute command(s) with sudo. Default: false | |
| detach | No | Background job on the server: returns an id at once, outlives this call, timeout does not apply. Follow with ssh_job_status / ssh_job_output, stop with ssh_job_kill. One command. With sudo the job runs as root and every later call follows it as root, provided the profile has a password or sudo needs none. Default: false | |
| command | Yes | One command, or a list: ["hostname", "whoami"]. Each runs in its own shell — no shared variable, no shared cd; cwd applies to all. A non-zero exit does not stop the list. | |
| profile | Yes | Machine name. | |
| timeout | No | Milliseconds, per command in a list, not for the whole list; default 30000. Work measured in minutes -> detach, not a bigger number. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| job_id | No | |
| legend | No | What the words in this answer mean. A key names the field before the value — "state=limited", "jobs[].state=lost" — and only the values this answer actually used are listed. |
| commands | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Beyond the destructiveHint annotation, the description adds behavior: each command returns its own exit code, stdout, and stderr, and long-running work should be detached rather than given a bigger timeout. It doesn't fully warn about the arbitrary-command risk, but the annotation and phrasing imply raw execution.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two tight sentences carry both the core behavior and the key usage caveat. Every clause earns its place, and the most important routing guidance comes second but remains succinct.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The combination of a rich schema, output schema, and a description that covers command granularity and tool routing gives an agent enough to invoke this correctly. It does not name the exact sibling tools, but the categories are identifiable from the sibling list.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already explains every parameter. The description reinforces the detach-vs-timeout tradeoff at a high level, but adds no new parameter-specific meaning. Baseline 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb and resource: running one command or a list on a server, with per-command exit code, stdout, and stderr. It also differentiates from specialized siblings by saying files, logs, transfers, health, and jobs each have their own tool, making this the raw fallback.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Provides explicit when-not-to-use guidance: work measured in minutes belongs in detach, not a longer timeout. It also tells the agent to prefer category-specific tools because they batch round trips and parse answers, which is clear routing advice.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
ssh_file_listARead-only
Lists a directory on a server: every entry with its size, mode, owner and modification time, as fields. A directory it was not allowed to enter is named rather than left out, and a listing cut short by the output limit says so. To see what is inside a file, use ssh_file_read.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| path | Yes | Directory to list. | |
| sudo | No | List as root, for directories the profile user cannot open. Default: false | |
| pattern | No | Glob matched on the machine: "*.conf". Without it every entry comes back. | |
| profile | Yes | Machine name. | |
| recursive | No | Descend into subdirectories. A deep tree is cut at the output limit and says so. Default: false |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| path | No | |
| legend | No | What the words in this answer mean. A key names the field before the value — "state=limited", "jobs[].state=lost" — and only the values this answer actually used are listed. |
| entries | No | |
| truncated | No | The output limit cut the answer: the directory holds more than entries lists. |
| unreadable | No | Directories nobody was allowed to enter. Their contents are missing from entries, and a list short by the one that mattered looks complete. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Beyond the readOnlyHint annotation, it discloses useful behavioral edge cases: unreadable directories are named rather than silently omitted, and listings truncated by the output limit are explicitly flagged. This gives the agent accurate expectations for permission failures and large listings.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three tight sentences with no filler: core purpose first, then key behavioral guarantees, then the routing note to ssh_file_read. Every sentence earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With a readOnlyHint, 100% schema parameter coverage, and an output schema present, the description covers the remaining contextual needs: result contents, error behavior, truncation signaling, and the relationship to the closest sibling. Nothing essential is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the input schema fully documents all five parameters. The description adds context about output fields and truncation but not new parameter-level semantics, matching the baseline for fully documented schemas.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Lists a directory on a server' and names the returned fields (size, mode, owner, modification time). It distinguishes itself from ssh_file_read by explicitly directing file-content needs to that sibling.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It clearly states the tool's use case (listing directories) and provides an explicit alternative for the adjacent case ('To see what is inside a file, use ssh_file_read'). No ambiguity remains about which sibling to pick for file-content access.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
ssh_file_readARead-only
Reads text files from a server, several of them in one call. A file it could not read is named with the reason, never returned empty or cut short as if that were the content. To look for something inside logs rather than read them, ssh_log_search greps on the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| path | Yes | One path, or a list: ["/etc/hosts", "/etc/resolv.conf"]. An unreadable file costs the list nothing — the others still come back. | |
| sudo | No | Read as root, for files the profile user cannot open. Default: false | |
| binary | No | Fetch over the transport, not the command channel; answer in base64. The safe way for non-text, implies encoding=base64. Default: false | |
| profile | Yes | Machine name. | |
| encoding | No | base64 keeps non-text bytes intact but still goes through the command channel and its size limit. Real binary -> binary below. Default: utf8 | utf8 |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations declare readOnlyHint=true, which the description does not contradict. The description adds meaningful behavioral context beyond annotations: unreadable files are reported with the reason, never returned as empty or truncated content, and multiple files can be read in one call. These are useful operational details not captured by the annotation.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences with no filler. The primary purpose and batch capability are front-loaded, followed by error behavior and an alternative tool reference. Every sentence earns its place and the structure is clean.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With a rich schema that documents all parameters, the description covers the core behavior (batch read, error handling) and names an alternative. Since there is no output schema, the error-behavior note partially clarifies return semantics, though the exact response structure isn't specified. For a read-only tool, this is adequate and nothing critical is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100% — every parameter (path, sudo, binary, profile, encoding) has a detailed schema description with defaults and enums where applicable. The tool description itself adds no additional parameter semantics beyond the schema, so this dimension sits at the baseline for high schema coverage.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The first sentence states a specific verb ('reads') and resource ('text files from a server') and highlights the batch capability ('several of them in one call'). It explicitly distinguishes itself from ssh_log_search, but does not address other siblings like ssh_file_list or ssh_file_write, so differentiation is partial.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Provides an explicit alternative: 'To look for something inside logs rather than read them, ssh_log_search greps on the server.' This is clear when-not-to-use guidance for one specific scenario, but it does not mention when to use ssh_file_list or other file tools, so coverage is limited.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
ssh_file_writeADestructiveIdempotent
Writes text files on a server, several in one call, each with its own path, permissions, owner and sudo. A file is replaced whole and never appears half-written; there is no append. For something that already exists on this machine, use ssh_upload.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| files | Yes | One file, or a list — mode and sudo decided per file, not per call. | |
| profile | Yes | Machine name. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| files | No | |
| legend | No | What the words in this answer mean. A key names the field before the value — "state=limited", "jobs[].state=lost" — and only the values this answer actually used are listed. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Beyond the idempotent and destructive hints, the description discloses that files are replaced whole, atomically, and never appended to. This adds useful behavioral context that the annotations alone do not provide.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three sentences, all high-signal: the core action, the atomic/replace behavior, and the sibling alternative. No filler or redundant restatement.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the rich input schema, annotations, and output schema, the description covers the essential behavioral semantics and alternative routing. Nothing critical is missing for an agent to invoke this correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already explains each parameter thoroughly. The description contributes the multi-file and per-file ownership/sudo framing, but most parameter-level meaning is in the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource: writes files on a server. It also differentiates itself from the closest sibling by saying anything already on this machine should use ssh_upload.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly names ssh_upload as the alternative for files that already exist locally, and clarifies the tool supports multiple files in one call. The no-append note also sets an important boundary.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
ssh_job_killADestructiveIdempotent
Stops a detached job and everything it started — the signal reaches the whole process group. A job that had already finished is reported as gone, not as a refusal.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | Job id returned by ssh_exec with detach: true. A job started with sudo is reached as root from the id alone — nothing extra to pass. | |
| signal | No | KILL only when TERM was already ignored. | TERM |
| profile | Yes | Machine name. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| id | No | |
| legend | No | What the words in this answer mean. A key names the field before the value — "state=limited", "jobs[].state=lost" — and only the values this answer actually used are listed. |
| reason | No | |
| signal | No | What was actually sent, which is not always what was asked for. |
| outcome | No | signalled — the signal reached the process group of the job; gone — the job had already ended, so there was nothing to stop; nopid — the job recorded no pid, so there was nothing to signal; missing — the server knows no job under this id; no-answer — the server did not answer the stop request, so the job state is unknown. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare destructiveHint and idempotentHint. The description adds valuable context: the signal reaches the whole process group, and already-finished jobs are reported as 'gone' rather than a refusal. This goes beyond the annotation hints.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two concise sentences that front-load the primary action and then clarify an edge case. No redundancy or wasted words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description is sufficient for a destructive operation with an output schema. It explains the scope of destruction (process group) and the idempotent edge case. Combined with schema documentation for parameters and annotation hints, an agent has what it needs to call correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema covers all 3 parameters with descriptions, so baseline is 3. The tool description itself does not add any parameter-specific meaning beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (Stops), resource (detached job), and clarifies it reaches the entire process group. Distinguishes from sibling tools like ssh_job_list and ssh_job_status which are non-destructive. Also clarifies behavior for already-finished jobs.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies usage for stopping detached background jobs, but does not explicitly mention alternatives or conditions when not to use. It clarifies that it targets detached jobs, giving scope, but lacks explicit when-not guidance or reference to alternative sibling tools.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
ssh_job_listARead-only
Lists the detached jobs on a machine with their state, jobs started with sudo included — for when an id was not kept. Ids and states only; for what a job printed, use ssh_job_output.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| profile | Yes | Machine name. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| jobs | No | |
| legend | No | What the words in this answer mean. A key names the field before the value — "state=limited", "jobs[].state=lost" — and only the values this answer actually used are listed. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, and the description adds meaningful behavioral detail beyond that: it lists detached jobs including sudo-started ones, and clarifies that only IDs and states are returned. This goes beyond the annotation without contradicting it.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences with no filler. The core purpose is front-loaded, followed by a scope caveat and a pointer to an alternative. Every clause earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple one-parameter read-only tool with an output schema, the description is complete. It explains scope, inclusion of sudo jobs, return content, and when to use it, while relying on annotations and the output schema for the rest.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100% because the only parameter, 'profile', is documented as 'Machine name.' The description does not add parameter-level meaning beyond the schema, so baseline 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb ('Lists') and resource ('detached jobs on a machine with their state'), and adds a distinguishing constraint ('jobs started with sudo included'). It also explicitly differentiates itself from ssh_job_output by limiting scope to 'Ids and states only', so an agent can select it correctly.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides explicit when-to-use guidance: 'for when an id was not kept'. It also names the alternative for related needs: 'for what a job printed, use ssh_job_output'. This directly helps an agent choose between sibling tools.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
ssh_job_outputARead-only
Returns what a detached job has written so far, stdout and stderr together, from a byte offset you choose. For whether the job is still running rather than what it printed, ssh_job_status answers in one line.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | Job id returned by ssh_exec with detach: true. A job started with sudo is reached as root from the id alone — nothing extra to pass. | |
| offset | No | Byte offset to read from; the answer names the next one. | |
| profile | Yes | Machine name. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations declare readOnlyHint=true, which covers safety, and the description adds meaningful behavioral context: reads only output produced 'so far' (non-blocking), merges stdout and stderr, and supports reading from a chosen byte offset with the next offset returned. This goes beyond annotation data without contradicting it.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences carry the full purpose, the key behavioral detail, and the alternative-tool routing. The most important information is front-loaded, and there is no filler or repetition of schema fields.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a read-only streaming tool with a complete schema, the description is largely sufficient: it conveys non-blocking behavior, combined streams, byte-offset seeking, and the cursor semantics. There is no output schema, so a bit more detail about the exact return shape would push this to 5, but nothing essential to invoking it correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all three parameters. The tool description itself does not add new parameter-level meaning beyond what the schema says; it merely restates the offset concept. This meets the baseline for full schema coverage but does not exceed it.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Returns what a detached job has written so far', and clarifies that stdout and stderr are combined. It also distinguishes this from ssh_job_status by explicitly contrasting output content with run-state. This leaves no ambiguity about the tool's core function.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The second sentence gives clear routing guidance: if an agent cares whether the job is still running, use ssh_job_status instead. This is an explicit condition that selects between two closely related siblings, which is exactly what an agent needs.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
ssh_job_statusARead-only
Reports the state of a detached job, with the last lines it wrote so you can see where it got to. lost means no exit code was left behind, not that the work failed — ssh_job_output still has the output.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | Job id returned by ssh_exec with detach: true. A job started with sudo is reached as root from the id alone — nothing extra to pass. | |
| profile | Yes | Machine name. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| jobs | No | |
| legend | No | What the words in this answer mean. A key names the field before the value — "state=limited", "jobs[].state=lost" — and only the values this answer actually used are listed. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already mark the tool as read-only, so the description adds value by explaining the 'lost' status semantics and clarifying that 'lost' does not mean the work failed. It also discloses that the output remains available via ssh_job_output, which is useful behavioral context beyond what the annotations state.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences convey the core purpose, the extra output detail, and the important 'lost' edge-case semantics. Every phrase carries meaning, and the key information is front-loaded.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple read-only status tool with complete schema descriptions and an output schema present, the description covers all essential context. The 'lost' clarification removes a likely source of confusion, and the readOnlyHint addresses safety.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema already provides 100% parameter coverage with descriptive text for both 'id' and 'profile', including the note about sudo. The tool description itself adds no additional parameter-level meaning, so the baseline of 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb ('Reports') and a specific resource ('the state of a detached job'), and also states it includes the last lines written for progress visibility. This distinguishes it from sibling tools like ssh_job_output (which retrieves full output) and ssh_job_list (which lists jobs).
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description makes clear when to use this tool: to check the state of a detached job and see where it got to via its last lines. It also gives an implicit when-not by pointing to ssh_job_output for cases where the job is 'lost' but output still exists. It does not explicitly contrast with ssh_job_list, but the single-job framing is enough.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
ssh_log_searchARead-only
Greps log files on the server and returns the matching lines with their paths, or the paths alone when line bodies are not wanted. An empty answer means no match, never a failed search — files that could not be read are listed apart. For the tail of a file rather than a search through it, ssh_log_tail is cheaper. A container is searched by name instead of by path.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| from | No | Which end maxMatches keeps: "end" newest (scans the whole file), "start" oldest (stops reading at the cap). Default: end | end |
| path | No | One path, a list, or a glob in the file name: "/var/log/*.log". Expanded by the server's find, not a shell — a name with a space or a newline stays one name. A glob in the directory part is refused. | |
| sudo | No | Read as root. Straight away for places a plain user cannot read (/root, /var/lib/docker); otherwise retry with true when the answer names what it could not read. Default: false | |
| query | Yes | Regex, grep -E dialect. | |
| since | No | Window: "today" | "2026-08-19" | "2h" | "3d", the day taken from the server. Skips files untouched in it (count reported). A window of a day or more then keeps only lines dated inside — 2026-08-19, Aug 19, 19/Aug/2026; a shorter one filters files and leaves their lines alone. Undated file: searched whole and named. | |
| context | No | Lines around each match, as grep -C. Excluded by namesOnly. Default: 0 | |
| profile | Yes | Machine name. | |
| timeout | No | Milliseconds per file, default 30000. Raise for multi-gigabyte files with from: "end". | |
| container | No | Read this container's output instead of a file: docker is asked where it writes, and the answer names the file it read. Whatever cannot be read this way — a driver that keeps no file, an engine that is not docker, a name nothing answers to — comes back said aloud, naming ssh_exec as the way through. The file belongs to root, so sudo: true. Give this or path, never both. | |
| namesOnly | No | Answer = matching paths, no line bodies. One command for the whole list; maxMatches and context do not apply. Default: false | |
| recursive | No | Walk the whole tree, not one level. With a glob: "/etc/nginx/*.conf" reaches those at any depth. Symlinked files are searched, symlinked dirs not descended. Default: false | |
| maxMatches | No | Cap per file; reaching it is reported. Default: 200 | |
| caseSensitive | No | false = case ignored. Default: false |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| files | No | Matching file names, for namesOnly. |
| lines | No | The matching lines. context:true marks a neighbour shown alongside, not a match. |
| source | No | Named only when container was asked: the engine, the driver and the file the lines were read from. |
| limited | No | maxMatches was reached — more exist than are shown. |
| matches | No | Lines in the answer — matches plus any context lines; with namesOnly, matching files. |
| truncated | No | Output was cut mid-answer: incomplete, not empty. |
| files_skipped | No | Left unread by the since window. |
| files_undated | No | No recognisable timestamp: searched whole, the window was not applied. |
| files_searched | No | |
| files_unreadable | No | Opened with an error — not proof the text is absent. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description adds significant behavioral clarity beyond the readOnlyHint annotation: an empty answer means no match, never a failed search, and unreadable files are listed apart. This prevents an agent from misinterpreting an empty result as an error. The readOnly annotation already covers mutation safety, so the added semantics are above baseline.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two dense sentences with no wasted words. The core purpose, output distinction, no-match semantics, failure handling, sibling alternative, and container usage are all packed in efficiently.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With a full input schema and an output schema present, the description covers the non-obvious behavioral gotchas an agent needs: empty-result semantics, unreadable-file reporting, and the tail alternative. It could have mentioned the output structure explicitly, but the output schema already supplies that.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents every parameter thoroughly. The description reinforces the container-by-name notion and the line-bodies-versus-paths choice, but it does not add meaning beyond what the parameter descriptions already supply. Baseline 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a precise verb and object: 'Greps log files on the server and returns the matching lines with their paths.' It also distinguishes the paths-only mode and immediately contrasts itself with ssh_log_tail, so an agent can disambiguate it from the closest sibling without inspecting the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It explicitly names when a sibling is cheaper: 'For the tail of a file rather than a search through it, ssh_log_tail is cheaper.' It also conveys the container-vs-path usage pattern. It does not enumerate all alternatives among the many siblings, but the relevant distinction is covered.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
ssh_log_tailARead-only
Returns the last lines of one or more log files, whatever their size — nothing is shipped here to be trimmed locally. A container is read by name instead of by path, through the file its driver writes. To look for something rather than read the end, use ssh_log_search.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| path | No | One path, a list, or a glob in the file name: "/var/log/*.log". Expanded by the server's find, not a shell — a name with a space or a newline stays one name. A glob in the directory part is refused. | |
| sudo | No | Read as root. Straight away for places a plain user cannot read (/root, /var/lib/docker); otherwise retry with true when the answer names what it could not read. Default: false | |
| lines | No | How many lines from the end. Default: 100 | |
| profile | Yes | Machine name. | |
| container | No | Read this container's output instead of a file: docker is asked where it writes, and the answer names the file it read. Whatever cannot be read this way — a driver that keeps no file, an engine that is not docker, a name nothing answers to — comes back said aloud, naming ssh_exec as the way through. The file belongs to root, so sudo: true. Give this or path, never both. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Beyond the readOnlyHint annotation, the description adds behavioral context: 'whatever their size — nothing is shipped here to be trimmed locally' and explains container resolution 'through the file its driver writes.' These clarify how the tool behaves without contradicting the annotation.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three purposeful sentences: core behavior and scope come first, container nuance follows, and the sibling alternative closes. No filler, no repetition of schema details.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a read-only tail tool, the description plus fully described schema covers file paths, globs, container mode, sudo behavior, and search routing. It does not describe the return format, but that is reasonably inferable from 'returns the last lines' and no output schema exists.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the parameter descriptions already carry the meaning. The main description adds tailing/container framing but does not materially extend individual parameter semantics beyond what the schema provides.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource: 'Returns the last lines of one or more log files'. It also distinguishes itself from the sibling ssh_log_search by explicitly contrasting tailing with searching for something.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly routes the agent: 'To look for something rather than read the end, use ssh_log_search.' It also clarifies the container-read path vs ordinary file paths, giving concrete context for when each mode applies.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
ssh_monitorAIdempotent
Looks after the SSH connections themselves, not the machines behind them: lists the configured profiles, tests one, reports pool statistics, closes a connection or reloads the profile file. Start here on a machine you have not used yet — test names the state before anything else runs.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | Yes | Which of the five to do. close and reload drop live connections; the other three only read. | |
| profile | No | Which machine. Required for stats, test and close; list and reload take none. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| state | No | ready — logged in, commands run; limited — logged in and commands run, but the shell is not POSIX; no-route — the server was never reached; rejected — the server was reached and refused the login. null — nothing was checked: only the test action reaches the server. |
| action | No | |
| broken | No | |
| legend | No | What the words in this answer mean. A key names the field before the value — "state=limited", "jobs[].state=lost" — and only the values this answer actually used are listed. |
| profile | No | |
| profiles | No | |
| exit_code | No | |
| latency_ms | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description reveals important behavioral nuance beyond the annotations: close and reload drop live connections while the other actions only read. Annotations already signal idempotent and non-destructive, so this is additive rather than repetitive, and it does not contradict the annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, front-loaded with the core scope and followed by practical guidance. Every phrase earns its place; there is no redundant filler or repetition of schema content.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With only two parameters, an output schema, and strong annotations, the description covers the essential usage guidance, side-effect differences, and conceptual scope. It could explicitly enumerate which action to use in which scenario, but the existing context is sufficient for correct invocation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, with both parameters already well described in the schema. The description adds a high-level summary of actions but does not materially improve on the schema's per-parameter semantics, so the baseline of 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states a specific verb-and-resource purpose: managing SSH connections themselves, listing profiles, testing, reporting pool stats, closing, and reloading. It explicitly distinguishes itself from tools that operate on machines behind the connections, which differentiates it from the many ssh_ sibling tools.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives concrete usage context: 'Start here on a machine you have not used yet' and recommends that 'test names the state before anything else runs.' It does not explicitly name which sibling tools to use instead, but its scope exclusion ('not the machines behind them') makes the appropriate context clear.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
ssh_service_statusARead-only
Reports one systemd unit: whether it is loaded, active and enabled, with the tail of its journal. A machine without systemd comes back as NOT CHECKED, never as a stopped service — that would read as an outage which is not there. For every failed unit at once, ssh_audit_baseline names them.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| sudo | No | Read as root. Straight away for places a plain user cannot read (/root, /var/lib/docker); otherwise retry with true when the answer names what it could not read. Default: false Without it the journal comes back trimmed to what the profile user may see. | |
| unit | Yes | Unit name, e.g. "nginx" or "nginx.service". | |
| since | No | Journal window, as journalctl reads it: "1h ago", "today", "2026-08-19". | |
| profile | Yes | Machine name. | |
| log_lines | No | Journal lines returned. Default: 50 |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| unit | No | |
| legend | No | What the words in this answer mean. A key names the field before the value — "state=limited", "jobs[].state=lost" — and only the values this answer actually used are listed. |
| enabled | No | |
| outcome | No | checked — systemd answered, and the fields below carry its measurement; no_systemd — there was nobody to ask on this server, so the service was not measured; no_unit — systemd knows no such unit, which is not the same as a unit that is stopped. |
| restart | No | |
| sub_state | No | |
| recent_log | No | |
| status_head | No | |
| active_state | No | |
| restart_after | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With readOnlyHint=true, the safety profile is already known, so the description adds valuable behavioral context beyond annotations: the NOT CHECKED distinction for non-systemd machines and the journal-tail behavior. This prevents a false outage conclusion and clarifies return semantics.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three sentences with no filler. The main purpose is front-loaded, and each subsequent sentence contributes either a behavioral caveat or a sibling alternative. Nothing is repeated from the schema.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the output schema exists and the input schema fully documents parameters, the description covers the essential agent-facing context: single-unit scope, journal tail, systemd-absence semantics, and the relevant sibling tool. No critical gap remains.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the input schema already documents all five parameters well. The description does not materially add parameter-level detail beyond the schema, so the baseline score of 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Reports one systemd unit: whether it is loaded, active and enabled, with the tail of its journal.' It also differentiates from ssh_audit_baseline by noting that sibling names failed units at once, making the tool's single-unit scope clear.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives an explicit alternative and condition: 'For every failed unit at once, ssh_audit_baseline names them.' It also provides a crucial usage caveat—machines without systemd return NOT CHECKED, not stopped—so an agent knows when not to interpret the result as an outage.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
ssh_snapshotARead-only
Reports how a machine is doing right now: cpu, memory, disk, containers, listening ports, services and recent errors, in one round trip. Whatever could not be measured comes back null and marked unavailable, never as a zero that reads like an idle machine. For how the machine is set up rather than how it is running, use ssh_audit_baseline.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| profile | Yes | Machine name. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| load | No | |
| ports | No | |
| cpu_pct | No | |
| mem_pct | No | |
| disk_pct | No | |
| services | No | |
| listening | No | |
| containers | No | |
| error_lines | No | |
| unavailable | No | |
| recent_errors | No | |
| services_running | No | |
| containers_running | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already establish readOnlyHint=true, so the read-only nature is covered. The description adds valuable behavioral context: unmeasured values return null and are marked unavailable rather than zero, preventing misinterpretation. This goes beyond annotations by defining output semantics, so a 4 is justified.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences with no filler. It front-loads the core purpose, adds the critical null-behavior detail, and ends with the alternative. Every word earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given that an output schema exists (which explains return structure) and the description covers what it measures, the round-trip efficiency, and the null unavailable convention, nothing essential is missing for an agent to invoke it correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The sole parameter 'profile' is already fully described in the schema as 'Machine name.' (100% coverage). The description does not add any further detail about the parameter, so baseline 3 applies—the schema carries the full semantic load.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool reports current machine health (cpu, memory, disk, containers, listening ports, services, recent errors) in one round trip, and explicitly contrasts it with ssh_audit_baseline for setup vs. running state. This makes its purpose unambiguous and distinguishes it from siblings.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides explicit guidance on when to use this tool: for current operational status, and when not to (for configuration use ssh_audit_baseline). This directly names the alternative and the condition, leaving no ambiguity about selection.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
ssh_tls_checkARead-only
Checks the TLS certificate a domain serves — days left, whether the name matches a SAN, the issuer and whether renewal is configured — with the handshake made from the server itself, so it sees what that machine sees, including hosts closed to the outside. A null field means the check could not run, not that the certificate is bad. Run it per domain, once ssh_audit_baseline has named the sites.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| port | No | Default: 443 | |
| sudo | No | Read the renewal config as root. Without it "no hook configured" only means "could not look". Default: false | |
| domain | Yes | The name to ask for, e.g. "example.com". | |
| profile | Yes | Machine name. | |
| check_renew_hook | No | Also look for the renewal config. Default: true |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| port | No | |
| domain | No | |
| issuer | No | |
| san_text | No | |
| not_after | No | |
| days_until_expiry | No | |
| renew_hook_evidence | No | |
| renew_hook_configured | No | |
| san_includes_hostname | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Beyond the readOnlyHint annotation, the description reveals that the handshake is made from the server itself, so it sees hosts closed to the outside, and clarifies that null fields mean the check could not run rather than certificate failure. This is meaningful behavioral context the annotation does not provide.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is information-dense and front-loads the core purpose, then adds null semantics and usage sequencing. The first sentence is a bit long with several em-dash interruptions, but every clause adds signal and there is no filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With annotations declaring read-only behavior, an output schema present, and 100% parameter coverage, the description adds the remaining needed context: what the check sees, how to interpret nulls, and when to run it relative to ssh_audit_baseline. Nothing critical is missing for an agent to select and call this tool correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the input schema already documents all five parameters. The tool description adds useful context around domains and null results, but it does not add new parameter-level meaning beyond what the schema provides, matching the baseline of 3.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb ('Checks') and resource ('the TLS certificate a domain serves'), and enumerates the concrete outputs: days left, SAN match, issuer, renewal configuration. This clearly differentiates it from sibling SSH tools like ssh_exec or ssh_audit_baseline.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly says to 'Run it per domain, once ssh_audit_baseline has named the sites,' giving a clear prerequisite and invocation pattern. It does not enumerate when not to use it or name alternatives, but the sequencing guidance is actionable and specific.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
ssh_uploadADestructiveIdempotent
Copies a local file or directory to a server, checked by sha256 on both sides and never left half-written at the target. A directory replaces the target whole — whatever was there and is not in the source is gone with it; merge: true keeps it instead. For text you can paste, ssh_file_write is cheaper; piping base64 through ssh_exec truncates silently.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| mode | No | Octal, one value for every file sent. Omit to keep local permissions. | |
| sudo | No | For /etc, /opt and the like, and for setting an owner. Data stages in /tmp first — the machine needs room for a second copy. Default: false | |
| merge | No | Directories only. true = what the target holds and the source does not stays — uploads, .env, logs; same-named files are taken from the source. The tree is still put in place whole, by one rename. mode and owner then cover the kept files too. Default: false | |
| owner | No | "root:root", every file and directory sent. Needs sudo; without it the answer says it was not applied. | |
| verify | No | sha256 on both sides, per file. "unavailable" = no sha256 on the machine = delivered, not broken. "mismatched" fails the call and replaces nothing. Default: true | |
| profile | Yes | Machine name. | |
| timeout | No | Milliseconds. No ceiling by default — a transfer runs as long as it takes. | |
| overwrite | No | false = refuse rather than replace, including when the target cannot be checked. A directory is judged whole, not per file. Default: true | |
| recursive | No | Only to force it — a directory is recognised on its own. | |
| local_path | Yes | A file or a directory on this machine. | |
| remote_path | Yes | Where it goes on the server. A sent directory becomes this path itself and replaces it whole, not file by file — with merge: true what the source lacks stays. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| files | No | |
| legend | No | What the words in this answer mean. A key names the field before the value — "state=limited", "jobs[].state=lost" — and only the values this answer actually used are listed. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Beyond the idempotentHint and destructiveHint annotations, the description discloses the critical behavior: sha256 verification on both sides, atomic writes that are never half-left, and full replacement of the target directory unless merge:true is set. This is substantive behavioral detail, not just a restatement of annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three sentences, each earning its place: the first states the action and key guarantees, the second clarifies the destructive directory behavior, and the third routes to an alternative. No wasted words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the rich parameter schema, the output schema, and annotations, the description covers the essential operational invariants: atomicity, verification, destructive replacement, and the relevant alternative. Nothing needed to correctly invoke the tool is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema already covers all 11 parameters richly, so the baseline is 3. The description adds cross-cutting meaning not obvious from individual parameters: the transfer is atomic, directories replace the target whole, and verification is built in. This is useful, but the per-parameter semantic burden is largely carried by the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Copies a local file or directory to a server.' It also distinguishes itself from siblings by noting that ssh_file_write is cheaper for pasteable text, making the tool's role clear against the other SSH tools.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly gives a decision rule: for text you can paste, use ssh_file_write instead, and warns that piping base64 through ssh_exec truncates silently. This tells an agent when not to use this tool and which sibling to prefer.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
12 tool updates
v2.3.3- Changed
ssh_audit_baseline4 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / include_sudo_sections / descriptionPrevious value: -"Read sshd config as sshd sees it (sshd -T), needs root. Without it the ssh section says so instead of guessing from the file. Default: false"New value: +"Run the sections that need root as root: sshd -T for ssh, ufw and iptables rules for firewall. Without it those sections name what they could not read instead of guessing. Default: false" - added
Output schema / properties / firewall / properties / iptables / properties / status / descriptionAdded value: +"not_installed — the tool is absent from the server, so it filters nothing here; no_access — the tool is there, but reading its rules needs root: what it allows is unknown; read — the rules were read, and the fields beside this one come from them." - added
Output schema / properties / firewall / properties / ufw / properties / status / descriptionAdded value: +"not_installed — the tool is absent from the server, so it filters nothing here; no_access — the tool is there, but reading its rules needs root: what it allows is unknown; read — the rules were read, and the fields beside this one come from them." - added
Output schema / properties / legendAdded value: +{ + "additionalProperties": { + "type": "string" + }, + "description": "What the words in this answer mean. A key names the field before the value — \"state=limited\", \"jobs[].state=lost\" — and only the values this answer actually used are listed.", + "type": "object" +}
- Changed
ssh_download4 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / verify / descriptionPrevious value: -"sha256 on both sides, per file. \"unavailable\" = no sha256 on the machine = delivered, not broken. Default: true"New value: +"sha256 on both sides, per file. \"unavailable\" = no sha256 on the machine = delivered, not broken. \"mismatched\" fails the call and replaces nothing. Default: true" - added
Output schema / properties / files / items / properties / verified / descriptionAdded value: +"How the sha256 check ended, not whether the data landed — written says that. verified — sha256 was compared after the write and matched; mismatched — sha256 was compared and differed: nothing was replaced, and the path still holds what it held before; unavailable — the check had nothing to work with, and reason says what was missing; skipped — no comparison ran: none was asked for, or nothing landed to compare." - changed
Output schema / properties / files / items / properties / verified / enumPrevious value: -[ - "verified", - "unavailable", - "skipped" -]New value: +[ + "verified", + "mismatched", + "unavailable", + "skipped" +] - added
Output schema / properties / files / items / properties / written / descriptionAdded value: +"Whether the data reached the path. Permissions and owner are a separate matter: one that did not apply is named in reason, and written stays true."
- Changed
ssh_file_list1 field changed- changed
Output schema / (root)Previous value: -nullNew value: +{ + "properties": { + "entries": { + "items": { + "properties": { + "group": { + "type": "string" + }, + "mode": { + "description": "Octal, as chmod takes it: \"644\", \"4755\" — not the rwx letters ls prints.", + "type": "string" + }, + "mtime": { + "description": "Seconds since epoch, UTC.", + "type": "number" + }, + "name": { + "description": "Name inside the listed directory; with recursive, the path below it. Never a full path, so it reads the same either way.", + "type": "string" + }, + "owner": { + "type": "string" + }, + "size": { + "type": "number" + }, + "target": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "type": { + "description": "What the entry is, which decides what size means for it. file — a regular file, and size is its bytes; dir — a directory: size is the directory entry itself, never the sum of what it holds; symlink — a symbolic link — target says where it points, and size is the length of that path; other — a socket, fifo or device node: there is no content to read here.", + "enum": [ + "file", + "dir", + "symlink", + "other" + ], + "type": "string" + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + "legend": { + "additionalProperties": { + "type": "string" + }, + "description": "What the words in this answer mean. A key names the field before the value — \"state=limited\", \"jobs[].state=lost\" — and only the values this answer actually used are listed.", + "type": "object" + }, + "path": { + "type": "string" + }, + "truncated": { + "description": "The output limit cut the answer: the directory holds more than entries lists.", + "type": "boolean" + }, + "unreadable": { + "description": "Directories nobody was allowed to enter. Their contents are missing from entries, and a list short by the one that mattered looks complete.", + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + } + }, + "type": "object" +}
- Changed
ssh_file_write4 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / files / oneOfPrevious value: -[ - { - "properties": { - "binary": { - "description": "content is base64, decoded before writing. Default: false", - "type": "boolean" - }, - "content": { - "description": "The whole new content, written byte for byte. Replaces the file, never extends it; no trailing newline is added.", - "type": "string" - }, - "mode": { - "description": "Octal string, \"644\". Applied before the file takes its place.", - "type": "string" - }, - "path": { - "description": "Where the file goes.", - "type": "string" - }, - "sudo": { - "description": "Write as root — /etc and anywhere the profile user cannot write. Default: false", - "type": "boolean" - }, - "verify": { - "description": "Compare sha256 before the file takes its place. Default: false", - "type": "boolean" - } - }, - "required": [ - "path", - "content" - ], - "type": "object" - }, - { - "items": { - "properties": { - "binary": { - "description": "content is base64, decoded before writing. Default: false", - "type": "boolean" - }, - "content": { - "description": "The whole new content, written byte for byte. Replaces the file, never extends it; no trailing newline is added.", - "type": "string" - }, - "mode": { - "description": "Octal string, \"644\". Applied before the file takes its place.", - "type": "string" - }, - "path": { - "description": "Where the file goes.", - "type": "string" - }, - "sudo": { - "description": "Write as root — /etc and anywhere the profile user cannot write. Default: false", - "type": "boolean" - }, - "verify": { - "description": "Compare sha256 before the file takes its place. Default: false", - "type": "boolean" - } - }, - "required": [ - "path", - "content" - ], - "type": "object" - }, - "type": "array" - } -]New value: +[ + { + "properties": { + "binary": { + "description": "content is base64, decoded before writing. Default: false", + "type": "boolean" + }, + "content": { + "description": "The whole new content, written byte for byte. Replaces the file, never extends it; no trailing newline is added.", + "type": "string" + }, + "mode": { + "description": "Octal string, \"644\", for this file alone. Applied before the file takes its place.", + "type": "string" + }, + "owner": { + "description": "\"root:root\", for this file alone. Set before the file takes its place. Needs sudo; without it the answer says it was not applied.", + "type": "string" + }, + "path": { + "description": "Where the file goes.", + "type": "string" + }, + "sudo": { + "description": "Write as root, for this file alone — /etc and anywhere the profile user cannot write. Default: false", + "type": "boolean" + }, + "verify": { + "description": "Compare sha256 before the file takes its place. A mismatch fails the call and leaves the path as it was. Default: true", + "type": "boolean" + } + }, + "required": [ + "path", + "content" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + { + "items": { + "properties": { + "binary": { + "description": "content is base64, decoded before writing. Default: false", + "type": "boolean" + }, + "content": { + "description": "The whole new content, written byte for byte. Replaces the file, never extends it; no trailing newline is added.", + "type": "string" + }, + "mode": { + "description": "Octal string, \"644\", for this file alone. Applied before the file takes its place.", + "type": "string" + }, + "owner": { + "description": "\"root:root\", for this file alone. Set before the file takes its place. Needs sudo; without it the answer says it was not applied.", + "type": "string" + }, + "path": { + "description": "Where the file goes.", + "type": "string" + }, + "sudo": { + "description": "Write as root, for this file alone — /etc and anywhere the profile user cannot write. Default: false", + "type": "boolean" + }, + "verify": { + "description": "Compare sha256 before the file takes its place. A mismatch fails the call and leaves the path as it was. Default: true", + "type": "boolean" + } + }, + "required": [ + "path", + "content" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "type": "array" + } +] - added
Output schema / properties / files / items / properties / verified / descriptionAdded value: +"How the sha256 check ended, not whether the data landed — written says that. verified — sha256 was compared after the write and matched; mismatched — sha256 was compared and differed: nothing was replaced, and the path still holds what it held before; unavailable — the check had nothing to work with, and reason says what was missing; skipped — no comparison ran: none was asked for, or nothing landed to compare." - changed
Output schema / properties / files / items / properties / verified / enumPrevious value: -[ - "verified", - "unavailable", - "skipped" -]New value: +[ + "verified", + "mismatched", + "unavailable", + "skipped" +] - added
Output schema / properties / files / items / properties / written / descriptionAdded value: +"Whether the data reached the path. Permissions and owner are a separate matter: one that did not apply is named in reason, and written stays true."
- Changed
ssh_job_kill2 fields changed- added
Output schema / properties / outcome / descriptionAdded value: +"signalled — the signal reached the process group of the job; gone — the job had already ended, so there was nothing to stop; nopid — the job recorded no pid, so there was nothing to signal; missing — the server knows no job under this id; no-answer — the server did not answer the stop request, so the job state is unknown." - added
Output schema / properties / signal / descriptionAdded value: +"What was actually sent, which is not always what was asked for."
- Changed
ssh_job_list2 fields changed- added
Output schema / properties / jobs / items / properties / started_at / descriptionAdded value: +"Seconds since the epoch; null — the server did not record it." - added
Output schema / properties / jobs / items / properties / state / descriptionAdded value: +"running — started and still running: this is not the outcome, come back later; finished — the job ended and reported its exit code; lost — the job is gone and left no exit code behind; missing — the server knows no job under this id."
- Changed
ssh_job_status2 fields changed- added
Output schema / properties / jobs / items / properties / started_at / descriptionAdded value: +"Seconds since the epoch; null — the server did not record it." - added
Output schema / properties / jobs / items / properties / state / descriptionAdded value: +"running — started and still running: this is not the outcome, come back later; finished — the job ended and reported its exit code; lost — the job is gone and left no exit code behind; missing — the server knows no job under this id."
- Changed
ssh_log_search4 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / containerAdded value: +{ + "description": "Read this container's output instead of a file: docker is asked where it writes, and the answer names the file it read. Whatever cannot be read this way — a driver that keeps no file, an engine that is not docker, a name nothing answers to — comes back said aloud, naming ssh_exec as the way through. The file belongs to root, so sudo: true. Give this or path, never both.", + "type": "string" +} - changed
Input schema / properties / since / descriptionPrevious value: -"Window: \"today\" | \"2026-08-19\" | \"2h\" | \"3d\", the day taken from the server. Skips files untouched in it (count reported), then keeps only lines dated inside — 2026-08-19, Aug 19, 19/Aug/2026. Undated file: searched whole and named. Under a day filters files, not lines."New value: +"Window: \"today\" | \"2026-08-19\" | \"2h\" | \"3d\", the day taken from the server. Skips files untouched in it (count reported). A window of a day or more then keeps only lines dated inside — 2026-08-19, Aug 19, 19/Aug/2026; a shorter one filters files and leaves their lines alone. Undated file: searched whole and named." - changed
Input schema / requiredPrevious value: -[ - "profile", - "path", - "query" -]New value: +[ + "profile", + "query" +] - added
Output schema / properties / sourceAdded value: +{ + "description": "Named only when container was asked: the engine, the driver and the file the lines were read from.", + "type": "string" +}
- Changed
ssh_log_tail2 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / containerAdded value: +{ + "description": "Read this container's output instead of a file: docker is asked where it writes, and the answer names the file it read. Whatever cannot be read this way — a driver that keeps no file, an engine that is not docker, a name nothing answers to — comes back said aloud, naming ssh_exec as the way through. The file belongs to root, so sudo: true. Give this or path, never both.", + "type": "string" +} - changed
Input schema / requiredPrevious value: -[ - "profile", - "path" -]New value: +[ + "profile" +]
- Changed
ssh_monitor2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / action / descriptionPrevious value: -"Which of the five to do."New value: +"Which of the five to do. close and reload drop live connections; the other three only read." - added
Output schema / properties / state / descriptionAdded value: +"ready — logged in, commands run; limited — logged in and commands run, but the shell is not POSIX; no-route — the server was never reached; rejected — the server was reached and refused the login. null — nothing was checked: only the test action reaches the server."
- Changed
ssh_service_status2 fields changed- added
Output schema / properties / legendAdded value: +{ + "additionalProperties": { + "type": "string" + }, + "description": "What the words in this answer mean. A key names the field before the value — \"state=limited\", \"jobs[].state=lost\" — and only the values this answer actually used are listed.", + "type": "object" +} - added
Output schema / properties / outcome / descriptionAdded value: +"checked — systemd answered, and the fields below carry its measurement; no_systemd — there was nobody to ask on this server, so the service was not measured; no_unit — systemd knows no such unit, which is not the same as a unit that is stopped."
- Changed
ssh_upload8 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / mergeAdded value: +{ + "default": false, + "description": "Directories only. true = what the target holds and the source does not stays — uploads, .env, logs; same-named files are taken from the source. The tree is still put in place whole, by one rename. mode and owner then cover the kept files too. Default: false", + "type": "boolean" +} - changed
Input schema / properties / owner / descriptionPrevious value: -"\"root:root\", every file sent. Needs sudo; without it the answer says it was not applied."New value: +"\"root:root\", every file and directory sent. Needs sudo; without it the answer says it was not applied." - changed
Input schema / properties / remote_path / descriptionPrevious value: -"Where it goes on the server. A sent directory becomes this path itself and replaces it whole, not file by file."New value: +"Where it goes on the server. A sent directory becomes this path itself and replaces it whole, not file by file — with merge: true what the source lacks stays." - changed
Input schema / properties / sudo / descriptionPrevious value: -"For /etc, /opt and the like. Data stages in /tmp first — the machine needs room for a second copy. Default: false"New value: +"For /etc, /opt and the like, and for setting an owner. Data stages in /tmp first — the machine needs room for a second copy. Default: false" - changed
Input schema / properties / verify / descriptionPrevious value: -"sha256 on both sides, per file. \"unavailable\" = no sha256 on the machine = delivered, not broken. Default: true"New value: +"sha256 on both sides, per file. \"unavailable\" = no sha256 on the machine = delivered, not broken. \"mismatched\" fails the call and replaces nothing. Default: true" - added
Output schema / properties / files / items / properties / verified / descriptionAdded value: +"How the sha256 check ended, not whether the data landed — written says that. verified — sha256 was compared after the write and matched; mismatched — sha256 was compared and differed: nothing was replaced, and the path still holds what it held before; unavailable — the check had nothing to work with, and reason says what was missing; skipped — no comparison ran: none was asked for, or nothing landed to compare." - changed
Output schema / properties / files / items / properties / verified / enumPrevious value: -[ - "verified", - "unavailable", - "skipped" -]New value: +[ + "verified", + "mismatched", + "unavailable", + "skipped" +] - added
Output schema / properties / files / items / properties / written / descriptionAdded value: +"Whether the data reached the path. Permissions and owner are a separate matter: one that did not apply is named in reason, and written stays true."
9 tool updates
v2.3.0- Changed
ssh_download1 field changed- added
Output schema / properties / legend / descriptionAdded value: +"What the words in this answer mean. A key names the field before the value — \"state=limited\", \"jobs[].state=lost\" — and only the values this answer actually used are listed."
- Changed
ssh_exec2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / detach / descriptionPrevious value: -"Background job on the server: returns an id at once, outlives this call, timeout does not apply. Follow with ssh_job_status / ssh_job_output, stop with ssh_job_kill. One command, no sudo. Default: false"New value: +"Background job on the server: returns an id at once, outlives this call, timeout does not apply. Follow with ssh_job_status / ssh_job_output, stop with ssh_job_kill. One command. With sudo the job runs as root and every later call follows it as root, provided the profile has a password or sudo needs none. Default: false" - added
Output schema / properties / legend / descriptionAdded value: +"What the words in this answer mean. A key names the field before the value — \"state=limited\", \"jobs[].state=lost\" — and only the values this answer actually used are listed."
- Changed
ssh_file_write1 field changed- added
Output schema / properties / legend / descriptionAdded value: +"What the words in this answer mean. A key names the field before the value — \"state=limited\", \"jobs[].state=lost\" — and only the values this answer actually used are listed."
- Changed
ssh_job_kill2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / id / descriptionPrevious value: -"Job id returned by ssh_exec with detach: true"New value: +"Job id returned by ssh_exec with detach: true. A job started with sudo is reached as root from the id alone — nothing extra to pass." - added
Output schema / properties / legend / descriptionAdded value: +"What the words in this answer mean. A key names the field before the value — \"state=limited\", \"jobs[].state=lost\" — and only the values this answer actually used are listed."
- Changed
ssh_job_list1 field changed- added
Output schema / properties / legend / descriptionAdded value: +"What the words in this answer mean. A key names the field before the value — \"state=limited\", \"jobs[].state=lost\" — and only the values this answer actually used are listed."
- Changed
ssh_job_output1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / id / descriptionPrevious value: -"Job id returned by ssh_exec with detach: true"New value: +"Job id returned by ssh_exec with detach: true. A job started with sudo is reached as root from the id alone — nothing extra to pass."
- Changed
ssh_job_status2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / id / descriptionPrevious value: -"Job id returned by ssh_exec with detach: true"New value: +"Job id returned by ssh_exec with detach: true. A job started with sudo is reached as root from the id alone — nothing extra to pass." - added
Output schema / properties / legend / descriptionAdded value: +"What the words in this answer mean. A key names the field before the value — \"state=limited\", \"jobs[].state=lost\" — and only the values this answer actually used are listed."
- Changed
ssh_monitor1 field changed- added
Output schema / properties / legend / descriptionAdded value: +"What the words in this answer mean. A key names the field before the value — \"state=limited\", \"jobs[].state=lost\" — and only the values this answer actually used are listed."
- Changed
ssh_upload1 field changed- added
Output schema / properties / legend / descriptionAdded value: +"What the words in this answer mean. A key names the field before the value — \"state=limited\", \"jobs[].state=lost\" — and only the values this answer actually used are listed."
18 tool updates
v1.0.0- First observed
ssh_audit_baseline - First observed
ssh_disk_breakdown - First observed
ssh_download - First observed
ssh_exec - First observed
ssh_file_list - First observed
ssh_file_read - First observed
ssh_file_write - First observed
ssh_job_kill - First observed
ssh_job_list - First observed
ssh_job_output - First observed
ssh_job_status - First observed
ssh_log_search - First observed
ssh_log_tail - First observed
ssh_monitor - First observed
ssh_service_status - First observed
ssh_snapshot - First observed
ssh_tls_check - First observed
ssh_upload
TDQS
Scored across 18 tools
Each tool targets a distinct resource and action: file read/write/list/upload/download, job status/output/list/kill, log tail/search, and system snapshot/audit/disk/service checks are clearly separated. Cross-references such as ssh_file_read vs ssh_download and ssh_snapshot vs ssh_audit_baseline reinforce rather than blur the boundaries. ssh_exec is explicitly positioned as a last-resort generic tool, reducing overlap.
All tools share the ssh_ prefix and snake_case, and most follow a domain_action pattern like ssh_file_read, ssh_job_status, and ssh_log_search. A few one-offs such as ssh_snapshot, ssh_monitor, ssh_upload, and ssh_audit_baseline break the otherwise predictable pattern, though they remain readable and recognizable.
At 18 tools, the set is slightly above the typical 3-15 range, but it covers a broad SSH operations domain: execution, files, transfers, detached jobs, logs, monitoring, TLS, disk, and services. Each tool has a distinct role and none feels redundant, so the count is reasonable for the stated scope.
The tool surface covers the main workflows: command execution, file read/write/list/transfer, detached job lifecycle, log tailing/searching, and system/health inspection. Obvious gaps like a dedicated file delete or service start/stop are absent, but ssh_exec provides a universal fallback, so agents can work around those missing operations.
Maintenance
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